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   i 
Thesis	  summary	  
One	  of	  the	  most	  significant	  roles	  of	  the	  EU	  in	  the	  world	  is	  that	  of	  being	  a	  norms	  exporter.	  
The	  EU	  has	  concluded	  numerous	  agreements	  with	  countries	   in	   its	  neighbourhood	  with	  
the	  aim	  of	  encouraging	  third	  countries	  to	  adopt	  EU	  acquis	   in	  exchange	  for	  access	  to	  the	  
internal	   market.	   The	   most	   ambitious	   of	   these	   agreements	   are	   the	   three	   multilateral	  
agreements	   establishing	   the	  European	  Economic	  Area,	   the	  Energy	  Community	   and	   the	  
European	  Common	  Aviation	  Area,	  respectively.	  The	  common	  feature	  of	  these	  agreements	  
is	   the	   aim	  of	   extending	   to	   third	   countries	   either	   the	  entire	   internal	  market	  or	   a	   sector	  
thereof.	   Achieving	   this	   objective	   is,	   however,	   challenged	   by	   the	   difficulty	   of	  
circumscribing	  precisely	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  internal	  market	  and	  delimiting	  it	  from	  other	  EU	  
policies,	  the	  sui	  generis	  nature	  of	  the	  EU	  legal	  order	  and	  the	  proclaimed	  need	  to	  protect	  
its	   autonomy.	  An	   analysis	   of	   the	   concept	   of	   the	   internal	  market,	   the	  EU’s	   foundational	  
principles	   and	   the	   institutions	   and	   procedures	   in	   place	   in	   the	   EU	   and	   in	   the	   three	  
agreements	   for	   achieving	   and	  maintaining	   homogeneity	   within	   the	   expanded	   internal	  
market	   reveals	   that	   it	   is,	   indeed,	   possible	   to	   extend	   the	   internal	   market	   to	   third	  
countries.	  However,	   the	   level	  of	  homogeneity	   in	   the	  expanded	  market	  depends	  heavily	  
on	   the	   goodwill	   of	   third	   country	   decision-­‐makers,	   national	   administrators	   and,	  
especially,	  courts	  to	  adopt	  and	  give	  the	  same	  effect	  to	  rules	  of	  EU	  origin	  outside	  the	  EU	  as	  
within	  the	  Union.	  The	  objective	  of	  full	  homogeneity	  within	  an	  expanded	  internal	  market	  
inevitably	   requires	   a	   certain	   transfer	   of	   supranational	   characteristics	   also	   to	   the	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Chapter	  1	   Introduction	  
1	  Introduction	  
The	  competitive	  position	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  (EU)	  in	  the	  world	  depends	  not	  only	  on	  
pure	  economic	  (trade)	  power	  but	  also	  the	  regulatory	  impact	  of	  the	  Union	  which	  is	  ever	  
increasing.	   The	   EU’s	   regulatory	   influence	   includes	   both	   participation	   in	   multilateral	  
bodies	   that	   create	   global	   rules,	   standards	   and	   practices	   as	   well	   as	   spreading	   its	   own	  
norms	  and	  values	  in	  exchange	  for	  access	  to	  the	  internal	  market.1	  The	  latter	  phenomenon	  
of	   integration	   through	   EU	   acquis	   is	   most	   visible	   in	   the	   EU’s	   neighbourhood	   and	  
exemplified	  by	  an	  array	  of	  regulatory	  tools	  varying	  in	  form	  and	  intensity.	  	  
The	   integration	  of	   third	   countries	   into	   the	  EU’s	   internal	  market	  has	   several	  objectives,	  
ranging	   from	   economic	   development	   of	   the	   neighbouring	   regions	   and	   of	   the	   EU	   to	  
coordinated	  responses	   to	  mutual	   threats	  and	  challenges.	   It	   is	  a	  challenge	   for	   the	  EU	   to	  
integrate	  neighbouring	   countries	   and	   respond	   to	   their	   interests	  while	  bearing	   in	  mind	  
those	   of	   its	   own.2	   The	  Union’s	   reasons	   to	   expand	   its	  acquis	   to	   non-­‐Member	   States	   are	  
largely	  twofold:	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  regulatory	  approximation	  between	  the	  EU	  and	  the	  third	  
countries’	   legal	  orders	   increases	  political	  and	  economic	  stability	   in	   the	  EU’s	   immediate	  
neighbourhood;	  on	   the	  other	  hand,	   the	  acquis	   serves	   to	  help	  non-­‐member	  states	   reach	  
internal	  policy	  goals	  which	  are	  beneficial	  also	  for	  the	  EU.3	  The	  latter	  holds	  true	  especially	  
for	  those	  states	  that	  are	  currently	  in	  a	  modernisation	  or	  transitional	  phase,	  such	  as	  the	  
countries	   of	   the	   former	   Soviet	   Union.	   Furthermore,	   providing	   third	   countries	   an	  
alternative	   to	   membership	   in	   the	   form	   of	   access	   to	   the	   internal	   market	   coupled	   with	  
                                            
1	   See	   further:	  M	  Cremona,	   'The	  Union	   as	   a	   global	   actor:	  Roles,	  models	   and	   identity'	   (2004)	  41	  Common	  
Market	   Law	   Review	   553.	   On	   the	   external	   dimension	   of	   the	   internal	   market	   see	   also	   Commission,	   ‘The	  
External	   Dimension	   of	   the	   Single	   Market	   Review’	   (Staff	   Working	   Document)	   SEC	   (2007)	   1519;	  
Commission,	  ‘A	  single	  market	  for	  21st	  century	  Europe’	  (Communication)	  COM	  (2007)	  724	  final.	  
2	   M	   Cremona,	   'The	   European	   Neighbourhood	   Policy:	   More	   than	   a	   Partnership?'	   in	   M	   Cremona	   (ed),	  
Developments	  in	  EU	  External	  Relations	  Law	  (Oxford	  University	  Press	  2008)	  244,	  245.	  
3	  S	  Lavenex,	  'EU	  external	  governance	  in	  'wider	  Europe''	  (2004)	  11	  Journal	  of	  European	  Public	  Policy	  680,	  
694.	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financial	  and	  technical	  aid	  instead	  of	  a	  broad	  enlargement	  strategy	  is	  a	  possible	  means	  of	  
dealing	  with	  the	  problem	  of	  accession	  capacity.4	  	  
The	   depth	   of	   cooperation	   varies	   considerably	   in	   each	   individual	   case	   according	   to	   the	  
regions	  and	  individual	  countries	  involved	  as	  well	  as	  the	  types	  of	  legal	  instruments	  used.	  
A	  certain	  group	  of	  international	  agreements	  employed	  for	  regulatory	  cooperation	  share	  
the	  special	  feature	  of	  exporting	  to	  third	  countries	  EU	  norms,	  policies	  and/or	  institutions.	  
The	  scope	  of	  the	  acquis	  and	  the	  depth	  of	  integration	  envisaged	  in	  each	  agreement	  are	  not	  
identical	   but	   depend	  on	   a	   number	   of	   factors,	   such	   as	   the	   broader	   political	   aims	   of	   the	  
general	  framework	  or	  programme	  into	  which	  the	  agreement	  belongs,	  the	  specific	  aim	  of	  
the	   particular	   agreement,	   the	   geographical	   proximity	   of	   the	   contracting	   parties,	   the	  
economic	  situation	  of	  the	  third	  country,	  and	  the	  latter’s	  prospect	  of	  and	  attitude	  towards	  
EU	  membership.	  	  
Differently	   from	   the	   enlargement	   process,	   agreements	   that	   envisage	   legal	  
approximation5	  between	  the	  EU	  and	  neighbouring	  countries	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  EU	  acquis	  do	  
not	   target	   total	   regulatory	   convergence	   to	   the	   extent	   of	   the	   entire	   body	   of	   EU	   acquis.	  
Most	  often	  the	  norms	  export	  only	  concerns	  the	  acquis	  of	  the	  internal	  market	  and	  is,	  thus,	  
directly	  connected	  to	  granting	  third	  countries	  market	  access	  in	  the	  EU.	  Furthermore,	  in	  
some	   instances	   the	   process	   of	   regulatory	   approximation	   is	   based	   primarily	   on	  
international	  or	  bilateral	  norms,6	  in	  other	  cases	  complete	  legal	  homogeneity	  on	  the	  basis	  
of	  internal	  market	  acquis	  is	  sought	  between	  the	  EU	  and	  the	  third	  countries.	  The	  evolution	  
of	   the	   role	  of	   internal	  market	  acquis	   in	   the	  EU’s	   external	   relations	   is	  one	  of	  deepening	  
and	  broadening	  towards	  a	  common	  set	  of	  rules,	  featuring	  a	  variety	  of	  policy	  frameworks,	  
types	  of	  agreements	  and	  objectives	  in	  terms	  of	  future	  EU	  membership.	  	  
                                            
4	  The	  former	  President	  of	  the	  European	  Commission	  Romano	  Prodi	  suggested	  as	  a	  solution	  the	  creation	  of	  
a	   Common	   European	   Economic	   Space	   based	   on	   ‘sharing	   everything	   with	   the	   Union	   but	   institutions’:	   R	  
Prodi,	   ‘A	  Wider	  Europe	  –	  A	  Proximity	  Policy	  as	  the	  key	  to	  stability’,	  speech	  held	  at	  the	  Sixth	  ECSA-­‐World	  
Conference	   ‘Peace,	   Security	   And	   Stability	   International	   Dialogue	   and	   the	   Role	   of	   the	   EU’,	   Brussels,	   5-­‐6	  
December	  2002,	  SPEECH/02/619.	  
5	   In	  the	  context	  of	  EU	  external	  relations	  the	  term	  refers	  to	  alignment	  with	  EU	  law	  rather	  than	   legislative	  
harmonisation	   involving	  the	  participation	  of	   the	  Member	  States.	  See	  M	  Cremona,	   'The	  New	  Associations:	  
Substantive	   Issues	   of	   the	   Europe	   Agreements	   with	   the	   Central	   and	   Eastern	   European	   States'	   in	   SV	  
Konstadinidis	   (ed),	   The	   Legal	   Regulation	   of	   the	   European	   Community's	   External	   Relations	   after	   the	  
Completion	  of	  the	  Internal	  Market	  (Dartmouth	  1996)	  141,	  154.	  
6	  E	  Barbé	  and	  others,	  'Drawing	  the	  Neighbours	  Closer…	  to	  What?'	  (2009)	  44	  Cooperation	  and	  Conflict	  378.	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The	  practice	  of	  exporting	  internal	  market	  acquis	  to	  third	  states	  and,	  especially,	  the	  aim	  of	  
thereby	  extending	  the	  internal	  market	  to	  third	  countries	  is	  an	  important	  part	  of	  the	  EU’s	  
external	  action	  and,	  in	  fact,	  the	  most	  extreme	  case	  in	  terms	  of	  legal	  integration.	  From	  the	  
perspective	   of	   EU	   constitutional	   law,	   the	   phenomenon	   raises	   a	   set	   of	   questions	  
pertaining	   to	   the	  nature	  of	   the	   internal	  market	   and	   the	  EU	   legal	   order	   and	   the	  overall	  
‘expandability’	  of	   the	   internal	  market	  separate	   from	  the	  EU’s	  enlargement	  process.	  The	  
following	   analysis	   serves	   to	   illustrate	   the	   emergence	   in	   the	  EU’s	   external	   action	  of	   the	  
practice	   of	   extending	   the	   internal	  market	   to	   the	   neighbourhood	   countries	   through	   the	  
prism	   of	   the	   different	   roles	   played	   by	   the	   internal	  market	   acquis	   in	   the	   EU’s	   external	  
relations.	  
2	  The	  evolving	  role	  of	  internal	  market	  acquis	  in	  EU	  external	  relations	  
Close	  regulatory	  cooperation	  between	  the	  EU	  and	  its	  neighbouring	  countries	  dates	  back	  
to	  the	  early	  days	  of	  the	  European	  Communities.	  The	  first	  Association	  Agreements	  were	  
signed	   between	   the	   European	   Economic	   Community	   (EEC)	   and	   Greece	   and	   Turkey	  
already	  in	  1961	  and	  1963,	  respectively.7	  During	  the	  next	  50	  years,	  the	  EU	  has	  concluded	  
numerous	   association,	   cooperation,	   and	   partnership	   agreements	   with	   its	   closer	   and	  
more	  distant	  neighbours.	  Today,	  every	  country	   in	   the	  EU’s	  neighbourhood	  –	  a	  notional	  
area	   that	   exceeds	   the	   geographical	   borders	   of	   Europe	   and	   includes	   the	  Mediterranean	  
and	   the	  Caucasus	   regions	   –	  has	   entered	   into	   formalised	   relations	  with	   the	  EU	   through	  
one	  or	  more	  bilateral	  or	  multilateral	  agreements.	  
The	  agreements	  concluded	  between	  the	  EU	  and	  the	  neighbouring	  countries	  vary	  in	  terms	  
of	   the	   broader	   political	   context,	   their	   particular	   aims	   and	   the	   scope	   of	   EU	   acquis	  
contained	  therein.	  The	  agreements	  are	  concluded	  on	  a	  variety	  of	  different	  legal	  bases	  and	  
envisage	  different	   levels	   and	   forms	  of	   political,	   economic	   and	   legal	   cooperation.	   There	  
are	   three	   broad	   categories	   of	   agreements	  which	   export	   EU	  acquis	   to	   the	   neighbouring	  
countries:	  association	  agreements;	  Partnership	  and	  Cooperation	  Agreements	  (PCAs)	  and	  
                                            
7	  Agreement	  establishing	  an	  association	  between	  the	  European	  Economic	  Community	  and	  Greece	  [1963]	  
OJ	   L26/294;	   Agreement	   establishing	   an	   association	   between	   the	   European	   Economic	   Community	   and	  
Turkey	  [1964]	  OJ	  L217/3685	  (EEC-­‐Turkey	  Association	  Agreement).	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other	   agreements	   belonging	   to	   the	   European	   Neighbourhood	   Policy	   (ENP);	   and	  
multilateral	  sectoral	  agreements.	  	  
The	   majority	   of	   association	   and	   partnership	   agreements	   form	   part	   of	   broader	   policy	  
frameworks,	  such	  as	  the	  Europe	  Agreements	  (EAs)	  or	  the	  Stabilisation	  and	  Association	  
Process	   (SAP).	   Next	   to	   these	   ‘macro-­‐policies’,	   however,	   regulatory	   approximation	   also	  
takes	   place	   on	   the	   level	   of	   ‘meso-­‐policies’	   that	   concern	   the	   external	   dimension	   of	  
developments	  within	  the	  internal	  market.8	  Five	  principal	  functions	  of	  the	  internal	  market	  
acquis	   in	  the	  EU’s	  relations	  with	  the	  neighbourhood	  can	  be	  distilled	  on	  the	  basis	  of	   the	  
aims	   and	   scope	   of	   the	   agreements	   as	   regards	   legal	   approximation	   with	   the	   internal	  
market.	   These	   five	   functions	   include	   the	   gradual	   integration	   of	   non-­‐member	   countries	  
into	   the	   wider	   area	   of	   cooperation	   in	   Europe;	   liberalisation	   of	   trade	   in	   the	   form	   of	  
establishing	  a	  free	  trade	  area	  or	  customs	  union;	  preparing	  potential	  candidate	  countries	  
for	  membership	  in	  the	  EU;	  integrating	  third	  countries	  into	  the	  internal	  market;	  and	  as	  a	  
limited	   version	   of	   the	   latter,	   integrating	   non-­‐member	   countries	   into	   a	   sector	   of	   the	  
internal	  market.	  The	   same	   third	   country	  may	  have	   concluded	  with	   the	  EU	  agreements	  
that	  envisage	  different	  roles	  of	  the	  acquis,	  such	  as	  deep	  sectoral	  integration	  in	  addition	  to	  
an	  association	  agreement	  with	  very	  limited	  scope	  for	  internal	  market	  acquis.	  In	  the	  same	  
agreement,	   too,	   the	  acquis	  may	   assume	   different	   roles.	   A	   generally	   noticeable	   trend	   is	  
towards	   greater	   integration	   through	   deeper	   and	   more	   legally	   binding	   forms	   of	  
regulatory	  cooperation	  over	  time	  and	  across	  individual	  countries	  and	  regions.	  
2.1	  Gradual	  integration	  of	  third	  countries	  into	  the	  wider	  area	  of	  cooperation	  in	  
Europe	  	  
The	   loosest	   connection	   between	   a	   third	   country	   and	   the	   single	   market	   acquis	   is	  
represented	   by	   the	   model	   of	   cooperation	   between	   the	   EU	   and	   non-­‐Member	   States	  
without	  directly	  integrating	  the	  latter	  into	  the	  internal	  market.	  Such	  cooperation	  mainly	  
takes	  place	  in	  the	  framework	  of	  PCAs	  and	  Euro-­‐Mediterranean	  Association	  Agreements	  
(EMAAs)9	  but	  includes	  also	  the	  ENP,	  the	  EU-­‐Russia	  Legal	  Spaces,	  the	  Eastern	  Partnership	  
                                            
8	   	   S	   Lavenex,	  D	  Lehmkuhl	   and	  N	  Wichmann,	   'Modes	  of	   external	   governance:	   a	   cross-­‐national	   and	   cross-­‐
sectoral	  comparison'	  (2009)	  16	  Journal	  of	  European	  Public	  Policy	  813,	  814.	  	  
9	  The	  EU-­‐Israel	  relationship	  is	  exceptional	  in	  this	  regard.	  Free	  trade	  between	  the	  EU	  and	  Israel	  in	  industrial	  
products	  has	  been	   in	  place	   since	   the	  1975	  Agreement	  between	   the	  European	  Economic	  Community	  and	  
the	  State	  of	  Israel	  [1975]	  OJ	  L136/3.	  The	  EC-­‐Israel	  EMAA	  aims	  to	   ‘reinforce’	  the	  existing	  FTA:	  see	  Article	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and	  the	  Union	  for	  the	  Mediterranean.	  The	  latter	  four	  programmes	  do	  not	  impose	  specific	  
obligations	   of	   approximation	   with	   EU	   acquis	   but	   instead	   endeavour	   to	   intensify	  
cooperation	   already	   started	   by	   the	   conclusion	   of	   the	   PCAs	   and	   EMAAs.	   In	   all	   of	   these	  
frameworks,	   approximation	   frequently	   takes	   place	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   international	  
conventions10	  and	  World	  Trade	  Organisation	  (WTO)	  law11	  instead	  of	  EU	  acquis.	  In	  these	  
frameworks,	   therefore,	   speaking	   of	   a	   function	   of	   internal	   market	   acquis	   is	   often	   only	  
notional.	  	  
PCAs	   form	   a	   large	   category	   of	   agreements.	   The	   legal	   bases	   for	   concluding	   partnership	  
agreements	   are	   Article	   212	   Treaty	   on	   the	   Functioning	   of	   the	   European	  Union	   (TFEU),	  
which	   provides	   for	   ‘economic,	   financial	   and	   technical	   cooperation	  measures,	   including	  
assistance,	  in	  particular	  financial	  assistance,	  with	  third	  countries	  other	  than	  developing	  
countries’,	   and	   Article	   209	   TFEU	   providing	   for	   the	   conclusion	   of	   agreements	   on	  
development	   cooperation.	   Less	   elaborate	   in	   set-­‐up	   than	   association	   agreements,	  
partnership	   agreements	   neither	   aim	   at	   setting	   up	   common	   institutions	   nor	   prepare	  
potential	  candidates	  for	  EU	  membership.	  	  
In	   the	   beginning	   of	   the	   1990s,	   the	   EU	   concluded	   PCAs	   with	   the	   former	   Soviet	   Union	  
countries	  with	  the	  exception	  of	  the	  Baltic	  States.	  At	  the	  time	  there	  was	  no	  separate	  legal	  
basis	  for	  this	  type	  of	  agreements	  and	  instead	  a	  combination	  of	  the	  Common	  Commercial	  
Policy	   (CCP)	   provision	   Article	   133	   EC	   Treaty	   (now	   Article	   207	   TFEU)	   and	   sectoral	  
provisions	  was	  used.12	  
In	  2004,	  the	  ENP	  was	  launched	  as	  a	  framework	  for	  the	  relations	  between	  the	  EU	  and	  the	  
southern	  and	  eastern	  neighbouring	  countries.	  Implicitly,	  the	  ENP	  provides	  an	  alternative	  
to	   EU	   membership	   for	   countries	   in	   the	   EU’s	   neighbourhood	   that	   generally	   lack	   a	  
                                            
6(1)	   of	   the	   Euro-­‐Mediterranean	   Agreement	   establishing	   an	   association	   between	   the	   European	  
Communities	  and	  their	  Member	  States,	  of	  the	  one	  part,	  and	  the	  State	  of	  Israel,	  of	  the	  other	  part	  [2000]	  OJ	  
L147/3.	  Pursuant	  to	  Article	  1(2)	  of	  the	  EC-­‐Israel	  EMAA,	  the	  specific	  aim	  of	  the	  agreement	  is	  the	  setting	  up	  
of	   political	   dialogue	   and	   the	   expansion	   of	   trade	   in	   goods	   and	   services,	   the	   liberalisation	   of	   the	   right	   of	  
establishment	   and	   of	   public	   procurement,	   the	   free	   movement	   of	   capital	   and	   the	   intensification	   of	  
cooperation	  in	  science	  and	  technology.	  	  
10	   Article	   2	   of	   Annex	   10	   to	   the	   Agreement	   on	   partnership	   and	   cooperation	   establishing	   a	   partnership	  
between	  the	  European	  Communities	  and	  their	  Member	  States,	  of	  one	  part,	  and	  the	  Russian	  Federation,	  of	  
the	  other	  part	  [1997]	  OJ	  L327/3	  (EC-­‐Russia	  PCA).	  
11	  See,	  for	  example,	  Articles	  10(1),	  28(1)	  and	  36	  EC-­‐Russia	  PCA.	  	  
12	  The	  legal	  bases	  for	  concluding	  the	  EC-­‐Russia	  PCA	  were	  Article	  101	  European	  Atomic	  Energy	  Community	  
(EAEC)	  Treaty,	  Articles	  57,	  54,	  235,	  113,	  100,	  99,	  84,	  75,	  66	  EC	  Treaty,	  Article	  95	  European	  Coal	  and	  Steel	  
Community	  (ECSC)	  Treaty.	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membership	   prospect	   and	   aims	   at	   avoiding	   dividing	   lines	   between	   an	   integrated	   and	  
integrating	   Europe	   and	   its	   further	   neighbours.	   The	   ENP	   also	   offers	   third	   countries	   ‘a	  
stake	   in	   the	   EU’s	   Internal	   Market	   and	   the	   promotion	   of	   the	   four	   freedoms’	   for	   the	  
purpose	  of	  achieving	   the	  primary	  aim	  of	   the	  ENP	  –	   security	   coupled	  with	   stability	  and	  
prosperity.13	  Wishing	   to	   communicate	  with	   the	  EU	  on	   a	  more	   equal	   level	   than	  what	   it	  
considers	  the	  ENP	  to	  be,	  Russia	  does	  not	  participate	   in	  the	  ENP.	   Instead,	   in	  addition	  to	  
the	  1997	  PCA	  and	  a	  number	  of	  sectoral	  agreements,	  EU-­‐Russia	  relations	  are	  governed	  by	  
the	  Four	  EU-­‐Russia	  Common	  Spaces	  on	  economic	  affairs,	  area	  of	   freedom,	  security	  and	  
justice	  (AFSJ),	  external	  security,	  and	  research,	  education	  and	  culture;	  and	  the	  EU-­‐Russia	  
Partnership	   for	   Modernization	   (P4M)	   which	   builds	   on	   the	   Four	   Common	   Spaces.14	   In	  
2008,	  negotiations	  on	  a	  new	  agreement	  to	  replace	  the	  PCA	  were	  launched	  but	  have	  been	  
suspended.	  	  
In	  spite	  of	  the	  PCAs	  exporting	  some	  acquis	  and	  the	  acquis	  in	  some	  occasions	  resulting	  in	  
granting	  third	  country	  nationals	  equal	  treatment	  with	  EU	  citizens,	  the	  soft	  nature	  of	  the	  
majority	  of	  obligations	  arising	  from	  PCAs	  reveals	  the	  flexibility	  of	  the	  agreements	  and	  the	  
absence	   of	   a	   deep	   integration	   perspective	   between	   the	   EU	   and	   the	   PCA	   countries	   as	  
compared	   to	   other	   agreements	   discussed	  below,	   such	   as	   the	  European	  Economic	  Area	  
(EEA)	   Agreement.	   The	   objectives	   of	   the	   PCA	   concluded	   between	   the	   European	  
Community	  (EC)	  and	  Russia,	   for	  example,	  are	  political	  dialogue,	  the	  promotion	  of	  trade	  
and	   investment,	   the	   strengthening	   of	   political	   and	   economic	   freedoms,	   providing	   an	  
‘appropriate	  framework	  for	  the	  gradual	  integration	  between	  Russia	  and	  a	  wider	  area	  of	  
cooperation	   in	   Europe’,	   and	   the	   creation	   of	   necessary	   conditions	   for	   the	   future	  
establishment	   of	   a	   free	   trade	   agreement	   (FTA)	   including	   the	   four	   internal	   market	  
freedoms	   and	   the	   freedom	   of	   establishment	   except	   for	   the	   most	   sensitive,	   the	   free	  
movement	  of	  persons.15	  The	  PCA	  does	  not	  grant	  Russia	  access	  to	  the	  internal	  market	  nor	  
                                            
13	  Commission,	   ‘Wider	  Europe	  —	  Neighbourhood:	  A	  New	  Framework	  for	  Relations	  with	  our	  Eastern	  and	  
Southern	  Neighbours’	  (Communication)	  COM	  (2003)	  104	  final,	  4.	  
14	  Council,	  ‘Joint	  Statement	  on	  the	  Partnership	  for	  Modernisation	  –	  25th	  EU-­‐Russia	  Summit,	  Rostov-­‐on-­‐Don,	  
31	  May-­‐1	  June	  2010’	  (Press	  Release)	  10546/10,	  1	  June	  2010.	  
15	  Article	  1	  EC-­‐Russia	  PCA.	  Russia	  was,	  in	  fact,	  aiming	  for	  the	  PCA	  to	  become	  something	  similar	  to	  the	  EAs	  
but	  the	  EC	  was	  reluctant	  to	  establish	  such	  close	  cooperation	  with	  an	  at	  the	  time	  rather	  unstable	  country	  
that	  was,	  moreover,	  in	  a	  complicated	  geopolitical	  situation:	  M	  Maresceau	  and	  E	  Montaguti,	   'The	  relations	  
between	   the	   European	   Union	   and	   Central	   and	   Eastern	   Europe:	   A	   legal	   appraisal'	   (1995)	   32	   Common	  
Market	  Law	  Review	  1327,	  1339;	  Y	  Borko,	  'The	  New	  Intra-­‐European	  Relations	  and	  Russia'	  in	  M	  Maresceau	  
(ed),	  Enlarging	  the	  European	  Union	  (Longman	  1997)	  376,	  384.	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does	   it	   establish	   an	   FTA.	   The	   latter	   is	   to	   be	   concluded	   separately,16	   taking	   into	  
consideration,	  among	  others,	  Russia’s	  accession	  to	  the	  WTO	  in	  2012.	  	  
In	  2009,	  the	  EU	  launched	  the	  Eastern	  Partnership	  as	  a	  special	  eastern	  dimension	  of	  the	  
ENP,	   supporting	   the	  political	  and	  socio-­‐economic	   reforms	  of	   the	  partner	  countries	  and	  
facilitating	  approximation	  with	  EU	  acquis.	  The	  outdated	  PCAs	  will	  soon	  be	  replaced	  with	  
new	   association	   agreements	   that	   include	   Deep	   and	   Comprehensive	   Free	   Trade	  
Agreements	  (DCFTAs).	  The	  new	  integration	  approach	  in	  the	  Eastern	  Partnership	  is	  two-­‐
dimensional.	   The	   DCFTAs	   envisage	   multilateral	   cooperation	   through	   approximating	  
third	  countries’	   legal	  systems	  with	  EU	  acquis	  and	  provide	  for	  third	  countries	  entry	  into	  
the	   EU’s	   internal	   market	   as	   well	   as	   lead	   to	   increased	   competition	   within	   the	  
neighbourhood.	  The	  new	  association	  agreements	  coupled	  with	  DCFTAs	  were	  signed	  with	  
Georgia,	   Moldova	   and	   Ukraine	   in	   2014.	   Negotiations	   with	   Azerbaijan	   are	   currently	  
ongoing.	  Negotiations	  with	  Armenia	  were	  finished	  but	  the	  agreement	  was	  not	  initialled	  
or	  signed	  because	  of	  Armenia’s	  plans	  to	  join	  the	  Russian-­‐led	  Customs	  Union	  the	  customs	  
provisions	  of	  which	  are	  incompatible	  with	  those	  of	  the	  envisaged	  DCFTA.	  
Following	   some	   initial	   agreements	   concluded	  between	   the	  EEC	  and	   the	  Mediterranean	  
countries	   in	   the	   1960’s	   and	   70’,	   cooperation	   between	   the	   EU	   and	   the	   southern	  
Mediterranean	   countries	   was	   revived	   in	   1995	   within	   the	   framework	   of	   the	   Euro-­‐
Mediterranean	   Partnership	   (‘Barcelona	   Process’).17	   Subsequently,	   EMAAs	   were	  
concluded	  with	  all	  of	  the	  participants	  of	  the	  Euro-­‐Mediterranean	  Partnership,	  except	  for	  
Syria.	   The	   level	   of	   ‘association’	   envisaged	   by	   the	   EMAAs	   does	   not	   differ	   considerably	  
from	  the	  PCAs	  despite	  them	  being	  FTAs.	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  agreements	  were	  
concluded	  as	  association	  agreements	  suggests	  the	  diversity	  among	  the	  latter	  rather	  than	  
the	  depth	  of	  the	  EU’s	  relations	  with	  the	  southern	  Mediterranean	  countries	  as	  compared	  
to	  PCAs	  in	  the	  eastern	  neighbourhood.	  	  
In	  2008,	  similarly	   to	   the	  Eastern	  Partnership	   for	   the	  eastern	  European	  neighbourhood,	  
the	   Union	   for	   the	   Mediterranean	   was	   initiated	   to	   complement	   the	   existing	   bilateral	  
                                            
16	  Article	  3	  EC-­‐Russia	  PCA.	  
17	   Barcelona	   Declaration	   adopted	   at	   the	   Euro-­‐Mediterranean	   Conference,	   Barcelona,	   27-­‐28	   November	  
1995.	  The	  founding	  members	  were	  the	  EC,	  Algeria,	  Egypt,	  Israel,	  Jordan,	  Lebanon,	  Morocco,	  the	  Palestinian	  
Authority,	  Syria,	  Tunisia	  and	  Turkey.	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agreements.18	  The	  specific	  objective	  of	   the	  Union	   for	   the	  Mediterranean	   is	   to	   liberalise	  
trade	  in	  two	  dimensions	  –	  bilaterally	  between	  the	  EU	  and	  the	  Mediterranean	  countries,	  
and	  multilaterally	  among	  all	  of	  the	  Mediterranean	  countries.	  The	  future	  perspective	  for	  
the	   Union	   for	   the	   Mediterranean	   is	   proclaimed	   in	   the	   Euro-­‐Mediterranean	   Trade	  
Roadmap	  beyond	  2010,	  which	  seeks	  to	  replace	  the	  existing	  association	  agreements	  and	  
South-­‐South	  Agreements	  with	  DCFTAs.19	  	  
Contrary	   to	   other	   association	   agreements,	   EMAAs	   do	   not	   endeavour	   to	   integrate	   the	  
southern	   Mediterranean	   countries	   into	   the	   Union.	   The	   objectives	   of	   the	   EC-­‐Algeria	  
EMAA,	   for	   example,	   are	   political	   dialogue,	   regional	   cooperation	   and	   the	   promotion	   of	  
trade,	  and	  the	  establishment	  of	  conditions	  for	  the	  gradual	  liberalisation	  of	  trade	  in	  goods,	  
services	  and	  capital.20	  None	  of	  these	  aims	  is	  particularly	  ambitious.	  Trade	  liberalisation	  
is	  to	  take	  place	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  WTO	  rules,21	  although	  in	  standardisation	  and	  conformity	  
assessment	   the	   use	   of	   EU	   standards	   is	   encouraged.22	   The	   lack	   of	   a	   membership	  
perspective	  due	  to	  the	  southern	  Mediterranean	  countries’	  geographical	  location,	  as	  well	  
as	  the	  poor	  economic	  and	  turbulent	  political	  situations	   in	  most	  countries	  of	  the	  region,	  
lead	  to	  a	  very	  low	  scale	  of	  alignment	  with	  EU	  acquis.	  The	  state	  of	  affairs	  may,	  however,	  
change	  with	  the	  adoption	  of	  the	  new	  DCFTAs.	  
2.2	  Trade	  liberalisation	  through	  establishing	  an	  FTA	  or	  customs	  union	  	  
In	   addition	   to	   integration	   into	   a	   broader	   area	   of	   cooperation	   in	   Europe	   the	   internal	  
market	  acquis	  also	  has	  a	  role	  in	  liberalising	  trade	  by	  means	  of	  an	  FTA	  or	  customs	  union.	  
Examples	   include,	   for	   instance,	   the	   EEC-­‐Turkey	   Association	   Agreement,	   the	   EAs	   and	  
Stabilisation	  and	  Association	  Agreements	  (SAAs)	  –	  instruments	  of	  the	  SAP.	  In	  principle,	  
the	  new	  association	  agreements	  and	  DCFTAs	  concluded	  in	  the	  framework	  of	  the	  Eastern	  
Partnership	  also	  belong	  to	  this	  category.	  
                                            
18	   Council,	   ‘Joint	  Declaration	  of	   the	  Paris	   Summit	   for	   the	  Mediterranean	   –	  13	   July	   2008’	   (Press	  Release)	  
11887/08,	  15	  July	  2008,	  para	  13.	  The	  founding	  members	  were	  the	  EU27	  and	  Albania,	  Algeria,	  Bosnia	  and	  
Herzegovina,	   Croatia,	   Egypt,	   Israel,	   Jordan,	   Lebanon,	   Mauritania,	   Monaco,	   Montenegro,	   Morocco,	   the	  
Palestinian	  Authority,	  Syria,	  Tunisia	  and	  Turkey.	  
19	   ‘Conclusions	   of	   the	   8th	   Union	   for	   the	   Mediterranean	   Trade	   Ministerial	   Conference	   –	   Brussels,	   9	  
December	  2009’	  (Press	  Release)	  MEMO/09/547,	  9	  December	  2009.	  
20	  Article	  1(2)	  of	   the	  Euro-­‐Mediterranean	  Agreement	   establishing	   an	  Association	  between	   the	  European	  
Community	  and	  its	  Member	  States,	  of	  the	  one	  part,	  and	  the	  People's	  Democratic	  Republic	  of	  Algeria,	  of	  the	  
other	  part	  [2005]	  OJ	  L265/2.	  For	  the	  exceptional	  case	  of	  the	  EC-­‐Israel	  EMAA	  see	  above	  n	  9.	  
21	  For	  example,	  Articles	  6,	  11,	  30(1),	  42	  EC-­‐Algeria	  EMAA.	  
22	  Article	  55	  EC-­‐Algeria	  EMAA.	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The	   legal	  basis	   for	   concluding	  association	  agreements	   is	  Article	  217	  TFEU.	  Association	  
agreements	  may	  have	  any	  of	  the	  four	  main	  objectives:	  preparing	  for	  membership	  in	  the	  
European	  Union,	  offering	  an	  alternative	   to	  membership,	  development	  cooperation,	  and	  
inter-­‐regional	  assistance.23	  The	  common	  feature	  of	  all	  current	  association	  agreements	  is	  
reciprocity,	  especially	  those	  that	  establish	  an	  FTA	  or	  a	  customs	  union	  by	  virtue	  of	  WTO	  
requirements,	  although	  the	  scope	  of	  rights	  and	  obligations	  varies	  from	  one	  agreement	  to	  
another.	  The	  nature	  of	   association	   agreements	  was	   clarified	   in	  Demirel.24	  According	   to	  
the	   Court,	   ‘an	   association	   agreement	   creat[es]	   special,	   privileged	   links	   with	   a	   non-­‐
member	   country	  which	  must,	   at	   least	   to	   a	   certain	   extent,	   take	   part	   in	   the	   Community	  
system’.25	  The	  precise	  character	  of	  these	  ‘special,	  privileged	  links’	  is	  not	  specified	  in	  the	  
judgment	  but	  in	  practice	  the	  reciprocal	  rights	  and	  obligations	  in	  association	  agreements	  
concluded	   with	   the	   neighbouring	   countries	   most	   often	   include	   the	   third	   countries’	  
adoption	  of	  EU	  acquis,	  or	  accession	  to	  international	  conventions	  in	  exchange	  for	  financial	  
and	  technical	  assistance	  and,	  to	  varying	  degrees,	  access	  to	  the	  internal	  market.	  
One	   of	   the	   earliest	   association	   agreements,	   the	   EEC-­‐Turkey	   Association	   Agreement	  
(‘Ankara	  Agreement’)	  which	  was	  concluded	  in	  1963	  and	  entered	  into	  force	  in	  1964,	  does	  
not	   belong	   to	   any	   other	   overarching	   policy	   agendas.	   The	   objective	   of	   the	   EEC-­‐Turkey	  
Agreement	  is	  to	  promote	  trade	  and	  economic	  relations	  between	  the	  EU	  and	  Turkey,	  and	  
to,	  subsequently,	  create	  a	  customs	  union	  covering	  all	  trade	  in	  goods.26	  The	  specific	  acquis	  
that	  Turkey	  is	  obliged	  to	  adopt	  under	  the	  agreement	  is	  specified	  in	  the	  ensuing	  decisions	  
of	   the	   Association	   Council,27	   which,	   together	   with	   the	   Agreement,	   form	   the	   ‘law	   of	  
association’.28	  The	  specific	  means	   for	  approximation	   include	  the	  adoption	  of	   legislation	  
‘equivalent’	   to	   the	   EU	  acquis	   and	   accession	   to	  multilateral	   conventions	   on	   intellectual,	  
                                            
23	  D	  Hanf	  and	  P	  Dengler,	  'Accords	  d'association'	  (2004)	  College	  of	  Europe	  Research	  Papers	  in	  Law	  2004/1,	  
10-­‐14.	  
24	  Case	  12/86	  Demirel	  [1987]	  ECR	  3719.	  
25	  ibid	  para	  9.	  
26	  Article	  2	  EEC-­‐Turkey	  Association	  Agreement.	  	  
27	   Most	   importantly,	   Decision	   1/95	   of	   the	   EC-­‐Turkey	   Association	   Council	   of	   22	   December	   1995	   on	  
implementing	   the	   final	   phase	   of	   the	   Customs	  Union	   [1996]	  OJ	   L35/1	   (Decision	   1/95);	   and	   a	   number	   of	  
subsequent	  decisions	  of	  the	  EC-­‐Turkey	  Customs	  Cooperation	  Committee	  laying	  down	  the	  detailed	  rules	  for	  
the	  application	  of	  Decision	  1/95.	  
28	   	   E	   Lenski,	   'Turkey	   (including	  Northern	   Cyprus)'	   in	   S	   Blockmans	   and	  A	   Łazowski	   (eds),	   The	   European	  
Union	  and	  Its	  Neighbours:	  A	  legal	  appraisal	  of	  the	  EU's	  policies	  of	  stabilisation,	  partnership	  and	  integration	  
(T.M.C.	  Asser	  Press	  2006)	  283,	  289.	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industrial	   and	   commercial	   property	   rights.29	   Harmonisation,	   however,	   is	   only	   to	   take	  
place	   ‘as	   far	   as	   possible’.	   The	   agreement	   does	   thus	   not	   aim	   for	   complete	   regulatory	  
harmonisation	   with	   EU	   acquis.	   Although	   the	   EU-­‐Turkey	   law	   of	   association	   comprises	  
extensive	  parts	  of	   internal	  market	  acquis	   it	   falls	  short	  of	  all	   four	   free	  movement	  rights.	  
Pursuant	   to	   the	  programmatic	  Article	  12	  of	   the	  EEC-­‐Turkey	  Agreement,30	   for	  example,	  
the	  parties	  are	  to	  progressively	  secure	  the	  free	  movement	  of	  workers.	  To	  this	  date,	  the	  
free	  movement	  of	  workers	  between	  the	  EU	  and	  Turkey	  has	  ‘not	  at	  all’	  been	  realised.31	  	  
In	   the	   1990s,	   the	   EC	   concluded	   almost	   identical	   bilateral	   association	   agreements	   –	  
Europe	  Agreements	  –	  with	  ten	  Central	  and	  Eastern	  European	  Countries	  (CEECs)	  which	  
all	   joined	  the	  EU	  during	  the	  two	  consecutive	  enlargements	  of	  2004	  and	  2007.	  Between	  
2000	  and	  2005,	  SAAs	  were	  concluded	  between	  the	  Community	  and	  six	  Western	  Balkan	  
countries	   Albania,	   Bosnia	   and	   Herzegovina,	   Croatia,	   the	   Former	   Yugoslav	   Republic	   of	  
Macedonia	  (FYROM),	  Montenegro	  and	  Serbia.	  Just	  as	  the	  EAs,	  the	  SAAs,	  too,	  are	  virtually	  
identical	  in	  content.	  	  
The	   explicit	   objective	   of	   the	   EAs	  was	   to	   gradually	   establish	   an	   FTA.32	   The	   agreements	  
provided	   for	   the	   abolishment	   of	   quantitative	   restrictions	   and,	   gradually,	   customs	  
duties,33	   liberalisation	  of	   trade	   in	  most	  areas	  except	   for	  agriculture	  and	  fisheries,34	  and	  
provisions	   on	   the	   movement	   of	   workers,	   capital	   and	   services.	   Eliminating	   unfair	  
competition	   in	   the	   CEECs	   prior	   to	   their	   integration	   into	   the	   internal	   market	   was	   of	  
crucial	   importance.35	  None	  of	  these	  policy	  areas	  enjoyed	  a	  special	  priority	  status.36	  The	  
                                            
29	  Annex	  8	  to	  Decision	  1/95,	  Articles	  2	  and	  3.	  
30	  Case	  12/86	  Demirel	  (n	  24)	  para	  23.	  
31	   Commission,	   ‘Proposal	   for	   a	   Council	   Decision	   on	   the	   position	   to	   be	   taken	   on	   behalf	   of	   the	   European	  
Union	  within	   the	   EEC-­‐Turkey	   Association	   Council	   with	   regard	   to	   the	   provisions	   on	   the	   coordination	   of	  
social	  security	  systems’	  COM	  (2012)	  152	  final,	  6;	  Case	  C-­‐81/13	  United	  Kingdom	  v	  Council	  (Court	  of	  Justice,	  
18	  December	  2014),	  para	  57.	  Moreover,	  the	  opening	  of	  labour	  markets	  has	  been	  stalled	  on	  both	  sides	  and	  
restrictions	  are	   in	  place	  also	   for	  EU	  citizens	   to	  undertake	   labour	  activities	   in	  Turkey:	  Lenski	  (n	  28)	  294-­‐
296.	  	  
32	   Article	   7(1)	   of	   the	   Europe	   Agreement	   establishing	   an	   association	   between	   the	   EC	   and	   their	  Member	  
States,	  and	  Poland	  [1993]	  OJ	  L348/1	  (EC-­‐Poland	  EA).	  	  
33	  Article	  13	  EC-­‐Poland	  EA.	  
34	  Articles	  20(5)	  and	  21(2)	  EC-­‐Poland	  EA.	  Under	  these	  provisions,	  due	  to	  the	  sensitivity	  of	  the	  agriculture	  
and	  fisheries	  policies	  concessions	  will	  be	  made	  gradually	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  negotiations.	  
35	  Commission,	   ‘The	  Europe	  Agreements	  and	  beyond:	  A	  Strategy	  for	  the	  countries	  of	  Central	  and	  Eastern	  
Europe	  for	  Accession’	  (Communication)	  COM	  (94)	  320	  final,	  5.	  
36	   Article	   69	   EC-­‐Poland	   EA	   provides	   that	   the	   approximation	   of	   laws	   shall	   extend	   to	   a	   number	   of	   areas	  
including	   customs	   law,	   company	   law,	   banking	   law,	   company	   accounts	   and	   taxes,	   intellectual	   property,	  
protection	  of	  workers	  at	  the	  workplace,	   financial	  services,	  rules	  on	  competition,	  protection	  of	  health	  and	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EAs	   also	   featured	   a	   strong	   social	   dimension,	   as	  well	   as	   cooperation	   in	   sectors	   such	   as	  
industry,	   investments,	   science	   and	   technology,	   education,	   agriculture,	   energy,	  
environment,	   transport,	   telecommunications,	   financial	   services,	   etc.37	  The	   level	  of	   legal	  
approximation	  between	  the	  EC	  and	  the	  CEECs	  envisaged	  by	  the	  EAs	  was	  very	  different	  
from	  one	  provision	  to	  another.	  While	  the	  rules	  on	  trade	  in	  goods	  and	  on	  competition	  and	  
state	  aid	  of	  the	  EAs	  reflected	  the	  EC	  Treaty	  quite	  exactly,	  the	  rules	  pertaining	  to	  the	  free	  
movement	   of	   persons,	   services,	   capital	   and	   the	   right	   of	   establishment,	   as	   well	   as	  
approximation	  clauses	  differed	  substantially	  from	  the	  EC	  Treaty.38	  	  
The	  SAAs,	  too,	  envisage	  the	  establishment	  of	  an	  FTA	  comprising	  industrial	  products	  and	  
gradual	   market	   opening	   for	   agricultural	   and	   fisheries	   products.	   In	   order	   to	   avoid	  
distortions	   to	   the	   internal	  market	   that	   the	   SAA	   countries	  will	   gradually	   gain	   access	   to,	  
competition	  provisions	  play	  an	  important	  role	  in	  the	  agreements.39	  The	  SAAs	  provide	  for	  
approximation	  with	  the	  fundamental	  elements	  of	  the	  internal	  market	  acquis	  and	  certain	  
key	  policy	  areas.	  They	  include	  provisions	  on	  the	  free	  movement	  of	  workers,	  services,	  and	  
capital	   and	   freedom	   of	   establishment,40	   nevertheless	   subject	   to	   a	   number	   of	  
restrictions.41	  The	  overall	  scope	  of	  the	  acquis	  contained	  in	  the	  SAAs	  is	  comparable	  to	  the	  
EAs.	  	  
2.3	  (Pre-­‐)	  pre-­‐accession	  	  
The	   third	   function	   of	   EU	   acquis	   in	   international	   agreements	   is	   to	   prepare	   potential	  
candidate	   countries	   for	   future	   EU	   candidacy	   status.	   The	   two	   frameworks	   to	   consider	  
                                            
life	  of	  humans,	  animals	  and	  plants,	  consumer	  protection,	   indirect	   taxation,	  technical	  rules	  and	  standards,	  
transport	  and	  the	  environment.	  
37	  Titles	  VI-­‐VIII	  EC-­‐Poland	  EA.	  	  
38	  PC	  Müller-­‐Graff,	   'Legal	  Framework	  for	  Relations	  between	  the	  European	  Union	  and	  Central	  and	  Eastern	  
Europe:	  General	  aspects'	  in	  M	  Maresceau	  (ed),	  Enlarging	  the	  European	  Union	  (Longman	  1997)	  27,	  34.	  An	  
indication	   of	   the	   more	   restricted	   scope	   of	   the	   fundamental	   freedoms	   in	   the	   EAs	   is	   provided	   in	   the	  
agreements	  that	  do	  not	  speak	  of	  the	  ‘free’	  movement	  of	  persons	  and	  ‘freedom	  of	  establishment’	  but	  merely	  
the	  movement	  of	  workers,	  establishment,	  and	  the	  supply	  of	  services:	  M	  Cremona,	  'The	  New	  Associations:	  
Substantive	   Issues	   of	   the	   Europe	   Agreements	   with	   the	   Central	   and	   Eastern	   European	   States'	   in	   S	   V	  
Konstadinidis	   (ed),	   The	   Legal	   Regulation	   of	   the	   European	   Community's	   External	   Relations	   after	   the	  
Completion	  of	  the	  Internal	  Market	  (Dartmouth	  1996)	  141,	  145.	  
39	  Article	  40	  of	   the	  Stabilisation	  and	  Association	  Agreement	  between	  the	  EC	  and	  their	  Member	  States,	  of	  
the	  one	  part,	  and	  the	  Republic	  of	  Albania,	  of	  the	  other	  part	  [2009]	  OJ	  L107/166	  (EC-­‐Albania	  SAA)	  on	  state	  
monopolies,	  Article	  71	  on	  competition	  law,	  Article	  72	  on	  public	  undertakings.	  	  
40	  Title	  V	  EC-­‐Albania	  SAA.	  
41	   These	   restrictions	   primarily	   concern	   the	   free	  movement	   of	  workers.	   See,	   for	   example,	   Article	   47	   EC-­‐
Albania	  SAA.	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here	  are	  the	  same	  as	  in	  the	  previous	  category	  –	  the	  EEC-­‐Turkey	  Association	  Agreement,	  
the	  EAs	  and	  the	  SAAs.	  	  
The	   aims	   and	   contents	   of	   the	   EEC-­‐Turkey	   Association	   Agreement	   together	   with	   the	  
political	   developments	   following	   its	   conclusion	   rather	   convincingly	   demonstrate	   that	  
while	   association	   agreements	   are	   a	   starting	   point	   for	   approximating	   third	   countries’	  
legal	   systems	   with	   the	   EU	   acquis,	   the	   conclusion	   of	   an	   association	   agreement	   is	   not	  
strictly	  connected	  to	   the	   idea	  of	   the	  associated	  country’s	   future	  membership	   in	   the	  EU.	  
Among	   the	  agreements	  discussed	  here,	   the	  EEC-­‐Turkey	  Agreement	   is	   the	  most	  explicit	  
example	  as	  regards	  the	  connection	  between	  a	  third	  country	  adopting	  EU	  acquis	  and	  the	  
same	  country’s	  membership	  prospect.	  Article	  28	  of	  the	  EEC-­‐Turkey	  Agreement	  makes	  a	  
reference	   to	   Turkey’s	   possible	   future	   accession	   to	   the	   Community.42	   At	   the	   Helsinki	  
summit	  in	  1999,	  Turkey	  obtained	  the	  status	  of	  a	  candidate	  country	  and	  started	  accession	  
negotiations	  in	  2005	  as	  a	  result	  of	  which	  Turkey	  is	  now	  adopting	  EU	  acquis	  as	  part	  of	  the	  
pre-­‐accession	   strategy.43	   The	   actual	   accession	   is,	   however,	   not	   to	   happen	   in	   the	   near	  
future.	  	  
The	   EAs,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   were	   initially	   not	   considered	   part	   of	   the	   pre-­‐accession	  
strategy	   but	   rather	   a	   means	   of	   modernisation	   and	   integration	   without	   an	   imminent	  
perspective	  of	  membership.44	  The	  EAs	  demonstrate	  that	  the	  role	  of	  the	  internal	  market	  
acquis	  can	  change	  over	  time	  within	  the	  same	  instrument,	  in	  this	  case	  from	  managing	  the	  
relationship	   between	   the	   EC	   and	   its	   neighbours	   to	   a	   pre-­‐accession	   tool.	   The	   EAs	   had	  
broader	   objectives	   of	   integrating	   the	   CEECs	   into	   the	   internal	   market	   than	   the	   EEC-­‐
Turkey	  Agreement.	  Nevertheless,	  the	  first	  EAs	  contained	  no	  more	  than	  a	  slight	  indication	  
                                            
42	  The	  provision	  reads	  as	  follows:	  ‘As	  soon	  as	  the	  operation	  of	  this	  Agreement	  has	  advanced	  far	  enough	  to	  
justify	   envisaging	   full	   acceptance	  by	  Turkey	   of	   the	   obligations	   arising	   out	   of	   the	  Treaty	   establishing	   the	  
Community,	   the	   Contracting	   Parties	   shall	   examine	   the	   possibility	   of	   the	   accession	   of	   Turkey	   to	   the	  
Community.’	  
43	  Maresceau	   defines,	   despite	   admitting	   the	   difficulty	   thereof,	   pre-­‐accession	   strategies	   as	   ‘EU	   initiatives	  
whereby	  candidate	  countries	  for	  EU	  membership	  are	  brought	  closer	  to	  the	  EU	  in	  political,	  economic,	  and	  
legal	  terms	  so	  that,	  in	  the	  end,	  accession	  is	  not	  too	  abrupt	  for	  both	  the	  candidate	  countries	  and	  the	  EU	  to	  
absorb’:	  M	  Maresceau,	  'Pre-­‐accession'	  in	  M	  Cremona	  (ed),	  The	  Enlargement	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  (Oxford	  
University	  Press	  2003)	  9,	  10.	  
44	  This	  was	  made	  explicit	  by	  the	  Commission:	   ‘[Eventual	  membership]	  is	  not	  among	  the	  objectives	  of	  the	  
[EAs]…[which]	   have	   a	   special	   value	   in	   themselves	   and	   should	   be	   distinguished	   from	   the	   possibility	   of	  
accession	   to	   the	   Community…’,	   Commission,	   ‘Association	   Agreements	   with	   the	   countries	   of	   central	   and	  
eastern	  Europe:	  a	  general	  outline’	  (Communication)	  COM	  (90)	  398,	  3.	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about	   the	  associated	  countries’	  membership	  aspirations	   in	   their	  preambles.45	  Since	   the	  
EC	  failed	  to	  recognise	  the	  CEECs	  as	  potential	  candidates,	  the	  category	  being	  introduced	  
only	   later,	   the	   EAs	   were	   subsequently	   not	   perceived	   as	   tools	   for	   preparing	   future	  
membership	  in	  the	  Community.	  
The	  EU’s	  initial	  careful	  approach	  changed	  after	  the	  1993	  Copenhagen	  European	  Council	  
where	   EU	  membership	  was	   declared	   to	   be	   available	   for	   the	   associated	   CEECs	  who	   so	  
desire	  after	  satisfying	  the	  relevant	  economic	  and	  political	  criteria.46	  The	  1994	  European	  
Council	  at	  Corfu	  included	  the	  EAs	  into	  the	  pre-­‐accession	  strategy	  by	  stating	  that	  the	  full	  
potential	  of	   the	  EAs	  and	  the	  decisions	  taken	  in	  Copenhagen	  in	  1993	  must	  be	   ‘exploited	  
with	   a	   view	   to	   preparing	   for	   accession’.47	   The	   following	   European	   Council	   in	   Essen,	  
furthermore,	   recognised	   the	   preparation	   of	   the	   CEECs	   for	   integration	   into	   the	   internal	  
market	  as	  the	  key	  element	  of	  the	  pre-­‐accession	  strategy.48	  The	  EAs	  concluded	  after	  1994	  
already	   contained	   an	   explicit	   reference	   to	   the	   associated	   countries’	   membership	  
perspectives.49	  The	  later	  EAs	  did	  not	  reflect	  the	  differences	   in	  the	  political	  context	  pre-­‐	  
and	  post-­‐Copenhagen.50	  	  
Transforming	  the	  EAs	  into	  pre-­‐accession	  instruments	  was	  not	  a	  difficult	  task	  because	  of	  
their	  far-­‐reaching	  substantive	  content	  which	  already	  set	  the	  basis	  for	  the	  application	  of	  
the	   four	   freedoms	   and	   legislative	   approximation,	   as	   well	   as	   creating	   a	   suitable	  
institutional	   framework.51	   Yet	   the	   CEECs’	   alignment	   with	   the	   internal	   market	   by	   the	  
association	  process	  did	  not	  replace	  the	  accession	  process.	  The	  EAs	  covered	  only	  internal	  
market	  acquis	  and	  not	  the	  entire	  accession	  acquis.	  	  
                                            
45	  See,	  for	  example,	  Recital	  15,	  Preamble	  to	  the	  EC-­‐Poland	  EA.	  
46	  European	  Council,	  ‘Conclusions	  of	  the	  Presidency	  –	  Copenhagen,	  21-­‐22	  June	  1993’	  SN	  180/1/93	  REV	  1,	  
13.	  
47	  European	  Council,	  ‘Conclusions	  of	  the	  Presidency	  –	  Corfu,	  24-­‐25	  June	  1994’	  SN	  150/94.	  
48	  European	  Council,	  ‘Conclusions	  of	  the	  Presidency	  –	  Essen,	  9-­‐10	  December	  1994’	  SN	  300/94.	  
49	   ‘Taking	   into	   account	   the	   accession	   preparation	   strategy	   adopted	   by	   the	   Essen	   European	   Council	   of	  
December	  1994,	  which	  is	  being	  politically	  implemented	  by	  the	  creation,	  between	  the	  associated	  States	  and	  
the	   institutions	   of	   the	   European	   Union,	   of	   structured	   relations	   which	   encourage	   mutual	   trust	   and	   will	  
provide	   a	   framework	   for	   addressing	   topics	   of	   common	   interest’:	   Recital	   23,	   Preamble	   to	   the	   Europe	  
Agreement	   establishing	   an	   association	  between	   the	  European	  Communities	   and	   their	  Member	   States,	   of	  
the	  one	  part,	  and	  the	  Republic	  of	  Estonia,	  of	  the	  other	  part	  [1998]	  OJ	  L68/3.	  
50	  K	  Inglis,	   'The	  Europe	  agreements	  compared	  in	  the	  light	  of	  their	  pre-­‐accession	  reorientation'	  (2000)	  37	  
Common	  Market	  Law	  Review	  1173,	  1175.	  	  
51	   M	   Maresceau,	   'Pre-­‐accession'	   in	   M	   Cremona	   (ed),	   The	   Enlargement	   of	   the	   European	   Union	   (Oxford	  
University	   Press	   2003)	   9,	   16-­‐17.	   In	   fact,	   only	   after	   1994	   has	   the	   EU	   engaged	   in	   genuine	   pre-­‐accession	  
strategies:	  ibid	  9.	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In	   the	   1995	  White	   Paper,	   the	   Commission	   sketched	   out	   the	   pre-­‐accession	   strategy	   of	  
integrating	  the	  CEECs	  into	  the	  internal	  market.52	  In	  terms	  of	  content	  –	  with	  the	  exception	  
of	  the	  free	  movement	  of	  persons	  –	  the	  voluntary	  approximation	  framework	  of	  the	  White	  
Paper	  is	  comparable	  to	  the	  Agreement	  establishing	  the	  European	  Economic	  Area.53	  The	  
focus	  of	   the	  EAs	  was	  on	  political	  dialogue	  and	   the	  establishment	  of	  an	  FTA.	  The	  White	  
Paper	  was	  to	  fill	  the	  gaps	  in	  the	  approximation	  plan	  of	  the	  EAs	  to	  comply	  with	  the	  pre-­‐
accession	  agenda.54	  The	  focus	  of	  the	  EAs	  had	  never	  been	  on	  fully	  integrating	  the	  CEECs	  
into	  the	   internal	  market	  –	  a	  stage	  that	  was	   instead	  envisaged	  and	  accomplished	  by	  the	  
EEA	  Agreement.	  	  
Analogously	   to	   the	  EAs,	  membership	   is	  not	  an	   immediate	  goal	  of	   the	  SAA	  Agreements.	  
The	   political	   contexts	   surrounding	   the	   two	   groups	   of	   agreements	   are	   rather	   similar.	  
However,	   compared	   to	   the	   EAs	   the	   SAAs	   are	   more	   assertive	   as	   regards	   future	  
membership,	  recognising	  the	  contracting	  parties	  as	  ‘potential	  candidate[s]	  for	  European	  
Union	  membership’55	  and	  mentioning	  their	   ‘gradual	  rapprochement	  with	  the	  European	  
Union’,56	  but	  this	  has	  little	  impact	  on	  the	  content	  of	  the	  agreements.	  The	  pronounced	  aim	  
of	   the	   SAAs	   is	   to	   establish	   an	   FTA.	   The	   SAAs	   are,	   furthermore,	   used	   in	   the	   pre-­‐pre-­‐
accession	   process	   in	   order	   to	   prepare	   future	   candidate	   countries	   for	   the	   accession	  
process.	   The	   potential	   candidate	   status	   of	   the	   SAP	   countries	   was	   recognised	   by	   the	  
European	  Council	  in	  2000.57	  At	  this	  moment,	  the	  United	  Nations	  Interim	  Administration	  
Mission	   in	   Kosovo	   (UNMIK)	   has	   completed	   negotiations	   on	   an	   SAA	   and	   Bosnia	   and	  
Herzegovina	   is	   recognised	  as	  a	  potential	   candidate	  country	  having	  not	  yet	   submitted	  a	  
membership	  application.	  Macedonia	   (FYROM)	  has	  enjoyed	  candidate	  status	  since	  2005	  
and	  Albania	  since	  2014.	  Montenegro	  and	  Serbia	  started	  accession	  negotiations	   in	  2012	  
and	   2014,	   respectively.	   In	   2013,	   Croatia	   joined	   the	   EU.	   Finally,	   the	   new	   association	  
agreements/DCFTAs	  signed	  with	  Georgia,	  Moldova	  and	  Ukraine	  in	  2014	  are	  significant	  in	  
                                            
52	  Commission,	   ‘White	  Paper	  –	  Preparation	  of	  the	  associated	  countries	  of	  Central	  and	  Eastern	  Europe	  for	  
integration	  into	  the	  internal	  market	  of	  the	  Union’	  COM	  (95)	  163	  final	  (CEEC	  White	  Paper).	  
53	  M	  Maresceau	   and	   E	  Montaguti,	   'The	   relations	   between	   the	   European	   Union	   and	   Central	   and	   Eastern	  
Europe:	  A	  legal	  appraisal'	  (1995)	  32	  Common	  Market	  Law	  Review	  1327,	  1336.	  For	  a	  contrasting	  view	  of	  
the	  EEA	  and	  the	  CEEC	  White	  Paper	  see	  M	  A	  Gaudissart	  and	  A	  Sinnaeve,	  'The	  Role	  of	  the	  White	  Paper	  in	  the	  
Preparation	   of	   the	   Eastern	  Enlargement'	   in	  M	  Maresceau	   (ed),	   Enlarging	   the	   European	  Union	   (Longman	  
1997)	  41,	  66-­‐71.	  	  
54	  ibid	  66.	  
55	  Recital	  17,	  Preamble	  to	  the	  EC-­‐Albania	  SAA.	  
56	  Article	  8(2)(1)	  EC-­‐Albania	  SAA.	  
57	  European	  Council,	  ‘Conclusions	  of	  the	  Presidency	  –	  Feira,	  19-­‐20	  June	  2000’	  SN	  200/00.	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terms	   of	   the	   adoption	   of	   the	   internal	   market	   acquis	   and	   the	   objective	   of	   a	   gradual	  
integration	  into	  the	  internal	  market.58	  
3	  Expanding	  the	  internal	  market	  
The	  final	  category	  of	  functions	  of	  the	  internal	  market	  acquis	  in	  the	  EU’s	  relations	  with	  the	  
neighbouring	   countries	   is	   that	   of	   integrating	   third	   countries	   into	   the	   internal	   market	  
independently	   of	   the	   non-­‐EU	   contracting	   parties’	   membership	   aspirations.	   This	  
integration	  may	  be	  cover	  the	  entire	  internal	  market	  or	  be	  limited	  to	  one	  or	  more	  specific	  
policy	  sectors.	  In	  spite	  of	  the	  differences	  in	  the	  breadth	  of	  the	  cooperation	  across	  policy	  
areas,	  both	  categories	  share	  the	  same	  depth	  of	  integration	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  free	  movement	  
provisions.	  
3.1	  Comprehensive	  integration	  into	  the	  internal	  market	  	  
The	  only	  genuine	  example	  of	  an	  agreement	  in	  which	  acquis	  is	  exported	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  
extending	  the	  internal	  market	  outside	  the	  Union	  in	  a	  comprehensive	  manner	  without	  a	  
membership	  perspective	  is	  the	  agreement	  establishing	  the	  EEA.	  The	  EEA	  Agreement	  was	  
signed	   in	   1992	   as	   a	   multilateral	   association	   agreement	   between	   the	   EC,	   its	   Member	  
States	   and	   the	   countries	   of	   the	   European	   Free	   Trade	   Area	   (EFTA)	   except	   for	  
Switzerland.59	  The	  EEA	  Agreement	  entered	  into	  force	  on	  1	  January	  1994.	  Since	  most	  of	  
the	  former	  EEA	  EFTA	  countries	  have	  by	  now	  joined	  the	  EU,60	  Iceland,	  Liechtenstein	  and	  
Norway	  are	  the	  only	  non-­‐EU	  participants	  in	  the	  EEA.	  Despite	  the	  small	  number	  of	  non-­‐EU	  
contracting	   parties,	   there	   are	   no	   indications	   that	   the	   EEA	  would	   cease	   to	   exist	   in	   the	  
foreseeable	  future.	  Norway’s	  possible	  accession	  to	  the	  EU	  was	  rejected	  at	  referenda	  both	  
in	  1972	  and	  1994.	  In	  July	  2009,	  Iceland	  submitted	  an	  application	  for	  EU	  membership	  and	  
started	  accession	  negotiations	  in	  2010	  but	  negotiations	  were	  suspended	  in	  2013	  and	  in	  
                                            
58	  See	  G	  Van	  der	  Loo,	  'The	  EU–Ukraine	  Deep	  and	  Comprehensive	  Free	  Trade	  Area:	  A	  coherent	  mechanism	  
for	   legislative	   approximation?'	   in	   P	   Van	   Elsuwege	   and	   R	   Petrov	   (eds),	   Legislative	   Approximation	   and	  
Application	  of	  EU	  Law	  in	  the	  Eastern	  Neighbourhood	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  (Routledge	  2014)	  63.	  
59	  Agreement	  on	  the	  European	  Economic	  Area	  [1994]	  OJ	  L1/3	  (EEA	  Agreement).	  
60	  Austria,	  Denmark,	  Portugal,	  Sweden,	  United	  Kingdom,	  Finland.	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March	  2015	   Iceland	  withdrew	   the	   application.	   Liechtenstein’s	  EU	  membership	  has	  not	  
been	  subject	  to	  genuine	  discussion.61	  
The	   objective	   of	   the	   EEA	   Agreement	   is	   to	   create	   a	   ‘homogeneous	   European	   Economic	  
Area’	   based	   on	   equal	   conditions	   of	   competition	   and	   respect	   for	   the	   same	   rules.62	   This	  
explicit	  aim	  of	  homogeneity	  differentiates	  the	  EEA	  Agreement	  from	  all	  other	  agreements	  
exporting	   internal	  market	  acquis	   discussed	  above.	   Instead	  of	   gradual	   cooperation	  with	  
the	  EU	  generally	  on	  a	  political	   level	  or	  particularly	  in	  the	  sphere	  of	  the	  internal	  market	  
the	  EEA	  Agreement	  aims	  to	  integrate	  EEA	  EFTA	  States	  to	  the	  internal	  market	  as	  deeply	  
as	  EU	  Member	  States.	  
The	  EEA	  Agreement	  covers	  almost	  the	  entire	  spectrum	  of	  internal	  market	  acquis:	  the	  free	  
movement	   of	   goods,	   persons,	   services	   and	   capital;	   rules	   on	   competition;	   horizontal	  
provisions	   relevant	   to	   the	   four	   freedoms	   covering	   social	   policy,	   consumer	   protection,	  
environment,	   statistics,	   and	   company	   law;	   and	   flanking	   provisions	   falling	   outside	   the	  
four	   freedoms,	   such	   as	   education,	   small	   and	   medium	   sized	   enterprises,	   tourism,	   the	  
audiovisual	   sector,	   and	   civil	   protection.	   The	   customs	   union	   and	   the	   CCP,	   on	   the	   other	  
hand,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  common	  agricultural	  and	  fisheries	  policies	  are	  not	  part	  of	   the	  EEA	  
Agreement	   thus	   limiting	   the	   application	   of	   the	   free	   movement	   of	   goods	   in	   the	   EEA.63	  
Outside	   the	   latter	   policy	   areas,	   EEA	   EFTA	   States	   are	   fully-­‐fledged	   participants	   in	   the	  
internal	  market.	  Schengen	  acquis	  does	  not	  form	  part	  of	  the	  EEA	  Agreement	  but	  all	  EFTA	  
states	   including	   Switzerland	   have	   joined	   the	   Schengen	   area	   by	   concluding	   separate	  
bilateral	   agreements	  with	   the	  EU.	  The	  Schengen	  and	  Dublin	  Agreements	   are	  unique	   in	  
the	   contexts	   of	   cooperation	  within	   the	   EEA	   and	   between	   the	   EU	   and	   Switzerland.	   The	  
annexes	   of	   the	   Schengen	   and	   Dublin	   agreements	   are	   updated	   dynamically	   to	   mirror	  
changes	   in	   the	   respective	  acquis.64	   In	   turn,	   the	  decision-­‐shaping	  procedure	  established	  
                                            
61	  The	  accession	  of	  a	  micro-­‐state	  to	  the	  EU	  potentially	  raises	  problems	  on	  the	  side	  of	  the	  acceding	  state	  as	  
well	  as	  the	  EU,	  see	  C	  Frommelt	  and	  S	  Gstöhl,	  ‘Liechtenstein	  and	  the	  EEA:	  The	  Europeanization	  of	  a	  (very)	  
small	  state’	  (2011)	  18	  Europautredningen,	  54-­‐55.	  
62	  Article	  1(1)	  EEA	  Agreement.	  
63	  Article	  8(3)	  EEA	  Agreement.	  
64	  For	  example,	  the	  transfer	  to	  the	  Swiss	  legal	  system	  of	  post-­‐signature	  acquis	  and	  case	  law	  of	  the	  Court	  of	  
Justice	   is	   provided	   by	   Articles	   8-­‐10	   of	   the	   Agreement	   between	   the	   European	   Union,	   the	   European	  
Community	   and	   the	   Swiss	   Confederation	   on	   the	   Swiss	   Confederation's	   association	   with	   the	  
implementation,	   application	   and	   development	   of	   the	   Schengen	   acquis	   [2008]	   OJ	   L53/52	   (EU-­‐EC-­‐
Switzerland	  agreement	  on	  Schengen	  acquis).	  Analogous	  rules	  are	   in	  place	   in	  the	  Agreement	  between	  the	  
European	   Community	   and	   the	   Swiss	   Confederation	   concerning	   the	   criteria	   and	   mechanisms	   for	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by	   these	   agreements	   allows	   Switzerland,	   Norway,	   Iceland	   and	   Liechtenstein	   to	  
participate	  in	  the	  Schengen	  and	  Dublin	  Mixed	  Committees	  where	  the	  Schengen	  acquis	  is	  
developed,	  albeit	  without	  a	  vote	  in	  the	  Council	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  (the	  Council).65	  	  
The	   EEA	   system	   of	   exporting	   the	   single	   market	   acquis	   to	   third	   countries	   goes	   well	  
beyond	  other	   association	   agreements.	   In	   addition	   to	   the	   extensive	   scope	  of	  acquis,	   the	  
EEA	  Agreement	   is	   unique	   due	   to	   its	   elaborate	   institutional	   framework	   that	   allows	   the	  
adoption	  of	  new	  acquis	  to	  take	  place	  quasi-­‐automatically.66	  According	  to	  the	  EFTA	  Court,	  
the	  EEA	  has,	  furthermore,	  become	  a	  legal	  system	  of	  its	  own	  based	  essentially	  on	  the	  EU	  
single	  market	  acquis	  but	  with	  a	  narrower	  scope	  than	  the	  EU	  Treaties.67	  	  
The	  preamble	  to	  the	  EEA	  Agreement	  specifies	  that	  in	  addition	  to	  adopting	  common	  rules	  
and	  provisions	  on	  competition	  the	  ‘dynamic	  and	  homogeneous	  European	  Economic	  Area’	  
must	   also	   provide	   for	   adequate	   enforcement,	   including	   at	   the	   judicial	   level.68	  
Accordingly,	  the	  dynamic	  and	  homogeneous	  EEA	  legal	  system	  is	  based	  on	  four	  pillars	  of	  
homogeneity	  –	  common	  rules,	  equal	  conditions	  of	  competition,	  enforcement,	  and	  judicial	  
review.	  These	  first	  of	  the	  four	  pillars	  refers	  to	  the	  internal	  market	  acquis	  contained	  in	  the	  
Annexes	  to	  the	  Agreement,	  the	  horizontal	  rules	  applying	  to	  all	  single	  market	  provisions,	  
the	  institutions	  and	  procedures	  set	  up	  by	  the	  EEA	  Agreement	  as	  well	  as	  the	  institutions	  
and	  procedures	  of	  the	  Union,	  including	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice.	  
Switzerland,	   although	   a	   member	   of	   the	   EFTA	   is	   not	   party	   to	   the	   EEA	   Agreement.	  
Switzerland	   participated	   in	   the	   negotiations	   of	   the	   EEA	   Agreement	   together	   with	   the	  
other	   EFTA	   members	   but	   did	   not	   conclude	   the	   agreement	   owing	   to	   a	   negative	  
referendum	   in	   1992.	   Instead,	   the	   EU-­‐Switzerland	   relationship	   is	   governed	   by	   over	   a	  
hundred	   bilateral	   agreements.	   These	   agreements	   notably	   include	   two	   packages:	  
‘Bilateral	   I’,	   signed	   in	   1999	   and	   ‘Bilateral	   II’,	   signed	   in	   2004.	   Bilateral	   I	   and	   II	   contain	  
seven	   and	   nine	   agreements,	   respectively,	   and	   cover	   the	   fields	   of	   free	   movement	   of	  
persons,	   air	   transport,	   rail	   and	   road	   transport,	   trade	   in	   agricultural	   products,	   public	  
procurement,	  scientific	  and	  technological	  cooperation,	  mutual	  recognition	  of	  conformity	  
                                            
establishing	   the	   State	   responsible	   for	   examining	   a	   request	   for	   asylum	   lodged	   in	   a	   Member	   State	   or	   in	  
Switzerland	  [2008]	  OJ	  L53/5.	  	  
65	  See	  also	  below	  chapter	  6	  section	  3.2.1.	  
66	  Articles	  102(1),	  (3),	  (4)	  EEA	  Agreement.	  
67	  Case	  E-­‐9/97	  Sveinbjörnsdóttir	  [1998]	  EFTA	  Ct	  Rep	  95,	  para	  59.	  
68	  Recital	  4,	  Preamble	  to	  the	  EEA	  Agreement.	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assessment,	  processed	  agricultural	  products,	  environment,	  statistics,	  fight	  against	  fraud,	  
double	  taxation	  of	  retired	  EU	  civil	  servants’	  pensions,	  Schengen/Dublin,	  etc.	  	  
The	  series	  of	  Bilateral	  I	  and	  II	  have	  certain	  differences.	  The	  Bilateral	  I	  agreements	  were	  
concluded	  as	  association	  agreements69	  as	  a	  single	  package.	  The	   termination	  of	  a	   single	  
agreement	  in	  the	  package	  is	  not	  possible	  due	  to	  the	  ‘guillotine	  clause’	  which	  requires	  that	  
all	  seven	  agreements	  enter	  into	  force	  together	  and	  that	  none	  of	  them	  can	  be	  terminated	  
individually.70	   The	   guillotine	   clause	   binds	   together	   some	   of	   the	   pieces	   of	  acquis	   in	   the	  
jigsaw	  puzzle	  of	  the	  EU-­‐Switzerland	  relationship	  and	  helps	  maintain	  its	  uniformity.71	  The	  
Bilateral	  II	  agreements	  are	  not	  association	  agreements72	  and	  do	  not	  contain	  a	  guillotine	  
clause	  because	  their	  subject	  matters	  are	  not	  connected	  to	  each	  other	  in	  a	  similar	  manner	  
as	   Bilateral	   I.	   The	   non-­‐ratification	   or	   termination	   of	   one	   or	   more	   of	   the	   Bilateral	   II	  
agreements	   by	   either	   party	   will	   not,	   therefore,	   have	   a	   detrimental	   effect	   on	   the	  
application	  of	  the	  others.	  
The	   objective	   of	   the	   EU-­‐Switzerland	   bilateral	   agreements	   is	   to	   enhance	   deep	   sectoral	  
cooperation	  but	  not	  full	  participation	  in	  the	  internal	  market	  on	  completely	  equal	  terms	  
with	   EU	  Member	   States.	   Similarly	   to	   the	   EEA	   Agreement,	   the	   annexes	   to	   the	   bilateral	  
agreements	   list	  applicable	  EU	  legislative	  acts	  and	  strive	  towards	  homogeneity	  between	  
EU	  acquis	  and	  pre-­‐signature	  acquis	  in	  the	  agreements,	  leaving	  the	  effect	  of	  post-­‐signature	  
acquis	   to	   be	   decided	   on	   an	  ad	   hoc	   basis.73	   The	   fact	   that	   the	   provisions	   of	   the	   bilateral	  
agreements	  are	  to	  be	  interpreted	  and	  applied	  in	  the	  light	  of	  the	  case	  law	  of	  the	  Court	  of	  
Justice	  confirms	  that	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  EU-­‐Swiss	  relationship	  is,	  at	   least	  to	  some	  extent,	  
                                            
69	  For	  example,	  the	  Agreement	  between	  the	  European	  Community	  and	  its	  Member	  States,	  of	  the	  one	  part,	  
and	   the	   Swiss	   Confederation,	   of	   the	   other,	   on	   the	   free	   movement	   of	   persons	   [2002]	   OJ	   L114/6	   (EC-­‐
Switzerland	  Agreement	  on	  the	  Free	  Movement	  of	  Persons)	  was	  concluded	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  Articles	  18,	  39,	  
44,	   42,	   44,	   46,	   47,	   52,	   55,	   95,	   150,	   229,	   310	   EC	   Treaty.	   The	   legal	   basis	   for	   the	   Agreement	   between	   the	  
European	  Community	  and	  the	  Swiss	  Confederation	  on	  trade	  in	  agricultural	  products	  [2002]	  OJ	  L114/132	  
was	  Article	  310	  EC	  Treaty.	  
70	  	  See,	  for	  example,	  Article	  25	  EC-­‐Switzerland	  Agreement	  on	  the	  Free	  Movement	  of	  Persons.	  The	  Bilateral	  I	  
agreements	  entered	  into	  force	  simultaneously	  on	  1	  July	  2002.	  
71	  See	  R	  Schwok,	  Switzerland-­-­European	  Union:	  an	  impossible	  membership?	  (P.I.E.	  Peter	  Lang	  2009)	  39.	  
72	   For	   example,	   Article	   285	   EC	   Treaty	   was	   the	   legal	   basis	   for	   concluding	   the	   Agreement	   between	   the	  
European	   Community	   and	   the	   Swiss	   Confederation	   on	   cooperation	   in	   the	   field	   of	   statistics	   [2006]	   OJ	  
L90/2;	  the	  EU-­‐EC-­‐Switzerland	  agreement	  on	  Schengen	  acquis	  was	  concluded	  on	  the	  legal	  bases	  of	  Articles	  
62,	  63,	  66,	  95	  EC	  Treaty,	  Articles	  24,	  38	  EU	  Treaty.	  	  
73	   See,	   for	   example,	   Article	   1(2)	   of	   the	   Agreement	   between	   the	   European	   Community	   and	   the	   Swiss	  
Confederation	  on	  Air	  Transport	  [2002]	  OJ	  L114/73.	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comparable	  to	  the	  sui	  generis	  character	  of	  the	  EU	  and	  the	  EEA	  legal	  orders.74	  On	  the	  one	  
hand,	   Switzerland	   is	   adopting	   all	   EU	   acquis	   in	   the	   fields	   covered	   by	   the	   bilateral	  
agreements	  which	  points	   at	   very	  deep	   cooperation.	  On	   the	  other	  hand,	   the	   integration	  
foreseen	  in	  the	  bilateral	  agreements	  is	  less	  profound	  than	  that	  of	  the	  comprehensive	  EEA	  
Agreement.	   In	   addition	   to	   lacking	   cooperation	   in	   some	   policy	   fields	   the	   bilateral	  
agreements	  notably	  exclude	  to	  a	  smaller	  or	  greater	  extent	  the	  free	  movement	  of	  capital	  
and	  services	  and	  the	  freedom	  of	  establishment.	  	  
The	   objective	   of	   the	   EU-­‐Swiss	   relationship	   based	   on	   bilateral	   echoes	   the	   negative	  
referendum	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  EEA.	  The	  cooperation	  between	  the	  EU	  and	  Switzerland	  
has	  rightly	  been	  called	  ‘differentiated	  integration’	  lying	  somewhere	  between	  cooperation	  
and	   integration.75	   On	   the	   one	   hand,	   the	   EU-­‐Swiss	   bilateral	   agreements	   envisage	  much	  
deeper	   integration	  with	  the	  EU	  internal	  market	  than	  EAs	  and	  SAAs.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  
not	   all	   of	   the	   four	   freedoms	   apply	   to	   the	   bilateral	   agreements,	   thus	   rendering	   the	   EU-­‐
Switzerland	  cooperation	  in	  the	  field	  of	  the	  internal	  market	  weaker	  than	  the	  cooperation	  
between	   the	  EU	  and	   the	  EEA	  EFTA	  States.	  What	  both	   (sets	  of)	  agreements	  do	  share	   in	  
common	   is	   the	   fact	   that	   they	   provide	   a	   comprehensive	   framework	   for	   a	   particular	  
country’s	  participation	  in	  the	  internal	  market.	  This	  is	  different	  from	  multilateral	  sectoral	  
agreements	   discussed	   in	   the	   next	   subsection	   that	   export	   the	   acquis	   and	   aim	   at	  
homogeneity	  yet	  are	  not	  intended	  to	  govern	  all	  aspects	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  
EU	  and	  the	  neighbouring	  countries	  in	  question.	  	  	  
3.2	  Sectoral	  integration	  into	  the	  internal	  market	  
Sectoral	  cooperation	  between	  the	  EU	  and	  the	  neighbouring	  countries	  has	  recently	  taken	  
on	   a	   new	   form.	   ‘Legally	   binding	   sectoral	   multilateralism’76	   is	   providing	   a	   successful	  
alternative	   to	   bilateral	   agreements	   such	   as	   those	   concluded	   between	   the	   EU	   and	  
Switzerland.	  Multilateral	   sectoral	   cooperation	   is	   a	  means	   of	   exporting	   internal	  market	  
acquis	  and	  thus	  creating	  ‘homogeneous’	  regulatory	  spaces	  that	  comprise	  the	  EU	  as	  well	  
as	  a	  number	  of	  third	  countries	  in	  limited	  policy	  areas.	  	  
                                            
74	  	  S	  Breitenmoser,	  'Sectoral	  agreements	  between	  the	  EC	  and	  Switzerland:	  Contents	  and	  context'	  (2003)	  40	  
Common	  Market	  Law	  Review	  1137,	  1144.	  
75	  	  ibid,	  1185.	  
76	  S	  Blockmans	  and	  B	  Van	  Vooren,	  'Revitalizing	  the	  European	  ‘Neighbourhood	  Economic	  Community’:	  The	  
case	  for	  legally	  binding	  sectoral	  multilateralism'	  (2012)	  17	  European	  Foreign	  Affairs	  Review	  577.	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The	   function	   of	   internal	  market	   acquis	   in	   sectoral	   integration	   is	   significantly	   different	  
from	  those	  discussed	  above.	  The	  previous	  categories	  reflected	  the	  use	  of	  the	  acquis	  as	  a	  
tool	   of	   EU’s	   external	   policy77	   and	   a	   platform	   for	   political	   and	   economic	   cooperation	  
between	   the	   EU	   and	   individual	   third	   countries	   or	   regional	   groups.	   Deep	   sectoral	  
cooperation	   rests	   on	   the	   foundation	  of	   SAP	  and	  ENP	   that	  have	   gradually	  prepared	   the	  
neighbouring	   countries	   for	   adopting	   EU	   acquis.	   In	   turn,	   sectoral	   integration	   is	   an	  
important	  contribution	  to	  the	  overarching	  policy	  frameworks.	  Sectoral	  cooperation	  plays	  
a	   significant	   role	   in	   the	   new	   agreements	   concluded	   in	   the	   framework	   of	   the	   Eastern	  
Partnership,	   especially	   in	   the	   field	   of	   energy	   policy.78	   The	   participants	   of	   the	   2011	  
Warsaw	   Summit	   agreed	   to	   further	   integrate	   the	   energy	   markets	   and	   increase	  
cooperation	   in	   the	   Energy	   Community	   Treaty	   (ECT),	   which	   was	   recently	   joined	   by	  
Moldova	  and	  Ukraine.79	  The	  Euro-­‐Mediterranean	  framework	  provides	  similar	  examples.	  
In	   2006,	   the	   first	   Euro-­‐Mediterranean	   Aviation	   Agreement	   between	   the	   EC	   and	   its	  
Member	  States	  and	  Morocco	  was	  signed	  and	  is	  pending	  entry	  into	  force.80	  Yet,	  in	  addition	  
to	   strengthening	   the	   accession	   and	   neighbourhood	   policies	   multilateral	   sectoral	  
agreements	   also	   serve	   the	  purpose	  of	   complementing	   the	  EU’s	   internal	   policies	  with	   a	  
structured	   external	   dimension.81	   The	   initial	   driving	   force	   behind	   deep	   sectoral	  
cooperation	  with	  the	  neighbouring	  countries	  can	  clearly	  be	  traced	  back	  to	  developments	  
in	  the	  respective	  policies	  of	  the	  EU.	  	  
The	  EU	  has	  currently	  concluded	  two	  multilateral	  sectoral	  agreements	  –	  the	  ECT	  and	  the	  
European	  Common	  Aviation	  Area	   (ECAA)	  Agreement.	  The	   text	   of	   a	   third	   agreement	  of	  
the	  same	  kind,	  the	  Transport	  Community	  Treaty	  (TCT),	  has	  been	  negotiated	  but	  not	  yet	  
signed.	  
                                            
77	  	  An	  extensive	  analysis	  of	  enlargement	  as	  foreign	  policy	  has	  been	  conducted	  by	  Cremona	  in	  M	  Cremona,	  
'Enlargement:	   A	   Successful	   Instrument	   of	   Foreign	   Policy?'	   in	   T	   Tridimas	   and	   P	   Nebbia	   (eds),	   European	  
Union	  Law	  for	  the	  Twenty-­First	  Century:	  Rethinking	  the	  New	  Legal	  Order	  (Hart	  Publishing	  2004)	  397.	  
78	   Third	   countries	   engaging	   in	   sectoral	   energy	   cooperation	   are	   mainly	   interested	   in	   the	   investment	  
opportunities	  and	  diversification	  of	  their	  own	  energy	  sources:	  see	  S	  Padgett,	   'Energy	  Co-­‐operation	  in	  the	  
Wider	   Europe:	   Institutionalizing	   Interdependence'	   (2011)	   49	   Journal	   of	   Common	  Market	   Studies	   1065,	  
1072.	  
79	   Council,	   ‘Joint	   Declaration	   of	   the	   Eastern	   Partnership	   Summit	   –	   Warsaw,	   29-­‐30	   September	   2011’	  
14983/11,	  para	  13.	  	  
80	  Euro-­‐Mediterranean	  Aviation	  Agreement	  between	  the	  European	  Community	  and	  its	  Member	  States,	  of	  
the	  one	  part,	  and	  the	  Kingdom	  of	  Morocco,	  of	  the	  other	  part	  [2006]	  OJ	  L386/57.	  
81	   See,	   for	   example,	   Commission,	   ‘Common	   Aviation	   Area	   with	   the	   Neighbouring	   Countries	   by	   2010	   -­‐	  
Progress	  Report’	  (Communication)	  COM	  (2008)	  596	  final.	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3.2.1	  Energy	  Community	  	  
Owing	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  majority	  of	  energy	  resources	  consumed	  in	  the	  EU,	  in	  particular	  
oil	   and	  gas,	   come	   from	  producers	  outside	   the	  Union	   the	  creation	  of	  an	   internal	  energy	  
sector	   inevitably	   requires	   a	   coordinated	   external	   action.82	   Constructing	   the	   external	  
dimension	  of	  the	  EU’s	  energy	  market	  on	  bilateral	  relations	  carries	  the	  risk	  of	  fragmenting	  
the	   market,	   jeopardising	   the	   security	   of	   supply	   and	   leaving	   the	   Union	   politically	  
vulnerable.	  A	  multilateral	  approach	  is	  certainly	  to	  be	  preferred,	  both	  on	  the	  level	  of	  the	  
EU	  and	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  third	  country	  partners	  to	  energy	  cooperation.83	  
Setting	   up	   an	   internal	   energy	  market	   in	   the	   EU	   has	   not	   been	   an	   easy	   task.	   The	   initial	  
steps	   towards	   the	   creation	  of	   a	   common	  energy	  market	  were	   to	   liberalise	   the	   internal	  
markets	   for	   electricity	   and	   gas	   by	   enforcing	   the	   freedom	   of	   establishment,	   free	  
movement	  of	  goods,	  market	  transparency	  and	  energy	  efficiency	  standards,	  and	  ensuring	  
the	   effective	   implementation	   of	   those	   obligations.84	   Directive	   96/92/EC	   on	   common	  
rules	   for	   the	   internal	  market	   in	   electricity	  was	   adopted	   in	   1996	  with	   the	   objective	   of	  
creating	   an	   open	   internal	   electricity	   market.85	   Two	   years	   later,	   the	   internal	   energy	  
market	   was	   extended	   to	   trade	   in	   gas.86	   In	   2003,	   the	   two	   directives	   were	   replaced	   by	  
Directives	  2003/54/EC87	  and	  2003/55/EC,88	  respectively.	  Their	  aim	  was	  to	  complete	  the	  
internal	  market	  for	  energy	  and	  gas	  by	  the	  year	  201489	  but	  further	  action	  is	  still	  necessary	  
to	  meet	  the	  target.90	  	  
                                            
82	  Commission,	  ‘White	  Paper	  –	  An	  Energy	  Policy	  for	  the	  European	  Union’	  COM	  (95)	  682	  final	  (1995	  White	  
Paper),	  8.	  
83	  The	  sensitivities	  surrounding	  energy	  policy	  do	  not,	  in	  themselves,	  support	  a	  move	  from	  bilateralism	  to	  
multilateralism:	   K	   Westphal,	   'Energy	   Policy	   between	   Multilateral	   Governance	   and	   Geopolitics:	   Whither	  
Europe?'	  (2006)	  4	  Internationale	  Politik	  und	  Gesellschaft	  44,	  58-­‐60.	  
84	  1995	  White	  Paper	  (n	  82)	  16.	  
85	  Directive	   96/92/EC	   of	   the	   European	  Parliament	   and	   of	   the	   Council	   of	   19	  December	   1996	   concerning	  
common	  rules	  for	  the	  internal	  market	  in	  electricity	  [1997]	  OJ	  L27/20.	  
86	  Directive	  98/30/EC	  of	  the	  European	  Parliament	  and	  of	  the	  Council	  of	  22	  June	  1998	  concerning	  common	  
rules	  for	  the	  internal	  market	  in	  natural	  gas	  [1998]	  OJ	  L204/1.	  
87	   Directive	   2003/54/EC	   of	   the	   European	   Parliament	   and	   of	   the	   Council	   of	   26	   June	   2003	   concerning	  
common	  rules	  for	  the	  internal	  market	  in	  electricity	  and	  repealing	  Directive	  96/92/EC	  [2003]	  OJ	  L176/37.	  
88	   Directive	   2003/55/EC	   of	   the	   European	   Parliament	   and	   of	   the	   Council	   of	   26	   June	   2003	   concerning	  
common	  rules	  for	  the	  internal	  market	  in	  natural	  gas	  and	  repealing	  Directive	  98/30/EC	  [2003]	  OJ	  L176/57.	  
89	  European	  Council,	  ‘Conclusions	  –	  Brussels,	  4	  February	  2011’	  EUCO	  2/1/11	  REV	  1,	  para	  4.	  
90	  Commission,	   ‘Progress	  towards	  completing	  the	  Internal	  Energy	  Market’	  (Communication)	  COM	  (2014)	  
634	  final,	  3.	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In	  1995,	   the	  Commission	  also	  pointed	  at	   the	  effect	  of	   trans-­‐European	  energy	  networks	  
on	  the	  neighbouring	  countries.91	  Action	  in	  the	  external	  dimension	  was	  taken	  further	  and	  
in	  2002,	  the	  EU	  signed	  together	  with	  nine	  South	  East	  Europe	  (SEE)	  countries	  the	  Athens	  
Memorandum	   –	   a	   political	   document	   in	   which	   the	   parties	   agreed	   to	   work	   towards	  
establishing	   an	   integrated	   regional	   energy	  market	   in	   electricity	   in	   South-­‐East	   Europe.	  
The	   regional	  market	  was	   to	   be	   created	   by	   2005	   and	   integrated	   into	   the	   EU’s	   internal	  
energy	  market.92	   One	   year	   later,	   a	   similar	  Memorandum	   of	   Understanding	   (MoU)	  was	  
signed	   in	  Athens	  on	   the	   gas	  market.93	  Both	  of	   the	  MoUs	   are	   soft	   law	   instruments.	  The	  
importance	  of	  giving	  the	  Athens	  Process	  a	  legally	  binding	  form	  was	  recognised	  as	  early	  
as	  in	  2002,94	  and	  made	  explicit	  in	  2003.95	  	  
Subsequently,	   on	  29	  May	  2006,	   the	  EC	  and	  Albania,	  Bulgaria,	  Bosnia	   and	  Herzegovina,	  
Croatia,	   Macedonia	   (FYROM),	   Montenegro,	   Romania,	   Serbia,	   and	   Kosovo	   (UNMIK)	  
concluded	  the	  ECT.96	  The	  Treaty	  entered	   into	   force	  on	  1	   July	  2006.	  Moldova	   joined	  the	  
Energy	  Community	   in	  2010,	   followed	  by	  Ukraine	   in	  2011.	  The	  agreement	  was	   initially	  
concluded	   for	   a	   period	   of	   ten	   years	   with	   the	   possibility	   of	   extension	   by	   a	   unanimous	  
decision	  of	  the	  Ministerial	  Council.97	  
The	   specific	   aims	   of	   the	   ECT	   are	   outlined	   in	   Article	   2	   of	   the	   Treaty	   and	   include	   the	  
following:	   creating	   a	   stable	   regulatory	   and	  market	   framework	   for	   ensuring	   stable	   and	  
continuous	   energy	   supply,	   creating	   a	   ‘single	   regulatory	   space’	   for	   trade	   in	   Network	  
Energy	  including	  the	  electricity	  and	  gas	  sectors,	  improving	  the	  environmental	  situation,	  
promoting	  the	  use	  of	  renewable	  energy	  resources,	  and	  establishing	  conditions	  for	  trade	  
in	   energy.	  These	  objectives	   are,	   according	   to	  Article	  3	  of	   the	  Treaty,	   to	  be	  attained	  via	  
extending	   the	  relevant	  EU	  acquis	   to	  all	   contracting	  parties,	   setting	  up	  a	  mechanism	   for	  
operation	  of	  Network	  Energy	  Markets,	  and	  establishing	  a	  single	  market	  in	  electricity	  and	  
                                            
91	  ibid	  29-­‐30.	  
92	   Memorandum	   of	   Understanding	   on	   the	   Regional	   Electricity	   Market	   in	   South	   East	   Europe	   and	   its	  
Integration	  into	  the	  European	  Union	  Internal	  Electricity	  Market,	  2002	  (The	  Athens	  Memorandum	  2002).	  	  
93	  Memorandum	  of	  Understanding	  on	  the	  Regional	  Energy	  Market	  in	  South	  East	  Europe	  and	  its	  Integration	  
into	   the	   European	   Community	   Internal	   Energy	  Market,	   2003,	   15548/03/bis	   (The	   Athens	  Memorandum	  
2003).	  
94	  The	  Athens	  Memorandum	  2002,	  para	  9.	  	  
95	   ‘The	   Participants	   will	   seek	   to	   replace	   this	   Memorandum	   of	   Understanding	   with	   a	   legally	   binding	  
agreement	  as	  soon	  as	  possible.’	  The	  Athens	  Memorandum	  2003,	  para	  9.	  
96	  Treaty	  establishing	  the	  Energy	  Community	  [2006]	  OJ	  L198/18	  (ECT).	  The	  legal	  bases	  for	  concluding	  the	  
Treaty	  were	  Articles	  47,	  55,	  83,	  89,	  95,	  133	  and	  175	  EC	  Treaty.	  	  
97	  Article	  97	  EEC	  Treaty.	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gas.	   Included	   is	   the	   acquis	   on	   energy,	   environment,	   competition	   and	   renewables.	   The	  
preamble	   to	   the	   Treaty	   provides	   for	   a	   possibility	   of	   expanding	   the	   scope	   of	   the	  
agreement	   in	   the	   future	   in	   order	   to	   keep	   up	  with	   developments	   in	   the	   energy	   sector,	  
including	   other	   energy	   products	   and	   carriers	   such	   as	   liquefied	   natural	   gas,	   petrol,	  
hydrogen,	   and	   other	   essential	   network	   infrastructures.98	   The	   Energy	   2020	   strategy	  
follows	   up	   on	   the	   provision	   and	   sets	   the	   objective	   of	   extending	   the	   ECT	   both	  
substantially	   and	   geographically.99	   The	   Energy	   Community	   is	   thus	   to	   closely	   follow	  
developments	  in	  the	  EU’s	  relations	  with	  the	  neighbourhood	  and	  energy	  acquis	  as	  well	  as	  
adapt	  its	  scope	  to	  developments	  in	  the	  field	  of	  energy	  in	  a	  broader	  sense.	  
3.2.2	  European	  Common	  Aviation	  Area	  
The	   logic	   underpinning	   the	   creation	   of	   the	   ECAA	   is	   similar	   to	   that	   of	   the	   Energy	  
Community.	  The	  EU	  singe	  market	   for	  aviation	  was	  created	   in	   the	  1990s	  by	   liberalising	  
the	   air	   transport	   sector.100	   In	   1999,	   the	   European	   Commission	   launched	   the	   Single	  
European	  Sky	  (SES)	  initiative	  on	  air	  traffic	  management	  (ATM)	  and	  regulation	  to	  reduce	  
delays	  and	  congestion	  in	  the	  European	  airspace	  and	  bring	  ATM	  under	  common	  transport	  
policy.101	  The	  initiative	  was	  followed	  by	  three	  legislative	  packages	  which	  came	  into	  force	  
in	  2004,102	  2009.103	  	  
The	   external	   aviation	   policy	   in	   the	   EU	  was	   traditionally	   conducted	   by	  Member	   States’	  
bilateral	   cooperation	   with	   third	   countries.	   The	   Open	   Skies	   judgments	   of	   2002	  
represented	   a	   revolutionary	   departure	   from	   the	   practice	   of	   concluding	   bilateral	  
                                            
98	  Recital	  8,	  Preamble	  to	  the	  ECT.	  
99	  Commission,	  ‘Energy	  2020	  A	  strategy	  for	  competitive,	  sustainable	  and	  secure	  energy’	  (Communication)	  
COM	  (2010)	  639	  final,	  18.	  
100	   This	   was	   achieved	   by	   the	   three	  market	   liberalisation	   packages	   of	   1987,	   1990	   and	   1992:	   L	   Butcher,	  
'Aviation:	   European	   Liberalisation,	   1986-­‐2002'	   (2010)	   House	   of	   Commons	   Library	   Standard	   Note	  
SN/BT/182.	  	  
101	  Commission,	  ‘The	  creation	  of	  the	  single	  European	  sky’	  (Communication)	  COM	  (1999)	  614	  final.	  	  	  
102	  Commission,	   ‘First	  Report	  on	  the	   implementation	  of	   the	  Single	  Sky	  Legislation:	  achievements	  and	  the	  
way	  forward’	  (Communication)	  COM	  (2007)	  845	  final.	  The	  ‘SES	  I’	  package	  included	  regulations	  setting	  out	  
the	   general	   framework,	   common	   requirements	   for	   the	   provision	   of	   air	   navigation	   services,	   rules	   on	   the	  
organisation	  and	  use	  of	  airspace,	  and	  interoperability	  of	  the	  Air	  Traffic	  Management	  Network.	  	  	  	  
103	   Commission,	   ‘Single	   European	   Sky	   II:	   towards	   more	   sustainable	   and	   better	   performing	   aviation’	  
(Communication)	  COM	  (2008)	  389	   final.	  The	   ‘SES	   II’	  package	  comprised	  updates	   to	   the	  2004	   legislation,	  
technological	  regulation	  of	  SESAR	  ATM	  (Single	  European	  Sky	  Air	  Traffic	  Management	  Research),	  rules	  on	  
safety,	   and	   an	   action	   plan	   for	   airport	   capacity.	   An	   Interim	   update	   of	   SES	   II	   is	   envisaged	   by	   SES	   2+:	  
Commission,	  ‘Accelerating	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  Single	  European	  Sky’	  (Communication)	  COM	  (2013)	  
408	  final.	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agreements.	   In	   this	   sequence	   of	   judgments,	   the	   Court	   of	   Justice	   declared	   that	  
computerised	  reservation	  systems,	   intra-­‐Community	  tariffs	  and	  time	  slots	   forming	  part	  
of	   the	  Open	  Skies	  Agreements	   fall	  within	  the	  EU’s	  exclusive	  competence.104	  As	  a	  result,	  
around	   2000	   bilateral	   agreements	   concluded	   by	   the	   Member	   States	   so	   far	   had	   to	   be	  
renegotiated	   in	  order	   to	  bring	   them	   in	   line	  with	  EU	   law.	  This	  marked	   the	  start	  of	  EU’s	  
external	  aviation	  policy.105	  	  
According	   to	   the	   Commission,	   the	   development	   and	   competitiveness	   of	   the	   internal	  
aviation	   market	   demand	   action	   also	   in	   the	   external	   sphere.106	   Deep	   multilateral	  
cooperation	   was	   first	   undertaken	   with	   SEE	   countries	   whose	   aviation	   markets	   were	  
already	   inclining	   towards	   the	   EU.	   The	   aviation	   markets	   of	   the	   SEEs	   were	   thought	   to	  
deliver	  greater	  operational	  efficiency,	  security	  and	  safety	  than	  other	  possible	  markets,	  as	  
well	  as	  contribute	  in	  sectoral	  form	  to	  the	  EU’s	  neighbourhood	  policy.107	  	  
The	  Agreement	  on	  the	  Establishment	  of	  a	  Common	  Aviation	  Area	  Agreement	  was	  signed	  
on	   9	   June	   2006	   between	   the	   EC	   and	   its	  Member	   States,	   of	   the	   one	   part,	   and	   Albania,	  
Bosnia	   and	   Herzegovina,	   Bulgaria,	   Croatia,	   Macedonia	   (FYROM),	   Iceland,	   Montenegro,	  
Norway,	  Romania,	   Serbia	   and	  Kosovo	   (UNMIK),	   of	   the	  other	  part.108	  The	  Agreement	   is	  
pending	  ratification	  by	  all	  of	  the	  contracting	  parties	  and	  has	  not	  yet	  entered	  into	  force109	  
but	  is	  being	  applied	  provisionally.110	  Pursuant	  to	  Article	  1(1)	  of	  the	  Agreement,	  the	  ECAA	  
is	   based	   on	   ‘free	   market	   access,	   freedom	   of	   establishment,	   equal	   conditions	   of	  
competition,	   and	   common	   rules	   including	   in	   the	   areas	   of	   safety,	   security,	   air	   traffic	  
management,	  social	  and	  environment’.	  The	  relevant	  acquis	  to	  be	  adopted	  by	  the	  non-­‐EU	  
                                            
104	  Case	  C-­‐467/98	  Commission	  v	  Denmark	  [2002]	  ECR	  I-­‐9519;	  Case	  C-­‐468/98	  Commission	  v	  Sweden	  [2002]	  
ECR	  I-­‐9575;	  Case	  C-­‐469/98	  Commission	  v	  Finland	  [2002]	  ECR	  I-­‐9627;	  Case	  C-­‐471/98	  Commission	  v	  Belgium	  
[2002]	   ECR	   I-­‐9681;	   Case	   C-­‐472/98	   Commission	   v	   Luxembourg	   [2002]	   ECR	   I-­‐9741;	   Case	   C-­‐475/98	  
Commission	  v	  Austria	  [2002]	  ECR	  I-­‐9797;	  Case	  C-­‐476/98	  Commission	  v	  Germany	  [2002]	  ECR	  I-­‐9855.	  
105	   Commission,	   ‘Developing	   the	   agenda	   for	   the	   Community’s	   external	   aviation	   policy’	   (Communication)	  
COM	  (2005)	  79	  final,	  2.	  	  
106	  ibid	  4.	  
107	  ibid	  8.	  
108	  [2006]	  OJ	  L285/3.	  
109	  In	  2013,	  the	  Commission	  issued	  a	  reasoned	  opinion	  threatening	  Belgium	  and	  Greece	  with	  infringement	  
proceedings	   against	   them	   unless	   they	   ratify	   the	   ECAA	   Agreement	   within	   two	   months’	   time:	   see	  
Commission	   ‘Air	   transport:	   Commission	   urges	   Belgium	   and	   Greece	   to	   proceed	   with	   ratification	   of	   the	  
agreement	  with	   the	  Western	   Balkans	   on	   a	   Common	   Aviation	   Area’	   (Press	   Release)	   IP/13/479,	   30	  May	  
2013.	  
110	  Decision	  of	  the	  Council	  and	  of	  the	  Representatives	  of	  the	  Member	  States	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  meeting	  
within	   the	   Council	   of	   9	   June	   2006	   on	   the	   signature	   and	   provisional	   application	   of	   the	   Multilateral	  
Agreement	  on	  the	  Establishment	  of	  a	  European	  Common	  Aviation	  Area	  (ECAA)	  [2006]	  OJ	  L285/1.	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contracting	   parties	   comprises	   that	   of	   access	   to	   the	   aviation	   market,	   aviation	   safety,	  
aviation	   security,	   air	   traffic	   management,	   environment,	   social	   aspects,	   consumer	  
protection,	  and	  certain	  other	  legislative	  acts	  outlined	  in	  Annex	  I	  of	  the	  Agreement.111	  	  
Similar	   but	   bilateral	   Common	   Aviation	   Area	   (CAA)	   Agreements	   were	   signed	   on	   2	  
December	  2010	  with	  Georgia112	  and	  on	  26	  June	  2012	  with	  Moldova113	  –	  countries,	  which	  
do	   not	   participate	   in	   the	   ECAA.	   An	   analogous	   agreement	   with	   Ukraine	   is	   pending	  
signature	   and	   negotiations	   on	   a	   CAA	   with	   Azerbaijan	   are	   currently	   ongoing.	   In	   the	  
southern	   neighbourhood,	   the	   EU	   has	   signed	   Euro-­‐Mediterranean	   Aviation	   Agreements	  
with	   Morocco,	   Jordan	   and	   Israel.	   Negotiations	   with	   Tunisia	   started	   in	   2013	   and	   the	  
conclusion	  of	  a	  similar	  agreement	  with	  Algeria	   is	  envisaged.	   Integration	   in	  the	  aviation	  
sector	   is	  not,	   therefore,	   constrained	   to	   the	  multilateral	  model	  but	   features	   a	   variety	  of	  
instruments	  that	  group	  the	  neighbouring	  countries	  according	  to	  proximity	  to	  the	  Union	  
and	  the	  depth	  of	  integration	  more	  generally.	  
3.2.3	  Transport	  Community	  
Road,	  rail,	  inland	  waterway	  and	  maritime	  transport	  are	  further	  key	  areas	  of	  cooperation	  
between	   the	   EU	   and	   its	   neighbouring	   countries.	   The	   focus	   of	   EU	   common	   transport	  
policy	   is	   on	   integrating	   transport	   networks	   for	   the	   benefit	   of	   greater	   cohesion	   in	   the	  
internal	  market	  as	  a	  whole.114	  The	  ambitious	  Trans-­‐European	  Transport	  Network	  (TEN-­‐
T)	  policy	  seeks	  to	  enhance	  transport	  connectivity	  within	  the	  EU	  to	  overcome	  the	  existing	  
bottlenecks	   and	   technical	   barriers.115	  A	  number	  of	   challenges	   in	   the	   internal	   transport	  
                                            
111	  Article	  3	  ECAA	  Agreement.	  	  
112	  Decision	  of	  the	  Council	  and	  of	  the	  Representatives	  of	  the	  Governments	  of	  the	  Member	  States,	  meeting	  
within	   the	   Council	   of	   15	   October	   2010	   on	   the	   signature	   and	   provisional	   application	   of	   the	   Common	  
Aviation	  Area	  Agreement	  between	  the	  European	  Union	  and	  its	  Member	  States,	  of	  the	  one	  part,	  and	  Georgia,	  
of	  the	  other	  part	  [2011]	  OJ	  L25/1.	  
113	  Decision	  of	  the	  Council	  and	  of	  the	  Representatives	  of	  the	  Governments	  of	  the	  Member	  States,	  meeting	  
within	  the	  Council	  of	  7	  June	  2012	  on	  the	  signing,	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  Union,	  and	  provisional	  application	  of	  the	  
Common	  Aviation	  Area	  Agreement	  between	  the	  European	  Union	  and	  its	  Member	  States	  and	  the	  Republic	  
of	  Moldova	  [2012]	  OJ	  L292/1.	  	  
114	   Commission,	   ‘Extension	   of	   the	   major	   trans-­‐European	   transport	   axes	   to	   the	   neighbouring	   countries’	  
(Communication)	   COM	   (2007)	   32	   final	   (Commission,	   ‘Extension	   of	   the	  major	   trans-­‐European	   transport	  
axes’),	  4.	  	  
115	   Revised	   in	   2004	   by	   Decision	   No	   884/2004/EC	   of	   the	   European	   Parliament	   and	   of	   the	   Council	  
of	  29	  April	  2004	  amending	  Decision	  No	  1692/96/EC	  on	  Community	  guidelines	  for	  the	  development	  of	  the	  
trans-­‐European	  transport	  network	  [2004]	  OJ	  L167/1.	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market	  remain	  to	  be	  tackled,	  especially	  in	  the	  fields	  of	  environment	  and	  sustainability.116	  	  
Neighbouring	  countries	  have	  been	  integrated	  with	  the	  EU	  transport	  networks	  since	  ten	  
Pan-­‐European	   Corridors	   (PEC)	   and	   Transport	   Areas	  were	   identified	   at	   the	  Ministerial	  
Conferences	   on	   Crete	   (1994)117	   and	   in	   Helsinki	   (1997).118	   Following	   the	   subsequent	  
enlargement	  rounds	  of	  the	  EU,	  most	  of	  the	  PECs	  are	  now	  part	  of	  the	  TEN-­‐T	  network.	  The	  
perceived	   weaknesses	   of	   the	   PEC	   were	   to	   be	   remedied	   in	   the	   future	   by	   regional	  
initiatives.	  The	  Pan-­‐European	  Transport	  Areas	  focus	  on	  specific	  regions	  and	  include,	  for	  
example,	  the	  South	  East	  Europe	  Transport	  Observatory	  (SEETO)	  in	  the	  Western	  Balkans,	  
operational	  since	  2005;	  the	  Euro-­‐Mediterranean	  Transport	  Forum	  in	  the	  Mediterranean	  
region,	   created	   in	   1998;	   and	   the	   TRACECA	   corridor	   connecting	   the	   EU	   with	   Turkey,	  
Southern	   Caucasus	   and	   Central	   Asia,	   set	   up	   in	   1993.119	   The	   extension	   of	   EU	   transport	  
networks	   to	   the	   neighbouring	   countries	   has	   been	   closely	   connected	   with	   the	  
implementation	  of	  the	  ENP120	  and	  the	  EU’s	  enlargements	  strategy,	  and	  has	  an	  important	  
place	  in	  the	  new	  FTAs.121	  	  	  	  
The	  SEETO	  was	  launched	  in	  2004	  with	  the	  signing	  of	  the	  MoU	  for	  the	  development	  of	  the	  
Core	  Regional	  Transport	  Network	  between	  the	  EU	  and	  Albania,	  Bosnia	  and	  Herzegovina,	  
Croatia,	   Macedonia	   (FYROM),	   Montenegro,	   Serbia	   and	   Kosovo	   (UNMIK).	   The	   MoU	  
established	  a	  transport	  strategy	  for	  the	  region,	  including	  infrastructure	  programmes	  and	  
policy	   cooperation	   to	   enhance	   investment	   capacity.	   In	   order	   to	   give	   transport	  
cooperation	   in	   the	   SEE	   region	   a	   legally	   binding	   form	   and	   improve	   the	   regulatory	   and	  
investment	   environment,122	   in	   June	   2008	   the	   participants	   of	   the	   SEETO	   started	  
negotiations	   on	   a	   Transport	   Community	   Treaty.	   Negotiations	  were	   concluded	   in	   2010	  
                                            
116	  Commission,	   ‘White	  Paper	  –	  Roadmap	   to	  a	  Single	  European	  Transport	  Area	  –	  Towards	  a	  competitive	  
and	  resource	  efficient	  transport	  system’	  COM	  (2011)	  144	  final,	  3-­‐5.	  	  	  
117	  Crete	  Declaration	  adopted	  at	  the	  Second	  Pan-­‐European	  Transport	  Conference,	  Crete,	  Greece,	  16	  March	  
1994.	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  Helsinki	  Declaration	  ‘Towards	  a	  European	  Wide	  Transport	  Policy:	  A	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  of	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  Principles’	  adopted	  
at	  the	  Third	  Pan-­‐European	  Transport	  Conference,	  Helsinki,	  25	  June	  1997.	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  Commission,	  ‘Extension	  of	  the	  major	  trans-­‐European	  transport	  axes’,	  5.	  	  
120	   For	   this,	   a	   High	   Level	   Group	   on	   the	   ‘Extension	   of	   the	   major	   trans-­‐European	   transport	   axes	   to	   the	  
neighbouring	  countries	  and	  regions’	  was	  established	  by	  the	  European	  Commission	  in	  2004.	  
121	   Commission	   ‘The	   EU	   and	   its	   neighbouring	   regions:	   A	   renewed	   approach	   to	   transport	   cooperation’	  
(Communication)	  COM	  (2011)	  415	  final,	  3.	  	  
122	   SEETO	   Comprehensive	   Network	   Development	   Plan	   2014	   <http://www.seetoint.org/wp-­‐
content/uploads/downloads/2013/12/SEETO-­‐Comprehensive-­‐Network-­‐Development-­‐Plan-­‐2014.pdf>	  
accessed	  24	  June	  2015,	  58.	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but	  political	  reasons	  have	  hindered	  the	  signing	  and	  entry	  into	  force	  of	  the	  Treaty.123	  	  
The	  TCT	  builds	  on	  the	  ECAA	  Agreement	  and	  aims	  at	   fully	   integrating	  the	  SEE	  region	  to	  
the	  EU’s	   internal	   transport	  market.	   Similarly	   to	   the	  ECT	  and	   the	  ECAA	  Agreement,	   the	  
TCT	  is	  based	  on	  the	  alignment	  of	   third	  country	   legal	  systems	  with	  the	  EU	  acquis	   in	  the	  
field	   of	   transport,	   including	   infrastructure	   development,	   market	   access,	   technical	  
interoperability,	   safety,	   security,	   environment,	   public	   procurement	   and	   social	  
regulation.124	  
4	  Aims	  and	  scope	  of	  the	  thesis	  
The	   above	   analysis	   shows	   that	   the	   EU’s	   external	   action	   towards	   the	   neighbouring	  
countries	   is	   not	   limited	   to	   bilateral	   trade	   relations,	   democratisation	   and	   improving	  
security	  at	  the	  Union’s	  immediate	  borders	  but	  is	  to	  a	  large	  degree	  directed	  at	  integrating	  
the	  neighbouring	  countries	  both	   into	  a	  wider	  area	  of	   cooperation	   in	  Europe	  and,	  more	  
specifically,	   into	   the	  EU’s	   internal	  market.	   In	   the	  same	  vein	   is	  EU’s	   internal	   integration	  
mirrored	   in	   the	   Union’s	   external	   action.	   Starting	   already	   in	   the	   1960s,	   the	   gradual	  
integration	   of	   the	   neighbourhood	   with	   the	   EU	   and	   especially	   with	   the	   EU’s	   internal	  
market	  got	  a	  kick-­‐start	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  1980s/beginning	  of	  the	  1990s.	  Internal	  market	  
acquis	   takes	   centre	   stage	   in	   the	   gradual	   integration	   of	   third	   countries	   without	  
(immediate)	  membership.	  	  
The	   different	   functions	   of	   the	   acquis	   outlined	   above	   generally	   reflect	   the	   ‘concentric	  
circles	   of	   EUropean	   integration’.125	   Firstly,	   the	   profundity	   of	   integration	   is	   strongly	  
correlated	  with	   a	   third	   country’s	   geographical	   proximity	   to	   the	   European	   Union.	   This	  
holds	   even	   true	   with	   regard	   to	   closeness	   to	   the	   ‘core’	   of	   European	   integration	   –	   the	  
founding	  Member	   States.	   The	   current	   and	   former	   EFTA	   countries,	   for	   example,	   do	   or	  
have	   with	   a	   few	   exceptions	   bordered	   the	   European	   Union.	   Likewise	   is	   integration	  
between	  the	  EEA	  and	  the	  EU	  the	  deepest	  among	  the	  neighbouring	  countries.	  Multilateral	  
                                            
123	  On	  the	  negotiating	  history	  and	  the	  difficulties	  surrounding	  the	  conclusion	  of	  the	  Treaty	  see	  S	  Blockmans	  
and	  B	  Van	  Vooren	  (n	  76)	  597-­‐598.	  
124	   ‘Project	   Fiche	   No.	   9	   Support	   to	   the	   Transport	   Community	   Treaty’	  
<http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/financial_assistance/ipa/2011/pf_9_ipa_2011_transport_communi
ty.pdf>	  accessed	  24	  June	  2015.	  	  
125	  S	  Lavenex,	  'Concentric	  circles	  of	  flexible	  ‘EUropean’	  integration:	  A	  typology	  of	  EU	  external	  governance	  
relations'	  (2011)	  9	  Comparative	  European	  Politics	  372,	  387.	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sectoral	  cooperation	  is	  equally	  profound	  as	  the	  EEA	  yet	  breaks	  the	  pattern	  of	  concentric	  
circles	   as	   it	   includes	   not	   only	   the	   EU’s	   closest	   and	   economically	   most	   developed	  
neighbours	  but	  also	  countries	  in	  European	  periphery	  and	  beyond.	  
The	   second	   criterion	   that	   largely	   determines	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   non-­‐members	   are	  
willing	  to	  adopt	  EU	  acquis	  is	  the	  country’s	  membership	  prospect.	  An	  outlook	  of	  acceding	  
to	  the	  EU	  provides	  for	  non-­‐EU	  Member	  States	  important	  incentives	  to	  align	  their	  national	  
regulatory	   frameworks	   with	   the	   acquis	   of	   the	   EU.	   The	   examples	   of	   the	   EU-­‐Morocco	  
aviation	  agreement,	  the	  EEA	  Agreement	  and	  the	  EU-­‐Switzerland	  bilateral	  agreements	  are	  
exceptions.	   Morocco	   cannot	   accede	   to	   the	   Union	   due	   to	   its	   geographic	   location	   and	  
neither	   the	   EEA	   EFTA	   States	   nor	   Switzerland	   wish	   to	   join	   the	   EU	   in	   the	   foreseeable	  
future.	   For	   the	  EFTA	   states,	   though,	   this	   does	  not	   exclude	  participation	   in	   the	   internal	  
market.	  In	  fact,	  the	  most	  far-­‐reaching	  legal	  approximation	  projects	  in	  terms	  of	  aims	  and	  
scope	  of	  the	  acquis	  have	  been	  undertaken	  by	  countries	  that	  have	  chosen	  not	  to	  become	  
members	  to	  the	  EU	  although	  accession	  would,	  at	   least	   from	  the	  perspective	  of	   fulfilling	  
membership	  criteria,126	  be	  largely	  a	  technical	  matter.	  	  
In	  terms	  of	  the	  form	  of	  exporting	  internal	  market	  acquis,	  bilateralism	  is	  the	  EU’s	  natural	  
first	   choice	   for	   cooperation	  with	   third	   countries,	   including	   the	  neighbouring	   countries.	  
This	   is	   notwithstanding	   several	   multilateral	   agreements	   and	   multilateral	   policy	  
frameworks.	  Due	  to	  their	  relative	  inflexibility,	  multilateralism	  is	  the	  preferred	  option	  for	  
integrating	  countries	  who	  are	  economically	  developed	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  allows	  them	  to	  
successfully	   participate	   in	   the	   EU’s	   single	   market,	   or	   for	   less	   developed	   countries	   in	  
sectors	   which	   have	   a	   strong	   cross-­‐border	   dimension	   such	   as	   energy	   and	   transport.	  
Multilateral	   agreements	   enjoy	   a	   particular	   position	   among	   EU’s	   external	   policy	  
instruments.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  multilateral	  comprehensive	  agreements	  such	  as	  the	  EEA	  
are	  a	  means	  for	  countries	  who	  wish	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  EU’s	  internal	  market	  on	  an	  equal	  
basis	  with	  the	  EU	  Member	  States	  and	  could	  join	  the	  EU	  without	  much	  difficulty	  yet	  prefer	  
to	  stay	  outside.	  The	  multilateral	  scope	  of	  the	  EEA	  Agreement	  is	  due	  to	  its	  origins	  in	  the	  
EFTA	   that	   is	   also	   a	   multilateral	   framework.	   Multilateral	   sectoral	   cooperation,	   on	   the	  
other	   hand,	   is	   an	   addition	   to	   the	   existing	   policy	   frameworks	   such	   as	   the	   ENP	   and	   the	  
                                            
126	   ‘Countries	   such	  as	   Switzerland	  and	  Norway	  already	  meet	   all	   of	   the	  membership	   criteria’:	   ‘Composite	  
Paper	  on	  the	  Commission	  Reports	  1999:	  Reports	  on	  progress	  towards	  accession	  by	  each	  of	  the	  candidate	  
countries’	  13	  October	  1999,	  5.	  
 
	   29 
accession	  process.	  Both	  the	  EEA	  and	  the	  sectoral	  agreements	  also	  enable	  the	  EU	  to	  reach	  
its	   internal	  policy	  goals	  by	  managing	  the	  often	  indispensable	  external	  dimension	  of	  the	  
EU’s	  internal	  policies	  that	  have	  a	  strong	  cross-­‐border	  element.	  	  
Some	   of	   the	   third	   countries	   that	   adopt	   EU	   acquis	   through	   multilateral	   political	  
frameworks,	  such	  as	  the	  SEE	  countries,	  wish	  and	  are	  likely	  to	  accede	  to	  the	  EU	  at	  some	  
point	  in	  time.	  For	  others,	  such	  as	  the	  EEA	  EFTA	  States	  or	  any	  country	  that	  may	  wish	  to	  
leave	   the	   EU	   in	   the	   future,	   deep	   multilateral	   cooperation	   is	   the	   preferred	   option	   for	  
gaining	   the	   economic	   benefits	   of	   participating	   only	   in	   chosen	   sectors	   of	   the	   internal	  
market.	  Integrating	  third	  countries	  by	  multilateral	  agreements	  also	  serves	  the	  interests	  
of	   the	   Union	   by	   creating	   necessary	   infrastructure	   and	   a	   safe	   investment	   climate	   in	  
countries	   that	   the	   Union	   has	   strong	   economic	   and	   political	   ties	   with.	   Multilateral	  
cooperation	   is	   gaining	   ground	   as	   can	   be	   witnessed	   by	   the	   negotiation	   of	   three	  
multilateral	  sectoral	  agreements	  in	  the	  past	  decade.	  Comprehensive	  sectoral	  cooperation	  
in	   the	   form	   of	   the	   EEA,	   too,	   appears	   to	   be	   there	   to	   stay	   as	   it	   seems	   to	   provide	   a	  
satisfactory	  alternative	  to	  EU	  membership	  for	  the	  countries	  involved.	  
Apart	   from	  the	  different	  scope	   in	  terms	  of	   the	  subject	  matter,	  both	  comprehensive	  and	  
sectoral	   multilateral	   agreements	   share	   in	   common	   the	   objective	   of	   granting	   third	  
countries	   access	   to	   a	   smaller	   or	   larger	   part	   of	   the	   internal	   market.	   The	   aim	   of	   the	  
agreements	   is	   to	   encourage	   non-­‐Member	   States	   to	   adopt	   a	   significant	   amount	   of	   EU	  
acquis	   in	   the	   fields	   covered	   by	   the	   agreements	   and	   to,	   thereby,	   extend	   the	   internal	  
market	  by	  creating	  a	  ‘homogeneous’	  internal	  market	  space	  operating	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  EU	  
acquis	  beyond	  the	  Union’s	  borders	  without,	  however,	  expanding	  the	  Union.	  Recital	  4	  of	  
the	  preamble	  to	  the	  EEA	  Agreement	  contains	  a	  direct	  reference	  to	  the	  aim	  of	  setting	  up	  a	  
‘dynamic	   and	   homogeneous’	   area	   and	   the	   EEA	   institutional	   system	   and	   procedural	  
framework	  have	  accordingly	  been	  designed	  to	   follow	  up	  the	  development	  of	   the	  acquis	  
after	   the	   date	   of	   signature.	   The	   objectives	   of	   the	   ECT	   and	   the	   ECAA	   Agreement	   are	  
similar	  in	  terms	  of	  achieving	  a	  level	  of	  homogeneity	  in	  the	  interpretation	  and	  application	  
of	  the	  acquis	  but	  their	  institutions	  and	  procedures	  are	  much	  less	  elaborate.	  	  
It	  is	  not,	  however,	  taken	  as	  a	  given	  that	  exporting	  part	  of	  the	  EU’s	  regulatory	  framework	  
beyond	  the	  Union’s	  borders	  will	  automatically	  result	  in	  a	  legal	  area	  that	  is	  homogeneous	  
to	  the	  internal	  market.	  The	  EU’s	  internal	  market	  acquis	  has	  been	  designed	  to	  function	  in	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a	  supranational	  legal	  order	  with	  supranational	  principles	  and	  an	  institutional	  system	  to	  
ensure	  the	  uniform	  interpretation	  and	  application	  and	  effective	  enforcement	  of	  common	  
rules.	   When	   extracted	   from	   the	   Union,	   the	   framework	   in	   which	   the	   acquis	   is	   applied	  
changes	   from	   a	   supranational	   legal	   order	   to	   one	   governed	   by	   the	   principles	   of	   public	  
international	   law.	  Outside	   the	  EU	   internal	  market	  acquis	   does	  not,	   therefore,	   enjoy	   the	  
same	   guarantees	   for	   homogeneity	   in	   substance,	   interpretation,	   application	   and	  
enforcement	  as	  within	  the	  EU.	  	  
In	   broad	   terms,	   there	   are	   three	   means	   for	   achieving	   legal	   homogeneity:	   legislative,	  
administrative,	   and	   judicial.127	   Legislative	   means	   encompass	   the	   mechanisms	   for	  
participation	   in	   the	   decision-­‐making	   processes,	   the	   procedures	   for	   keeping	   the	   acquis	  
up-­‐to-­‐date	  and	   the	   status	  of	  EU	   law	   in	   the	   third	  countries’	   legal	  orders;	   administrative	  
means	   include	   the	   surveillance	   and	   enforcement	   mechanisms;	   and	   judicial	   means	  
comprise	   infringement	  procedures	  and	   the	  possibility	   to	  give	   (binding)	   interpretations	  
of	   the	  acquis.	   The	   contracting	  parties	   to	   the	  multilateral	   agreements	   are	  not,	   however,	  
entirely	   free	   in	   choosing	   an	   appropriate	   institutional	   design	   to	   achieve	   and	   maintain	  
homogeneity	  between	  the	  acquis	  contained	  in	  the	  agreements	  and	  the	  acquis	  as	  in	  force	  
and	  applied	  in	  the	  EU.	  	  
The	  main	  conflict	  lies	  in	  the	  need	  to	  preserve	  the	  autonomy	  of	  the	  European	  legal	  order	  –	  
a	  concept	  that	  is	  keenly	  protected	  by	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice.	  The	  question	  of	  autonomy	  vis-­
à-­vis	  international	  agreements	  concluded	  by	  the	  EU	  has	  been	  in	  the	  focus	  of	  the	  Court’s	  
Opinions	   1/91128	   and	  1/92129	   on	   the	   draft	   EEA	  Agreement,	  Opinion	   1/00	   on	   the	   draft	  
ECAA	  Agreement,130	  Opinion	  1/09	  on	  the	  draft	  agreement	  on	  a	  unified	  Patents	  Court	  131	  
and,	  most	  recently,	  Opinion	  2/13	  on	  the	  EU’s	  accession	  to	  the	  European	  Convention	  on	  
Human	  Rights	  (ECHR).132	  In	  its	  case	  law,	  the	  Court	  has	  distilled	  a	  set	  of	  conditions	  which	  
an	   international	  agreement	  and,	  especially,	   the	   institutional	  and	  procedural	   framework	  
                                            
127	   See	   A	   Lazowski,	   'Box	   of	   chocolates	   integration:	   the	   European	   Economic	   Area	   and	   the	   Swiss	  models	  
revisited'	   in	   S	   Blockmans	   and	   S	   Prechal	   (eds),	   Reconciling	   the	   Deepening	   and	  Widening	   of	   the	   European	  
Union	  (T.M.C.	  Asser	  Press	  2007)	  87.	  
128	  Opinion	  1/91	  EEA	  I	  [1991]	  ECR	  I-­‐6079.	  
129	  Opinion	  1/92	  EEA	  II	  [1992]	  ECR	  I-­‐2821.	  
130	  Opinion	  1/00	  ECAA	  [2002]	  ECR	  I-­‐3493,	  
131	  Opinion	  1/09	  Patents	  Court	  [2011]	  ECR	  I-­‐1137.	  
132	  Opinion	  2/13	  ECHR	  II	  (Court	  of	  Justice,	  18	  December	  2014).	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established,	  must	  conform	  with	  in	  order	  to	  be	  regarded	  as	  compatible	  to	  the	  principle	  of	  
autonomy.	  	  	  
The	  central	  question	  that	  hereby	  arises	   is	  to	  what	  extent	   it	   is	   feasible	  to	  extend	  the	  EU	  
internal	  market,	  either	  as	  a	  whole	  or	  in	  the	  extent	  of	  a	  policy	  sector,	  to	  third	  countries	  by	  
exporting	   EU	   internal	   market	   acquis	   beyond	   the	   EU	   borders	   rather	   than	   in	   the	  
enlargement	  process.	  An	  answer	  to	   this	  question	  necessitates	  an	  analysis	  of	   two	  broad	  
issues:	   firstly,	   the	   constitutional	   limitations	   inherent	   to	   the	   concept	   of	   the	   internal	  
market	  and,	  secondly,	  the	  institutional	  limitations	  to	  exporting	  the	  acquis	  outside	  the	  EU	  
and	  maintaining	  its	  homogeneity	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  preserving	  the	  autonomy	  of	  the	  
EU	   legal	   order.	   The	   first	   category	   comprises	   questions	   about	   the	   concept	   of	   the	   EU	  
internal	  market	   in	   the	   broadest	   sense:	   its	   substantive	   content,	   the	   idea	   of	   the	   internal	  
market	  and	  the	  EU	  legal	  order	  as	  uniform	  constellations,	  and	  the	  effect	  of	  uniform	  rules	  
in	   the	  common	  legal	  order.	  The	  second	  category	  pertains	  to	   the	  necessary	   institutional	  
structures	  that	  need	  to	  be	  in	  place	  in	  order	  to	  support	  the	  aim	  of	  extending	  the	  internal	  
market,	   or	   a	   sector	   thereof,	   to	   third	   countries	   in	   a	   homogeneous	   manner	   including	  
institutions	   for	   ensuring	   the	   dynamic	   export	   and	   updating	   of	   the	   acquis,	   and	   the	  
surveillance,	   enforcement,	   interpretation	   and	   application	   of	   the	   exported	   rules.	   The	  
possibilities	   to	   set	   up	   any	   institutional	   structures	   by	   an	   international	   agreement	  
concluded	   by	   the	   EU	   are	   restricted	   by	   the	   limitations	   deriving	   from	   the	   principle	   of	  
autonomy.	  The	  thesis	  aims	  to	  provide	  a	  legal	  analysis	  of	  the	  ‘exportability’	  of	  the	  concept	  
of	   the	   internal	   market	   to	   non-­‐EU	   Member	   States,	   the	   possible	   effects	   of	   such	   norms	  
export	  on	  the	  EU’s	  own	  legal	  order	  and	  the	  potential	  challenges	  for	  the	  legal	  orders	  of	  the	  
non-­‐EU	  Member	  States.	  The	  thesis	  takes	  the	  perspective	  of	  EU	  constitutional	  law	  rather	  
than	   that	   of	   the	   third	   countries’	   legal	   systems	   and	   provides	   a	   theoretical	   rather	   than	  
practical	  or	  empirical	  account	  of	  the	  subject.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  thesis	  does	  not	  focus	  on	  
the	   practical	   challenges	   associated	   with	   the	   exporting	   of	   the	   EU	   acquis	   or	   examine	  
empirical	   data	   on	   the	   adoption	   and	   transposition	   of	   EU	   acquis	   in	   the	   multilateral	  
frameworks	  and	  national	  legal	  orders	  but	  concentrates	  primarily	  on	  the	  legal	  questions	  
pertaining	   to	   the	   feasibility	  of	   the	  project	  of	  extending	   the	  EU	   internal	  market	   to	   third	  
countries	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  EU	  legal	  order	  generally	  and	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  EU	  
internal	  market	  specifically.	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Three	   case	   studies	   are	   used	   in	   the	   analysis	   to	   illustrate	   the	   challenges	   of	   setting	   up	  
institutions	  and	  procedures	  that	  respect	  both	  the	  autonomy	  of	  the	  EU	  legal	  order	  and	  the	  
sovereignty	   of	   the	   contracting	   parties	   while	   seeking	   to	   achieve	   and	   maintain	  
homogeneity	   in	   the	   expanded	   internal	   market.	   The	   case	   studies	   comprise	   the	   EEA	  
Agreement	   and	   two	  multilateral	   agreements	   –	   the	   agreements	   establishing	   the	  Energy	  
Community	  and	  the	  ECAA,	  respectively.	  All	  of	  the	  three	  agreements	  demonstrate	  an	  aim	  
of	  achieving	  a	  homogeneous	  market	  space	  as	  well	  as	  deep	   integration	   into	  the	   internal	  
market	   through	   extensive	   commitments	   assumed	   by	   the	   third	   country	   contracting	  
parties	   to	   adhere	   to	   EU	   acquis	   in	   the	   fields	   covered	   by	   the	   respective	   agreements.	   A	  
fourth	  multilateral	  agreement,	  the	  TCT,	  too,	  exhibits	  similar	  characteristics	  and	  would	  be	  
suitable	  to	  use	  in	  this	  analysis.	  However,	  since	  the	  Treaty	  has	  not	  yet	  been	  concluded	  and	  
its	   text	  not	  made	  publicly	  available	   it	   is	  not	  possible	   to	   include	   the	  TCT	   in	   the	   current	  
study.	  	  
The	  EEA	  Agreement,	  which	   is	   comprehensive	   in	   scope,	   provides	   an	   example	   of	   a	   ‘best	  
case	   scenario’	   in	   terms	   of	   extending	   the	   internal	   market	   to	   third	   countries.	   The	   EEA	  
Agreement	  allows	  for	  an	  analysis	  as	  to	  the	  general	  expandability	  of	  the	  internal	  market	  
in	  depth	  as	  well	  as	  breadth.	  The	  ECT	  and	  the	  ECAA	  Agreement	  that	  are	  sectoral	  in	  scope	  
provide,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   a	   basis	   for	   a	   study	   into	   whether	   and	   if	   so,	   then	   how	   the	  
sectoral	   scope	   of	   acquis	   export	   that	   pertains	   to	   the	   depth	   of	   integration	   rather	   than	  
breadth	  can	  affect	  the	  possibilities	  of	  expanding	  the	  EU	  internal	  market	  or	  a	  sector	  of	  the	  
internal	  market	  in	  a	  homogeneous	  manner.	  	  
The	   thesis	   is	  divided	   into	   two	  parts,	  each	  composed	  of	   three	  substantive	  chapters.	  The	  
first	  part	  deals	  with	   the	   constitutional	   limitations	   to	   expanding	   the	   internal	  market	  by	  
international	   agreements	  as	  derive	   from	   the	   specificities	  of	   the	   concept	  of	   the	   internal	  
market.	  The	  second	  part	  of	  the	  thesis	  addresses	  the	  institutional	  limitations	  to	  achieving	  
and	  maintaining	  homogeneity	  in	  the	  expanded	  internal	  market	  that	  derive	  from	  the	  need	  
to	  preserve	  the	  autonomy	  of	  the	  EU	  legal	  order	  and	  the	  sovereignty	  of	  the	  non-­‐EU	  states	  
parties	  to	  the	  multilateral	  agreements.	  
Chapter	  2	  identifies	  the	  defining	  features	  of	  the	  internal	  market	  –	  the	  characteristics	  that	  
distinguish	   the	   internal	   market	   from	   any	   single	   market	   constellation	   and	   serve	   as	   a	  
possible	  benchmark	  for	  determining	  the	  degree	  of	  homogeneity	  in	  the	  expanded	  internal	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market.	  The	  chapter	  focuses	  in	  particular	  on	  the	  principles	  that	  form	  the	  traditional	  core	  
of	   the	   internal	  market,	   such	  as	   the	   four	   fundamental	   freedoms	  and	  competition	  policy,	  
and	   their	   interaction	   with	   horizontal	   provisions	   and	   fundamental	   freedoms	   and	   the	  
concept	  specific	  to	  EU	  membership	  –	  EU	  citizenship.	  In	  addition	  to	  looking	  at	  the	  internal	  
market	  as	  a	  whole,	  the	  chapter	  also	  explores	  the	  cores	  of	  specific	  sectors	  of	  the	  internal	  
market.	  	  
Chapter	   3	   scrutinises	   both	   the	   notion	   of	   unity	   as	   an	   essential	   characteristic	   of	   the	  
internal	   market	   and	   of	   the	   EU	   legal	   order	   and	   the	   aim	   of	   the	   agreements	   to	   achieve	  
‘homogeneity’	   in	   the	   expanded	   internal	   market.	   	   The	   chapter	   provides	   a	   comparative	  
analysis	  of	   the	  notions	  of	   ‘unity’	   and	   ‘homogeneity’	   and	   the	  nature	  of	   the	  homogeneity	  
provision	  in	  the	  multilateral	  agreements	  with	  the	  aim	  of	  establishing	  the	  necessary	  level	  
of	   legislative	   commonality	   –	   as	   opposed	   to	   flexibility	   and	   differentiation	   –	   in	   the	  
extended	   internal	  market	   in	   order	   to	   be	   able	   to	   consider	   third	   country	  market	   actors	  
equal	  participants	  in	  the	  internal	  market	  alongside	  EU	  nationals.	  	  
Chapter	  4	  addresses	  the	  role	  of	   the	   foundational	  principles	  of	  EU	  law	  –	  primacy,	  direct	  
effect,	  consistent	  interpretation	  and	  state	  liability	  –	  in	  the	  definition	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  
internal	  market.	  The	  EU-­‐specific	  principles	  are	  compared	  with	  their	  equivalents	  in	  public	  
international	  law	  and	  in	  the	  EEA,	  Energy	  Community	  and	  the	  ECAA	  legal	  orders	  in	  order	  
to	  determine	  which	  implications	  a	  possible	  absence	  of	  the	  supranational	  principles	  in	  the	  
agreements	  exporting	  the	  acquis	  may	  have	  on	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  acquis	  exported	  to	  
third	  countries	  by	  agreements	  operating	  under	  public	  international	  law.	  
Chapter	   5	   defines	   the	   concept	   of	   the	   autonomy	   of	   the	   EU	   legal	   order	   from	   the	  
perspectives	  of	   the	  EU	   legal	  order	  vis-­à-­vis	  national	   legal	  orders	  and	   international	   law,	  
and	  examines	  the	  specific	  implications	  of	  the	  concept	  on	  the	  choice	  of	  the	  most	  effective	  
institutional	   framework	   for	   achieving	   and	   maintaining	   homogeneity	   in	   the	   expanded	  
internal	  market.	  The	  latter	  part	  of	  the	  analysis	  is	  based	  on	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  autonomy	  
of	  the	  EU	  legal	  order	  as	  defined	  and	  developed	  in	  the	  case	  law	  of	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice.	  	  
Chapter	   6	   scrutinises	   the	   institutional	   structures	   necessary	   for	   achieving	   and	  
maintaining	  homogeneity	   in	   the	  process	  of	  exporting	   the	  acquis	   to	   third	  countries.	  The	  
analysis	  is	  divided	  into	  two	  parts.	  The	  first	  part	  of	  the	  chapter	  deals	  with	  the	  necessary	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institutional	   and	   procedural	   frameworks	   for	   dynamically	   updating	   the	   international	  
agreements	   that	  export	   internal	  market	  acquis.	   In	   the	  second	  part,	   specific	  attention	   is	  
paid	  to	  the	  modalities	  of	  third	  country	  participation	  in	  the	  process	  of	  defining	  the	  acquis	  
on	  the	  EU	  level	  and	  the	  implications	  of	  the	  increasing	  use	  of	  new	  governance	  methods	  in	  
EU	   policy-­‐making	   on	   third	   country	   actors’	   possibilities	   to	   influence	   the	   content	   of	  
internal	  market	  acquis	  and	  to,	  thereby,	  increase	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  norms	  transfer.	  
Chapter	   7	   explores	   the	   essential	   institutional	   characteristics	   for	   maintaining	  
homogeneity	   in	   the	  expanded	   internal	  market.	  The	  analysis	   focuses	  on	   the	   institutions	  
and	  procedures	  in	  place	  in	  the	  EU	  and	  the	  multilateral	  agreements,	  respectively,	  that	  are	  
vested	  with	   the	   task	   of	   the	   uniform	   enforcement	   and	   application	   of	   the	  acquis	   in	   and	  
outside	  the	  Union.	  The	  chapter	  is	  divided	  into	  two	  parts	  dealing	  with	  the	  centralising	  and	  
decentralising	  dynamics,	  respectively.	  
The	  final	  chapter	  8	  provides	  a	  conclusion	  on	  the	  viability	  of	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  true	  extension	  
of	  the	  internal	  market	  to	  third	  countries,	  either	  in	  a	  comprehensive	  of	  sectoral	  manner,	  
by	  means	  of	   exporting	   internal	  market	  acquis	   by	  multilateral	   agreements.	  The	   chapter	  
addresses	  both	  the	  substantive	  and	  institutional	  aspects	  of	  the	  process	  of	  expanding	  the	  
internal	  market	  to	  third	  countries	  without	  enlarging	  the	  Union.	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PART	  I	   EXPANDING	  THE	  INTERNAL	  MARKET:	  THE	  CONCEPT	  
Chapter	  2	  	  Internal	  market	  acquis:	  the	  concept	  
1	  Introduction	  
The	   multilateral	   agreements	   that	   export	   internal	   market	   acquis	   to	   non-­‐EU	   Member	  
States	  aim	  at	  expanding	  the	  internal	  market	  beyond	  the	  Union’s	  borders.	  In	  the	  centre	  of	  
the	   expansion	   project	   is	   the	   concept	   of	   the	   internal	  market:	   the	   characteristics	   of	   the	  
market	   and	   the	   legal	   order,	   the	   substantive	   content	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   acquis	   and	   its	  
operability	   and	   relationship	   with	   the	   national	   legal	   orders.	   The	   initial	   European	  
Communities	   set	   out	   to	   create	   a	  multi-­‐state	  market	   in	  which	   the	   factors	  of	   production	  
can	  move	   freely	   and,	   thus,	   be	  placed	   around	   the	  Union	   to	   ensure	  maximum	  efficiency.	  
The	   question	   of	   whether	   the	   internal	   market	   is	   ‘exportable’	   to	   non-­‐Member	   States	  
demands	  a	  close	  look	  at	  both	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  internal	  market,	  the	  level	  of	  compliance	  
with	   the	   EU’s	   legal	   order	   and	   the	   role	   of	   the	   foundational	   principles	   therein;	   in	   other	  
words,	   the	   breadth	   and	  depth	   of	   integration	   and	   the	   legal	   context	   in	  which	   the	  acquis	  
operates	  in	  the	  third	  countries’	  legal	  orders.	  
The	  object	  of	  the	  acquis	  export	  is	  the	  internal	  market.	  The	  internal	  market	  consists	  of	  a	  
package	   of	   obligations	   to	   which	   the	   Member	   States	   must	   adhere	   as	   part	   of	   their	  
membership	   in	   the	   EU.	   For	   the	   purpose	   of	   determining	   whether	   and	   to	   what	   extent	  
exporting	   internal	   market	   acquis	   to	   third	   countries	   can	   result	   in	   a	   market	   space	  
homogeneous	  to	  the	  EU	  internal	  market	  it	  is	  essential	  to	  delimit	  and	  thereby	  define	  the	  
distinctive	  features	  of	  the	  latter.	  	  
The	   internal	  market	   is	  a	  dynamic	  rather	   than	  a	  static	  concept.	  This	  chapter	  sets	  out	   to	  
analyse	   both	   the	   ‘old’	   and	   the	   ‘new’	   elements	   of	   the	   internal	  market:	   the	   fundamental	  
freedoms	   and	   competition	   policy,	   on	   the	   one	   hand,	   and	   non-­‐economic	   policy	  
considerations,	  on	  the	  other	  hand.	  The	  analysis	  seeks	  to	  answer	  the	  questions	  of	  how	  do	  
various	  non-­‐economic	  elements	  affect	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  internal	  market	  and	  whether	  they	  
can	  be	  considered	  sine	  qua	  non	  in	  order	  to	  ensure	  the	  setting	  up	  and	  proper	  functioning	  
of	   the	   internal	   market	   as	   envisaged	   by	   the	   contracting	   parties.	   Section	   2	   provides	   an	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insight	  into	  the	  terminology	  surrounding	  the	  internal	  market	  project	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  
identifying	   the	   proper	   term	   for	   the	  market	   constellation	   created	   by	   the	  acquis	   export.	  
Section	   3	   gives	   an	   account	   of	   the	   terminological	   questions	   surrounding	   the	   notion	  
‘acquis’.	   Section	   4	   discusses	   the	   ‘traditional’	   core	   of	   the	   internal	   market	   –	   the	  
fundamental	  freedoms	  and	  competition	  policy.	  Section	  5	  is	  dedicated	  to	  the	  various	  roles	  
that	   non-­‐economic	   principles	   play	   in	   the	   internal	   market	   vis-­à-­vis	   economic	   policy	  
concerns.	  The	  choice	  of	  non-­‐economic	  elements	  discussed	  in	  this	  chapter	  is	  limited	  to	  the	  
three	   policy	   areas	   with	   the	   most	   profound	   connection	   to	   the	   internal	   market	   as	  
demonstrated	  by	  literature	  and	  the	  case	  law	  of	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice	  –	  environment,	  social	  
policy	   including	   labour	   policy,	   and	   consumer	   protection	   –,	   and	   the	   protection	   of	  
fundamental	  rights.	  The	  role	  in	  the	  internal	  market	  played	  by	  EU	  citizenship,	  which	  has	  
constantly	   been	   gaining	   importance	   in	   defining	   the	   scope	   of	   individual	   rights	   of	  
movement	  within	   the	  EU,	   is	   considered	   in	   section	  6.	   Finally,	   section	  7	   investigates	   the	  
examples	  of	  two	  particular	  policy	  sectors	  which	  have	  been	  the	  subject	  to	  norms	  export	  –	  
transport	  and	  energy	  –	  in	  order	  to	  determine	  whether	  individual	  sectors	  of	  the	  internal	  
market	   may	   feature	   a	   different	   set	   of	   central	   elements	   than	   the	   internal	   market	   as	   a	  
whole.	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  Defining	  the	  internal	  market	  	  	  
The	   internal	  market	   holds	   a	   central	   position	   in	   the	   European	   integration	   project.	   The	  
EEC	  Treaty	  was	  concluded	  with	   the	  aim	  of	  enhancing	  economic	  prosperity	   through	   ‘an	  
ever	  closer	  union	  among	  the	  peoples	  of	  Europe’.1	  The	  single	  European	  market,	  based	  on	  
the	  removal	  of	  barriers	  to	  free	  trade	  by	  establishing	  the	  free	  movement	  of	  people,	  goods,	  
services	   and	   capital,	   is	   not	   an	   objective	   in	   itself	   but	   rather	   a	  means	   for	   achieving	   the	  
broader	  aims	  of	  the	  Union.2	  Over	  the	  decades	  of	  existence	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  and	  the	  
Communities,	   different	   terms	   have	   been	   employed	   to	   denote	   the	   unified	   European	  
market:	  ‘common	  market’,	  ‘internal	  market’	  and	  ‘single	  market’.3	  	  
                                            
1	  Recitals	  1	  and	  2,	  Preamble	  to	  the	  EEC	  Treaty.	  
2	  Commission,	   ‘White	  Paper	  –	  Preparation	  of	   the	  associated	  countries	  of	  Central	  and	  Eastern	  Europe	   for	  
integration	  into	  the	  internal	  market	  of	  the	  Union’	  COM	  (95)	  163	  final,	  para	  2.1.	  
3	  A	   fourth	   term,	   ‘European	  home	  market’	   is	  used	   in	   the	  meaning	  of	   ‘a	  market	  with	  a	  homogeneous	   legal	  
framework	   in	  which	   it	   is	   possible	   not	   only	   to	  move	   between	  Member	   States	   but	   also	   to	   operate	  within	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2.1	  Common	  market	  
The	  origins	  of	  the	  ‘common	  market’	  –	  the	  original	  term	  used	  in	  the	  EEC	  Treaty	  –	  can	  be	  
found	  in	   international	  trade	  law.	  A	  common	  market	  features	  the	  removal	  of	  barriers	  to	  
trade,	  the	  freedom	  of	  movement	  of	  people,	  services	  and	  capital,	  a	  system	  of	  competition	  
law,	   and	   a	   common	   external	   trade	   policy	   which	   ensures	   undistorted	   competition	   for	  
common	  market	   undertakings	   also	   in	   relation	   to	   trade	  with	   third	   countries.4	   The	   EEC	  
Treaty	   envisaged	   the	   creation	   of	   a	   common	   market	   by	   removing	   customs	   duties	   and	  
eliminating	   quantitative	   restrictions	   and	   measures	   of	   equivalent	   effect	   between	   the	  
Member	  States,	  setting	  up	  a	  common	  customs	  tariff	  and	  a	  common	  external	  commercial	  
policy,	  and	  abolishing	  restrictions	  to	  the	  free	  movement	  of	  persons,	  services	  and	  capital.5	  
The	  Treaty	  also	  contained	  common	  agricultural	  and	  transport	  policies,	  and	  a	  system	  of	  
competition	  law.	  The	  transitional	  period	  for	  completing	  the	  common	  market	  was	  set	  to	  
end	  on	  1	   January	  1970.	  On	  1	   July	  1968,	   the	  Customs	  Union	  between	   the	  EEC	  Member	  
States	  entered	  into	  force,	  abolishing	  customs	  duties	  on	  trade	  within	  the	  EEC	  and	  setting	  
up	  a	  common	  customs	  tariff	  and	  a	  common	  trade	  policy.	  
Neither	   the	  EEC	  Treaty	  nor	   the	   subsequent	   amending	   treaties	  provided	  a	  definition	  of	  
the	  common	  market.	  In	  literature,	  the	  common	  market	  has	  been	  defined	  as	  ’a	  market	  in	  
which	   every	   participant	   within	   the	   Community	   in	   question	   is	   free	   to	   invest,	   produce,	  
work,	  buy	  and	  sell,	   to	  supply	  or	  obtain	  services	  under	  conditions	  of	  competition	  which	  
have	  not	  been	  artificially	  distorted	  wherever	  economic	  conditions	  are	  most	  favourable.’6	  
The	   definition	   includes	   the	   aspects	   of	   the	   four	   fundamental	   freedoms	   and	   undistorted	  
competition	  but	  lacks	  the	  external	  aspect	  –	  the	  common	  external	  trade	  policy.	  
In	  the	  case	  law	  of	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice,	  the	  focus	  of	  the	  definition	  of	  the	  common	  market	  is	  
on	   its	   similarity	   to	   a	   national	   market.	   The	   Court	   elaborated	   on	   the	   objectives	   of	   the	  
common	  market	  first	  in	  Polydor:	  
                                            
Member	  States	  as	  constituent	  parts	  of	  one	  market’:	  K	  von	  Wogau,	  'Completing	  the	  European	  Home	  Market	  
by	  2009'	  (2003)	  38	  Intereconomics	  63,	  64.	  
4	  PJG	  Kapteyn	  and	  P	  VerLoren	  van	  Themaat,	  The	  Law	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  and	  the	  European	  Communities	  
(Kluwer	  Law	  International	  2008)	  115,	  127.	  
5	  Article	  2	  EEC	  Treaty.	  
6	  PJG	  Kapteyn	  and	  P	  VerLoren	  van	  Themaat	  (n	  4)	  127.	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…	   [T]he	   Treaty,	   by	   establishing	   a	   common	   market	   and	   progressively	  
approximating	  the	  economic	  policies	  of	  the	  Member	  States,	  seeks	  to	  unite	  national	  
markets	  into	  a	  single	  market	  having	  the	  characteristics	  of	  a	  domestic	  market.7	  
An	  almost	  identical	  definition	  was	  provided	  in	  Gaston	  Schul:	  
The	   concept	   of	   a	   common	  market	  …	   involves	   the	   elimination	   of	   all	   obstacles	   to	  
intra-­‐Community	   trade	   in	   order	   to	   merge	   the	   national	   markets	   into	   a	   single	  
market	   bringing	   about	   conditions	   as	   close	   as	   possible	   to	   those	   of	   a	   genuine	  
internal	  market.8	  	  
Partial	  terminological	  change	  occurred	  in	  1986	  with	  the	  Single	  European	  Act	  (SEA)9	  but	  
the	  above	  definitions,	  insofar	  as	  they	  highlight	  the	  depth	  of	  market	  integration	  in	  the	  EU	  
and	   compare	   the	   envisaged	   situation	   to	   that	   of	   a	   domestic	   market,	   have	   not	   lost	  
relevance.	  	  
2.2	  Internal	  market	  
The	   SEA	   gave	   new	   breathing	   to	   the	   common	   market	   project.	   It	   set	   a	   deadline	   for	  
completing	   the	   ‘internal	  market’	   by	   31	   December	   1992.10	   A	   Commission	  White	   Paper	  
identified	   the	   measures	   necessary	   to	   complete	   the	   internal	   market	   and	   set	   a	   precise	  
timetable	   for	  meeting	   the	   end	   of	   1992	   deadline.11	   The	  White	   Paper	  was	   exceptionally	  
detailed	  containing	  279	  legislative	  initiatives	  for	  removing	  barriers	  to	  trade	  between	  the	  
Member	  States.	  	  
The	  SEA	  defined	  the	  internal	  market	  as	  ‘compris[ing]	  an	  area	  without	  internal	  frontiers	  
in	   which	   the	   free	   movement	   of	   goods,	   persons,	   services	   and	   capital	   is	   ensured	   in	  
accordance	  with	   the	  provisions	  of	   this	  Treaty’.12	  This	  definition	  has	   remained	  virtually	  
untouched	   by	   the	   subsequent	   treaty	   amendments	   and	   has	   been	   repeated	   in	   almost	  
identical	  wording	  in	  Article	  26(2)	  TFEU.	  	  
                                            
7	  Case	  270/80	  Polydor	  v	  Harlequin	  Records	  [1982]	  ECR	  329,	  para	  16.	  
8	  Case	  15/81	  Gaston	  Schul	  [1982]	  ECR	  1409,	  para	  33.	  	  
9	  The	  SEA	  entered	  into	  force	  on	  1	  July	  1987.	  
10	  Article	  8a	  EEC	  Treaty.	  
11	  Commission,	  ‘White	  Paper	  –	  Completing	  the	  Internal	  Market’	  COM	  (85)	  310	  final.	  	  
12	  Article	  8a	  EEC,	  second	  paragraph.	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A	  significant	  difference	  between	  the	  concepts	  of	  common	  market	  and	  internal	  market	  is	  
the	   lack	   of	   internal	   frontiers	   in	   the	   latter.	   A	   borderless	   market	   was	   novel	   among	   the	  
existing	   FTAs	   and	   customs	   unions	   and	   allowed	   for	   a	   true	   achievement	   of	   the	   free	  
movement	  of	  persons	  and	  goods	  between	  the	  Member	  States.13	  The	  frontier-­‐free	  market	  
was	  accomplished	  by	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  Schengen	  Area:	  first	  by	  cooperation	  between	  EU	  
Member	   States,14	   and	   since	   the	   entry	   into	   force	   of	   the	   Treaty	   of	   Amsterdam	   in	   1999	  
within	   the	   framework	   of	   the	   EU.	   Schengen	   cooperation	   provides	  within	   the	   Schengen	  
Area	   for	   the	   abolition	   of	   border	   controls,	   common	   rules	   for	   crossing	   the	   external	  
borders,	  and	  common	  visa	  rules	  for	  third	  country	  citizens.	  The	  introduction	  of	  Schengen	  
rules	  has	  changed	  the	  substance	  of	  the	  freedom	  of	  movement.	  The	  right	  to	  move	  freely	  
within	   the	   internal	  market	  was	   originally	   vested	  with	   economically	   active	   individuals:	  
workers	  and	  providers	  and	  receivers	  of	  services.	  Now	  the	  freedom	  of	  movement	  applies	  
to	  all	  individuals	  in	  the	  Schengen	  Area,	  including	  EU	  citizens	  as	  well	  as	  non-­‐citizens	  upon	  
their	   entry	   into	   the	   area.15	   The	   changes	   in	   the	   concept	   of	   the	   internal	  market	   do	   not,	  
however,	  apply	  to	  the	  Member	  States	  that	  have	  either	  opted	  out	  from16	  or	  have	  not	  yet	  
joined	  the	  Schengen	  framework.17	  As	  concerns	  the	  free	  movement	  of	  persons,	  in	  practice,	  
the	  EU’s	  internal	  market	  does	  thus	  not	  correspond	  to	  an	  area	  without	  internal	  frontiers.	  	  
Notwithstanding	  the	  abolition	  of	  internal	  borders,	  a	  comparison	  of	  the	  definitions	  of	  the	  
common	  market	   and	   the	   internal	  market	   reveals	   the	   strikingly	   narrower	   scope	   of	   the	  
latter.	   The	   Court	   of	   Justice	   has	   recognised	   the	   objective	   of	   the	   common	   market	   to	  
resemble	   a	   domestic	   market	   and	   identified	   its	   three	   fundamental	   characteristics:	   the	  
abolition	   of	   barriers	   to	   trade,	   guarantees	   for	   undistorted	   competition	   and	  unity	   of	   the	  
market.18	   Interestingly,	   only	   the	   first	   of	   the	   three	   elements	   is	   formally	   included	   in	   the	  
                                            
13	   In	  the	  areas	  of	   the	  free	  movement	  of	  goods	  and	  services	  and	  freedom	  of	  establishment	  the	  removal	  of	  
borders	  has	  taken	  place	  through	  the	  shift	  towards	  home	  state	  control.	  	  	  	  
14	  In	  1985,	  five	  of	  the	  then	  ten	  Member	  States	  signed	  the	  Schengen	  Agreement	  which	  was	  complemented	  
by	  the	  Schengen	  Protocol	  in	  1990.	  	  
15	  The	  notion	  of	  EU	  citizenship,	  too,	  has	  an	  impact	  on	  the	  freedom	  of	  movement	  of	  persons	  within	  the	  EU.	  
See	   below	   section	   6.	   Also	   S	   Carrera,	   'What	   Does	   Free	   Movement	   Mean	   in	   Theory	   and	   Practice	   in	   an	  
Enlarged	  EU?'	  (2005)	  11	  European	  Law	  Journal	  699;	  N	  Reich,	  'The	  Constitutional	  Relevance	  of	  Citizenship	  
and	  Free	  Movement	  in	  an	  Enlarged	  Union'	  (2005)	  11	  European	  Law	  Journal	  675;	  JD	  Mather,	  'The	  Court	  of	  
Justice	  and	  the	  Union	  Citizen'	  (2005)	  11	  European	  Law	  Journal	  722.	  
16	  Ireland	  and	  the	  United	  Kingdom.	  
17	  Bulgaria,	  Croatia,	  Cyprus,	  Romania.	  
18	  Case	  32/65	  Italy	  v	  Council	  and	  Commission	  [1966]	  ECR	  389;	  Case	  14/68	  Walt	  Wilhelm	  [1969]	  ECR	  1,	  para	  
5;	  P	  Pescatore,	   'Observations	  critiques	  sur	  l'	  "Acte	  Unique	  europeén"'	  in,	  L'Acte	  Unique	  Europeén	  (Institut	  
d'Etudes	  europeénnes	  1986)	  39,	  61.	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definition	  of	   the	   internal	  market.19	  The	  definition	  of	   the	   internal	  market	  comprises	   the	  
four	   fundamental	   freedoms	   but	   excludes	   competition	   policy,	   thus	   providing	   for	   the	  
establishment	  of	  the	  internal	  market	  but	  excluding	  conditions	  for	  its	  functioning.20	  This	  
peculiarity	  proved,	  however,	  not	  to	  be	  decisive	  practice.	  The	  Court’s	  case	  law	  as	  well	  as	  
legislation	  implementing	  the	  internal	  market	  provision	  of	  former	  Article	  14(1)	  EC	  Treaty	  
(now	  Article	  26(1)	  TFEU)	  have	   recognised	   that	   the	   approximation	  provision	   in	  Article	  
95(1)	  EC	  Treaty	  (now	  Article	  114(1)	  TFEU)	  can	  be	  used	  for	  adopting	  measures	  that	  aim	  
at	   preventing	   distortions	   of	   competition.21	   Both	   Article	   95(1)	   EC	   Treaty	   and	   Article	  
114(1)	  TFEU	  use	  the	  language	  of	  approximating	  measures	  in	  Member	  States	  which	  have	  
as	   their	   objective	   the	   ‘establishment	   and	   functioning	   of	   the	   internal	   market’.	   Since	  
undistorted	   competition	   is	   indispensable	   for	   the	   functioning	   of	   the	   market,	   the	  
competition	  element	  continues	  to	  be	  included	  in	  the	  internal	  market	  package	  despite	  the	  
restrictive	  scope	  of	  the	  definition.	  The	  role	  of	  competition	  rules	  in	  ensuring	  the	  operation	  
of	  the	  internal	  market	  is,	  furthermore,	  explicitly	  provided	  in	  Article	  3(1)(b)	  TFEU.22	  	  
The	   use	   of	   terminology	   in	   post-­‐SEA	   Treaties	   reflects	   the	   imprecise	   but	   potentially	  
broader	  scope	  of	  the	  common	  market	  as	  compared	  to	  the	  internal	  market	  thus	  implying	  
that	   the	   internal	  market	   did	   not	   completely	   replace	   the	   common	  market.	   Article	   2	   EC	  
Treaty,	   for	   instance,	   referred	   to	   the	   common	  market	   as	   a	   stage	   in	  market	   integration	  
alongside	  monetary	  and	  economic	  union	  rather	  than	  a	  concept	  with	  a	  specific	  meaning	  in	  
the	  EU	   context.23	  Other	   provisions	   of	   the	  EC	  Treaty	   point	   at	   a	  more	   ambiguous	  use	   of	  
terminology.	   Article	   3(1)	   EC	   Treaty	   outlined	   the	   activities	   that	   the	   Community	   must	  
undertake	  in	  order	  to	  achieve	  the	  objectives	  of	  Article	  2.	  These	  activities	  included	  both	  ‘a	  
                                            
19	  P	  VerLoren	  van	  Themaat,	   'The	  Contributions	   to	   the	  Establishment	  of	   the	   Internal	  Market	  by	   the	  Case-­‐
Law	  of	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice	  of	  the	  European	  Communities'	  in	  R	  Bieber	  and	  others	  (eds),	  1992:	  One	  European	  
Market?	  (Nomos	  1988)	  109,	  124.	  
20	   R	   Barents,	   'The	   internal	   market	   unlimited:	   Some	   observations	   on	   the	   legal	   basis	   of	   Community	  
legislation'	  (1993)	  30	  Common	  Market	  Law	  Review	  85,	  104.	  
21	  PJG	  Kapteyn	  and	  P	  VerLoren	  van	  Themaat	  (n	  4)	  127.	  For	  example,	  Case	  C-­‐300/89	  Commission	  v	  Council	  
(Titanium	   dioxide)	   [1991]	   ECR	   I-­‐2867;	   Case	   C-­‐376/98	   Germany	   v	   Parliament	   and	   Council	   (Tobacco	  
Advertising)	  [2000]	  ECR	  I‑2247.	  
22	   ‘1.	   The	   Union	   shall	   have	   exclusive	   competence	   in	   the	   following	   areas:	   …	   (b)	   the	   establishing	   of	   the	  
competition	  rules	  necessary	  for	  the	  functioning	  of	  the	  internal	  market’.	  
23	  ‘The	  Community	  shall	  have	  as	  its	  task,	  by	  establishing	  a	  common	  market	  and	  an	  economic	  and	  monetary	  
union	  and	  by	  implementing	  the	  common	  policies	  or	  activities	  referred	  to	  in	  Articles	  3	  and	  3a,	  to	  promote	  
throughout	   the	  Community	   a	   harmonious	   and	  balanced	  development	   of	   economic	   activities,	   sustainable	  
and	   non-­‐inflationary	   growth	   respecting	   the	   environment,	   a	   high	   degree	   of	   convergence	   of	   economic	  
performance,	  a	  high	  level	  of	  employment	  and	  of	  social	  protection,	  the	  raising	  of	  the	  standard	  of	  living	  and	  
quality	  of	  life,	  and	  economic	  and	  social	  cohesion	  and	  solidarity	  among	  Member	  States.’	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system	   ensuring	   that	   competition	   in	   the	   internal	   market	   is	   not	   distorted’24	   and	   ‘the	  
approximation	  of	  the	  laws	  of	  Member	  States	  to	  the	  extent	  required	  for	  the	  functioning	  of	  
the	   common	  market’.25	   Several	   provisions	   of	   the	   EC	   Treaty	  mirror	   this	   terminological	  
plurality.	   The	   two	   paragraphs	   of	   Article	   15	   EC	   Treaty	   (now	   Article	   27	   TFEU),	   for	  
example,	  referred	  to	  both	  the	  ‘establishment	  of	  the	  internal	  market’	  and	  the	  ‘functioning	  
of	  the	  common	  market’.	  Articles	  94	  and	  95	  EC	  Treaty	  (now	  Articles	  115	  and	  114	  TFEU)	  
concerned	   the	   approximation	   of	   Member	   States’	   laws,	   regulations	   and	   administrative	  
provisions	  which	  ‘directly	  affect	  the	  establishment	  or	  functioning	  of	  the	  common	  market’	  
and	  ‘which	  have	  as	  their	  object	  the	  establishment	  and	  functioning	  of	  the	  internal	  market’,	  
respectively.	  	  
It	   became	   relevant	   to	   define	   the	   terms	   ‘internal	  market’	   and	   ‘common	  market’	   for	   the	  
purposes	  of	  delimiting	  the	  scope	  of	  Articles	  94	  and	  95	  EC	  Treaty.	  In	  the	  Opinion	  given	  in	  
the	  Titanium	  Dioxide	  case,	  Advocate	  General	  (AG)	  Tesauro	  first	  contended	  that	  the	  ‘area	  
without	   internal	   frontiers’	   provided	   in	  Article	   8a	   EC	  Treaty	   (SEA	  numbering)	  must	   be	  
regarded	   as	   ‘a	   truly	   integrated	   area	   where	   the	   prevailing	   conditions	   are	   as	   close	   as	  
possible	   to	   those	   of	   a	   single	   internal	   market’	   including	   the	   harmonisation	   of	   rules	  
concerning	  products	  as	  well	  as	  competition	  between	  undertakings.26	  Little	  space	  was	  left	  
for	  a	   restrictive	  definition	  of	   the	   internal	  market.	  The	  AG	   further	  clarified	   that	   the	   two	  
market	  concepts	   ‘differ	   in	  breadth	  in	  that	  the	   ‘common	  market’	  extends	  to	  areas	  which	  
are	  not	  part	  of	  the	  ‘internal	  market’,	  but	  not	  in	  depth,	  in	  that	  both	  concepts	  relate	  to	  the	  
same	   level	   of	   integration’.27	   This	   reasoning	   suggests	   that	   the	   three	   elements	   of	   the	  
common	   market	   –	   the	   abolition	   of	   barriers	   to	   trade,	   guarantees	   for	   undistorted	  
competition	  and	  unity	  of	  the	  market	  –	  are	  equally	  represented	  in	  the	  internal	  market.	  In	  
order	   to	   discern	   the	   real	   difference	   between	   the	   ‘common’	   and	   the	   ‘internal’	   market	  
recourse	  must	  be	  had	  to	  the	  areas	  to	  which	  the	  common	  market	  extends	  but	  the	  single	  
market	   does	   not.	   The	   AG	   did	   not	   specify	   these	   areas	   but	   having	   established	   that	   the	  
prevention	  of	  distortions	  to	  competition	  is	  in	  fact	  included	  in	  the	  internal	  market	  concept	  
they	   could	   include,	   for	   example,	   common	   policies	   such	   as	   environment,	   energy	   and	  
                                            
24	  Article	  3(1)(g)	  EC	  Treaty.	  
25	  Article	  3(1)(h)	  EC	  Treaty.	  
26	  Case	  C-­‐300/89	  Commission	  v	  Council	  (Titanium	  dioxide)	  [1991]	  ECR	  I-­‐2867,	  Opinion	  of	  AG	  Tesauro,	  para	  
10.	  	  
27	  ibid.	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transport,	  or	  the	  harmonisation	  of	  Member	  States’	  legislation	  for	  reasons	  other	  than	  the	  
elimination	  of	  barriers	  to	  trade.28	  	  
In	  connection	  with	  the	  entry	  into	  force	  of	  the	  Lisbon	  Treaty	  in	  December	  2009,	  common	  
market	   terminology	   was	   replaced	   with	   that	   of	   the	   internal	   market	   and	   the	   common	  
market/internal	  market	  distinction	  has	  thus	  lost	  its	  relevance	  in	  today’s	  discourse.	  This	  
is	   not	   to	   say,	   however,	   that	   the	   concept	   of	   internal	  market	   itself	   has	   become	  perfectly	  
intelligible	  or	  that	  the	  term	  ‘common	  market’	  has	  lost	  significance	  as	  a	  general	  notion	  in	  
economic	  law	  literature.	  
Despite	   the	   ambitious	   plans	   and	   partial	   success,	   the	   efforts	   to	   complete	   the	   internal	  
market	  by	  the	  1993	  deadline	  were	  unsuccessful.	  The	  efforts,	  nevertheless,	  continued.	  On	  
30	   October	   1996,	   the	   Commission	   published	   a	   Communication	   on	   the	   impact	   and	  
effectiveness	  of	  the	  single	  market	  followed	  by	  an	  Action	  plan	  for	  the	  single	  market	  on	  4	  
June	  1997.	  In	  the	  Communication,	  the	  Commission	  emphasised	  that	  the	  legal	  framework	  
of	   the	  Single	  Market	  essentially	  requires	   the	  addition	  of	  other	  policy	   instruments,	   ‘first	  
and	   foremost,	   a	   single	   currency’,29	   marking	   a	   move	   from	   a	   common	   market	   to	   a	  
monetary	   union.	   The	   Action	   Plan	   focused	   on	   four	   strategic	   targets:	   increasing	   the	  
effectiveness	  of	  existing	  rules	  by	  improving	  implementation,	  enforcement	  and	  problem-­‐
solving,	   addressing	   key	   market	   distortions	   in	   the	   fields	   of	   taxation	   and	   competition,	  
removing	  sectoral	  obstacles	  to	  market	  integration,	  and	  improving	  the	  role	  of	  the	  citizens	  
through	  eliminating	  internal	  borders	  and,	  importantly,	  reinforcing	  the	  social	  dimension	  
of	  the	  single	  market.30	  	  
The	   Commission	   no	   longer	   strives	   for	   its	   original	   goal	   of	   a	   ‘finalised’	   or	   ‘complete’	  
internal	   market.	   In	   the	   communication	   ‘A	   Single	   Market	   for	   21st	   Century’,	   the	  
Commission	   instead	   highlighted	   the	   dynamic	   character	   of	   the	   internal	   market	   and	   its	  
need	   to	  adapt	   to	   the	  changes	   in	   time.31	  The	  new	  perspective	   takes	   the	   internal	  market	  
beyond	  the	  idea	  of	  eliminating	  obstacles	  to	  cross-­‐border	  trade	  and	  endorses	  the	  need	  to	  
                                            
28	  P	  VerLoren	  van	  Themaat	  (n	  19)	  111.	  
29	  Commission,	   ‘The	  impact	  and	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  Single	  Market’	  (Communication)	  COM	  (96)	  520	  final,	  
para	  5.4.	  
30	  Commission,	   ‘Action	  Plan	  for	  the	  Single	  Market’	  (Communication)	  CSE	  (97)	  1	  final	  (‘Action	  Plan	  for	  the	  
Single	  Market’).	  
31	  Commission,	  ’A	  single	  market	  for	  21st	  century	  Europe’	  (Communication)	  COM	  (2007)	  724	  final	  (‘A	  single	  
market	  for	  21st	  century	  Europe’),	  3.	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take	   into	   account	   the	   consequences	   for	   the	   functioning	   of	   the	   internal	   market	   of	  
globalisation	   and	   increased	   competition,	   new	   economic,	   environmental	   and	   social	  
challenges,	   and	   the	  enlarged	  Union.32	  While	   the	  principles	  of	   the	   single	  market	   remain	  
relevant,	   their	   application	   needs	   to	   adapt	   to	   new	   realities	   and	   right	   balance	   must	   be	  
struck	   between	   a	   market	   without	   frontiers,	   on	   the	   one	   hand,	   and	   labour	   law,	   health,	  
safety	  and	  environmental	   standards,	  on	   the	  other.33	  The	   fact	   that	   the	   common	  policies	  
will	  never	  be	   ‘finalised’34	   insofar	  as	   they	  affect	   the	   internal	  market	  also	  means	  that	   the	  
internal	  market	  concept	  will	  never	  lose	  its	  dynamic	  outline.	  	  
2.3	  Single	  market	  
The	   third	   term	   often	   used	   in	   the	   context	   of	   the	   unified	   European	   market	   is	   ‘single	  
market’.	  The	  notion	  does	  not	  appear	  in	  any	  EU	  Treaties	  but	  is	  frequently	  used	  in	  the	  EU’s	  
policy	   documents.	   The	   term	   ‘single	   market’	   arguably	   dates	   back	   to	   the	   SEA	   which	  
brought	  together	  in	  a	  single	  amending	  act	  amendments	  to	  the	  EC	  Treaty	  and	  provisions	  
on	   European	   Political	   Cooperation,	   the	   predecessor	   of	   Common	   Foreign	   and	   Security	  
Policy	  (CFSP).	  	  
Since	  the	  early	  days	  of	  the	  case	  law	  of	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice,	  ‘single	  market’	  has	  served	  as	  a	  
generic	  term	  denoting	  a	  commonly	  organised	  economic	  space	  without	  barriers	  and	  with	  
fair	   competition	   between	   undertakings,35	   having	   conditions	   similar	   to	   a	   domestic	  
                                            
32	  ibid.	  Already	  the	  4	  June	  1997	  communication	  from	  the	  Commission	  to	  the	  European	  Council	  stated	  that	  
the	   internal	  market	  was	  not	   ‘simply	  an	  economic	  structure’	  but	  set	   ‘basic	  standards	  of	  health	  and	  safety,	  
equal	   opportunities	   and	   labour	   law’:	   ‘Action	   Plan	   for	   the	   Single	   Market’	   (n	   30)	   1.	   As	   one	   of	   the	   four	  
strategic	   targets	   to	   be	   pursued,	   the	   Action	   Plan	   included	   ‘a	   single	  market	   for	   the	   benefit	   of	   all	   citizens’	  
comprising	   social,	   labour	   and	   consumer	   rights	   as	  well	   as	   health	   and	   environment	   issues.	   In	   addition,	   a	  
number	   of	   European	   Councils,	   such	   as	   Lisbon	  March	   2000,	   Feira	   June	   2000,	   Nice	   December	   2000,	   and	  
Stockholm	  March	  2001	  addressed	  the	  non-­‐economic	  dimension	  of	  European	  integration	  and	  its	  effects	  on	  
the	   internal	  market:	   European	   Council,	   ‘Conclusions	   of	   the	   Presidency	   –	   Lisbon,	   23-­‐24	  March	   2000’	   SN	  
100/00;	  European	  Council,	  ‘Conclusions	  of	  the	  Presidency	  –	  Feira,	  19-­‐20	  June	  2000’	  SN	  200/00;	  European	  
Council,	   ‘Conclusions	   of	   the	   Presidency	   –	   Nice,	   7-­‐9	   December	   2000’	   SN	   400/00;	   European	   Council,	  
‘Conclusions	  of	  the	  Presidency	  –	  Stockholm,	  23-­‐24	  March	  2001’	  SN	  100/01.	  
33	   ‘A	   single	   market	   for	   21st	   century	   Europe’	   (n	   31)	   7.	   Later	   reports	   and	   communications	   have	   further	  
elaborated	  on	  the	  non-­‐economic	  aspects	  of	  the	  internal	  market,	  see	  M	  Monti	  ‘A	  New	  Strategy	  for	  the	  Single	  
Market	   at	   the	   Service	   of	   Europe’s	   Economy	   and	   Society’	   report	   to	   the	   President	   of	   the	   European	  
Commission,	  9	  May	  2010;	  Commission	  ‘Single	  Market	  Act:	  Twelve	  levers	  to	  boost	  growth	  and	  strengthen	  
confidence;	  Working	  together	  to	  create	  new	  growth’	  (Communication)	  COM	  (2011)	  206	  final.	  	  
34	  PJG	  Kapteyn	  and	  P	  VerLoren	  van	  Themaat	  (n	  4)	  137.	  
35	   Case	   32/65	   Italy	   v	   Council	   and	   Commission	   (n	   18)	   405;	   Case	   56/65	   Société	   Technique	   Minière	   v	  
Maschinenbau	  Ulm	  GmbH	   [1966]	   ECR	   235,	   249;	   Case	   45/69	  Boehringer	  Mannheim	   v	  Commission	   [1970]	  
ECR	  769,	  786;	  Case	  270/80	  Polydor	  (n	  7);	  Case	  15/81	  Gaston	  Schul	  (n	  8).	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market.36	   The	   single	   market	   does	   not	   have	   a	   specific	   content,	   however,	   and	   does	   not	  
refer	  to	  any	  particular	  degree	  of	  integration.	  
In	  literature,	  the	  terms	  are	  often	  used	  interchangeably	  and	  many	  authors	  do	  not	  see	  the	  
terminology	  question	  as	  decisive.37	  One	  observer	  notes	  that	  ‘common	  market’	  is	  mainly	  
used	  in	  economic	  context,	  single	  market	  in	  political	  discourse,	  and	  internal	  market	  in	  EU	  
documentation	  and	  legislation.38	  The	  terminological	  distinction	  does,	  however,	  maintain	  
relevance	   in	   the	   context	   of	   exporting	   the	   acquis	   to	   third	   countries.	   The	   creation	   of	   a	  
homogeneous	   EU	   internal	  market	   requires	   that	   a	   similar	   level	   of	   integration	   as	   in	   the	  
EU’s	   internal	   market	   is	   transferred	   to	   the	   non-­‐Member	   States.	   The	   visible	   difference	  
between	   the	   internal	   market	   acquis	   in	   the	   EU	   and	   the	   acquis	   exported	   outside	   is	   the	  
objective	  of	  setting	  up	  a	  borderless	  area.	  In	  the	  EU,	  the	  nature	  and	  scope	  of	  the	  internal	  
market	  are	   inseparable	   from	   the	  objective	  of	  ever	  deeper	   integration	   in	  Europe,	  hence	  
the	   gradual	   creation	   and	   expansion	   of	   the	   Schengen	   Area	   that	   now	   belongs	   to	   the	  
‘package	  deal’	  of	   the	   internal	  market.	  The	  multilateral	  agreements	  exporting	  the	  acquis	  
have	   no	   general	   objective	   of	   ever	   deeper	   integration	   in	   Europe,	   parallel	   to	   the	   EU	  
Treaties,	  but	  are	  directly	  connected	  to	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  internal	  market	  in	  the	  specific	  
areas	   covered	   by	   the	   agreements.	   The	   export	   excludes	   Schengen	   acquis	   which	  means	  
that	  the	  objective	  of	  the	  agreements	  cannot	  strictly	  be	  seen	  as	  the	  extension	  of	  the	  EU’s	  
internal	  market	  but	  a	  creation	  of	  a	  single	  market	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  selection	  of	  the	  internal	  
market	  acquis.	  For	   the	  sake	  of	  clarity	  and	  simplicity,	   this	   thesis	  uses	   the	   term	   ‘internal	  
market	   acquis’	   to	   denote	   the	   export	   of	   EU	   market	   norms	   to	   non-­‐Member	   countries	  
notwithstanding	   the	   more	   limited	   scope	   of	   the	   acquis	   and	   a	   lesser	   degree	   of	   market	  
integration	  as	  compared	  to	  the	  EU.	  
3	  Defining	  the	  acquis	  	  
In	   the	  EU,	   the	   term	   ‘acquis’	  appears	   in	  different	  contexts.	   Its	  scope	  and	  meaning	  varies	  
accordingly.	  The	  acquis	   is	  a	   ‘notion	  of	  variable	  content’	   –	   its	   functions	  change	   together	  
                                            
36	  Case	  26/76	  Metro	  v	  Commission	  [1977]	  ECR	  1875,	  para	  20.	  
37	  K	  Mortelmans,	   'The	   common	  market,	   the	   internal	  market	   and	   the	   single	  market,	  what's	   in	   a	  market?'	  
(1998)	  35	  Common	  Market	  Law	  Review	  101,	  107-­‐108.	  
38	   PP	   Craig,	   'The	   Evolution	   of	   the	   Single	   Market'	   in	   C	   Barnard	   and	   J	   Scott	   (eds),	   The	   Law	   of	   the	   Single	  
European	  Market	  (Hart	  Publishing	  2002)	  1,	  40.	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with	  the	  context	  in	  which	  it	  is	  used	  while	  the	  concept	  itself	  remains	  the	  same.39	  One	  talks	  
about	  the	  acquis	  communautaire,	  EU	  acquis,	  internal	  market	  acquis,	  accession	  acquis,	  EEA	  
acquis,	  and	  many	  others.	  The	  term	  is	  frequently	  used	  in	  EU-­‐internal	  as	  well	  as	  external	  
contexts.	  	  
According	   to	  Petrov,	   the	   internal	   and	  external	   contexts	  of	   the	  acquis	   reflect	   the	   steady	  
development	  of	  the	  EU	  and	  the	  practice	  of	  integrating	  candidate	  countries	  into	  the	  Union,	  
respectively.40	  Magen	  sees	  the	  internal	  and	  external	  dimensions	  of	  the	  acquis	  as	  its	  two	  
personalities:	  one,	  an	   inward-­‐looking	  character	  representing	  the	  EU	  patrimony	  and	  the	  
unique	   features	  of	  European	   integration,	   the	  other	  an	  outward-­‐looking	   ‘transformative	  
engagement’	   or	   ‘governance	   export’	   personality	   that	   advances	   the	   EU’s	   norms	   and	  
interests	  outside	  the	  Union	  without	  the	  aim	  of	  integrating	  future	  members	  into	  the	  EU.41	  
Insofar	  as	  it	  is	  arguable	  how	  much	  accession	  policy	  can	  be	  considered	  an	  external	  policy	  
in	   a	   truly	   EU-­‐external	   sense,42	   it	   is	   reasonable	   to	   agree	   with	   Magen	   in	   his	   claim	   that	  
accession	  acquis	   is	  an	  example	  of	  the	  internal	  rather	  than	  external	  dimension	  of	  the	  EU	  
acquis.43	  	  	  	  
One	   of	   the	   functions	   of	   the	   acquis,	   however,44	   the	   one	   of	   integrating	   non-­‐member	  
countries	  into	  the	  EU’s	  internal	  market	  without	  membership	  in	  the	  EU	  by	  exporting	  EU	  
acquis	  does	  not	  fit	  squarely	  into	  either	  the	  internal	  or	  the	  external	  dimension.	  On	  the	  one	  
hand,	  the	  countries	  to	  which	  the	  single	  market	  acquis	  is	  exported	  do	  not	  find	  themselves	  
in	  the	  process	  of	  acceding	  to	  the	  EU,	  which	  suggests	  the	  ‘governance	  export’	  personality	  
of	  the	  exported	  acquis.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  however,	  the	  objective	  of	  such	  norm	  transfer	  is	  
to	   extending	   the	   internal	  market	   to	   include	  non-­‐member	   countries	  or	   integrating	  non-­‐
member	   states	   into	   the	   EU’s	   internal	   market.	   Seen	   from	   this	   perspective,	   the	   acquis	  
serves	   the	   purpose	   of	   maintaining	   homogeneity	   both	   within	   this	   expanded	   internal	  
                                            
39	   C	   Jarrosson,	  La	   notion	   d'arbitrage	   (Librairie	  Générale	   de	  Droit	   et	   de	   Jurisprudence	   1987)	   225.	   Also	   S	  
Weatherill,	   'Safeguarding	   the	   Acquis	   Communautaire'	   in	   T	   Heukels,	   N	   Blokker	   and	   M	   Brus	   (eds),	   The	  
European	   Union	   after	   Amsterdam	   (Kluwer	   Law	   International	   1998)	   153,	   161.	   ‘Unitary	   in	   language	   but	  
binary	  in	  function’:	  A	  Magen,	  'Transformative	  Engagement	  through	  Law:	  The	  Acquis	  Communautaire	  as	  an	  
Instrument	  of	  EU	  External	  Influence'	  (2007)	  9	  European	  Journal	  of	  Law	  Reform	  361,	  362.	  
40	   R	   Petrov,	  Exporting	   the	   Acquis	   Communautaire	   through	   European	   Union	   External	   Agreements	   (Nomos	  
2011)	  27.	  
41	  A	  Magen	  (n	  39)	  392.	  
42	  Temporally	   limited	  and	  aimed	  at	   internalising	   something	  external,	   enlargement	   is	   an	  unusual	   form	  of	  
foreign	  policy:	  ibid	  377.	  
43	  ibid.	  
44	  See	  further	  below	  section	  3.3.	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market	  and	  between	  this	  and	  the	  EU’s	  internal	  market	  while	  preserving	  the	  key	  features	  
of	  the	  latter.	  	  	  	  
The	   following	   analysis	  will	   clarify	   the	  different	  meanings	   and	   components	   of	   the	   term	  
‘acquis’	   as	   used	   in	   the	   EU	   context,	   in	   EU	   external	   contexts	   and	   also,	   in	   the	   context	   of	  
exporting	  EU	  internal	  market	  rules	  to	  third	  countries	  by	  multilateral	  agreements.	  	  
3.1	  Acquis	  within	  the	  EU	  
The	   origin	   and	   content	   of	   the	   term	   ‘acquis’	   have	   been	   profusely	   discussed	   in	   the	  
literature.45	   The	   notion	   although	   not	   defined	   anywhere	   in	   the	   Treaties	   signifies	   the	  
accumulation	   of	   rights	   and	   obligations	   that	   the	   Member	   States	   and	   their	   individuals	  
derive	   from	   the	   EU	   Treaties,	   whether	   legally	   binding	   or	   not.	   Until	   recently,	   the	   most	  
common	  use	  of	  the	  term	  was	  in	  conjunction	  with	  a	  reference	  to	  its	  Community	  origin,	  the	  
‘acquis	  communautaire’.	  The	  terminological	  choice	  does	  not,	  however,	  define	  the	  scope	  of	  
the	  notion.	  In	  the	  context	  of	  accession	  to	  the	  EU,	  where	  the	  term	  is	  most	  frequently	  used,	  
the	   obligations	   deriving	   from	   the	   former	   non-­‐Community	   pillars	  were	   incorporated	   in	  
the	   acquis	   communautaire.46	   The	   ‘Union	   acquis’	   used	   in	   parallel	   and	   often	  
interchangeably	   with	   ‘acquis	   communautaire’	   denoted	   the	   rights	   and	   obligations	  
conferred	   by	   the	   Treaty	   on	   European	   Union	   (TEU)	  which	   contained	   provisions	   of	   the	  
former	  second	  and	  third	  pillars.	  Although	  Delcourt	  argues	  for	  the	  possible	  continuing	  use	  
of	  ‘acquis	  communautaire’	  in	  the	  meaning	  of	  a	  timeless	  ‘fundamental	  acquis’47	  or	  the	  EU’s	  
                                            
45	  For	  a	  comprehensive	  overview	  of	  the	  origins	  of	  the	  term	  see	  KE	  Jørgensen,	   'The	  Social	  Construction	  of	  
the	  Acquis	  Communautaire:	  A	  Cornerstone	  of	  the	  European	  Edifice'	  (1999)	  3	  European	  Integration	  online	  
Papers,	  8-­‐10	  <http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/1999-­‐005a.htm>	  accessed	  24	  June	  2015.	  For	  the	  history	  of	  the	  
use	  of	  the	  term	  in	  the	  Treaties	  see	  C	  Delcourt,	  'The	  Acquis	  Communautaire:	  Has	  the	  Concept	  Had	  Its	  Day?'	  
(2001)	  38	  Common	  Market	  Law	  Review	  829,	  829-­‐831;	  R	  Petrov	  (n	  40)	  29-­‐32.	  
46	   For	   example,	   the	   Joint	   Declaration	   on	   Common	   Foreign	   and	   Security	   Policy	   attached	   to	   the	   Treaty	  
concerning	  the	  accession	  of	  the	  Kingdom	  of	  Norway,	  the	  Republic	  of	  Austria,	  the	  Republic	  of	  Finland	  and	  
the	   Kingdom	   of	   Sweden	   to	   the	   European	   Union	   refers	   to	   the	   acquis	   communautaire	   as	   the	   ‘content,	  
principles	  and	  political	  objectives	  of	  the	  Treaties,	  including	  those	  of	  the	  Treaty	  on	  European	  Union’:	  [1994]	  
OJ	  C241/381,	  para	  1.	  For	  further	  examples	  see	  C.	  Delcourt	  (n	  45)	  832.	  According	  to	  Curti	  Gialdino	  ‘acquis	  
communautaire’	  goes	  ‘beyond	  the	  concept	  of	  Community	  law	  strictu	  sensu’	  to	  include	  measures	  adopted	  in	  
the	  field	  of	  external	  relations	  and	  justice	  and	  home	  affairs:	  C	  Curti	  Gialdino,	  'Some	  Reflections	  on	  the	  Acquis	  
Communautaire'	   (1995)	   32	   Common	   Market	   Law	   Review	   1089,	   1092-­‐1093.	   The	   EU	   Glossary	   has	   also	  
contained	  an	  entry	  titled	  ‘Community	  acquis’	  including	  the	  Treaties,	  legislation	  adopted	  in	  the	  application	  
of	   the	   Treaties	   as	   well	   as	   measures	   in	   the	   areas	   of	   CFSP	   and	   Justice	   and	   Home	   Affairs:	  
<http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/glossary/community_acquis_en.htm>	  accessed	  24	  June	  2015.	  
47	  P	  Pescatore,	   'Aspects	   judiciaires	  de	   l’«acquis	   communautaire»'	   (1981)	  20	  Revue	   trimestrielle	  de	  droit	  
européen	  617,	  620.	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‘genetic	   code’	   or	   ‘genetic	   inheritance’,48	   for	   the	   purposes	   of	   this	   study	   such	  
terminological	  distinction	  is	  not	  necessary	  and	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  acquis	  as	  it	  appears	  
within	  the	  EU	  as	  well	  as	  in	  the	  accession	  process	  the	  term	  ‘EU	  acquis’	  will	  be	  used.	  	  
As	  mentioned	  above,	  there	  has	  never	  been	  a	  single	  definition	  for	  the	  acquis,	  the	  ‘holiest	  
cow	  of	  all’,49	  in	  either	  the	  Treaties	  or	  in	  literature.	  Since	  the	  entry	  into	  force	  of	  the	  Treaty	  
of	   Lisbon,	   references	   to	   the	   acquis	   can	   be	   found	   in	   only	   two	   Articles	   in	   the	   Treaties.	  
Article	  20(4)	  TEU	  provides	  that	  acts	  adopted	  in	  the	  framework	  of	  enhanced	  cooperation	  
do	  not	  form	  part	  of	  the	  accession	  acquis	  whereas	  Article	  87(3)	  TFEU	  makes	  a	  reference	  
to	  Schengen	  acquis.	  	  
The	  EU	  acquis	  is	  a	  flexible	  and	  constantly	  evolving	  concept.	  Its	  elements	  can	  be	  classified	  
into	   those	   of	   legislative,	   political	   and	   jurisprudential	   origin	   pursuant	   to	   their	   function	  
and	   institutional	   origin.50	   Legislative	  acquis51	   includes	   the	   body	   of	   legally	   binding	   and	  
non-­‐binding	   acts:	   the	   Treaties	   on	   which	   the	   EU	   is	   founded	   and	   their	   subsequent	  
amendments;	   secondary	   legislative	   acts	   including	   regulations,	   directives,	   decisions,	  
recommendations	   and	   opinions;	   the	   internal	   acts	   of	   the	   EU	   institutions	   and	   inter-­‐
institutional	   agreements;	   international	   agreements	   concluded	   by	   the	   EU,	   mixed	  
agreements,	  and	  agreements	  concluded	  by	   the	  Member	  States	   in	   the	  areas	  of	  exclusive	  
EU	   competence;	   and	   possibly	   also	   the	   acts	   of	   the	   representatives	   of	   Member	   States	  
meeting	  within	   the	   Council	   and	  measures	   adopted	  within	   the	   framework	   of	   enhanced	  
cooperation.	  	  
Political	   acquis	   generally	   comprises	   legally	   non-­‐binding	   acts	   such	   as	   the	   political	  
objectives	   of	   the	   Treaties	   as	   well	   as	   various	   resolutions,	   declarations,	   positions,	  
guidelines,	   principles,	   including	   decisions	   and	   agreements	   adopted	   by	   the	   European	  
Council	  and	  the	  Council.	  Although	  deficient	  of	  legal	  enforceability	  the	  political	  aspects	  of	  
the	  acquis	  have	  some	  legal	  implications.	  Article	  3(3)	  of	  the	  Act	  of	  Accession	  of	  Croatia	  to	  
the	   EU,	   for	   example,	   specifies	   that	   the	   principles	   and	   guidelines	   originating	   from	  
declarations,	  resolutions	  and	  other	  positions	  of	  the	  European	  Council	  and	  the	  Council	  as	  
                                            
48	  C	  Delcourt	  (n	  45)	  835ff.	  
49	   JHH	  Weiler,	   'The	   Reformation	   of	   European	   Constitutionalism'	   (1997)	   35	   Journal	   of	   Common	  Market	  
Studies	  97,	  98.	  
50	  P	  Pescatore,	  'Aspects	  judiciaires	  de	  l’«acquis	  communautaire»'	  (n	  47)	  619.	  
51	  Also	  referred	  to	  as	  normative	  acquis:	  C	  Curti	  Gialdino	  (n	  46)	  1092.	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well	  as	  positions	   ‘concerning	  the	  Union	  adopted	  by	  common	  agreement	  of	  the	  Member	  
States’	  must	  be	  observed	  and	  properly	  implemented	  by	  the	  Member	  States	  as	  well	  as	  the	  
acceding	  Croatia.52	  	  
The	  third	  category,	   jurisprudential	  acquis,	  consists	  of	  the	  case	  law	  of	  the	  EU’s	  judiciary.	  
On	   the	   one	   hand,	   the	   case	   law	   of	   the	   Court	   of	   Justice	   and	   the	   General	   Court	   can	   be	  
regarded	  as	  acts	  of	  an	   institution	  of	   the	  EU,	  albeit	  not	  one	  belonging	  to	  the	  category	  of	  
Article	  263	  TFEU.53	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  case	  law	  of	  the	  Court	  is	  a	  source	  of	  a	  number	  
of	  fundamental	  principles	  such	  as	  direct	  effect,	  primacy,	  efficiency	  and	  unity	  of	  EU	  law.54	  
According	   to	   Pescatore	   these	   principles	   are	   more	   than	   merely	   the	   production	   of	   the	  
Court.	  Instead,	  the	  Court	  could	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  mediator	  expressing	  the	  communis	  opinio	  of	  
the	  whole	  body	  of	  the	  European	  Union.55	  	  
An	   inspection	  of	   the	  diverse	  sources	  of	   the	  acts	  belonging	   to	   the	  acquis	   and	   their	   legal	  
force	  reveals	  that	  all	  elements	  of	  the	  acquis	  are	  not	  equally	  influential.	  Certain	  legislative	  
acts	  and	  parts	  of	  jurisprudence	  pertain	  to	  the	  fundamentals	  of	  the	  Union,	  its	  institutional	  
structure	  and	  legal	  order	  as	  well	  as	  its	  economic	  and	  social	  organisation,56	  whereas	  the	  
effect	  of	  others	   is	  not	  considerable	   in	  establishing	  the	  EU’s	  existence	  and	   identity.	  As	  a	  
result	   of	   a	  direct	   link	  between	   the	  Treaties	   and	   the	   foundational	  principles	  mentioned	  
above	   fundamental	   acquis	   assumes	   a	   constitutional	   rank	   in	   the	   European	   edifice.57	   In	  
case	   of	   a	   conflict	   between	   ‘fundamental’	   and	   ‘non-­‐fundamental’	   acquis,	   therefore,	   the	  
legislative	  and	  political	  acquis	  including	  even	  primary	  law	  will	  have	  to	  recede.	  	  
In	   order	   to	   distinguish	   between	   the	   ‘privileged’	   and	   ‘unprivileged’	   types	   of	  
jurisprudential	   acquis,	   Pescatore	   introduced	   the	   categories	   of	   ‘ordinary	   acquis’	   and	  
‘fundamental	   acquis’,	   dividing	   the	   latter	   further	   into	   ‘structural	   acquis’	   concerning	   the	  
general	  characteristics	  of	  the	  EU	  legal	  order	  and	  ‘material	  acquis’	  relating	  to	  the	  choices	  
made	  with	  respect	   to	   the	  Union’s	  economic	  and	  social	  order	  such	  as	   the	  elimination	  of	  
                                            
52	  Act	  concerning	  the	  conditions	  of	  accession	  of	  the	  Republic	  of	  Croatia	  and	  the	  adjustments	  to	  the	  Treaty	  
on	  European	  Union,	   the	  Treaty	  on	  the	  Functioning	  of	   the	  European	  Union	  and	  to	  the	  Treaty	  establishing	  
the	  European	  Atomic	  Energy	  Community	  [2012]	  OJ	  L112/21.	  
53	  C	  Curti	  Gialdino	  (n	  46)	  1098.	  
54	  P	  Pescatore,	  'Aspects	  judiciaires	  de	  l’«acquis	  communautaire»'	  (n	  47)	  619.	  
55	  ibid.	  
56	  ibid	  620.	  
57	  ibid	  620.	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obstacles	  to	  intra-­‐Community	  free	  trade.58	  Only	  the	  hard	  core	  of	  the	  EU’s	  constitutional	  
framework	  can,	  therefore,	  be	  considered	  ‘the	  Holy	  of	  Holies’.59	  	  
The	  Court	  has	  on	  a	  number	  of	  occasions	  ruled	  on	  conflicts	  between	  fundamental	  acquis	  
and	  acquis	  of	  lesser,	  unconstitutional	  rank.	  In	  Opinion	  1/76,	  for	  example,	  the	  Court	  was	  
asked	   to	   give	   an	   opinion	   on	   the	   compatibility	   of	   the	   Draft	   Agreement	   establishing	   a	  
European	   laying-­‐up	   fund	   for	   inland	   waterway	   vessels	   with	   the	   provisions	   of	   the	  
Treaties.60	  The	  Court	  found	  that	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  Supervisory	  Board	  which	  envisaged	  
an	   ‘extremely	   limited’	   participation	   of	   the	   Community	   institutions,	   and	   the	   decision-­‐
making	  procedure	  in	  which	  the	  Community	  enjoyed	  no	  right	  to	  vote	  were	  impeding	  with	  
the	  Community’s	   independent	  external	  action	  as	  well	  as	  altered	  the	  prerogatives	  of	  the	  
institutions	  and	   the	  Member	  States	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  one	  another.	  These	  consequences,	   in	   turn,	  
would	  affect	  the	  ‘internal	  constitution	  of	  the	  Community’	  and	  were,	  therefore,	  ruled	  to	  be	  
contrary	  to	  the	  requirements	  of	  unity	  and	  solidarity.61	  The	  protection	  of	  the	  institutional	  
aspects	  of	   the	   fundamental	  acquis	  has	  been	  the	  subject	  of	  a	  number	  of	  cases	  discussed	  
below62	   including	   in	  addition	  to	  Opinion	  1/76,	  notably,	  Opinions	  1/9163	  and	  1/9264	  on	  
the	  Draft	  Agreement	  on	  the	  EEA,	  Opinion	  1/00	  on	  the	  proposed	  Agreement	  establishing	  
the	   ECAA,65	   Opinion	   1/09	   on	   the	   Draft	   Agreement	   on	   the	   European	   and	   Community	  
Patents	  Court,66	  and	  Opinion	  2/13	  on	  the	  EU’s	  accession	  to	  the	  ECHR.67	  	  
Not	  only	   the	  structural	  but	   the	  material	  acquis,	   too,	  has	  been	  under	   the	  scrutiny	  of	   the	  
                                            
58	  ibid	  620-­‐621.	  
59	  JHH	  Weiler	  (n	  48)	  98.	  
60	  Opinion	  1/76	  European	  laying-­up	  fund	  for	  inland	  waterway	  vessels	  [1977]	  ECR	  741.	  
61	   ibid	  para	  12.	  Not	  only	  the	  composition,	  structure	  and	  powers	  of	  the	  Supervisory	  Board	  but	  also	  of	  the	  
Fund	  Tribunal	  were	  considered	  incompatible	  with	  the	  Treaties:	  paras	  17-­‐22.	  See	  in	  detail	  below	  chapter	  5	  
section	  3.1.	  
62	  See	  chapter	  5	  section	  3.	  
63	  The	  Court	   ruled	   that	   the	  system	  of	  courts	  set	  up	  by	   the	  envisaged	  agreement	  would	  conflict	   ‘with	   the	  
very	  foundations	  of	  the	  Community’:	  Opinion	  1/91	  EEA	  I	  [1991]	  ECR	  I-­‐6079,	  para	  71.	  
64	  The	  Draft	  Agreement	  was	  approved	  by	  the	  Court	  on	  the	  condition	  that	  the	  competition	  rules	  envisaged	  
therein	   ‘do	  not	  change	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  powers	  of	  the	  Community	  and	  of	   its	   institutions	  as	  conceived	  in	  
the	  Treaty’:	  Opinion	  1/92	  EEA	  II	  [1992]	  ECR	  I-­‐2821,	  para	  41.	  
65	  The	  Court	  reiterated	  the	  considerations	  expressed	  in	  Opinions	  1/91	  and	  1/92	  but	  found	  the	  version	  of	  
the	  ECAA	  Agreement	   submitted	  not	   to	  affect	   the	  autonomy	  of	   the	  Community	   legal	  order:	  Opinion	  1/00	  
ECAA	  [2002]	  ECR	  I-­‐3493,	  para	  46.	  	  
66	  The	  envisaged	  agreement	  ‘would	  alter	  the	  essential	  character	  of	  the	  powers	  which	  the	  Treaties	  confer	  on	  
the	   institutions	   of	   the	   European	   Union	   and	   on	   the	   Member	   States	   and	   which	   are	   indispensable	   to	   the	  
preservation	  of	   the	  very	  nature	  of	  European	  Union	   law’:	  Opinion	  1/09	  Patents	  Court	   [2011]	  ECR	  I-­‐1137,	  
para	  89.	  
67	  Opinion	  2/13	  ECHR	  II	  (Court	  of	  Justice,	  18	  December	  2014).	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Court	  of	  Justice.	  In	  Joined	  Cases	  80	  and	  81/77,	  the	  Court	  found	  that	  the	  powers	  conferred	  
upon	  the	  Community	  in	  the	  field	  of	  Common	  Agricultural	  Policy	  must	  be	  exercised	  with	  
due	  consideration	  given	   to	   the	  unity	  of	   the	  market.68	  Any	  action	   incompatible	  with	   the	  
pursuance	  of	  the	  objective	  of	  the	  unity	  of	  the	  market	  would	  create	  a	  risk	  of	  ‘opening	  the	  
way	   to	   mechanisms	   which	   would	   lead	   to	   disintegration	   contrary	   to	   the	   objectives	   of	  
progressive	   approximation	   of	   the	   economic	   policies	   of	   the	  Member	   States‘,69	   and	   thus	  
violate	  an	  important	  principle	  of	  EU	  law.70	  
In	  addition	  to	  the	  EU	  acquis	  as	  a	  whole,	  frequent	  references	  are	  made	  to	  its	  subdivisions	  
–	   the	   sectoral	   acquis.	   A	   sector	   marks	   out	   a	   segment	   of	   a	   broader	   entity	   and	   sectoral	  
acquis,	  therefore,	  a	  fragment	  of	  the	  general	  concept	  of	  EU	  acquis.	  Sectoral	  acquis	  is	  often	  
used	   in	   connection	   with	   policy	   sectors,	   such	   as	   ‘consumer	   acquis’,	   ‘energy	   acquis’,	   or	  
‘Schengen	  acquis’.	  The	  ‘internal	  market	  acquis’	  also	  forms	  a	  part	  of	  the	  overall	  EU	  acquis	  
and	  can	  be	  divided	  into	  subsections	  such	  as	  the	  ‘acquis	   in	  the	  area	  of	  free	  movement	  of	  
workers’	  or	  ‘competition	  acquis’.	  In	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  clear	  definition	  of	  the	  term	  ‘sectoral	  
acquis’	  that,	  too,	  can	  be	  regarded	  as	  a	  notion	  of	  variable	  content.	  	  
If	   the	   full	   EU	   acquis	   consists	   of	   the	   content,	   principles	   and	   political	   objectives	   of	   the	  
Treaties,	   secondary	   legislation,	   various	   non-­‐binding	   acts	   adopted	   by	   the	   EU’s	   political	  
institutions,	   as	   well	   as	   case	   law	   of	   the	   EU’s	   judiciary,	   what	   are	   the	   components	   of	  
‘sectoral	  acquis’?	  Given	  that	  all	  the	  above-­‐mentioned	  elements	  play	  a	  role	  in	  determining	  
the	  scope	  and	  application	  of	  a	  sector	  of	  the	  acquis	  as	  well	  as	  one	  sector’s	  interaction	  with	  
the	  others,	  sectoral	  acquis	  cannot	  be	  limited	  to	  the	  primary	  and	  secondary	  law	  adopted	  
in	  that	  particular	  field	  only.	  The	  composition	  of	  a	  sector	  of	  the	  acquis	  should	  be	  regarded	  
as	   a	   cross-­‐section	   of	   the	   entire	   EU	   acquis	   comprising	   all	   elements	   relevant	   to	   the	  
application	   of	   the	   substantive	   acquis	   in	   that	   particular	   policy	   area.	   This	   includes,	  
indispensably,	   case	   law	   asserting	   principles	   that	   determine,	   for	   example,	   the	   order	   of	  
precedence	   of	   application	   between	   different	   sectors	   of	   the	   acquis,71	   as	   well	   as	   policy	  
documents	  guiding	  the	  development	  of	  the	  sectoral	  policies.	  	  	  
                                            
68	  Joined	  Cases	  80/77	  and	  81/77	  Commissionnaires	  Réunis	  v	  Receveur	  des	  Douanes	  [1978]	  ECR	  928.	  
69	  ibid	  paras	  35-­‐36.	  	  
70	  W	  Sauter,	   'The	  Economic	  Constitution	  of	   the	  European	  Union'	  (1998)	  4	  Columbia	   Journal	  of	  European	  
Law	  27,	  42.	  
71	  See	  Case	  C-­‐438/05	  Viking	  [2007]	  ECR	  I-­‐10779.	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Taking	  account	  of	  the	  definition	  of	  the	  internal	  market	  provided	  above,	  internal	  market	  
acquis	  includes	  all	  primary	  and	  secondary	  law,	  political	  instruments,	  and	  case	  law	  of	  the	  
EU	   Courts	   pertaining	   to	   the	   establishment	   and	   functioning	   of	   the	   internal	   market,	  
including	   the	   four	   freedoms	   as	   well	   as	   horizontal	   provisions	   on,	   for	   example,	  
competition,	  environment,	  social	  policies	  and	  consumer	  protection.	  As	  both	  the	  internal	  
market	  and	  acquis	  are	  broad	  and	  undefined	  concepts,	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  determine	  exactly	  
which	   instruments	   belong	   to	   the	   internal	   market	   acquis,	   but	   their	   number	   can	   be	  
assumed	  to	  be	  significant.	  
3.2	  Acquis	  outside	  the	  EU	  
Since	   the	   acquis	   became	   an	   export	   article	   through	   the	   EU’s	   external	   policy,	   the	   term	  
‘acquis’	  also	  occurs	  in	  EU-­‐external	  settings.	  This	  applies,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  to	  the	  ‘internal’	  
acquis	  exported	  outside	  the	  Union	  as	  well	  as,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  acquis	  of	  a	  particular	  
EU	  external	  policy,	  e.g.	  trade	  policy	  acquis.	  Out	  of	  the	  four	  categories	  of	  acquis	  identified	  
by	  Curti	  Gialdino	   in	   the	  pre-­‐Maastricht	   setting,72	   two,	   in	   fact,	   the	  Lomé	  acquis	   and	   the	  
EEA	  acquis	  denote	  a	  set	  of	  norms	  of	  EU	  origin	  placed	  outside	  the	  Union.	  
The	  Lomé	  acquis	  consists	  of	  the	  body	  of	  shared	  objectives	  and	  principles	  together	  with	  
provisions	  on	  trade	  preferences	  which	  have	  governed	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  EU	  
and	   the	   African,	   Caribbean	   and	   Pacific	   (ACP)	   Countries	   across	   the	   four	   Lomé	  
Conventions73	  and	  since	  2003	  their	  successor,	  the	  Cotonou	  Agreement.	  Throughout	  the	  
renegotiations	  of	  the	  Lomé	  Conventions	  the	  existing	  structure	  and	  essential	  components	  
were	  carried	  on.	  An	  example	  of	  path	  dependence	  from	  a	  social	  science	  perspective,74	  the	  
preservation	  of	  the	  previous	  political	  and	  legal	  choices	  translates	  into	  the	  maintenance	  of	  
an	  acquis	   in	   legal	   terms.	   The	   foundation	   on	  which	   the	   Lomé	  acquis	   is	   constructed	   is	   a	  
specific	   part	   of	   EU	   acquis	   –	   the	   acquis	   of	   EU’s	   external	   relations	   towards	   the	   ACP	  
countries.	  	  
Just	  as	   the	  Lomé	  acquis,	   the	  EEA	  acquis	   relates	  to	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  EU	  and	  
the	   EEA	   EFTA	   countries.	   Differently	   from	   the	   Lomé	   counterpart,	   though,	   EEA	   acquis	  
                                            
72	  ‘Accession’	  acquis,	  ‘institutional’	  acquis,	  ‘Lomé’	  acquis,	  ‘EEA’	  acquis:	  C	  Curti	  Gialdino	  (n	  46)	  1090.	  
73	  Signed	  in	  1975,	  1979,	  1985	  and	  1989,	  respectively.	  
74	   G	   Forwood,	   'The	   Road	   to	   Cotonou:	   Negotiating	   a	   Successor	   to	   Lomé'	   (2001)	   39	   Journal	   of	   Common	  
Market	  Studies	  423,	  438.	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consists	  of	  the	  core	  of	  the	  EU	  acquis	  –	  the	  internal	  market.	  The	  EEA	  acquis	  is	  composed	  of	  
all	  instruments	  relevant	  to	  the	  establishing	  and	  functioning	  of	  the	  EEA	  including	  the	  EEA	  
Agreement	   together	   with	   annexes	   and	   protocols,	   acts	   referred	   to	   or	   contained	   in	   the	  
annexes,	  decisions	  taken	  by	  the	  bodies	  established	  by	  the	  Agreement,	  and	  case	  law	  of	  the	  
EFTA	  Court	  and	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice.	  Owing	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  only	  the	  first	  two	  of	  the	  four	  
categories	   of	   elements	   constituting	   the	   EEA	   acquis	   feature	   a	   direct	   the	   link	   to	   the	   EU	  
acquis,75	   the	  EEA	  acquis	  as	  a	  whole	  must	  be	  considered	  a	  separate	  entity	  rather	   than	  a	  
limited	  section	  of	  the	  EU	  acquis	  replicated	  in	  the	  EEA.	  	  	  	  	  	  
From	  examining	  the	  use	  of	  the	  term	  ‘acquis’	  in	  the	  EU-­‐external	  context	  it	  logically	  follows	  
that	  every	  international	  agreement	  concluded	  by	  the	  EU	  and	  creating	  a	  political	  and	  legal	  
framework	   as	   a	   platform	   for	   the	   relationship	   between	   the	   EU	   and	   third	   countries	  
potentially	   creates	   a	   new	   ‘acquis’.	   In	   certain	   contexts,	   however,	   the	   component	   of	   EU	  
acquis	  in	  international	  agreements	  deserves	  special	  attention.	  	  
3.3	  Acquis	  expanding	  the	  internal	  market	  
On	  the	  one	  hand,	  multilateral	  agreements	  that	  export	  entire	  sectors	  of	  EU	  acquis	  to	  non-­‐
member	   countries	   establish	   a	   new	   acquis	   –	   EEA	   acquis	   discussed	   above,	   Energy	  
Community	   acquis,	   ECAA	   acquis,	   Transport	   Community	   acquis,	   etc.	   These	   agreements,	  
however,	   contain	   a	   special	   feature	   in	   the	   form	   of	   the	   objective	   of	   establishing	   and	  
maintaining	  a	  homogeneous	   legal	  area	  based	  on	  EU	  acquis	  which	   is	  absent	   in	  other	  EU	  
external	  agreements,	  such	  as	  the	  Lomé	  and	  Cotonou	  conventions	  or	  the	  EU-­‐Switzerland	  
bilateral	   agreements.	   This	   process	   is	   sometimes	   referred	   to	   as	   integrating	   the	   EEA	  
countries’	   economies	   into	   the	   EU	   internal	   market,76	   or	   ‘extending	   the	   full	   rights	   and	  
obligations	  of	  the	  EU’s	  internal	  market’	  to	  the	  EEA	  EFTA	  countries.77	  	  
The	   question	   refers	   back	   to	   the	   distinction	   between	   ‘internal’	   and	   ‘external’	   acquis.78	  
Seen	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  EU,	  exporting	  the	  single	  market	  acquis	  by	  multilateral	  
                                            
75	  The	  term	  acquis	  is	  not	  mentioned	  in	  the	  EEA	  Agreement	  itself.	  
76	   Council,	   ‘Conclusions	   on	   EU	   relations	   with	   EFTA	   countries’	   3060th	   General	   Affairs	   Council	   meeting	  
Brussels,	  14	  December	  2010,	  paras	  3	  and	  7.	  
77	   ‘The	   European	   Economic	   Area	   (EEA),	   Switzerland	   and	   the	   North’	   (European	   Parliament	   website)	  
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/aboutparliament/en/displayFtu.html?ftuId=FTU_6.5.3.html>	   accessed	  
24	  June	  2015.	  
78	  See	  R	  Petrov	  (n	  40).	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agreements	  is	  not	  merely	  a	  question	  of	  foreign	  policy	  towards	  third	  states.	  It	  is	  equally	  a	  
matter	  of	  expanding	   the	   internal	  market,	  albeit	   incompletely	  or	  partially,	  as	  a	   result	  of	  
which	  third	  countries	  become	  participants,	  at	  least	  to	  a	  limited	  extent,	  in	  the	  EU	  internal	  
market.	  The	  very	  aim	  of	  the	  multilateral	  agreements	  is	  to	  integrate	  third	  countries	  into	  
the	   EU	   internal	  market	   rather	   than	   to	   create	   a	   separate	   legal	   order	   constructed	   upon	  
norms	  different	  from	  those	  that	  apply	  within	  the	  EU.	  The	  quest	  for	  homogeneity	  builds	  a	  
bridge	  between	  the	  EU	  acquis	  and	  the	  acquis	  of	  the	  legal	  order	  created	  by	  the	  agreement	  
across	  which	  parts	  of	  the	  former	  are	  transferred	  to	  third	  countries.	  	  
4	  Economic	  principles	  of	  the	  internal	  market	  
According	  to	  AG	  Jacobs,	  the	  underlying	  economic	  ideal	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  has	  been	  
the	   creation	   of	   ‘integrated	   economy	   in	  which	   the	   factors	   of	   production,	   as	  well	   as	   the	  
fruits	  of	  production,	  may	  move	  freely	  and	  without	  distortion,	  thus	  bringing	  about	  a	  more	  
efficient	  allocation	  of	  resources	  and	  a	  more	  perfect	  division	  of	  labour.’79	  Within	  the	  scope	  
of	  these	  broad	  principles,	  ample	  room	  is	  left	  both	  for	  the	  Member	  States	  and	  the	  Court	  of	  
Justice	  to	  carve	  out	  the	  exact	  shape	  of	  the	  internal	  market	  and	  to,	  thereby,	  determine	  the	  
breadth	  and	  depth	  of	  the	  market	  integration	  within	  the	  EU.	  	  
The	  concept	  of	  the	  internal	  market	  is,	  by	  and	  large,	  made	  up	  of	  rights	  and	  principles.	  The	  
definition	   of	   the	   internal	   market	   provided	   in	   Article	   26(2)	   TFEU	   focuses	   on	   the	   four	  
fundamental	   freedoms	   –	   the	   free	  movement	   of	   goods,	   persons,	   services	   and	   capital.80	  
Recital	  1	  of	  the	  preamble	  to	  Protocol	  No	  27	  on	  internal	  market	  and	  competition	  annexed	  
to	   the	   Treaties	   and	   Article	   3(3)	   TEU	   also	   refer	   to	   equal	   conditions	   for	   competition	  
between	  undertakings.	  These	  elements,	  in	  turn,	  are	  substantiated	  by	  two	  principles	  that	  
prescribe	   the	   rules	   governing	   the	   relationships	   between	   market	   participants	   –	   the	  
principles	  of	  non-­‐discrimination	  and	  equality.	  Enshrined	   in	  Articles	  2	   and	  3(3)	  TEU	  as	  
well	  as	  Articles	  8	  and	  10	  TFEU	  as	  horizontal	  provisions,	  these	  principles	  are	  integrated	  
into	  all	  EU	  policies,	  not	  only	  the	  internal	  market.	  
                                            
79	  Joined	  Cases	  C-­‐92/92	  and	  C-­‐326/92	  Phil	  Collins	  [1993]	  ECR	  I-­‐5145,	  Opinion	  of	  AG	  Jacobs,	  para	  10.	  
80	  The	  Commission	  has	  proposed	  to	  promote	   the	   free	  movement	  of	  knowledge	  and	   innovation	  as	  a	   ‘fifth	  
freedom’:	  ‘A	  single	  market	  for	  21st	  century	  Europe’	  (n	  31)	  9.	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In	   literature,	   the	   principles	   of	   non-­‐discrimination	   and	   equality	   are	   often	   used	  
interchangeably	  regardless	  of	  their	  noticeable	  differences.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  the	  principle	  
of	  non-­‐discrimination	  is	  an	  expression	  of	  the	  principle	  of	  equality.	   In	  the	  context	  of	  the	  
internal	  market,	  however,	  it	  refers	  specifically	  to	  the	  prohibition	  of	  discrimination	  on	  the	  
basis	   of	   nationality.	   Provided	   in	   Article	   18	   TFEU	   and	   Article	   21(2)	   of	   the	   Charter	   of	  
Fundamental	   Rights	   of	   the	   European	   Union	   (‘the	   Charter’),	   the	   prohibition	   of	  
discrimination	   on	   grounds	   of	   nationality,	   furthermore,	   has	   a	   strong	   connection	   to	   the	  
concept	   of	   EU	   citizenship,	   applying	   to	   all	   EU	   citizens	   regardless	   of	   their	   status	   as	   a	  
participant	  in	  the	  internal	  market.	  	  	  
The	  principle	  of	  equality,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  in	  addition	  to	  being	  a	  general	  principle	  of	  EU	  
law,	   refers	   to	   two	   kinds	   of	   situations.	   Firstly,	   it	   pertains	   to	   the	   idea	   of	   competitive	  
equality	   between	   undertakings	   operating	   in	   the	   internal	   market	   and	   provides	   a	  
justification	   for	   the	   EU’s	   competition	   policy.	   Secondly,	   the	   principle	   of	   equality	   is	   a	  
horizontal	   provision	   and	   one	   of	   the	   fundamental	   freedoms	   protected	   by	   the	   EU,	  most	  
prominently	  in	  the	  context	  of	  equality	  between	  men	  and	  women	  but	  also	  age	  or	  race.	  The	  
current	  analysis	  focuses	  on	  the	  former	  function	  of	  the	  principle.	  	  
4.1	  Non-­‐discrimination	  
According	   to	   AG	   Jacobs,	   non-­‐discrimination	   is	   a	   fundamental	   principle	   that	   underlies	  
European	  integration.81	  It	  plays	  more	  than	  a	  formal	  role:	  	  
‘[n]o	  other	  aspect	  of	  Community	  law	  touches	  the	  individual	  more	  directly	  or	  does	  
more	  to	  foster	  that	  sense	  of	  common	  identity	  and	  shared	  destiny	  without	  which	  
the	  ‘ever	  closer	  union	  among	  the	  peoples	  of	  Europe’,	  proclaimed	  by	  the	  preamble	  
to	  the	  Treaty,	  would	  be	  an	  empty	  slogan.’82	  
As	   a	   principle	   of	   national	   treatment,	   the	   principle	   of	   non-­‐discrimination	   has	   a	   broad	  
scope	   of	   application.	   It	   applies	   ‘in	   every	   respect	   and	   in	   all	   circumstances	   governed	   by	  
[EU]	   law	   to	   any	   person	   established	   in	   a	   Member	   State’.83	   The	   general	   prohibition	   of	  
discrimination	   on	   grounds	   of	   nationality	   enables	   the	   nationals	   of	   a	   Member	   State	   to	  
                                            
81	  ibid	  para	  10.	  
82	  ibid	  para	  11.	  
83	  Case	  137/84	  Mutsch	  [1985]	  ECR	  2681,	  para	  12.	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undertake	   economic	   activities	   in	   another	   Member	   State	   on	   equal	   terms	   with	   the	  
nationals	   of	   the	   host	   Member	   State.84	   Due	   to	   its	   residual	   character,	   the	   concrete	  
application	  of	  Article	  18	  TFEU	  in	  particular	  policy	  areas	  is	  specified	  in	  other	  provisions	  of	  
the	   TFEU.85	   In	   some	   instances,	   such	   as	   intellectual	   property	   or	   the	   right	   to	   adequate	  
judicial	   remedies	   for	   assisting	   a	   person	   to	   exercise	   or	   enforce	   his	   or	   her	   fundamental	  
freedoms	  Article	  18	  TFEU	  is	  applied	  directly.86	  The	  principle	  of	  non-­‐discrimination	  has	  
direct	  effect87	  and	  can	  even	  be	  enforced	  in	  disputes	  between	  individuals.88	  	  
The	   Court	   of	   Justice	   has	   granted	   the	   principle	   of	   non-­‐discrimination	   broad	  
interpretation.	  In	  Luisi	  and	  Carbone,	  for	  example,	  the	  Court	  recognised	  that	  the	  freedom	  
to	   provide	   services	   also	   had	   a	   passive	   dimension	   –	   the	   freedom	   of	   persons,	   including	  
tourists,	  students	  and	  persons	  receiving	  medical	  services,	  ‘to	  go	  to	  another	  Member	  State	  
in	  order	  to	  receive	  a	  service	  there,	  without	  being	  obstructed	  by	  restrictions’.89	  In	  Cowan,	  
other	  passive	  receivers	  of	  services,	  such	  as	  tourists,	  were	  placed	  under	  the	  protection	  of	  
the	  principle	  of	  national	  treatment.90	  	  
Through	   the	   link	   created	  by	   the	  Court	  of	   Justice	   in	  Martínez	   Sala	   and	   subsequent	   case	  
law	   between	   the	   prohibition	   of	   discrimination	   on	   grounds	   of	   nationality	   and	   EU	  
citizenship,91	   the	   principle	   of	   non-­‐discrimination	   has	   gained	   a	   broader	   scope	   of	  
                                            
84	   Joined	  Cases	  C-­‐92/92	  and	  C-­‐326/92	  Phil	  Collins,	  Opinion	  of	  AG	   Jacobs	   (n	  79)	  para	  14;	   Joined	  Cases	  C-­‐
92/92	  and	  C-­‐326/92	  Phil	  Collins	  [1993]	  ECR	  I-­‐5145,	  para	  32.	  
85	  Case	  C-­‐176/96	  Lehtonen	  and	  Castors	  Braine	  [2000]	  ECR	  I-­‐2681,	  para	  37:	  ‘According	  to	  settled	  case-­‐law,	  
Article	  6	  of	  the	  [EC]	  Treaty,	  which	  lays	  down	  as	  a	  general	  principle	  that	  there	  shall	  be	  no	  discrimination	  on	  
grounds	  of	  nationality,	  applies	  independently	  only	  to	  situations	  governed	  by	  Community	  law	  for	  which	  the	  
Treaty	  lays	  down	  no	  specific	  rules	  prohibiting	  discrimination’.	  See	  also	  Case	  305/87	  Commission	  v	  Greece	  
[1989]	   ECR	   1476,	   para	   13;	   Case	   C-­‐179/90	  Merci	   Convenzionali	   Porto	   di	   Genova	   v	   Siderurgica	   Gabrielli	  
[1991]	  ECR	  I-­‐5889,	  para	  11;	  Case	  C-­‐379/92	  Peralta	  [1994]	  ECR	  I-­‐3453,	  para	  18.	  The	  policy	  areas	  to	  which	  
the	  principle	  of	  non-­‐discrimination	  applies	   include	   the	   free	  movement	  of	   goods	   (Article	  36	  TFEU),	   state	  
monopolies	  (Article	  37(1)	  TFEU),	  the	  common	  agricultural	  policy	  (Article	  40(2)	  TFEU),	  the	  free	  movement	  
of	  workers	  (Article	  45(2)	  TFEU),	  the	  free	  movement	  of	  services	  (Article	  61	  TFEU),	  the	  free	  movement	  of	  
capital	  (Article	  65	  (3)	  TFEU),	  transport	  policy	  (Article	  95(1)	  TFEU),	  competition	  policy	  (Article	  172(2)(a)	  
TFEU),	   approximation	   of	   laws	   (Article	   107(6)	   TFEU),	   association	   of	   overseas	   countries	   and	   territories	  
(Article	   200(5)	   TFEU),	   humanitarian	   aid	   (Article	   214(2)	   TFEU),	   and	   enhanced	   cooperation	   (Article	   326	  
TFEU).	  
86	  Case	  C-­‐398/92	  Mund	  &	  Fester	  v	  Hatrex	  [1994]	  ECR	  I-­‐467,	  paras	  14-­‐15.	  	  
87	  Joined	  Cases	  C-­‐92/92	  and	  C-­‐326/92	  Phil	  Collins	  (n	  84)	  para	  35.	  
88	  Case	  C-­‐413/95	  Bosman	  [1995]	  ECR	  I-­‐4921;	  Case	  C-­‐281/98	  Angonese	  [2000]	  ECR	  I-­‐4139.	  	  
89	  Joined	  Cases	  286/82	  and	  26/83	  Luisi	  and	  Carbone	  [1984]	  ECR	  377,	  para	  16.	  
90	  Case	  186/87	  Cowan	  [1989]	  ECR	  195,	  para	  17.	  
91	  Case	  C-­‐85/96	  Martínez	  Sala	  [1998]	  ECR	  I-­‐2691;	  Case	  C-­‐184/99	  Grzelczyk	   [2001]	  ECR	  I-­‐6193,	  para	  31;	  
Case	  C-­‐413/99	  Baumbast	  [2002]	  ECR	  I-­‐7091,	  para	  82.	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application	  in	  EU	  law	  than	  strictly	  the	  internal	  market.92	  A	  citizen	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  
lawfully	  resident	  in	  the	  territory	  of	  a	  Member	  State	  of	  which	  he	  is	  not	  a	  national	  can	  rely	  
on	  Article	  18	  TFEU	  in	  all	  situations	  which	  fall	  within	  the	  scope	  of	  Community	  law.93	  	  
Within	  the	  internal	  market,	  the	  application	  of	  the	  principle	  of	  non-­‐discrimination	  is	  not	  
restricted	  to	  grounds	  of	  nationality.	  It	  applies	  equally	  to	  cases	  that	  feature	  a	  cross-­‐border	  
element	  but	  where	  the	  nationality	  of	  the	  freely	  moving	  individual	  plays	  no	  role.	  In	  Köbler,	  
for	   example,	   the	   Court	   found	   that	   the	   requirement	   under	  Austrian	   law	   that	   university	  
professors	  be	  employed	  for	  15	  years	  in	  Austrian	  universities	  in	  order	  to	  obtain	  the	  right	  
for	  a	  higher	  grade	  of	  remuneration	  and	  not	  taking	  into	  account	  periods	  of	  employment	  
which	  the	  professors	  may	  have	  accumulated	   in	  other	  universities	   in	   the	  EU	  constitutes	  
discrimination,	   albeit	   not	   on	   grounds	   of	   nationality.94	   In	   the	   internal	   market,	   the	  
principle	   of	   non-­‐discrimination,	   in	   fact,	   applies	   to	   all	   ‘free	  movers’	   regardless	   of	   their	  
nationality,	  residence	  or	  the	  direction	  of	  their	  movement.95	  
The	  principle	  of	  non-­‐discrimination	  requires	   that	  comparable	  situations	  not	  be	   treated	  
differently	  and	  different	   situations	  not	  be	   treated	   in	   the	   same	  way.96	  On	   the	  one	  hand,	  
different	  treatment	  can	  only	  be	  justified	  on	  objective	  basis	  independent	  of	  the	  nationality	  
of	   the	   persons	   concerned	   if	   the	   differentiation	   is	   proportionate	   to	   the	   objective	   being	  
legitimately	   pursued.97	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   different	   treatment	   only	   amounts	   to	  
discrimination	   if	   it	   is	   arbitrary,	   or	   ‘devoid	   of	   adequate	   justification	   and	   not	   based	   on	  
objective	  criteria’.98	  
The	  principle	  of	  non-­‐discrimination	  covers	  both	  direct	  and	  indirect	  discrimination.	  The	  
free	  movement	  of	  goods	  in	  the	  EU	  is	  substantiated	  primarily	  by	  Articles	  34	  and	  35	  TFEU	  
that	  stipulate	  the	  prohibition	  of	  quantitative	  restrictions	  on	  imports	  and	  exports	  and	  all	  
                                            
92	  T	  Tridimas,	  The	  General	  Principles	  of	  EU	  Law	  (Oxford	  University	  Press	  2006)	  p	  132.	  
93	   Case	   C-­‐85/96	  Martínez	   Sala	   (n	   91)	   para	   63;	   Case	   C-­‐184/99	  Grzelczyk	   (n	   91)	   para	   32;	   Case	   C-­‐209/03	  
Bidar	  [2005]	  ECR	  I-­‐2119,	  para	  32.	  
94	  Case	  C-­‐244/01	  Köbler	  [2003]	  ECR	  I-­‐10239.	  Also:	  Case	  C-­‐419/92	  Scholz	  [1994]	  ECR	  I-­‐505;	  Case	  C-­‐18/93	  
Corsica	  Ferries	  [1994]	  ECR	  I-­‐1783;	  Case	  C-­‐224/98	  D’Hoop	  [2002]	  ECR	  I-­‐6191,	  paras	  30-­‐31.	  
95	  N	  Bernard,	   'Discrimination	   and	   Free	  Movement	   in	   EC	   Law'	   (1996)	   45	   International	   and	   Comparative	  
Law	  Quarterly	  82,	  88-­‐89.	  
96	  Case	  C-­‐300/04	  Eman	  and	  Sevinger	  [2006]	  ECR	  I-­‐8055,	  para	  57;	  Case	  C-­‐227/04	  P	  Lindorfer	  [2007]	  ECR	  I-­‐
6767,	  para	  63.	  
97	  Case	  C-­‐148/02	  Garcia	  Avello	   [2003]	  ECR	   I-­‐11613,	  para	  31;	  Case	  C 524/06	  Huber	   [2008]	  ECR	   I-­‐9705,	  
para	  75;	  Case	  C-­‐164/07	  Wood	  [2008]	  ECR	  I-­‐4143,	  para	  13.	  
98	  Case	  139/77	  Denkavit	  [1978]	  ECR	  1317,	  para	  15;	  Case	  106/81	  Kind	  [1982]	  ECR	  2885,	  para	  22.	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measures	  having	  equivalent	  effect.	  A	  definition	  of	  measures	  having	  an	  effect	  equivalent	  
to	  quantitative	  restrictions	  was	  given	  by	  the	  Court	  in	  Dassonville	  and	  includes	  ‘all	  trading	  
rules	   enacted	  by	  Member	   States	  which	   are	   capable	   of	   hindering,	   directly	   or	   indirectly,	  
actually	   or	   potentially,	   intra-­‐Community	   trade’.99	   Some	   commentators	   argue	   that	  
Dassonville	  formula	  was	  an	  attempt	  by	  the	  Court	  to	  depart	  from	  the	  original	  logic	  of	  non-­‐
discrimination,100	   whereas	   others	   disagree.101	   The	   forms	   of	   possible	   measures	   of	  
equivalent	  effect	  are	  numerous	  and	  may	  range	  from	  customs	  measures	  to	  national	  rules	  
on	   intellectual	   property.102	   Furthermore,	   the	   principles	   of	   non-­‐discrimination	   and	  
effectiveness	  also	  apply	  to	  procedural	  law,	  including	  remedies	  and	  sanctions	  giving	  effect	  
to	  EU	  law.103	  
Article	   49	  TFEU	   stipulates	   the	   freedom	  of	   establishment,	   Articles	   56	   and	  62	  TFEU	   the	  
free	   movement	   of	   services,	   and	   Article	   65	   TFEU	   the	   free	   movement	   of	   capital.	   The	  
principle	  of	  free	  movement	  of	  persons	  gives	  right	  to	  both	  employed	  workers104	  and	  the	  
self-­‐employed105	   –	   the	   freedom	  of	   establishment	   –	   to	   look	   for	   and	  undertake	   jobs	   and	  
establish	  themselves,	  respectively,	  in	  another	  EU	  Member	  State.	  In	  this	  context,	  the	  non-­‐
discrimination	  principle	  prescribes	   that	  non-­‐EU	  national	   job	  seekers,	  employees	  or	   the	  
self-­‐employed	  may	  not	  be	  placed	  at	  a	  disadvantaged	  position	  compared	  with	   their	  EU-­‐
national	  counterparts.	  	  
The	  non-­‐discrimination	  model	  is	  strongly	  present	  in	  the	  design	  of	  the	  free	  movement	  of	  
workers	   and	   services.	  Accordingly,	  workers	   and	   service	  providers	   from	  other	  Member	  
States	   are	   not	   to	   be	   treated	   in	   a	   manner	   discriminatory	   as	   compared	   to	   their	   host	  
country	   counterparts.	   Nevertheless,	   the	   non-­‐discrimination	   approach	   is	   incapable	   of	  
breaking	   down	   barriers	   that	   apply	   to	   all	   workers	   and	   service	   providers	   equally	  
regardless	   of	   their	   nationality	   but	   that	   do,	   in	   fact,	   impede	   the	  movement	   of	   labour	   or	  
                                            
99	  Case	  8/74	  Dassonville	  [1974]	  ECR	  837,	  para	  5.	  
100	   JHH	  Weiler,	   'The	  Constitution	  of	   the	  Common	  Market	  Place:	  Text	  and	  Context	   in	   the	  Evolution	  of	   the	  
Free	  Movement	   of	   Goods'	   in	   P	   Craig	   and	  G	  De	  Búrca	   (eds),	   The	   Evolution	   of	   EU	   Law	   (Oxford	  University	  
Press	  1999)	  349.	  
101	   For	   example,	   N	   Bernard,	   'On	   the	   Art	   of	  Not	  Mixing	  One's	  Drinks:	  Dassonville	  and	   Cassis	   de	   Dijon	  
Revisited'	  in	  M	  Poiares	  Maduro	  and	  L	  Azoulai	  (eds),	  The	  Past	  and	  Future	  of	  EU	  Law	  (Hart	  Publishing	  2010)	  
456,	  456-­‐457.	  
102	  PJ	  Oliver	  (ed),	  Oliver	  on	  Free	  Movement	  of	  Goods	  in	  the	  European	  Union	  (Hart	  Publishing	  2010)	  1.	  
103	  Case	  45/76	  Comet	  [1976]	  ECR	  2043;	  Case	  33/76	  Rewe	  [1976]	  ECR	  1989.	  
104	  Articles	  45-­‐48	  TFEU.	  
105	  Articles	  49-­‐55	  TFEU.	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services	   within	   the	   internal	   market.	   The	   ‘market	   access	   approach’	   introduced	   by	   the	  
Court	   in	  Säger	   provides	   that	   the	   freedom	   to	  provide	   services	   includes	   in	   addition	   to	   a	  
prohibition	   of	   discrimination	   on	   basis	   of	   nationality	   also	  measures	  which	   are	   liable	   to	  
prohibit	  or	  otherwise	  impede	  the	  activities	  of	  a	  service	  provider	  established	  in	  another	  
Member	  State	  where	  he	  lawfully	  provides	  similar	  services.106	  The	  same	  line	  of	  reasoning	  
was	   continued	   in	   Kraus	   with	   respect	   to	   restrictions	   ‘liable	   to	   hamper	   or	   make	   less	  
attractive	   the	   exercise	   of	   fundamental	   freedoms’.107	   This,	   surely,	   leads	   to	   the	   potential	  
effect	  of	  undermining	  the	  position	  of	  non-­‐movers	  to	  whom	  national	  regulations	  continue	  
to	   apply	   despite	   being	   declared	   unsuitable	   for	   application	   to	   non-­‐nationals	   or	   those	  
nationals	  who	  have	  exercised	  their	  free	  movement	  rights.108	  	  	  
In	   sum,	   the	  principle	   of	   non-­‐discrimination	  on	   grounds	  of	   nationality	   provides	   that	   all	  
market	   actors	   irrespective	   of	   their	   nationality	   or	   whether	   or	   not	   they	   have	   exercised	  
their	   free	  movement	  rights	  have	  free	  access	  to	  enter	  another	  Member	  State	   in	  order	  to	  
trade	   in	   goods,	   provide	   or	   receive	   services,	   establish	   an	   undertaking,	   take	   up	  
employment	  and	  transfer	  capital.	  This	  principle	  –	  together	  with	  the	  principle	  of	  equality	  
–	   is	   in	   the	   heart	   of	   the	   internal	  market.	   Yet	   the	   actual	   limits	   to	   the	   application	   of	   this	  
provision	  are	  determined	  by	  the	  factors	  discussed	  below	  in	  section	  4.	  	  
4.2	  Equality	  	  
The	  principle	  of	  equality	  is	  a	  fundamental	  principle	  of	  EU	  law.	  Together	  with	  the	  need	  to	  
apply	  EU	  law	  uniformly,	  the	  principle	  of	  equality	  requires	  that	  the	  provisions	  of	  EU	  law	  
for	   the	   interpretation	   of	  which	  Member	   States	   have	   not	   been	   expressly	   authorised	   be	  
interpreted	  in	  an	  autonomous	  and	  uniform	  manner.109	  	  
                                            
106	  Case	  C-­‐76/90	  Säger	   [1991]	  ECR	  I-­‐4221,	  para	  12;	   Joined	  Cases	  C-­‐49/98,	  C-­‐50/98,	  C-­‐52/98	  to	  C-­‐54/98	  
and	  C-­‐68/98	   to	  C-­‐71/98	  Finalarte	  and	  Others	   [2001]	  ECR	   I-­‐7831,	  para	  28;	  Case	  C-­‐255/04	  Commission	  v	  
France	  (Performing	  artists)	  [2006]	  ECR	  I-­‐5251,	  para	  38.	  
107	  Case	  C-­‐19/92	  Kraus	  [1993]	  ECR	  I-­‐1663,	  para	  32.	  
108	  C	  Barnard,	  'Internal	  Market	  v.	  Labour	  Market:	  A	  Brief	  History'	  in	  M	  De	  Vos	  (ed),	  European	  Union	  Internal	  
Market	  and	  Labour	  Law:	  Friends	  or	  Foes?	  (Intersentia	  2009)	  19,	  23.	  
109	   Case	   327/82	   Ekro	   v	   Produktschap	   voor	   Vee	   en	   Vlees	   [1984]	   ECR	   107,	   para	   11;	   Case	   C-­‐287/98	  
Luxembourg	  v	  Linster	  [2000]	  ECR	  I-­‐6917,	  para	  43.	  
 
	   59 
The	   principle	   of	   equal	   treatment	   carries	   several	   functions	   in	   EU	   law:	   unifying	   and	  
regulating	   the	   market	   as	   well	   as	   providing	   constitutional	   protection.110	   The	   market	  
unification	   role	   pertains	   mainly	   to	   the	   non-­‐discrimination	   of	   market	   participants	   on	  
grounds	   of	   nationality.	   The	  market	   regulation	   role,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   concerns	   equal	  
conditions	  of	  competition.	  The	  third,	  constitutional	  role	  of	  equal	  treatment,	  refers	  to	  EU	  
law	  provisions	  on	  gender	  equality	  (Article	  8	  TFEU)	  and	  anti-­‐discrimination	  on	  grounds	  
of	   sex,	   racial	   or	   ethnic	   origin,	   religion	   or	   belief,	   disability,	   age	   or	   sexual	   orientation	  
(Article	   19	   TFEU)	   for	   the	   sake	   of	   protecting	   individual	   rights	   affected	   by	   market	  
integration.	  The	  equality	  principle	  is	  also	  firmly	  vested	  in	  the	  EU	  Charter	  of	  Fundamental	  
Rights:	   in	   Article	   20	   as	   equality	   before	   the	   law,	   and	   in	   Article	   23	   as	   equality	   between	  
women	  and	  men.	  	  
The	  focus	  of	  this	  section	  is	  on	  the	  market	  regulation	  role	  of	  the	  principle	  of	  equality.	  As	  a	  
‘key	  to	   the	  breaking	  down	  of	  protectionist	  barriers	  between	  Member	  State	  markets’,111	  
the	  principle	  of	  equality	  aims	  to	  ensure	  the	  elimination	  of	  distortions	  to	  competition	  in	  
the	  internal	  market.112	  Equal	  competition	  is	  essential	  to	  ensure	  the	  efficient	  functioning	  
of	  the	  market,113	  as	  well	  as	  the	  protection	  of	  public	  interest,	  individual	  undertakings	  and	  
consumers	   and,	   ultimately,	   safeguarding	   the	   general	   economic	   well-­‐being	   of	   the	  
European	  Union.114	   In	  Continental	  Can	   and	  subsequent	  case	   law,	   the	  Court	  emphasised	  
that	   free	   competition	   is	   essential	   for	   the	   general	   functioning	   of	   the	   Treaty	   and,	   in	  
particular,	   for	   the	   internal	   market.115	   Conversely,	   harmonisation	   in	   the	   field	   of	  
competition	   policy	   in	   the	   EU	   is	   limited	   by	   the	   objective	   of	  maintaining	   in	   the	  Union	   a	  
‘harmonious	  development	  of	  economic	  activities’.116	  
The	  Treaties	  provide	  rules	  on	   the	  prohibition	  of	  anti-­‐competitive	  cooperation	  between	  
undertakings	   in	   the	   form	   of	   agreements,	   decisions	   or	   concerted	   practices	   (Article	   101	  
                                            
110	  G	  More,	  'The	  Principle	  of	  Equal	  Treatment:	  From	  Market	  Unifier	  to	  Fundamental	  Right?'	  in	  P	  Craig	  and	  G	  
de	  Búrca	  (eds),	  The	  Evolution	  of	  EU	  Law	  (Oxford	  University	  Press	  1999)	  517,	  518.	  
111	  ibid	  522.	  
112	  Case	  6/64	  Costa	  v	  ENEL	  [1964]	  ECR	  585.	  
113	  Case	  C-­‐126/97	  Eco	  Swiss	  [1999]	  ECR	  I-­‐3055,	  para	  36;	  Case	  C-­‐453/99	  Courage	  and	  Crehan	  [2001]	  ECR	  I-­‐
6297,	  para	  20.	  
114	   Joined	   Cases	   46/87	   and	   227/88	   Hoechst	   v	   Commission	   [1989]	   ECR	   2859,	   para	   25;	   Case	   C-­‐94/00	  
Roquette	  Frères	  [2002]	  ECR	  I-­‐9011,	  para	  42;	  Case	  C-­‐52/09	  TeliaSonera	  [2011]	  ECR	  I-­‐527,	  para	  22.	  
115	  Case	  6/72	  Continental	  Can	  [1973]	  ECR	  215,	  para	  24;	  Case	  C-­‐126/97	  Eco	  Swiss	  (n	  113)	  para	  36;	  Case	  C-­‐
453/99	  Courage	  and	  Crehan	  (n	  113)	  para	  20.	  
116	  Case	  6/72	  Continental	  Can	  (n	  115)	  para	  24.	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TFEU)	  or	  the	  abuse	  of	  dominant	  position	  (Article	  102	  TFEU),	  and	  state	  aid	  (Article	  107	  
TFEU).	  	  	  
Competition	  law	  is	  an	  example	  of	  how	  individuals	  who,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  are	  empowered	  
as	  the	  enforcers	  of	  EU	  law	  may,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  impair	  the	  functioning	  of	  the	  internal	  
market.	   Whereas	   the	   non-­‐discrimination	   principles	   are	   addressed	   primarily	   to	   the	  
Member	   States,	   rules	   on	   competition	   law	   target	   private	   undertakings.	   Without	   any	  
regulation	   of	   competition	   private	   actors	   are	   capable	   of	   erecting	   barriers	   with	   a	  
comparably	  detrimental	  effect	  on	  the	  functioning	  of	  the	  market	  as	  obstacles	  created	  by	  
states,	   thus	   have	   individual	   actors	   become	   the	   subjects	   of	   the	   principle	   of	   equal	  
treatment.117	  The	  direct	  role	  of	  the	  individuals	  in	  the	  internal	  market	  in	  the	  above	  sense	  
is,	  however,	  limited	  to	  the	  sphere	  of	  competition	  law.118	  	  
5	  Non-­‐economic	  considerations	  in	  the	  internal	  market	  
The	   internal	  market	   is	  but	  one	  –	  albeit	   the	  most	  significant	  –	  means	  towards	  achieving	  
the	  broader	  aims	  of	  the	  Union.	  The	  ‘barriers	  which	  divide	  Europe’	  are	  not	  only	  physical	  
or	  constrained	  to	  tariffs	  and	  other	  direct	  barriers	  to	  trade.119	  They	  are	  increasingly	  of	  a	  
social	   nature,	   or	   challenge	   the	   legitimacy	  of	   the	  EU	   legal	   order.	  The	   ‘ever	   closer	  union	  
among	   the	   peoples	   of	   Europe’	   proclaimed	   in	   Article	   1	   TEU120	   inevitably	   includes	  
cooperation	  between	  the	  Member	  States	  in	  non-­‐economic	  policy	  areas	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  
creation	  of	  the	  internal	  market.	  	  
Changes	  in	  the	  context	  in	  which	  the	  internal	  market	  operates	  raise	  questions	  about	  how	  
to	   set	   up	   a	  well-­‐functioning	   internal	  market	   in	   the	  EU.121	   For	   the	   sake	  of	   ensuring	   the	  
political	  viability	  of	  the	  Union,	  the	  EU	  legislator	  and	  judiciary	  cannot	  disregard	  the	  non-­‐
economic	   policies	   that	   shape	   the	   economies	   and	   societies	   of	   the	  Member	   States	  when	  
defining	  and	  implementing	  EU	  policies.	  	  
                                            
117	  P	  Pescatore,	  'Public	  and	  Private	  Aspects	  of	  European	  Community	  Competition	  Law'	  (1986)	  10	  Fordham	  
International	  Law	  Journal	  373,	  383.	  
118	  R	  Lane,	  'The	  internal	  market	  and	  the	  individual'	  in	  N	  Nic	  Shuibhne	  (ed),	  Regulating	  the	  Internal	  Market,	  
(Edward	  Elgar	  Publishing	  2006)	  245,	  252.	  
119	  Recital	  2,	  Preamble	  to	  the	  TFEU.	  
120	  Initially	  in	  the	  Preamble	  to	  the	  EEC	  Treaty.	  	  
121	   M	   Dewatripont	   and	   others,	   Flexible	   integration:	   Towards	   a	   more	   effective	   and	   democratic	   Europe	  
(Monitoring	  European	  Integration	  1995)	  80.	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The	   balance	   between	   the	   economic	   and	   the	   non-­‐economic	   interests	   in	   the	   internal	  
market	   is	   highlighted	   by	   the	   EU	   Treaties	   as	   well	   as	   the	   Charter.	   The	   non-­‐economic	  
dimension	  of	  the	  internal	  market	  is	  explicit	  in	  Article	  3(3)	  TEU	  outlining	  the	  objectives	  of	  
the	  Union.	  Article	  3(3)	  TEU	  mirrors	   the	  deepening	   integration	   in	   the	  EU	  as	  well	  as	   the	  
changing	  needs	  of	  the	  society.	  The	  provision	  asserts	  that	  the	  aims	  of	  the	  EU	  go	  beyond	  
the	  mere	  abolition	  of	  barriers	  to	  the	  free	  movement	  of	  factors	  of	  production	  and	  amount	  
to	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  ‘highly	  competitive	  social	  market	  economy’.	  In	  addition	  to	  economic	  
efficiency,	   this	   social	  market	   economy	   pursues	   a	   number	   of	   social	   and	   environmental	  
objectives	  including,	  for	  example,	  full	  employment	  and	  social	  progress	  and	  a	  high	  level	  of	  
protection	  and	  improvement	  of	  the	  quality	  of	  the	  environment.	  
In	   some	   instances,	   non-­‐economic	   policies	   have	   gradually	   made	   their	   way	   into	   the	  
functioning	   of	   the	   internal	  market.	   In	   others,	   such	   as	   the	   example	   of	   consumer	   policy,	  
they	  have	  exited	  the	  realm	  of	   the	  market.	  Non-­‐economic	  policies	  play	  a	   twofold	  role	   in	  
the	   EU.	   Firstly,	   the	   EU	   pursues	   a	   number	   of	   non-­‐economic	   policies	   in	   addition	   to	   the	  
internal	  market	  project	  –	  employment,	   social	  policy,	  education	  and	  vocational	   training,	  
culture,	   public	   health,	   consumer	   protection,	   environment,	   etc.	   Secondly,	   non-­‐economic	  
considerations	   affect	   the	   establishment	   and	   functioning	   of	   the	   internal	   market.	   Their	  
influence	   takes	   place	   both	   on	   the	   level	   of	   rulemaking	   via	   horizontal	   provisions	   that	  
require	  non-­‐economic	   aspects	   to	  be	   incorporated	   in	   the	  design	  and	   implementation	  of	  
internal	  market	   legislation,	   as	   well	   as	   on	   the	   level	   of	   derogations	   granted	   to	  Member	  
States	   to	   deviate	   from	   the	   fundamental	   freedoms	   and	   rules	   on	   competition.	   In	   the	  
internal	  market	   context,	   therefore,	  non-­‐economic	  principles	  help	   shape	   the	  nature	  and	  
scope	  of	  the	  application	  of	  the	  market	  freedoms.	  
The	   original	   concept	   of	   the	   internal	   market	   is	   subject	   to	   transformation.	   It	   is	  
characteristic	  of	  internal	  market	  legislation	  that	  it	  joins	  together	  both	  economic	  and	  non-­‐
economic	  aspects.122	   	  The	  limits	  of	  the	  internal	  market,	   for	  example,	  are	  determined	  by	  
economic	   considerations	   yet	   derogations	   from	   the	   four	   freedoms	   increasingly	   take	  
account	   of	   non-­‐economic	   concerns.	   The	   case	   law	   of	   the	   Court	   of	   Justice,	   too,	   is	  
                                            
122	  B	  de	  Witte,	   'Non-­‐market	  values	   in	   internal	  market	   legislation'	   in	  N	  Nic	  Shuibhne	   (ed),	  Regulating	   the	  
Internal	  Market	  (Edward	  Elgar	  Publishing	  2006)	  61,	  76.	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accommodating	  towards	  the	  changing	  character	  of	  the	  internal	  market.123	   In	  the	  Viking	  
case,	   for	   example,	   the	   Court	   underlined	   the	   importance	   of	   balancing	   free	   movement	  
rights	  against	  social	  policy	  objectives	  owing	  to	  the	  purposes	  of	  the	  Community	  which	  are	  
social	  as	  well	  as	  economic.124	  	  
The	   Lisbon	  Treaty	   accentuates	   the	   relationship	   between	   the	   internal	  market	   and	  non-­‐
economic	  policy	  aspects	  even	  more	  than	  Article	  2	  of	  the	  pre-­‐Lisbon	  TEU	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  
which	   the	   Court	   ruled	   in	  Viking.	   Article	   2	   TEU	   (pre-­‐Lisbon)	   recognised	   the	   social	   and	  
environmental	  aspects	  of	  European	  integration	  but	  referred	  to	  their	   ‘promotion’	  rather	  
than	   an	   imperative	   for	   the	   Union.125	   The	   integration	   between	   economic	   and	   non-­‐
economic	   policies	   is	   to	   take	   place	   not	   only	   with	   respect	   to	   the	   elaboration	   of	   Union	  
policies	  vis-­à-­vis	   national	   regulation	  but	   also	   as	   regards	   the	  design	  of	   the	  Union’s	   own	  
numerous	  policies.	  Insofar	  as	  many	  non-­‐economic	  policies	  are	  intangibly	  attached	  to	  the	  
free	  movement	  of	  goods,	  persons,	  services	  and	  capital	  and	  rules	  on	  competition	  policy	  it	  
is	   necessary	   to	   explore	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   they	   define	   the	   scope	   of	   the	   fundamental	  
freedoms	  and	  competition	  rules	  in	  the	  EU	  internal	  market.	  
The	   Treaty	   of	   Lisbon	   challenged	   the	   fundamental	   position	   of	   the	   four	   freedoms	   by	  
placing	   them,	   albeit	   as	   first,	   among	   all	   other	   EU	   policies.126	   The	   four	   fundamental	  
freedoms	   and	   competition	   policy	   are	   complemented	   by	   a	   number	   of	   horizontal	   and	  
flanking	  policies	   located	   in	  other	  parts	  of	   the	  TFEU.	  Horizontal	  provisions	  are	   found	   in	  
Article	  8	  on	  equal	  treatment,	  Article	  9	  on	  social	  policy,	  Article	  10	  on	  anti-­‐discrimination,	  
Article	  11	  on	  environment,	  Article	  12	  on	  consumer	  protection,	  and	  Article	  13	  on	  animal	  
welfare.	  Horizontal	  provisions	   require	   that	   the	   relevant	  policy	   considerations	  be	   taken	  
into	   account	   in	   the	   definition	   and	   implementation	   of	   all	   EU	   policies	   and	   activities,	  
including	  the	   internal	  market.	  They	  serve	  a	  dual	   function.	  Firstly,	  horizontal	  provisions	  
such	  as	  environmental	  protection	  must	  be	  taken	  into	  consideration	  by	  EU	  institutions	  in	  
the	  exercise	  of	  the	  powers	  entrusted	  to	  them;	  secondly,	  the	  measures	  of	  environmental	  
                                            
123	   I	   Govaere,	   'The	   Future	   Direction	   of	   the	   EU	   Internal	   Market:	   On	   Vested	   Values	   and	   Fashionable	  
Modernism'	  (2009)	  16	  Columbia	  Journal	  of	  European	  Law	  67,	  72.	  
124	  Case	  C-­‐438/05	  Viking	  (n	  71)	  para	  79.	  
125	  Cf	  ‘shall	  work	  for’	  in	  Article	  3(3)	  TEU	  (post-­‐Lisbon).	  I	  Govaere,	  ‘The	  Future	  Direction	  of	  the	  EU	  Internal	  
Market’	   (n	   123)	   70.	   Article	   114(3)	   TFEU	   sets	   high	   level	   of	   protection	   as	   the	   basis	   for	   approximation	  
measures	  in	  the	  fields	  of	  health,	  safety,	  environmental	  protection	  and	  consumer	  protection.	  
126	  R	  Lane	  (n	  118)	  258.	  	  
 
	   63 
protection	  may	  also	  be	  adopted	  on	  other	   legal	  bases	   than	  those	  specifically	  concerning	  
the	  environment,127	  in	  particular	  in	  the	  exercise	  of	  powers	  relating	  to	  the	  attainment	  of	  
the	   internal	   market.128	   Internal	   market	   harmonisation	   measures	   may	   also	   take	   into	  
account	  other	  policies	  in	  which	  the	  Union	  enjoys	  no	  general	  competence,	  such	  as	  public	  
health,	   but	   the	   measures	   may	   not	   be	   taken	   only	   for	   the	   sake	   of	   protecting	   those	  
objectives.129	  
Horizontal	  provisions	  may	  belong	   to	   the	  same	   fields	  as	   flanking	  policies,	  which	  denote	  
cooperation	   outside	   the	   internal	   market.	   Examples	   include	   environmental	   and	   social	  
policy	  –	  areas	  in	  which	  the	  EU	  enjoys	  competence	  but	  the	  objectives	  of	  which	  also	  need	  
to	   be	   integrated	   into	   EU’s	   other	   policies,	   including	   the	   internal	  market.	   Other	   flanking	  
policies	  are	  common	  policies	  in	  their	  own	  right,	  such	  as,	  for	  example,	  energy,	  transport,	  
agriculture	  and	  fisheries,	  consumer	  policy,	  education	  and	  cultural	  policy.	  The	  rules	  of	  the	  
internal	   market	   do	   not	   apply	   to	   flanking	   policies	   unless	   they	   feature	   an	   economic	  
dimension.130	  Conversely,	  the	  fact	  that	  an	  economic	  activity	  –	  one	  consisting	  of	  offering	  
goods	  or	  services	  on	  a	  given	  market	  –	  has	  a	  relation	  with	  a	  non-­‐economic	  activity,	  such	  
as	  sports,	  does	  not	  preclude	  the	  application	  of	  internal	  market	  rules.131	  	  
Since	  debate	  on	   the	   internal	  market	  almost	   inevitably	   concerns	  matters	   falling	  outside	  
the	   four	   freedoms,	   it	  has	  been	  suggested	   that	   the	   internal	  market	  has	   two	  meanings:	  a	  
narrow	  and	  a	  broad	  one.	  The	  narrow	  meaning	  comprises	  only	  the	  economic	  whereas	  the	  
broad	   meaning	   covers	   economic	   as	   well	   as	   non-­‐economic	   aspects	   of	   integrated	  
Europe.132	  The	  emergence	  of	  a	  broader	  internal	  market	  is	  not,	  however,	  unproblematic.	  
It	  creates	  a	  number	  of	  tensions	  between	  the	  economic	  and	  social	  policies,	  such	  as	  those	  
at	  stake	  in	  Viking.133	  
The	  aim	  of	  this	  section	  is	  to	  highlight	  the	  changes	  in	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  internal	  market	  as	  
a	   result	   of	   the	   interaction	   between	   the	   economic	   and	   non-­‐economic	   considerations	  
therein.	  The	   analysis	   focuses	  on	   three	  major	   groups	  of	   non-­‐economic	   considerations	   –	  
                                            
127	  Articles	  191-­‐193	  TFEU.	  
128	  Case	  C-­‐300/89	  Commission	  v	  Council	  (Titanium	  dioxide),	  Opinion	  of	  AG	  Tesauro	  (n	  26)	  para	  11.	  This	  is	  
notwithstanding	  the	  EU’s	  competences	  in	  the	  field	  of	  environment.	  
129	  I	  Govaere,	  ‘The	  Future	  Direction	  of	  the	  EU	  Internal	  Market’	  (n	  123)	  72.	  
130	  ibid	  74-­‐75.	  	  	  
131	  Case	  C 49/07	  MOTOE	  [2008]	  ECR	  I 4863,	  para	  22.	  
132	  PP	  Craig	  (n	  38)	  1	  and	  37-­‐38.	  	  
133	  PP	  Craig	  and	  G	  De	  Búrca,	  EU	  law:	  Text,	  Cases,	  and	  Materials	  (Oxford	  University	  Press	  2011)	  581.	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environment,	   social	   policy	   and	   consumer	   protection,	   and	   fundamental	   freedoms.	   The	  
first	  subsection	  provides	  brief	  a	  brief	  account	  of	  their	  emergence	  as	  EU	  policies	  and/or	  
components	  of	  the	  internal	  market	  acquis.	  The	  second	  and	  third	  subsections	  discuss	  the	  
two	  levels	  on	  which	  non-­‐economic	  policies	  interact	  with	  the	  fundamental	  freedoms	  and	  
competition	   policy:	   the	   levels	   of	   positive	   integration,	   i.e.	   legislative	   activity	   and	  
harmonisation,	   and	   negative	   integration,	   i.e.	   justifications	   to	   derogations	   from	   the	  
fundamental	  freedoms.	  	  
5.1	  Emergence	  of	  non-­‐economic	  policies	  
Initially,	   the	   Treaties	   envisaged	   the	   creation	   of	   a	   market	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   certain	   legal	  
principles	   pertaining	   to	   its	   economic	   dimension.	   The	   non-­‐economic	   aspects	   of	   trade	  
were	   left	   to	   be	   regulated	   by	   the	  Member	   States.	   Even	   though	   the	   core	   concept	   of	   the	  
internal	  market	   is	   exclusively	   economic	   in	  nature,	   the	   free	  movement	  of	   the	   factors	  of	  
production	  entails	  a	  considerable	  non-­‐economic	  dimension.	  It	  is	  impossible	  to	  disregard	  
non-­‐economic	   interests	   in	   a	   union	   of	   states	   that	   aims	   ever	   deeper	   integration	   both	  
economically	  and	  politically.	   In	   the	  course	  of	  developments	  within	  the	   internal	  market,	  
the	   EU	   gradually	   gained	   additional	   competences	   in	   areas	   previously	   governed	   by	   the	  
Member	  States.	  From	  that	  point	  on,	  it	  fell	  on	  the	  Union	  to	  tackle	  the	  non-­‐economic	  issues	  
closely	  linked	  to	  the	  exercise	  of	  the	  market	  freedoms.134	  	  
5.1.1	  Environment	  
Not	   included	   in	   the	  original	  Treaties,	   the	   first	   step	   towards	  a	  European	  environmental	  
policy	   was	   taken	   in	   1972	   by	   the	   Stockholm	   Declaration,	   which	   recognised	   that	   the	  
interconnection	   between	   the	   rational	   management	   of	   resources	   and	   the	   objective	   of	  
improving	  the	  environment	  require	  a	  coordination	  of	  national	  environmental	  policies.135	  
Following	  the	  Stockholm	  Declaration,	  in	  1973,	  the	  first	  European	  Environmental	  Action	  
Programme	   was	   adopted.136	   The	   Action	   Programme	   acknowledged	   that	   natural	  
environment	  and	   its	   conservation	  are	   important	   to	   ‘the	  organisation	  and	  promotion	  of	  
                                            
134	   S	  Weatherill,	   'On	   the	  Depth	   and	  Breadth	  of	   European	   Integration'	   (1997)	  17	  Oxford	   Journal	   of	   Legal	  
Studies	  537,	  546.	  
135	  Principle	  13,	  1972	  Declaration	  of	  the	  United	  Nations	  Conference	  on	  the	  Human	  Environment.	  	  
136	  Declaration	  of	  the	  Council	  of	  the	  European	  Communities	  and	  of	  the	  Representatives	  of	  the	  Governments	  
of	   the	  Member	   States	  Meeting	   in	   the	   Council	   of	   22	  November	   1973	   on	   the	   Programme	  of	   Action	   of	   the	  
European	  Communities	  on	  the	  Environment	  [1973]	  OJ	  C112/1.	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human	  progress’	  and	  that	  environmental	  concerns	  must,	  therefore,	  be	  integrated	  into	  the	  
planning	   and	   execution	   of	   EU	   and	   national	   policies.	   The	   Action	   Programme	   further	  
identified	   the	   environmental	   aspect	   as	   a	   necessary	   corollary	   to	   the	   aims	   of	   the	   EEC	  
regarding	   the	   ‘harmonious	   development	   of	   economic	   activities	   and	   a	   continuous	   and	  
balanced	   expansion’.137	   Appreciation	   was	   thus	   given	   to	   the	   importance	   of	   integrating	  
environmental	  policy	  objectives	  into	  the	  EEC’s	  economic	  policies.	  	  
In	   1979,	   the	   Court	   of	   Justice	   made	   an	   important	   assertion	   that	   provisions	   on	   the	  
environment	  may,	  indeed,	  be	  adopted	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  Article	  100	  EEC	  Treaty	  (now	  Article	  
115	  TFEU)	  due	  to	  the	  potential	  adverse	  effects	  of	  diverging	  environmental	  standards	  on	  
competition	  within	  the	  internal	  market.138	  Exceptions	  from	  the	  harmonisation	  provision	  
of	  the	  then	  Article	  100a	  EC	  Treaty	  only	  appeared	  in	  the	  Maastricht	  Treaty.	  At	  the	  same	  
time,	  the	  Union	  also	  gained	  powers	  in	  the	  field	  of	  environment	  in	  general.	  
The	  1985	  White	  Paper	  on	  Completing	  the	  Internal	  Market	  did	  not	  include	  a	  full	  overview	  
of	  the	  environmental	  dimension	  of	  the	  internal	  market.	  In	  1988,	  however,	  a	  Task	  Force	  
on	   the	   Environment	   and	   the	   Internal	  Market	  was	   established	  with	   the	   specific	   task	   of	  
identifying	  the	  environmental	  aspects	  of	  the	  internal	  market	  in	  1992.	  	  
The	   horizontal	   provision	   –	   integration	   principle	   –	   of	   environmental	   policy	   was	   first	  
introduced	   by	   the	   SEA	   in	   1987.139	   In	   the	   Maastricht	   Treaty,140	   the	   provision	   was	  
reworded	   to	   avoid	   giving	   it	   direct	   effect.141	   Allegedly,	   the	   reason	   for	   not	   granting	  
environmental	  policy	  direct	  effect	  lies	  in	  its	  undetermined	  scope	  and	  nature.142	  	  
Article	  2	  of	  the	  Maastricht	  Treaty	  provided	  that	  sustainable	  growth	  and	  respect	  for	  the	  
environment	   must	   be	   promoted	   across	   the	   Community.	   In	   the	   Treaty	   of	   Amsterdam,	  
‘sustainable	  growth’	  was	   replaced	  by	   the	  principle	  of	   ‘sustainable	  development’,	   to	   the	  
                                            
137	  Article	  2	  EEC	  Treaty.	  
138	  Case	  91/79	  Commission	  v	  Italy	  [1980]	  ECR	  I-­‐1099,	  para	  8.	  
139	   Article	   130r(2)	   EEC	   Treaty	   (SEA	   numbering):	   ‘Environmental	   protection	   requirements	   shall	   be	   a	  
component	  of	  the	  Community’s	  other	  policies.’	  	  
140	   Article	   130r(2)	   EC	   Treaty	   (Maastricht):	   ‘Environmental	   protection	   requirements	  must	   be	   integrated	  
into	  the	  definition	  and	  implementation	  of	  other	  Community	  policies.’	  
141	  L	  Krämer,	   'Giving	  a	  voice	  to	  the	  environment	  by	  challenging	  the	  practice	  of	  integrating	  environmental	  
requirements	  into	  other	  EU	  policies'	  in	  S	  Kingston	  (ed),	  European	  Perspectives	  on	  Environmental	  Law	  and	  
Governance	  (Routledge	  2013)	  83,	  86-­‐87.	  	  
142	   M	   Hession	   and	   R	   Macrory,	   'Balancing	   Trade	   Freedom	   with	   the	   Requirements	   of	   Sustainable	  
Development'	  in	  N	  Emilou	  and	  D	  O'Keeffe	  (eds),	  The	  European	  Union	  and	  World	  Trade	  Law:	  After	  the	  GATT	  
Uruguay	   Round	   (John	  Wiley	   &	   Sons	   1996)	   181,	   reproduced	   in	   R	  Macrory,	  Regulation,	   Enforcement	   and	  
Governance	  in	  Environmental	  Law	  (Oxford	  University	  Press	  2014)	  473,	  477-­‐478.	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content	   of	   those	   who	   were	   concerned	   about	   the	   role	   of	   environmental	   policy	   in	   the	  
EU.143	  The	  principle	  of	  sustainable	  development	  is	  now	  included	  in	  Articles	  3(3)	  and	  21	  
TEU.	  
The	   Cardiff	   summit	   of	   1998	   heralded	   a	   new	   era	   in	   the	   integration	   of	   environmental	  
effects	   into	  EU	   law	  and	  policies	  by	   setting	  out	   to	   formalise	   the	   integration	  principle	   in	  
decision-­‐making	  and	  implementing	  processes.	  Due	  to,	  among	  others,	  lack	  of	  consistency	  
and	  weak	  political	  commitment	  the	  Cardiff	  process	  has,	  however,	  generally	  been	  deemed	  
to	  have	  failed	  to	  reach	  its	  goals.144	  	  
Amsterdam	   Treaty	   amendments	   moved	   the	   environmental	   integration	   principle	   from	  
the	   chapter	   of	   environmental	   policy	   to	   Article	   7	   of	   the	   ‘Principles’	   section	   of	   the	   EC	  
Treaty.	   Since	   the	   Treaty	   of	   Lisbon,	   a	   significant	   number	   of	   horizontal	   provisions	   are	  
recognised	  by	  EU	  primary	  law	  and	  subject	  to	  being	  integrated	  into	  other	  EU	  policies.	  The	  
‘Provisions	   of	   General	   Application’	   of	   Title	   II	   TFEU	   include,	   in	   addition	   to	   the	   general	  
principle	   of	   consistency	  between	  all	  Union	  policies	   and	   activities	  provided	   in	  Article	  7	  
TFEU	   a	   number	   of	   horizontal	   provisions.	   Interestingly,	   from	   the	   perspective	   of	   the	  
environmental	  law,	  the	  increase	  in	  the	  number	  of	  horizontal	  provisions	  brought	  about	  by	  
the	  Treaty	  of	  Lisbon	  has	  a	  detrimental	  effect	  on	  the	  special	  role	  previously	  accorded	  to	  
environmental	  policy	  as	  the	  ‘original’	  integration	  provision.145	  The	  fact	  that	  more	  aspects	  
are	   to	   be	   considered	   and	   weighed	   against	   the	   market	   objectives	   has	   led	   to	   the	  
environmental	  policy	  losing	  its	  special	  position	  as	  the	  first	  and,	  for	  some	  time,	  the	  only	  
integration	   principle.146	   The	   curtailing	   of	   the	   importance	   and	   status	   of	   the	   economic	  
integration	  principle	  compared	  to	  other	  non-­‐economic	  principles	  in	  the	  internal	  market	  
has	   been	   feared	   to	   lead	   to	   a	   so-­‐called	   ‘minestrone-­‐effect’	   of	   ‘reversed	   integration’	   in	  
which	  many	  aspects	  must	  be	  considered	  but	  none	  of	  them	  to	  a	  particularly	  large	  extent,	  
especially	  vis-­à-­vis	  one	  other.147	  	  
                                            
143	  JH	  Jans,	  'Stop	  the	  Integration	  Principle?'	  (2009)	  33	  Fordham	  International	  Law	  Journal	  1533,	  1538.	  
144	   Commission,	   ‘Integrating	   environmental	   considerations	   into	   other	   policy	   areas-­‐	   a	   stocktaking	   of	   the	  
Cardiff	  process’	  (Working	  Document)	  COM	  (2004)	  394	  final,	  31.	  	  
145	  O	  McIntyre,	  'The	  integration	  challenge:	  Integrating	  environmental	  concerns	  into	  other	  EU	  policies'	  in	  S	  
Kingston	   (ed),	  European	  Perspectives	  on	  Environmental	  Law	  and	  Governance	   (Routledge	  2013)	  125,	  125;	  
On	  the	  Cardiff	  process:	  ibid	  130-­‐131.	  
146	  JH	  Jans	  (n	  143)	  1545.	  
147	  ibid	  1546-­‐1547;	  O	  McIntyre	  (n	  145)	  137-­‐138.	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5.1.2	  Social	  policy	  
Albeit	  appearing	  after	  the	  environmental	  integration	  provision,	  there	  is	  little	  doubt	  that	  
social	  policy	  has	  taken	  up	  a	  role	  comparable	  to	  environmental	  policy	  in	  the	  design	  of	  the	  
internal	   market.148	   Initially,	   social	   policy	   considerations	   played	   barely	   any	   role	   in	   the	  
market	  regulation	  at	  all.	   It	  was	  primarily	   the	  task	  of	   the	  Court	  of	   Justice	  to	  balance	  the	  
growing	   interest	   in	   social	   policy	   with	   market	   integration.	   More	   recently,	   the	   Treaty	  
makers	  and	  EU	  legislator,	  too,	  have	  started	  to	  insert	  into	  EU	  law	  the	  developments	  of	  EU	  
social	  policy	  and,	  especially,	  its	  effects	  on	  the	  internal	  market.	  Social	  policy	  concerns	  are	  
represented	  by	   the	  horizontal	  provision	  of	  Article	  9	  TFEU,	  additional	  provisions	  on	  EU	  
social	   policy	   in	   the	  TFEU,	   and	   appear	   in	   secondary	  EU	   legislation	   such	   as	   the	   Services	  
Directive.149	  
Initially,	   the	   economic	   aspirations	   driving	   European	  market	   integration	   forward	  were	  
aimed	  at	  economic	  development	  and	  free	  competition.	  These	  were	  to	  steadily	  lead	  to	  the	  
most	   efficient	   division	   of	   resources	   and,	   consequently,	   the	   best	   outcomes	   for	   both	   the	  
economies	  as	  a	  whole	  and	  the	  participating	  individuals	  in	  particular,	  the	  latter	  benefiting	  
from	  the	  freedom	  to	  take	  up	  employment	  elsewhere	  in	  the	  European	  Community.	  Social	  
policy	   in	   the	  EC	   first	   included	   cooperation	  between	   the	  Member	   States	   in	   the	   fields	  of	  
employment,	   labour	  law	  and	  working	  conditions,	  equal	  pay	  for	  men	  and	  women,	  social	  
security,	   vocational	   training,	   working	   hours	   and	   holiday	   pay,	   etc.150	   Reliance	   on	   the	  
Member	  States	  was	  reflected	  both	  in	  the	  1956	  Spaak	  Report	  and	  the	  ensuing	  wording	  of	  
Article	  117	  EEC	  Treaty.151	  Social	  policy	   traditionally	  being	   in	   the	  hands	  of	   the	  Member	  
States,	  there	  continues	  to	  be	  a	  certain	  dualism	  between	  the	  market	  and	  social	  policy.	  The	  
tensions	  between	  the	  two	  are	  demonstrated	  in	  Article	  151	  TFEU.152	  The	  tensions	  appear	  
                                            
148	   S	  Weatherill,	   'On	   the	   Depth	   and	   Breadth	   of	   European	   Integration'	   (n	   134)	   547;	  M	   Dewatripont	   and	  
others	  (n	  121)	  93ff.	  
149	   Directive	   2006/123/EC	   of	   the	   European	   Parliament	   and	   of	   the	   Council	   of	   12	  December	  2006	   on	  
services	  in	  the	  internal	  market	  [2006]	  OJ	  L367/36	  (Services	  Directive).	  
150	  Articles	  118-­‐120	  EEC	  Treaty.	  
151	   Article	   117	  EEC	  Treaty	   reads	   as	   follows:	   ‘Member	   States	   agree	   upon	   the	   need	   to	   promote	   improved	  
working	   conditions	   and	   an	   improved	   standard	   of	   living	   for	   workers,	   so	   as	   to	   make	   possible	   their	  
harmonisation	   while	   the	   improvement	   is	   being	  maintained.	   They	   believe	   that	   such	   a	   development	   will	  
ensue	  not	  only	  from	  the	  functioning	  of	  the	  common	  market,	  which	  will	  favour	  the	  harmonisation	  of	  social	  
systems,	   but	   also	   from	   the	   procedures	   provided	   for	   in	   this	   Treaty	   and	   from	   the	   approximation	   of	  
provisions	  laid	  down	  by	  law,	  regulation	  or	  administrative	  action.’	  
152	   ‘The	   Union	   and	   the	  Member	   States	   [...]	   shall	   have	   as	   their	   objectives	   the	   promotion	   of	   employment,	  
improved	  living	  and	  working	  conditions	  [...].	  To	  this	  end	  the	  Union	  and	  the	  Member	  States	  shall	  implement	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both	  in	  the	  delimitation	  of	  the	  respective	  competences	  of	  the	  EU	  and	  the	  Member	  States	  
in	   social	   legislation	   as	   well	   as	   in	   the	   role	   of	   social	   policy	   in	   the	   development	   and	  
functioning	  of	  the	  internal	  market.	  
The	   difficulty	   of	   reaching	   agreement	   as	   to	   the	   role	   of	   social	   policy	  within	   the	   EU	  was	  
demonstrated	  by	  the	  adoption	  of	  the	  Social	  Protocol	  in	  1991	  by	  eleven	  of	  the	  then	  twelve	  
Member	  States.	  The	  purpose	  of	   the	  Social	  Protocol	  was	   to	  accommodate	   in	  EU	   law	   the	  
1989	  Social	  Charter.	  The	  protocol,	  attached	  to	  the	  Maastricht	  Treaty,	  was	  a	  compromise	  
solution	   to	   respect	   the	  wish	   of	   the	  United	  Kingdom	  not	   to	   be	   bound	  by	   the	   envisaged	  
chapter	  on	  Social	  Policy	  in	  the	  EC	  Treaty.	  The	  United	  Kingdom	  had	  the	  possibility	  to	  opt	  
out	  from	  the	  Social	  Policy	  protocol.	  In	  1997,	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  instead	  opted	  in	  to	  the	  
Social	  Protocol,	  the	  provisions	  of	  which	  were	  finally	  incorporated	  in	  the	  EC	  Treaty	  by	  the	  
1997	  Amsterdam	  Treaty.	  Even	  though	  the	  EU’s	  competences	  in	  the	  field	  of	  social	  policy	  
are	  limited,	  the	  internal	  market	  affects	  national	  social	  policies.	  	  
In	   the	   famous	   report	   dating	   back	   to	   1956,	   the	   Spaak	   Committee	   established	   that	  
efficiency	  of	   the	   common	  market	  depends	  on	   the	   free	  movement	  of	   labour	   in	  order	   to	  
secure	   an	   optimal	   allocation	   of	   resources.	   In	   order	   to	   make	   labour	   move	   and,	   thus,	  
achieve	  the	  desirable	  level	  of	  efficiency,	  two	  preconditions	  have	  to	  be	  fulfilled:	  firstly,	  the	  
desire	  of	  workers	  to	  migrate	  and,	  secondly,	  the	  readiness	  of	  host	  states	  to	  receive	  them	  
by	   accommodating	   the	   freedom	   of	  movement	   in	   their	   national	   legislation.153	   The	   dual	  
objectives	  of	  the	  free	  movement	  or	  workers	  have	  been	  affirmed	  by	  the	  Court	  in	  Stanton	  v	  
INASTI,154	  Singh155	  and	  Bosman.156	  	  
The	  aims	  of	  the	  free	  movement	  of	  persons	  go	  beyond	  what	  is	  necessary	  for	  the	  efficiency	  
of	  state	  economy.	  The	  social	  conditions	  under	  which	  labour	  migration	  takes	  place	  in	  the	  
EU,	   too,	   are	   frequently	   under	   scrutiny.157	   The	  welfare	   of	   the	   free	  movers,	   and	   even	   of	  
those	  who	  do	  not	  move,158	  has	  been	  high	  on	  the	  agenda	  of	  both	  the	  founding	  fathers	  of	  
                                            
measures	  which	  take	  account	  of	  the	  diverse	  forms	  of	  national	  practices	  [...].’	  See	  H	  Collins,	  Employment	  Law	  
(Oxford	  University	  Press	  2010)	  20.	  
153	  S	  O’Leary,	  'Free	  movement	  of	  persons	  and	  services'	  in	  P	  Craig	  and	  G	  de	  Búrca	  (eds),	  The	  Evolution	  of	  EU	  
Law	  (Oxford	  University	  Press	  2011)	  499,	  502-­‐503.	  
154	  Case	  143/87	  Stanton	  v	  Inasti	  [1988]	  ECR	  I-­‐3877,	  para	  13	  
155	  Case	  C-­‐370/90	  Surinder	  Singh	  [1992]	  ECR	  I-­‐4265,	  para	  16.	  
156	  C-­‐413/95	  Bosman	  (n	  88)	  para	  94.	  
157	  S	  O’Leary	  (n	  153)	  505.	  
158	  ibid	  506.	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the	  EU,	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice	  and,	  surely,	  also	  the	  Member	  States.	  This	  objective	  of	  the	  free	  
movement	   of	   workers	   was	  made	   explicit	   by	   AG	   Jacobs	   in	  Bettray:	   ‘[L]abour	   is	   not,	   in	  
Community	   law,	   to	   be	   regarded	   as	   a	   commodity	   and	   notably	   gives	   precedence	   to	   the	  
fundamental	  rights	  of	  workers	  over	  satisfying	  the	  requirements	  of	  the	  economies	  of	  the	  
Member	  States.’159	  AG	   Jacobs	   referred	   to	  emphasis	   in	   secondary	   law	   implementing	   the	  
free	  movement	  provisions	  on	   the	   instrumentality	  of	   freedom	  of	  movement	   in	  allowing	  
the	   workers	   to	   improve	   their	   and	   their	   families’	   quality	   of	   life	   and	   employment	   and	  
advance	  their	  social	  conditions.160	  	  
In	  1999,	  a	  call	   for	  modernisation	  of	   the	   internal	  market	  was	   launched.161	  This	  call	  was	  
repeated	  in	  2007162	  and,	  most	  recently,	  in	  2010.163	  The	  2007	  report	  put	  forward	  that	  the	  
first	   step	   in	   the	   creation	  of	   the	   internal	  market	   –	  making	  operational	   the	   fundamental	  
freedoms	  –	  was	   to	  be	  complemented	  by	   the	  second,	   ‘21st	   century’	  step	  geared	   towards	  
enhancing	   the	   functioning	  of	   the	   internal	  market	   in	   the	   interest	  of	   citizens,	   consumers	  
and	   public	   confidence,	   among	   others.164	   Especially	   for	   the	   sake	   of	   the	   latter,	  
sustainability	  as	  applies	  both	  to	  the	  social	  and	  environmental	  dimension	  of	  the	  internal	  
market	  is	  the	  key	  goal	  in	  enhancing	  the	  future	  quality	  of	  life	  in	  the	  EU,	  thus	  broadening	  
the	   understanding	   of	   the	   function	   of	   the	   internal	  market.	   It	   is	   inevitable	   for	   a	   healthy	  
market	  to	  demonstrate	  respect	  for	  labour,	  health,	  safety	  and	  environmental	  standards.165	  
The	  2010	  Report	  recognised	  that	  in	  order	  to	  consolidate	  support	  for	  the	  internal	  market	  
project,	   there	   is	   a	   need	   to	   alleviate	   the	   tensions	   between	   supranational	   market	  
integration	   and	  national	   social	   protection	  policies.166	  The	  problem	  needs	   to	  be	   tackled	  
both	  by	  giving	  greater	  consideration	  to	  Member	  States’	  social	  realities	  in	  internal	  market	  
acquis	  as	  well	  as	  coordinating	  national	  regulatory	  systems	  in	  line	  with	  EU	  principles.167	  	  
                                            
159	  Case	  344/87	  Bettray	  [1988]	  ECR	  1621,	  Opinion	  of	  AG	  Jacobs,	  para	  29.	  
160	  Recital	  3,	  Preamble	  to	  Regulation	  (EEC)	  No	  1612/68	  of	  the	  Council	  of	  15	  October	  1968	  on	  freedom	  of	  
movement	  for	  workers	  within	  the	  Community	  [1968]	  OJ	  L257/2.	  
161	  Commission,	   ‘White	  Paper	  on	  Modernisation	  of	   the	  Rules	   Implementing	  Articles	  85	  and	  86	  of	   the	  EC	  
Treaty’	  [1999]	  OJ	  C132/1.	  	  
162	   ‘A	   single	   market	   for	   21st	   century	   Europe’	   (n	   31).	   Also	   Commission,	   ‘Instruments	   for	   a	   modernised	  
single	  market	  policy’	  (Staff	  Working	  Document)	  SEC	  (2007)	  1518	  final.	  
163	  M	  Monti	  (n	  33).	  	  	  	  
164	  Commission	  ‘A	  vision	  for	  the	  single	  market	  of	  the	  21st	  century’	  (Press	  Release)	  IP/07/214,	  21	  February	  
2007.	  
165	  ‘A	  single	  market	  for	  21st	  century	  Europe’	  (n	  31)	  7.	  
166	  M	  Monti	  (n	  33)	  68.	  	  	  
167	  ibid.	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5.1.3	  Consumer	  protection	  
Just	  as	  in	  the	  cases	  of	  environment	  and	  social	  policy,	  the	  original	  Rome	  Treaty	  contained	  
little	  on	  consumer	  protection.	  References	  to	  consumer	  protection	  were	  limited	  to	  some	  
policies	   such	   as	   agriculture	   and	   competition.	  The	  need	   for	   a	   separate	  Union	   consumer	  
policy	  emerged	  in	  the	  1970s.	  EU	  consumer	  protection	  policy	  is	  considered	  to	  have	  been	  
launched	  at	  the	  1972	  Paris	  Summit	  where	  the	  institutions	  were	  called	  upon	  to	  set	  up	  a	  
plan	   for	   the	   strengthening	   and	   coordination	   of	   consumer	   protection	   within	   the	  
Communities.168	   A	   preliminary	   programme	   for	   consumer	   protection	   and	   information	  
policy	   was	   adopted	   by	   the	   Council	   in	   1975,169	   followed	   by	   a	   second	   programme	   in	  
1982.170	   The	   two	   initial	   action	   plans	   containing	   ‘soft	   law’	   rather	   than	   hard	   legal	  
obligations	   were	   followed	   by	   a	   number	   of	   others,	   yet	   ‘hard	   law’	   in	   EU	   consumer	  
protection	  policy	  did	  not	  emerge	  until	  much	  later.	  
Since	   the	   EEC	   Treaty	   lacked	   a	   separate	   legal	   basis	   for	   EU	   consumer	   protection	   law,	  
legislation	  in	  the	  field	  was	  adopted	  on	  the	  harmonisation	  legal	  basis	  of	  Article	  100	  EEC	  
Treaty	  under	  the	  disguise	  of	  maintaining	  fair	  conditions	  for	  competition.	  From	  the	  very	  
beginning,	  therefore,	  consumer	  protection	  has	  been	  very	  closely	  attached	  to	  the	  internal	  
market.	   In	   the	  SEA,	   consumer	  protection	  was	   inserted	   into	  Article	  100a(3)	  EEC	  Treaty	  
(now	  Article	  114(3)	  TFEU)	  providing	   for	  a	  high	   level	  of	  protection	   in	   consumer	  policy	  
but	  no	  separate	  EC	  consumer	  policy	  was	  created.	  The	  situation	  finally	  changed	  with	  the	  
entry	   into	  force	  of	   the	  Maastricht	  Treaty	  that	   included	  consumer	  protection	  among	  the	  
activities	   of	   the	   Community	   under	   Article	   3(s)	   EC	   Treaty	   and	   introduced	   into	   the	   EC	  
Treaty	  Article	  129(a)(1)	  authorising	  the	  Community	  to	  pursue	  a	  high	  level	  of	  consumer	  
protection.	   The	   latter	   provision	   enabled	   the	   Community	   either	   to	   engage	   in	   consumer	  
protection	   through	   the	   internal	  market	   legal	  basis	  of	  Article	  100a	  EC	  Treaty	  or	   to	   take	  
separate	   action	   in	   the	   field	   to	   support	   and	   supplement	   Member	   State	   activities.	  
Regardless	  of	  the	  possibility	  to	  do	  so,	  recourse	  to	  the	  separate	  consumer	  protection	  legal	  
                                            
168	   ‘Conclusions	  of	   the	   first	  Summit	  Conference	  of	   the	  enlarged	  Community	  –	  Paris,	  19-­‐20	  October	  1972’	  
Bulletin	  of	  the	  European	  Communities	  10-­‐1972.	  
169	   Council	   Resolution	   of	   25	   April	   1975	   on	   a	   preliminary	   programme	   of	   the	   European	   Economic	  
Community	  for	  a	  consumer	  protection	  and	  information	  policy	  [1975]	  OJ	  C92/1.	  
170	  Council	  resolution	  of	  19	  May	  1981	  on	  a	  second	  programme	  of	  the	  European	  Economic	  Community	  for	  a	  
consumer	  protection	  and	  information	  policy	  [1981]	  OJ	  C133/1.	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basis	   is	   still	   seldom	   had.171	   Internal	   market	   harmonisation,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   has	  
assumed	  the	  role	  of	  ‘indirect	  consumer	  policy.’172	  	  
Amsterdam	   Treaty	   added	   a	   provision	   on	   consumer	   protection	   in	   Article	   129a(2)	  
(renumbered	   Article	   153(2))	   EC	   Treaty	   (now	   Article	   169	   TFEU).	   Even	   the	   separate	  
provision	  on	  EU	  consumer	  policy	  has,	  nevertheless,	  not	  brought	  about	  a	  departure	  from	  
the	   internal	  market	   legal	   basis	   of	   Article	   114	   TFEU	   for	   adopting	   consumer	   protection	  
policy	   measures.173	   On	   a	   negative	   side,	   the	   continued	   interconnectedness	   hinders	   the	  
development	  of	  an	  EU	  consumer	  protection	  policy	  independent	  of	  market	  integration.174	  
5.1.4	  Fundamental	  rights	  
Fundamentally,	  the	  question	  of	  balancing	  economic	  rights	  with	  those	  of	  a	  non-­‐economic	  
nature	  translates	  into	  an	  issue	  of	  empowering	  or	  limiting	  individual	  action.175	   	  The	  role	  
of	  individuals	  in	  the	  construction	  of	  the	  European	  edifice	  and	  ensuring	  its	  effectiveness	  
affects	   the	   development	   of	   the	   internal	   market.	   The	   greater	   the	   degree	   to	   which	  
individuals	  are	  affected	  by	  the	  EU,	  the	  greater	  the	  need	  for	  their	  protection.	  Since	  EU	  law	  
binds	   not	   only	   the	  Member	   States	   but	   also	   individuals	   by	   virtue	   of	   the	   direct	   effect	   of	  
some	   of	   its	   provisions,	   it	   is	   important	   that	   adequate	   fundamental	   rights	   protection	   be	  
provided	  also	  on	  EU	  level.	  	  
The	  ever	  stronger	  protection	  of	  fundamental	  rights	  in	  the	  EU	  owes	  greatly	  to	  the	  Member	  
States’	   perception	   of	   the	   lack	   of	   such	   protection.	   National	   constitutional	   courts	   were	  
increasingly	   taking	   the	  matter	  of	  ensuring	   the	  observance	  of	   fundamental	   rights	   in	   the	  
field	  of	  application	  EU	  law	  into	  their	  own	  hands.	  This	  triggered	  the	  EU	  to	  create	  an	  own	  
catalogue	  of	  rights	  that	  apply	  to	  all	  EU	  law	  in	  order	  to	  avoid	  national	  courts	  undermining	  
the	   autonomy	   of	   the	   EU	   legal	   order	   by	   means	   of	   relying	   on	   the	   fundamental	   rights	  
protection	  accorded	  by	  national	  constitutions	  and	  thereby	  challenging	  the	  primacy	  of	  EU	  
law.176	  The	  most	  active	  national	  court	  in	  this	  regard	  has	  been	  the	  German	  Constitutional	  
Court.	   It	   has	   frequently	   made	   its	   respect	   for	   the	   jurisdiction	   of	   the	   Court	   of	   Justice	  
                                            
171	  T	  Bourgoignie,	   'European	  Community	  Consumer	  Law	  and	  Policy:	   from	  Rome	  to	  Amsterdam'	  (1998)	  6	  
Consumer	  Law	  Journal	  443,	  447.	  
172	  S	  Weatherill,	  EU	  Consumer	  Law	  and	  Policy	  (Edward	  Elgar	  Publishing	  2013)	  11.	  
173	  I	  Benöhr,	  EU	  Consumer	  Law	  and	  Human	  Rights	  (Oxford	  University	  Press	  2013)	  42.	  
174	  ibid	  43.	  
175	  M	  Hession	  and	  R	  Macrory	  (n	  142)	  478-­‐479.	  
176	  LFM	  Besselink,	  A	  Composite	  European	  Constitution	  (Europa	  Law	  Publishing	  2007)	  12.	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conditional	  on	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  latter	  provides	  a	  similar	  degree	  of	  fundamental	  rights	  
protection	   as	   the	   German	   Basic	   Law.177	   Allowing	   national	   courts	   to	   circumvent	   the	  
Court’s	  interpretation	  of	  EU	  law	  would,	  furthermore,	  undermine	  both	  the	  uniformity	  and	  
efficacy	  of	  EU	  law.178	  	  	  
The	  Lisbon	  Treaty	  incorporated	  the	  Charter	  of	  Fundamental	  Rights	  into	  EU	  primary	  law	  
by	   Article	   6	   TEU	   and	   authorised	   the	   EU	   to	   join	   the	   ECHR.	   Prior	   to	   the	   Lisbon	   Treaty,	  
fundamental	  rights	  enjoyed	  in	  the	  EU	  the	  status	  of	  general	  principles	  of	   law	  and	  bound	  
both	   the	  Member	  States	  and	   the	   institutions.	  As	  general	  principles,	   fundamental	   rights	  
were	  to	  be	  substantiated	  by	  constitutional	   traditions	  common	  to	   the	  Member	  States	  as	  
interpreted	   by	   the	   Court	   of	   Justice.	   Fundamental	   rights	   forming	   part	   of	   the	   Member	  
States’	  legal	  orders	  were,	  thus,	  part	  of	  the	  catalogue	  of	  fundamental	  rights	  applying	  to	  EU	  
law,	   yet	   only	   to	   the	   extent	   of	   broader	   recognition,	   i.e.	   in	   the	   legal	   orders	   of	   several	  
Member	  States.	  This	   is	  provided	   in	  Article	  6(3)	  TEU.	   In	   the	  meantime,	  Member	  States’	  
fundamental	   rights	   protection	   comprised	   their	   international	   commitments	   in	   the	   field,	  
especially	   under	   the	   ECHR.	   The	   fundamental	   rights	   provisions	   of	   such	   international	  
agreements,	   too,	   have	   a	   guiding	   role	   in	   the	   interpretation	   of	   EU	   law.179	   Following	   the	  
jurisprudence	  of	   the	  European	  Court	  of	  Human	  Rights	  (ECtHR)	  directly,	   though,	  means	  
for	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice	  a	  departure	  from	  the	  autonomy	  of	  the	  EU	  legal	  order.180	  	  	  	  
The	  United	  Kingdom	  and	  Poland	  have	  an	  opt-­‐out	  from	  the	  Charter	  pursuant	  Protocol	  No	  
30	  TEU.	   Insofar	   as	   the	   Charter	  mainly	   reiterates	   general	   principles	   of	   EU	   law	   that	   are	  
already	   developed	   and	   applicable	   via	   the	   case	   law	   of	   the	   Court	   of	   Justice,	   it	   is	  
questionable	  whether	   the	   Protocol	   really	   constitutes	   an	   opt-­‐out	   from	   the	   fundamental	  
rights	  protection	  accorded	  by	  the	  EU.181	  
                                            
177	  Case	  C	  29/69	  Stauder	  [1969]	  ECR	  419;	  Case	  11/70	  Internationale	  Handelsgesellschaft	  [1970]	  ECR	  1125,	  
para	  2.	  
178	  Case	  11/70	  Internationale	  Handelsgesellschaft	  (n	  175)	  para	  3.	  
179	  Case	  4/73	  Nold	  [1974]	  ECR	  491,	  para	  13.	  
180	  LFM	  Besselink	  (n	  174)	  14.	  
181	  M	  Dougan,	   'The	  Treaty	   of	   Lisbon	   2007:	  Winning	  minds,	   not	   hearts'	   (2008)	   45	   Common	  Market	   Law	  
Review	  617,	  667-­‐668.	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5.2	  Effect	  of	  non-­‐economic	  policies	  on	  the	  internal	  market:	  policy-­‐making	  	  
In	   the	   most	   direct	   manner,	   non-­‐economic	   policies	   affect	   the	   scope	   of	   the	   economic	  
principles	   of	   the	   internal	   market	   by	   being	   integrated	   into	   internal	   market	   legislation,	  
including	   harmonisation	  measures.	   One	   of	   the	  most	   significant	   vehicles	   for	   that	   is	   the	  
integration	   principle	   and	   the	   integration	   provisions	   which	   give	   effect	   to	   it.	   The	  
integration	   principle	   ensures	   that	   horizontal	   provisions	   are	   incorporated	   into	   the	  
legislation	  on	  free	  movement	  and	  competition	  policy.182	  	  
The	  first	  integration	  principle	  to	  emerge	  was	  that	  of	  environmental	  protection.	  The	  Court	  
has	   deemed	   it	   to	   be	   an	   ‘essential	   objective’	   of	   the	   Union.183	   The	   importance	   of	   the	  
protection	  of	  environment	  in	  EU	  law	  is	  underscored	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  Article	  11	  TFEU	  uses	  
significantly	   stronger	   language	   in	   demanding	   that	   environmental	   protection	  
requirements	   must	   be	   integrated	   into	   EU	   policies	   and	   activities.	   Other	   horizontal	  
provisions	  are	  referred	  to	  in	  softer	  language	  –‘shall	  aim/shall	  be	  taken	  into	  account’.	  	  
According	   to	   the	   environmental	   policy	   horizontal	   provision,	   the	   aim	   of	   integrating	  
environmental	   concerns	   into	   other	   EU	   policies	   is	   the	   promotion	   of	   sustainable	  
development.	   The	   objectives	   of	   environmental	   protection	   and	   improvement	   of	   the	  
quality	  of	  the	  environment	  as	  well	  as	  that	  of	  sustainable	  development	  are	  all	  reflected	  in	  
the	  objectives	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  in	  establishing	  an	  internal	  market	  as	  expressed	  in	  
Article	  3(3)	  TEU.	  The	  principle	  of	  sustainable	  development	  plays	  a	  crucial	  role	  in	  guiding	  
the	  development	  of	  the	  European	  Union,	  integrating	  economic	  objectives	  with	  social	  and	  
economic	   aims.184	   Article	   3(3)	   TEU	   also	   identifies	   a	   highly	   competitive	   social	   market	  
economy	   that	   aims	   at	   full	   employment	   and	   social	   progress	   as	   components	   of	   the	  
sustainable	  development	  of	  Europe.	  Environmental	  and	  social	  policy	  considerations	  are,	  
therefore,	  deeply	  rooted	  in	  the	  context	  of	  setting	  up	  the	  internal	  market.	  	  
In	  addition	  to	  Article	  11	  TFEU,	  the	  objectives	  of	  the	  EU’s	  environmental	  policy	  are	  also	  
stated	  in	  Title	  XX	  of	  the	  TFEU,	  specifically	  Article	  191(1)	  TFEU.	  The	  same	  applies	  to	  EU’s	  
social	   and	   employment	   policy	   provided	   in	   Titles	   IX	   and	   X	   of	   the	   TFEU,	   and	   consumer	  
protection	  in	  Title	  XV	  TFEU.	  The	  role	  of	  the	  EU’s	  flanking	  policies	  in	  the	  internal	  market	  
                                            
182	  S	  de	  Vries,	  Tensions	  within	  the	  Internal	  Market	  (Europa	  Law	  Publishing	  2006)	  18.	  
183	  Case	  240/83	  ADBHU	  [1985]	  ECR	  531,	  para	  13.	  	  
184	  M	  Hession	  and	  R	  Macrory	  (n	  140)	  473.	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project	  is	  unclear.185	  It	  is	  often	  complicated,	  yet	  necessary	  due	  to	  procedural	  reasons,	  to	  
distinguish	  between	  the	  various	  legal	  bases	  for	  adopting	  environmental	  policy	  legislation	  
as	  it	   is	  both	  an	  EU	  policy	  of	  its	  own	  right	  and	  a	  policy	  deeply	  embedded	  in	  the	  internal	  
market.186	  
In	   addition	   to	   the	   dilemma	   of	   legal	   bases,	   it	   is	   also	   unclear	   which	   are	   the	   exact	  
environmental	  protection	  measures	  that	  must	  be	  integrated	  into	  EU’s	  other	  policies	  and	  
activities	  –	  the	  environmental	  policy	  objectives	  of	  Article	  191(1)	  TFEU,	  the	  principles	  of	  
191(2)	   TFEU	   or	   the	   policy	   aspects	   of	   191(3)	   TFEU?187	   Practice	   has	   proven	   that	   the	  
integration	   principle	   allows	   only	   a	   partial	   integration	   of	   environmental	   policy	  
considerations	   into	   the	   internal	   market,	   whereas	   the	   core	   of	   the	   economic	   activity	  
remains	   in	  place.188	  This	  outcome	   is	   expected	  as	   the	  aim	  of	   the	  horizontal	  principle	   is,	  
indeed,	   to	   provide	   a	   perspective	   of	   reviewing	   the	   fundamental	   freedoms	   through	   the	  
prism	  of	  environmental	  and	  other	  non-­‐economic	  concerns	  but	  not	  to	  replace	  completely	  
the	   model	   of	   the	   market	   economy	   envisaged	   in	   the	   Treaties	   by	   an	   environmental	  
objective.	  The	  internal	  market	  is,	  after	  all,	  a	  market	  project,	  although	  social,	  sustainable,	  
etc.	  	  	  
The	  integration	  principle	  itself	  does	  not	  create	  conflicts	  between	  the	  internal	  market	  and	  
other	   EU	   policies	   as	   it	   does	   not	   set	   up	   a	   hierarchical	   system.189	   On	   the	   one	   hand,	   the	  
integration	   principle	   requires	   that	   environmental	   concerns	   be	   incorporated	   in	   the	  
legislation	  adopted	  in	  any	  field	  of	  EU	  law.	  Here,	  not	  only	  the	  horizontal	  provisions	  play	  a	  
role	  but	  also	  the	  general	  principles	  of	  consistency	  in	  the	  Treaties,	  such	  as	  Article	  7	  TFEU.	  
On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  integration	  principle	  requires	  that	  all	  EU	  law	  be	  interpreted	  in	  a	  
manner	  consistent	  with	  the	  objectives	  of	  EU’s	  environmental	  policy.190	  In	  the	  landmark	  
judgment	   of	   EU	   environmental	   law	   Waddenzee,	   for	   example,	   the	   Court	   stated	   that	  
secondary	  EU	  law	  must	  be	  interpreted	  in	  the	  light	  of	  the	  precautionary	  principle	  –	  one	  of	  
the	   guiding	   principles	   of	   EU	   environmental	   policy.191	   The	   objectives	   and	   principles	   of	  
                                            
185	  S	  Weatherill,	  'Safeguarding	  the	  Acquis	  Communautaire'	  (n	  39)	  163.	  
186	  S	  Weatherill,	  'On	  the	  Depth	  and	  Breadth	  of	  European	  Integration'	  (n	  134)	  545.	  
187	  O	  McIntyre	  (n	  145)	  132.	  
188	  N	  Dhondt,	  Integration	  of	  Environmental	  Protection	  into	  other	  EC	  Policies	  (Europa	  Law	  Publishing	  2003)	  
482.	  
189	  JH	  Jans	  (n	  143)	  1543.	  
190	  ibid	  1541.	  	  
191	  Case	  C-­‐127/02	  Waddenzee	  [2004]	  ECR	  I-­‐7405,	  para	  44.	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environmental	  protection	  under	  the	  now	  Article	  191	  TFEU	  can	  also	  serve	  as	  a	  ground	  for	  
judicial	   review	   of	   the	   validity	   of	   an	   EU	   measure	   but	   judicial	   review	   is	   limited	   to	  
determining	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  ‘manifest	  error	  of	  appraisal’	  of	  the	  conditions	  for	  applying	  
the	   environmental	   policy	   objectives.192	   Regardless	   of	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   integration	  
principle	  mainly	  addresses	  EU	  institutions	  and	  decision-­‐making	  processes	  it	  must	  also	  be	  
observed	  by	  the	  Member	  States	  when	  implementing	  EU	  law.193	  	  
Insofar	  as	  different	  regulation	  of	  non-­‐market	  values	  by	  the	  Member	  States	  can	  constitute	  
a	   distortion	   of	   competition	   in	   the	   internal	   market	   or	   an	   obstacle	   to	   the	   fundamental	  
freedoms,	   harmonising	   measures	   can	   be	   adopted.194	   One	   of	   the	   landmark	   decisions	  
analysing	   the	   interaction	   between	   economic	   and	   non-­‐economic	   policies	   in	   internal	  
market	   legislation	  was	  given	  by	  the	  Court	   in	  Titanium	  Dioxide.195	   In	  the	  case,	   the	  Court	  
had	   to	   consider	   the	   appropriate	   legal	   basis	   for	   adopting	   Directive	   89/428/EEC	   on	  
procedures	  for	  harmonizing	  the	  programmes	  for	  the	  reduction	  and	  eventual	  elimination	  
of	  pollution	  caused	  by	  waste	  from	  the	  titanium	  dioxide	  industry.	  Although	  the	  envisaged	  
directive	   pertained	   both	   to	   competition	   law	   and	   the	   protection	   of	   the	   environment	  
differences	   in	   the	   decision-­‐making	   procedures	   rendered	   it	   impossible	   to	   adopt	   the	  
directive	  on	  a	  dual	  legal	  basis.	  Article	  100a(3)	  EC	  Treaty	  (now	  Article	  114(3)	  TFEU)	  did,	  
however,	  provide	  for	  a	  possibility	  to	  adopt	  internal	  market	  harmonisation	  measures	  also	  
in	   the	   areas	   of	   health,	   safety,	   environmental	   protection	   and	   consumer	  protection	   if,	   in	  
accordance	   with	   paragraph	   1	   of	   the	   same	   Article,	   they	   have	   as	   their	   object	   the	  
establishment	  and	  functioning	  of	  the	  internal	  market.	  The	  Court	  considered	  the	  directive	  
to	  have	  falsely	  been	  adopted	  on	  the	  environmental	  policy	  legal	  basis	  and,	  subsequently,	  
deemed	  the	  internal	  market	  harmonisation	  provision	  of	  Article	  100a	  EC	  Treaty	  to	  be	  the	  
correct	   legal	   basis.	   The	   Court’s	   decision	   was	   motivated	   by	   a	   threat	   of	   a	   distortion	   of	  
competition	  between	  undertakings	  unless	  provisions	  stipulating	  environment	  and	  health	  
considerations	   were	   harmonised.196	   Article	   100a(3)	   EC	   Treaty,	   furthermore,	   provided	  
that	  the	  level	  of	  protection	  accorded	  to	  non-­‐economic	  considerations	  must	  be	  high	  and	  in	  
keeping	  with	  contemporary	  scientific	  facts.	  
                                            
192	  Case	  C-­‐341/95	  Bettati	  [1998]	  ECR	  I-­‐4355,	  paras	  33-­‐35.	  	  
193	  N	  Dhondt,	  (n	  188)	  48ff.	  	  
194	  A	  Dashwood,	  'The	  Limits	  of	  European	  Community	  Powers'	  (1996)	  21	  European	  Law	  Review	  113,	  120.	  
195	  Case	  C-­‐300/89	  Commission	  v	  Council	  (Titanium	  dioxide)	  (n	  21).	  
196	  ibid	  para	  23.	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In	  the	  Tobacco	  Advertising	  case,	  the	  Court	  cast	  light	  on	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  non-­‐economic	  
considerations	  can	  be	   incorporated	   into	   internal	  market	  harmonising	  measures.197	  The	  
Court	   affirmed	   that	   public	   health	   requirements	   must	   form	   part	   of	   other	   EU	   policies	  
including	   those	   for	   which	   harmonisation	   measures	   are	   adopted.	   Insofar	   as	   no	  
harmonisation	   is	   envisaged	   in	   the	   Treaties	   for	   public	   health,	   however,	   other	   Treaty	  
articles	   such	   as	   Article	   100a	   EC	   Treaty	   (now	   Article	   114	   TFEU)	   may	   not	   be	   used	   to	  
circumvent	   the	   absence	   of	   an	   authorisation	   for	   harmonisation	   in	   the	   field	   of	   public	  
health.198	   The	   Court	   concluded	   that	   harmonisation	   measures	   are	   merely	   intended	   to	  
serve	   the	  purpose	  of	   facilitating	   the	   creation	  and	   functioning	  of	   the	   internal	  market	   to	  
the	  extent	  of	  what	  is	  necessary,	  not	  a	  general	  power	  to	  regulate	  the	  internal	  market.199	  	  
In	   these	   two	   cases,	   the	   Court	   had	   an	   important	   task	   of	   not	   only	   ensuring	   that	   non-­‐
economic	  measures	   be	   given	   due	   consideration	   in	   internal	  market	   legislation	   but	   also	  
keeping	  the	  two	  apart.	  In	  areas,	  such	  as	  public	  health,	  where	  the	  Union’s	  objectives	  and,	  
consequently,	   competences	   are	   limited	   and	   harmonisation	   precluded,	   internal	   market	  
measures	   cannot	   be	   used	   to	   circumvent	   the	   division	   of	   powers	   as	   laid	   down	   in	   the	  
Treaties.200	  In	  the	  meantime,	  the	  Court	  has	  importantly	  noted	  that	  where	  the	  conditions	  
for	  relying	  on	  Article	  100a	  EC	  Treaty	  are	  fulfilled,	  recourse	  to	  that	  legal	  basis	  must	  also	  
be	  had	  regardless	  of	  whether	   the	  content	  of	   the	  measure	   is	  also	  determined	  by	  a	  non-­‐
economic	   factor	   such	   as	   public	   health;	   this	   is	   by	   virtue	   of	   Article	   100a(3)	   EC	   Treaty	  
which	  prescribes	  a	  high	  level	  of	  protection	  of	  health.201	  	  
Judgment	   in	   Swedish	   Match	   consolidated	   the	   Court’s	   previous	   case	   law.202	   The	   case	  
concerned	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  a	  public	  health	  measure	  can	  be	  adopted	  under	  Article	  
95	  EC	  Treaty	  (Article	  114	  TFEU).	  The	  Court	  confirmed	  that	  Article	  95	  EC	  Treaty	  was	  the	  
correct	   legal	   basis	   for	   adopting	   Directive	   2001/37	   concerning	   the	   manufacture,	  
presentation	   and	   sale	   of	   tobacco	   products,	   especially	   considering	   the	   high	   level	   of	  
                                            
197	  Case	  C-­‐376/98	  Germany	  v	  Parliament	  and	  Council	  (Tobacco	  Advertising)	  (n	  21).	  
198	  ibid	  paras	  78-­‐79.	  
199	  ibid	  para	  83.	  
200	  I	  Govaere,	  'Modernisation	  of	  the	  Internal	  Market:	  Potential	  Clashes	  and	  Crossroads	  with	  Other	  Policies'	  
in	  M	  De	  Vos	  (ed),	  European	  Union	  internal	  Market	  and	  Labour	  Law:	  Friends	  or	  Foes?	  (Intersentia	  2009)	  3,	  8.	  
201	  Case	  C-­‐376/98	  Germany	  v	  Parliament	  and	  Council	   (Tobacco	  Advertising)	   (n	  21)	  para	  88;	  Also	  Case	  C-­‐
491/01	  BAT	  and	  Imperial	  Tobacco	  [2002]	  ECR	  I-­‐11453,	  para	  62;	  Case	  C-­‐380/03	  Germany	  v	  Parliament	  and	  
Council	  (Tobacco	  Advertising	  II)	  [2006]	  ECR	  I-­‐11573,	  para	  39.	  
202	  Case	  C-­‐210/03	  Swedish	  Match	  [2004]	  ECR	  I-­‐11893.	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protection	   of	   public	   health	   accorded	   by	   Article	   95(3)	   EC	   Treaty.203	   Harmonisation	  
measures	   must,	   nevertheless,	   respect	   the	   legal	   principles	   provided	   in	   the	   Treaty	   or	  
identified	   in	   the	   Court’s	   case	   law,	   especially	   the	   principle	   of	   proportionality.204	   In	  RTL	  
Television,	  the	  Court	  further	  reiterated	  its	  previous	  findings	  that	  a	  directive	  intended	  to	  
harmonise	  Member	  States’	  legislation	  in	  a	  given	  field	  may	  offer	  a	  ‘balanced	  protection’	  of	  
the	  economic	  interests	  of	  television	  broadcasters	  and	  advertisers,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  
the	   non-­‐economic	   interests	   of	   writers	   and	   producers	   as	   rights	   holders	   and	   television	  
viewers	  as	  consumers,	  on	  the	  other.205	  	  
The	  effect	  of	  the	  integration	  principle	  on	  internal	  market	  law	  has	  been	  substantial.206	  It	  
surely	   restricts	   the	   freedom	   of	   the	   Union	   to	   set	   up	   the	   internal	   market	   in	   the	  
economically	  most	  efficient	  manner.	  The	  restrictions	  are	  clearly	  visible,	   for	  example,	   in	  
the	   preferential	   conditions	   provided	   to	   the	   producers	   of	   renewable	   energy,207	   and	  
competitive	   advantages	   provided	   to	   tender	   participants	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   the	   level	   of	  
environmental	  protection	  offered.208	  
Horizontal	  provisions	  also	  influence	  the	  inherently	  efficiency-­‐driven	  competition	  law.	  In	  
the	  EU,	  non-­‐economic	  factors	  arguably	  play	  a	  bigger	  role	  in	  the	  definition	  of	  competition	  
policy	   goals	   than	   in	   the	   USA,	   for	   example.209	   In	   this	   regard,	   competition	   law	   only	  
confirms	   its	   position	   in	   the	   internal	   market	   project	   integrating	   non-­‐economic	   aspects	  
just	  as	  the	  other	  market-­‐defining	  factors	  –	  the	  fundamental	  freedoms.	  	  	  
5.3	  Effect	  of	  non-­‐economic	  policies	  on	  the	  internal	  market:	  derogations	  
In	   addition	   to	   being	   incorporated	   into	   the	   definition	   and	   implementation	   of	   the	  
fundamental	   freedoms	   and	   competition	   policy,	   non-­‐economic	   concerns	   also	   penetrate	  
them	  as	  exceptions	  and	  justifications.	  Derogations	  from	  the	  free	  movement	  rights	  as	  well	  
                                            
203	  ibid	  paras	  33	  and	  42.	  
204	  ibid	  para	  33.	  
205	  Case	  C-­‐245/01	  RTL	  Television	  [2003]	  ECR	  I-­‐12489,	  para	  62.	  
206	  JH	  Jans	  (n	  143)	  1540.	  
207	  Case	  C-­‐379/98	  PreussenElektra	  [2001]	  ECR	  I-­‐2099.	  
208	  Case	  C-­‐513/99	  Concordia	  Bus	  Finland	   [2002]	  ECR	   I-­‐7213.	   Inevitably,	   a	  number	  of	   criteria	  need	   to	  be	  
fulfilled:	  tender	  participants	  cannot	  be	  subjected	  to	  environmental	  requirements	  that	  are	  not	  linked	  to	  the	  
subject-­‐matter	  of	  the	  contract;	  the	  decision-­‐maker	  cannot	  be	  given	  ‘an	  unrestricted	  freedom	  of	  choice’;	  the	  
environmental	   requirements	  must	  be	  notified	  expressly	   in	   the	   contract	  documents	  or	   the	   tender	  notice;	  
and	   compliance	  must	   be	   ensured	  with	   the	   fundamental	   principles	   of	   EU	   law,	   especially	   the	   principle	   of	  
non-­‐discrimination:	  ibid	  para	  64.	  
209	  S	  Kingston,	  Greening	  EU	  Competition	  Law	  and	  Policy	  (Cambridge	  University	  Press	  2012)	  19.	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as	   mandatory	   requirements	   based	   on	   case	   law	   demonstrate	   the	   development	   of	   the	  
internal	  market	   into	   a	  marketplace	   that	   encompasses	   a	   growing	   range	   of	   values	   other	  
than	   economic	   freedoms.	   The	   Treaties,	   thus,	  move	   further	   and	   further	   away	   from	   the	  
original	  perception	  of	  creating	  an	  economic	  constitution.210	  	  
5.3.1	  Exceptions	  in	  primary	  law	  
Justifications	   on	   grounds	   of	   non-­‐economic	   considerations	   allow	   Member	   States	   to	  
surpass	  the	  fundamental	  freedoms	  as	  provided	  in	  primary	  and	  secondary	  EU	  law,	  as	  well	  
as	  deviate	  from	  EU	  competition	  rules.	  	  
Each	   of	   the	   specific	   provisions	   on	   the	   free	   movement	   contains	   a	   clarification	   of	   their	  
scope.	  While	  Articles	  34	  and	  35	  TFEU	  prohibit	  quantitative	  restrictions	  on	  imports	  and	  
exports	   in	   trade	   between	   Member	   States	   and	   all	   measures	   having	   equivalent	   effect,	  
Article	  36	  TFEU	  provides	  for	  exceptions.	  Notwithstanding	  the	  general	  principle	  of	  non-­‐
discrimination	  enshrined	  in	  Article	  18	  as	  well	  as	  Articles	  34	  and	  35	  TFEU,	  prohibitions	  or	  
restrictions	   on	   imports,	   exports	   or	   goods	   in	   transit	   are	   justified	   on	   grounds	   of	   public	  
morality,	   public	   policy	   or	   public	   security;	   the	   protection	   of	   health	   and	   life	   of	   humans,	  
animals	   or	   plants;	   the	   protection	   of	   national	   treasures	   possessing	   artistic,	   historic	   or	  
archaeological	   value;	   or	   the	   protection	   of	   industrial	   and	   commercial	   property.	   The	  
exceptions	   to	   the	   general	   rule	   of	   national	   treatment	   are,	   nevertheless,	   subject	   to	   the	  
caveat	   that	   they	  do	  not	  constitute	  arbitrary	  discrimination	  or	  a	  disguised	  restriction	  to	  
inter-­‐state	  trade.211	  	  
The	  same	  rule	  of	  justification	  applies	  also	  to	  the	  free	  movement	  of	  workers	  by	  virtue	  of	  
Article	  45(3)	  TFEU,	  which	  provides	   for	  exceptions	  on	   the	  basis	  of	  public	  policy,	  public	  
security	   or	   public	   health.	   Public	   service	   is,	   moreover,	   generally	   excluded	   from	   the	  
general	   freedom	  of	  movement	   for	  workers	   by	   virtue	   of	   Article	   45(4)	   TFEU.	   Article	   48	  
TFEU	  adds	  an	   important	  qualification	   to	   the	   free	  movement	  of	  workers.	  The	  provision	  
deems	   certain	   social	   security	  measures	   ‘necessary’	   for	   the	   free	  movement	   of	   workers	  
and	  authorises	   the	  EU	   to	   adopt	   social	  policy	  measures	   to	   enable	   the	  aggregation	  of	   all	  
periods	  of	  employment	  under	  the	  laws	  of	  several	  Member	  States	  in	  order	  to	  grant	  to	  the	  
                                            
210	  C	  Barnard,	  The	  Substantive	  Law	  of	  the	  EU:	  The	  Four	  Freedoms	  (Oxford	  University	  Press	  2013)	  166-­‐168.	  
211	  Article	  36	  TFEU.	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moving	  worker	  the	  right	  to	  benefit	  and	  a	  proper	  calculation	  of	  the	  amount	  of	  the	  benefit.	  
Due	   benefits	   must	   be	   paid	   also	   to	   those	   workers	   and	   their	   family	   members	   who	   are	  
resident	   in	   the	   host	   Member	   State,	   subject	   to	   conditions	   specified	   in	   secondary	   law.	  
Should	  draft	   legislation	   implementing	  Article	  48	   affect	   important	   aspects	   of	   a	  Member	  
State’s	   social	   security	   system,	   including	   its	   scope,	   cost	   or	   financial	   structure,	   or	   its	  
financial	  balance,	  the	  Member	  State	  may	  suspend	  the	  legislative	  procedure	  and	  request	  
the	  matter	  to	  be	  referred	  to	  the	  European	  Council	  for	  discussion.	  In	  individual	  cases,	  also	  
non-­‐economic	  considerations	  integrated	  in	  the	  free	  movement	  provisions	  may,	  thus,	  be	  
limited	  by	  economic	  considerations.	  	  
Exceptions	   from	   the	   general	   principles	   of	   the	   freedom	   of	   establishment	   and	   the	   free	  
movement	  of	  services	  are	  provided	  in	  Article	  52	  TFEU	  and	  cover	  the	  same	  areas	  as	  in	  the	  
case	  of	  the	  free	  movement	  if	  workers	  –	  public	  policy,	  public	  security	  and	  public	  health.	  
Exceptions	   from	   the	   free	   movement	   of	   capital	   include	   taxation	   and	   supervision	   of	  
financial	  institutions,	  administrative	  or	  statistical	  information	  or	  reasons	  of	  public	  policy	  
or	  public	  security.	  The	  same	  rule	  applies	  as	   in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  free	  movement	  of	  goods:	  
Article	  65(3)	  TFEU	  provides	  that	  the	  measures	  and	  procedures	  provided	  above	  may	  not	  
constitute	   a	   means	   of	   arbitrary	   discrimination	   or	   a	   disguised	   restriction	   to	   the	   free	  
movement	   of	   capital	   and	   payments.	   Finally,	   Article	   107(2)(a)	   TFEU	   provides	   an	  
exception	  from	  the	  general	  rule	  prohibiting	  state	  aid	  by	  allowing	  social	  state	  assistance	  
to	  individuals	  in	  need	  provided	  that	  no	  discrimination	  occurs	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  origin	  of	  
the	  products	  that	  constitute	  the	  aid.	  	  
Interestingly,	   Article	   326	   TFEU	   on	   enhanced	   cooperation	   stipulates	   that	   advanced	  
cooperation	   between	   some	   of	   the	   Member	   States	   may	   not	   ‘undermine	   the	   internal	  
market	   or	   economic,	   social	   and	   territorial	   cohesion’,	   result	   in	   a	   barrier	   to	   trade	   or	  
discrimination	   or	   have	   adverse	   effects	   on	   equal	   opportunities	   for	   competition.	   The	  
provision	   seeks	   to	   avoid	   situations	  where	   differentiation	   from	   the	   common	   legislative	  
framework	  of	  the	  EU	  which	  is	  generally	  considered	  permissible	  may	  affect	  the	  effective	  
functioning	  of	  the	  internal	  market.	  Whatever	  the	  provisions	  adopted	  by	  Member	  States	  
in	   the	   framework	   of	   advanced	   cooperation,	   therefore,	   the	   core	   commitment	   of	   the	  
Member	   States	   includes	   ‘economic,	   social	   and	   territorial	   cohesion’,	   the	   prohibition	   of	  
barriers	  to	  trade	  and	  equal	  opportunities	  for	  competition.	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The	  above	  exceptions	  demonstrate	  the	  incorporation	  into	  the	  internal	  market	  of	  various	  
non-­‐economic	   concerns	   –	   primarily	   relating	   to	   the	   protection	   of	   public	   policy,	   public	  
security	  and	  public	  health,	  and	  the	  social	  security	  system.	  The	  criteria	  for	  applying	  these	  
exceptions	  are	  not	  stipulated	  by	  EU	  law	  but	  are,	  according	  to	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice,	  to	  be	  
substantiated	   by	   the	   judiciaries	   of	   the	   Member	   States	   in	   interpreting	   the	   respective	  
provisions	   of	   EU	   law.	   The	   exception	   of	   public	   security,	   for	   example,	   includes	   both	   the	  
internal	   and	   the	   external	   dimensions	   of	   security	   of	   the	   Member	   State	   in	   question.212	  
Member	   States	   are	   free	   to	   decide	   on	   the	   requirements	   of	   public	   policy	   and	   public	  
security	  according	   to	   their	   ‘national	  needs’	  which	  may	  differ	  across	   the	  Member	  States	  
and	  over	   the	  course	  of	   time.213	  The	  EU	  does	  not	  prescribe	   the	  values	   that	   the	  Member	  
States	   must	   base	   their	   considerations	   on,214	   but	   the	   exceptions	   must	   be	   given	   strict	  
interpretation	  and	  are	  subject	  to	  control	  by	  the	  institutions	  of	  the	  Union.215	  Invoking	  the	  
exception	  of	  public	  policy,	  for	  example,	  requires	  that	  there	  exists	  not	  only	  a	  ‘perturbation	  
of	   the	   social	   order	   which	   any	   infringement	   of	   the	   law	   involves’	   but	   also	   ‘a	   genuine,	  
present	  and	  sufficiently	  serious	  threat	  to	  one	  of	  the	  fundamental	  interests	  of	  society’.216	  	  
The	  Court	  of	  Justice	  has	  also	  elaborated	  general	  rules	  to	  govern	  the	  application	  of	  these	  
restrictions	  to	  the	  free	  movement.	  Importantly,	  while	  ‘obstacles	  to	  trade’	  are	  given	  broad	  
interpretation	  derogations	   to	   them	  must	  be	   interpreted	   restrictively.217	  The	   restrictive	  
interpretation	  of	  Article	  36	  TFEU	  exceptions	  means,	   for	  example,	   that	  measures	  which	  
are	  necessary	  for	  the	  protection	  of	  health	  and	  life	  of	  humans,	  animals	  or	  plants	  cannot	  be	  
construed	   in	   a	   broad	   manner	   to	   incorporate	   general	   environmental	   protection	  
objectives.218	  Also,	   in	  order	   to	  deviate	   from	   the	   fundamental	   freedoms,	  Member	  States	  
need	  to	  take	  into	  account	  general	  principles	  of	  EU	  law	  that	  include	  fundamental	  rights,219	  
and	   demonstrate	   the	   proportionality	   of	   the	   national	   measure	   to	   the	   legitimate	  
                                            
212	  Case	  C-­‐273/97	  Sirdar	  [1999]	  ECR	  I-­‐7403,	  para	  17;	  Case	  C-­‐285/98	  Kreil	  [2000]	  ECR	  I-­‐69,	  para	  17;	  Case	  
C-­‐423/98	  Albore	   [2000]	  ECR	   I-­‐5965,	   para	  18;	   Case	  C-­‐186/01	  Dory	   [2003]	  ECR	   I-­‐2479,	   para	  32;	   Case	  C-­‐
145/09	  Tsakouridis	  [2010]	  ECR	  I-­‐11979,	  para	  43.	  	  
213	  Case	  C-­‐348/09	  P.I.	  (Court	  of	  Justice,	  22	  May	  2012),	  para	  23	  and	  case	  law	  cited.	  
214	  Case	  C-­‐268/99	  Jany	  and	  Others	  [2001]	  ECR	  I-­‐8615,	  para	  60;	  ibid	  para	  21.	  
215	  Case	  36/75	  Rutili	  [1975]	  ECR	  1219,	  paras	  26-­‐27;	  Case	  30/77	  Bouchereau	  [1977]	  ECR	  1999,	  paras	  33-­‐
34;	  Case	  C-­‐54/99	  Église	  de	   scientologie	   [2000]	  ECR	   I-­‐1335,	  para	  17;	  Case	  C-­‐36/02	  Omega	   [2004]	  ECR	   I-­‐
9609,	  paras	  30-­‐31.	  
216	  Case	  C-­‐33/07	  Jipa	  [2008]	  ECR	  I-­‐5157,	  para	  23;	  Case	  C-­‐434/10	  Aladzhov	  [2011]	  ECR	  I-­‐11659,	  para	  35.	  
217	  I	  Govaere,	  ‘Modernisation	  of	  the	  Internal	  Market’	  (n	  200)	  16.	  
218	  J	  Scott,	  EC	  Environmental	  Law	  (Longman	  1998)	  68.	  	  
219	  Case	  C-­‐260/89	  ERT	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outcome,220	   and	   endorse	   principles	   of	   good	   governance	   as	   part	   of	   the	   proportionality	  
test.221	   Some	   limitations	   apply	   to	   both	   Article	   36	   TFEU	   grounds	   for	   permissible	  
restrictions	  and	  mandatory	  requirements.222	  Firstly,	  the	  exceptions	  can	  only	  be	  applied	  
in	   cases	   where	   national	   rules	   have	   not	   been	   harmonised.223	   Secondly,	   Member	   States	  
bear	   the	   burden	   of	   proof	   to	   demonstrate	   that	   the	   national	  measure	   is	   justified	   by	   the	  
derogation224	  and	  is	  not	  a	  means	  of	  arbitrary	  discrimination	  or	  a	  disguised	  restriction	  on	  
trade	  within	  the	  Union.	  	  
Although	  the	  Member	  States	  enjoy	  relative	  freedom	  in	  determining	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  
they	  provide	  exceptions	  from	  the	  free	  movement	  provisions,	  the	  conditions	  attached	  to	  
the	   application	   of	   these	   exceptions,	   in	   particular	   the	   control	   exercised	   by	   the	   Court	   of	  
Justice	   and	   other	   ‘Union	   institutions’	   enable	   for	   unity	   of	   the	   internal	   market	   to	   be	  
maintained.	  It	  is	  moreover	  clear	  that	  the	  harmonisation	  of	  Member	  State	  laws	  eventually	  
reduces	  the	  scope	  of	  application	  of	  Article	  36	  TFEU.225	  
In	  Hünermund,	  AG	  Tesauro	  asked	  whether	  Article	  30	  EC	  Treaty	  (now	  Article	  36	  TFEU)	  
was	   intended	   to	   liberalise	   intra-­‐Community	   trade	   or	   whether	   it	   was	   directed	   more	  
generally	  towards	  the	  unhindered	  pursuit	  of	  commerce	  in	  individual	  Member	  States.226	  
The	  question	  pertains	  to	  the	  depth	  of	  integration	  in	  the	  internal	  market.	  In	  the	  judgment	  
given	   in	   the	   same	   case,	   the	   Court	   noted	   with	   reference	   to	   its	   previous	   judgment	   in	  
Keck,227	   that	   the	   selling	   arrangements	   under	   scrutiny	   did	   not	   constitute	   obstacles	   to	  
inter-­‐state	  trade	   in	  the	  Dassonville	  meaning228	  since	  they	  concerned	  both	  domestic	  and	  
imported	  products	  and	  did	  not,	  therefore,	  impair	  trade.	  Selling	  arrangements	  would	  only	  
constitute	   obstacles	   to	   trade	   between	   Member	   States	   if	   they	   indirectly	   discriminate	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   C-­‐60/00	  
Carpenter	  [2002]	  ECR	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  [2003]	  ECR	  I-­‐9607,	  para	  59;	  Case	  C-­‐17/00	  De	  
Coster	  [2001]	  ECR	  I-­‐9445,	  para	  37.	  
221	  Case	  C-­‐19/92	  Kraus	  (n	  107)	  paras	  37-­‐41.	  
222	  Further	  discussed	  in	  the	  next	  section.	  
223	  Case	  C-­‐39/90	  Denkavit	  [1991]	  ECR	  I-­‐3069,	  para	  19;	  Case	  C-­‐5/94	  Hedley	  Lomas	  [1996]	  ECR	  I-­‐2553,	  para	  
18.	  
224	  Case	  227/82	  Van	  Bennekom	  [1983]	  ECR	  3883,	  para	  43;	  Case	  178/84	  Commission	  v	  Germany	  [1987]	  ECR	  
1227;	  Case	  304/84	  Muller	  [1986]	  ECR	  1511;	  Case	  C-­‐42/90	  Bellon	  [1990]	  ECR	  I-­‐4863;	  Joined	  Cases	  C-­‐13/91	  
and	  C-­‐113/91	  Criminal	  proceedings	  against	  Michel	  Debus	  [1992]	  ECR	  I-­‐3617,	  para	  18.	  
225	   A	   Rosas,	   'Life	   after	  Dassonville	   and	  Cassis:	   Evolution	   but	   No	   Revolution'	   in	  M	   Poiares	  Maduro	   and	   L	  
Azoulai	  (eds),	  The	  Past	  and	  Future	  of	  EU	  Law	  (Hart	  Publishing	  2010)	  433,	  443.	  	  
226	  Case	  C-­‐292/92	  Hünermund	  [1993]	  ECR	  I-­‐6787,	  Opinion	  of	  AG	  Tesauro,	  para	  1.	  
227	  Joined	  Cases	  C-­‐267/91	  and	  C-­‐268/91	  Keck	  and	  Mithouard	  [1993]	  ECR	  I-­‐6097,	  paras	  16-­‐17.	  
228	  Case	  C-­‐292/92	  Hünermund	  [1993]	  ECR	  I-­‐6787,	  para	  21.	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against	   the	  marketing	  of	   foreign	  products	  as	  compared	  to	  domestic	  goods.229	  With	   this	  
judgment,	   the	   Court	   thus	   established	   that	   the	   aim	   of	   Article	   30	   EC	   Treaty	   was	   to	  
liberalise	  inter-­‐state	  trade	  rather	  than	  encourage	  it	  in	  a	  more	  general	  manner.	  	  
In	   addition	   to	   the	   derogations	   from	   the	   free	   movement	   and	   competition	   provisions,	  
Article	   114(4)	   TFEU	   includes	   a	   possibility	   for	   Member	   States	   to	   refrain	   from	   a	  
harmonisation	  measure	   if	   they	  deem	  so	  doing	  necessary	   for	  maintaining	   their	  national	  
regulations	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  protecting	  the	  environment	  or	  the	  working	  environment.	  
This	   may	   happen	   on	   the	   condition	   that	   the	   Commission	   is	   notified	   of	   the	   situation	  
according	   to	  Article	  114(5)	  TFEU.	  This	   is	   yet	   another	   example	  of	   the	   especially	   strong	  
protection	   accorded	   to	   environmental	   and	   social	   considerations	   in	   the	   context	   of	   the	  
internal	  market.	  	  
Finally,	   the	   fundamental	   freedoms	   are	   limited	   by	   non-­‐economic	   concerns	   not	   only	   by	  
Member	  States’	  legal	  and	  political	  considerations	  but	  also	  by	  the	  legislative	  prioritising	  of	  
the	  Union	  itself.	  The	  EU,	  too,	  may	  adopt	  measures	  that	  curtail	  the	  economic	  freedoms	  of	  
the	   EU	   citizens	   by	  means	   of	   integrating	   non-­‐economic	   concerns	   into	   EU	   policies.	   The	  
limits	  on	  the	  Union	  are	  essentially	  the	  same	  as	  apply	  for	  the	  Member	  States	  with	  respect	  
to	  maintaining	  national	  legislation	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  public	  interest:	  the	  measures	  may	  not	  
‘substantively	  impair’	  the	  four	  freedoms,	  they	  must	  be	  necessary,	  proportional	  and	  non-­‐
discriminatory.230	  	  
5.3.2	  Mandatory	  requirements	  
In	   addition	   to	   the	   exceptions	   listed	   in	   primary	   law,	   the	   Court	   has	   developed	   a	   set	   of	  
justifications	   for	  deviations	   from	   the	   fundamental	   freedoms	   in	   the	   form	  of	   ‘mandatory	  
requirements’,	   also	   referred	   to	   as	   ‘imperative	   requirements’231	   or	   ‘overriding	  
requirements	   in	   the	  public	   interest’.232	   In	  Cassis	  de	  Dijon,	   the	  Court	  developed	   the	   first	  
four	  mandatory	  requirements,	  justifying	  deviations	  from	  the	  free	  movement	  of	  goods	  for	  
the	  sake	  of	  effective	  fiscal	  supervision,	  protection	  of	  public	  health,	  fairness	  of	  commercial	  
                                            
229	  Case	  C-­‐110/05	  Commission	  v	  Italy	  [2009]	  ECR	  I-­‐519,	  paras	  36-­‐37.	  	  
230	  Case	  240/83	  ADBHU	  (n	  181)	  paras	  12-­‐13.	  
231	  Case	  C-­‐524/07	  Commission	  v	  Austria	  [2008]	  ECR	  I-­‐187,	  para	  54.	  
232	   For	   example,	   Case	   C-­‐224/04	   Commission	   v	   Germany	   [2006]	   ECR	   I-­‐885,	   para	   31;	   Case	   C-­‐219/08	  
Commission	  v	  Belgium	  [2009]	  ECR	  I-­‐9213,	  para	  14;	  Case	  C-­‐577/10	  Commission	  v	  Belgium	  (Court	  of	  Justice,	  
19	  December	  2012),	  para	  44.	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transactions,	  and	  defence	  of	  the	  consumer.233	  Mandatory	  requirements	  provide	  a	  certain	  
flexibility	   to	   keep	   up	  with	   the	   changes	   and	   needs	   of	   the	  modern	   society	   in	   situations	  
where	   the	   exceptions	   from	   the	   fundamental	   freedoms	   enshrined	   in	   the	   Treaties	   are	  
limited.	  Cassis	  de	  Dijon	  was	  followed	  by	  the	  recognition	  of	  a	  number	  of	  other	  significant	  
public	  policy	  derogations,	   such	  as	   the	  protection	  of	   the	  environment;	   the	  protection	  of	  
working	  conditions;	  the	  prevention	  of	  social	  dumping;	  the	  protection	  of	  cinema	  as	  a	  form	  
of	   cultural	   expression;	   the	   protection	   of	   national	   or	   regional	   socio-­‐cultural	  
characteristics;	   the	  maintenance	   of	   press	   diversity;	   the	   protection	   of	   books	   as	   cultural	  
objects;	  preventing	  the	  risk	  of	  seriously	  undermining	  the	  financial	  balance	  of	  the	  social	  
security	   system;	   the	   protection	   of	   fundamental	   rights;	   preserving	   the	   maintenance	   of	  
order	  in	  society;	  road	  safety;	  protection	  of	  children;	  protection	  of	  animal	  welfare;	  and	  the	  
fight	  against	  crime.234	  	  
In	   Danish	   Bottles,	   the	   Court	   recognised	   environmental	   protection	   as	   one	   of	   the	  
mandatory	   requirements	   that	   may	   be	   invoked	   to	   justify	   restrictions	   to	   trade	   brought	  
about	   by	   indistinctly	   applicable	   measures	   which	   Member	   States	   have	   adopted	   in	   the	  
absence	  of	  EU	  harmonisation.235	  This	  recognition	  paved	  way	  for	  even	  deeper	  integration	  
of	   environmental	   considerations	   into	   internal	   market	   legislation	   than	   what	   had	   been	  
achieved	  by	  the	  integration	  principle.	  	  
Initially,	   mandatory	   requirements	   could	   only	   be	   invoked	   in	   the	   case	   of	   indistinctly	  
applicable	  measures,236	  whereas	  Article	  36	  TFEU	  derogations	  applied	  to	  both	  distinctly	  
and	  indistinctly	  applicable	  measures.237	  Some	  differences	  in	  the	  application	  of	  Article	  36	  
TFEU	  and	  other	  exceptions,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  mandatory	  requirements,	  on	  the	  other,	  
as	   regards	   their	   application	   to	  distinctly	  or	   indistinctly	   applicable	  measures	   still	   exists	  
but,	  gradually,	  the	  distinction	  may	  be	  losing	  its	  relevance.238	  	  
Mandatory	   requirements	   also	   apply	   to	   other	   fundamental	   freedoms	   but	   the	   free	  
movement	   of	   goods.	   The	   freedom	   to	   provide	   television	   services,	   for	   example,	   can	   be	  
                                            
233	  Case	  120/78	  Cassis	  de	  Dijon	  [1979]	  ECR	  649.	  
234	  C	  Barnard,	  The	  Substantive	  Law	  of	  the	  EU	  (n	  210)	  172-­‐173.	  
235	  Case	  302/86	  Commission	  v	  Denmark	  (Danish	  Bottles)	  [1988]	  ECR	  4607,	  para	  9,	  following	  Case	  302/86	  
Commission	  v	  Denmark	  (Danish	  Bottles)	  [1988]	  ECR	  4607,	  Opinion	  of	  AG	  Sir	  Gordon	  Slynn,	  4622.	  	  
236	  Joined	  Cases	  C-­‐1/90	  and	  C-­‐176/90	  Aragonesa	  [1991]	  ECR	  I-­‐4151,	  para	  13.	  
237	  PJ	  Oliver	  (n	  102)	  215.	  
238	  C	  Barnard,	  The	  Substantive	  Law	  of	  the	  EU	  (n	  210)	  171,	  referring	  to	  Case	  C-­‐524/07	  Commission	  v	  Austria	  
(n	  231)	  paras	  54-­‐55;	  PJ	  Oliver	  (n	  102)	  219-­‐220.	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limited	   on	   considerations	   of	   consumer	   protection	   or	   cultural	   policy.239	   The	   four	  
fundamental	  freedoms	  do	  not	  have	  an	  identical	  scope,	  neither	  as	  concerns	  primary	  law	  
exceptions	   nor	   mandatory	   requirements.	   The	   Court	   considers	   the	   scope	   of	   each	   free	  
movement	   right	   individually	   and	   in	   its	   own	   context.	   Compared	   to	   the	   other	   three,	   for	  
example,	  fewer	  restrictions	  are	  permitted	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  free	  movement	  of	  persons.240	  	  	  
Neither	  the	  exceptions	  under	  Article	  36	  and	  other	  provisions	  of	  the	  TFEU	  nor	  mandatory	  
requirements	  are	  unconditional.	  Recourse	  to	  mandatory	  requirements	  must	  be	  justified	  
by	  the	  Member	  States	  as	  being	  necessary,	  proportional	  and	  the	  least	  restrictive	  means	  to	  
achieve	   the	   envisaged	   aim.241	   In	   specific	   cases,	   other	   conditions	   may	   apply.	   In	  
Dassonville,	  the	  Court	  found	  that	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  Community	  legislation	  Member	  States	  
were	  allowed	  to	  maintain	   their	  national	  consumer	  protection	  regulations	  as	  concerned	  
the	  authenticity	  of	  a	  product’s	  designation	  of	  origin	  on	  the	  condition	  that	  the	  measures	  
are	  reasonable,	  do	  not	  constitute	  a	  restriction	  to	   inter-­‐state	  trade	  and	  are	  accessible	  to	  
all	  Community	  nationals.242	  	  
Both	   primary	   and	   secondary	   law	   provide	   for	   possibilities	   of	   balancing	   between	  
fundamental	   freedoms	   and	   non-­‐economic	   policy	   considerations	   but	   neither	   deems	   the	  
one	  to	  have	  absolute	  advantage	  over	  the	  other.243	  The	  Court	  of	  Justice,	  too,	  refrains	  from	  
establishing	   pre-­‐determined	   and	   absolute	   hierarchies	   between	   different	   policy	  
objectives.244	  The	  Court’s	  balancing	  does	  generally	  not	  create	  a	  hierarchy	  of	  primary	  and	  
secondary	   values	   but	   instead	   endorses	   the	   plurality	   of	   legal	   principles	   –	   according	   to	  
Azoulai	  this	  signifies	  a	  ‘new	  type	  of	  “constitutionalisation”’	  where	  coherence	  goes	  before	  
primacy.245	  	  
The	   case	  Defrenne	   I	  was	   the	   first	   case	   to	   explain	   the	   interplay	   between	   economic	   and	  
social	   policy	   objectives	   in	   internal	   market.	   In	   his	   Opinion,	   AG	   Dutheillet	   de	   Lamothe	  
                                            
239	  Case	  C-­‐288/89	  Collectieve	  Antennevoorziening	  Gouda	  (n	  220)	  para	  27;	  Case	  C-­‐6/98	  ARD	  [1999]	  ECR	  I-­‐
7599,	  para	  50;	  Case	  C-­‐245/01	  RTL	  Television	  (n	  205)	  para	  71	  
240	  PJ	  Oliver	  (n	  102)	  10-­‐11.	  
241	  Case	  120/78	  Cassis	  de	  Dijon	  (n	  233);	  Case	  261/81	  Walter	  Rau	  Lebensmittelwerke	  v	  De	  Smedt	  [1982]	  ECR	  
3961,	  para	  12.	  	  
242	  Case	  8/74	  Dassonville	  (n	  99)	  para	  6.	  
243	  See,	  for	  example,	  Articles	  1(6)	  and	  (7)	  of	  the	  Services	  Directive	  (n	  149)	  which	  provide	  that	  the	  Directive	  
affects	  neither	  labour	  law	  nor	  the	  exercise	  of	  fundamental	  rights.	  
244	  See	  also	  Case	  C-­‐438/05	  Viking	  [2007]	  ECR	  I-­‐10779,	  Opinion	  of	  AG	  Poiares	  Maduro,	  para	  23.	  
245	   L	   Azoulai,	   'The	   Court	   of	   Justice	   and	   the	   social	  market	   economy:	   The	   emergence	   of	   an	   ideal	   and	   the	  
conditions	  for	  its	  realization'	  (2008)	  45	  Common	  Market	  Law	  Review	  1335,	  1336-­‐1337.	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suggested	  that	  Article	  119	  EEC	  Treaty	  (now	  Article	  157	  TFEU)	  on	  equal	  pay	  for	  men	  and	  
women	  pursued	  both	  a	   social	  and	  an	  economic	  objective.246	  The	   two	  are	  connected	  by	  
virtue	  of	  the	   link	  between	   ‘social	  dumping’	  and	  undistorted	  conditions	  for	  competition.	  
The	   Court	   of	   Justice	   took	   up	   the	   AG’s	   reasoning	   on	   the	   double	   aims	   of	   the	   equal	   pay	  
provision	   in	   the	   follow-­‐up	  case	  Defrenne	   II.	   In	   that	   judgment,	   the	  Court	  made	  a	  special	  
reference	  to	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  Community	  which	  was	  ‘not	  merely	  an	  economic	  union,	  but	  
[…]	  at	  the	  same	  time	  intended,	  by	  common	  action,	  to	  ensure	  social	  progress	  and	  seek	  the	  
constant	   improvement	   of	   the	   living	   and	  working	   conditions	   of	   their	   peoples’.247	  While	  
the	   Court	   attempted	   to	   reconcile	   the	   economic	   aims	   of	   the	   Union	   with	   its	   social	  
objectives	   as	   they	   meet	   within	   the	   scope	   of	   the	   internal	   market,	   it	   refrained	   from	  
granting	  either	  of	  them	  automatic	  preference.	  
The	   case	   of	   public	   health	   is	   exceptional	   in	   enjoying	   almost	   absolute	   precedence	   over	  
fundamental	   freedoms.	   In	  Artegodan,	   the	  Court	   found	  that	  public	  health	  considerations	  
‘must	  unquestionably	  take	  precedence	  over	  economic	  considerations’.248	  The	  Court	  relied	  
on	   the	   precautionary	   principle	   enshrined	   in	   Article	   174(2)	   EC	   Treaty	   (now	   Article	  
191(2)	  TFEU).	  The	  precautionary	  principle	  is	  universal	  in	  character	  –	  it	  applies	  not	  only	  
in	   the	   field	   of	   environmental	   protection	   but	   also	   accords	   a	   high	   level	   of	   protection	   of	  
human	  health	  and	  consumer	  protection	  across	  the	  whole	  sphere	  of	  EU	  activities.249	  As	  a	  
general	  principle	  of	  EU	  law,	  it	  requires	  EU	  and	  national	  authorities	  to	  give	  precedence	  to	  
the	  requirements	  related	  to	  the	  protection	  of	  public	  health,	  safety	  and	  the	  environment	  
over	  economic	  interests.250	  
At	   the	   same	   time	   as	   market	   integration	   is	   one	   of	   the	   driving	   forces	   behind	   EU	   social	  
policy	   it	   also	  has	   its	   limitation.	  EU’s	   social	   policy	  has	  been	   criticised	   for	   endorsing	   the	  
values	  of	  market	  integration	  rather	  than	  its	  own,	  as	  well	  as	  having	  a	  purpose	  of	  market	  
                                            
246	  Case	  80/70	  Defrenne	  I	  [1971]	  ECR	  445,	  Opinion	  of	  AG	  Dutheillet	  de	  Lamothe,	  455.	  Reiterated	   in	  Case	  
69/80	  Worringham	  and	  Humphreys	  v	  Lloyds	  Bank	  Limited	  [1981]	  ECR	  767,	  Opinion	  of	  AG	  Warner,	  802.	  
247	  Case	  43/75	  Defrenne	  II	  [1976]	  ECR	  455,	  para	  10.	  
248	   Joined	   Cases	   T-­‐74/00,	   T-­‐76/00,	   T-­‐83/00,	   T-­‐85/00,	   T-­‐132/00,	   T-­‐137/00	   and	   T-­‐141/00	   Artegodan	  
[2002]	   ECR	   II-­‐4945,	   para	   173	   (emphasis	   added),	   with	   references	   to	   Order	   of	   12	   July	   1996	   in	   Case	   C-­‐
180/96	  R	  United	  Kingdom	  v	  Commission	  [1996]	  ECR	  I-­‐3903,	  para	  93;	  Case	  C-­‐183/95	  Affish	  [1997]	  ECR	  I-­‐
4315,	  para	  43.	  
249	   Joined	   Cases	   T-­‐74/00,	   T-­‐76/00,	   T-­‐83/00,	   T-­‐85/00,	   T-­‐132/00,	   T-­‐137/00	   and	   T-­‐141/00	  Artegodan	   (n	  
248)	  para	  183.	  
250	  ibid	  para	  184.	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integration	  and	  not	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  general	  citizenship	  right.251	  The	  criticism	  resembles	  
that	  directed	  against	  the	  EU	  consumer	  protection	  policy.	  In	  the	  Deposit	  Guarantees	  case,	  
the	   Court	   was	   faced	   with	   the	   task	   of	   balancing	   the	   right	   of	   establishment	   and	   the	  
freedom	   to	   provide	   services	   with	   consumer	   protection.252	   The	   Court	   refrained	   from	  
granting	   consumer	   protection	   overall	   higher	   position	   vis-­à-­vis	   fundamental	   market	  
freedoms.	  Instead,	  the	  Court	  found	  that	  a	  high	  level	  of	  consumer	  protection,	  which	  is	  one	  
of	   the	   objectives	   of	   the	   EU	   alongside	   the	   functioning	   of	   the	   internal	  market,	   does	   not	  
require	   the	  highest	   level	  of	   consumer	  protection	   that	   can	  be	   found	   in	  a	  Member	  State.	  
Neither	   does	   the	   lowering	   of	   the	   standards	   that	   exist	   in	   some	   Member	   States	   affect	  
negatively	   the	   overall	   improvement	   in	   the	  protection	  of	   depositors	  within	   the	  EU	   as	   a	  
whole.253	  The	  benefit	  for	  the	  many	  thus	  outweighs	  the	  disadvantage	  of	  some.	  	  
The	  dual	  purpose	  of	  the	  EU	  –	  economic	  as	  well	  as	  social	  –	  extends	  also	  to	  the	  realm	  of	  EU	  
competition	   and	   state	   aid	   law.	   In	   its	   judgment	   in	   the	   case	   3F,	   the	   Court	   balanced	  
competition	   law	   objectives	   against	   the	   Union’s	   social	   policy	   aims	   including	   those	  
enshrined	   in	   Article	   136	   EC	   Treaty	   (now	   Article	   151	   TFEU).254	   A	   similar	   balancing	  
exercise	  had	  previously	  taken	  place	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  freedom	  of	  establishment	  and	  
the	   freedom	   to	  provide	   services	   in	   the	   landmark	   cases	  Viking255	  and	  Laval.256	   In	   those	  
cases,	  the	  fundamental	  social	  right	  under	  scrutiny	  was	  the	  right	  of	  collective	  action.	  The	  
Court	   concluded	   that	   insofar	   as	   collective	   action	   restricts	   the	   fundamental	   free	  
movement	   rights	   it	   can	   be	   justified	   to	   the	   extent	   that	   the	   following	   conditions	   are	  
fulfilled:	   the	   exercise	   of	   the	   fundamental	   freedoms	   would	   adversely	   affect	   jobs	   or	  
working	   conditions;	   collective	   action	   is	   a	   suitable	   means	   for	   achieving	   the	   objectives	  
pursued;	  and	  collective	  action	  stays	  within	  the	  limits	  of	  what	  is	  necessary	  to	  achieve	  the	  
objective.257	   It	   is	   up	   to	   the	   Member	   States	   to	   ensure	   that	   the	   above	   conditions	   are	  
                                            
251	  M	  Poiares	  Maduro,	   'Striking	  the	  Elusive	  Balance	  Between	  Economic	  Freedom	  and	  Social	  Rights	   in	   the	  
EU'	  in	  P	  Alston	  (ed),	  The	  EU	  and	  Human	  Rights	  (Oxford	  University	  Press	  1999)	  449,	  455	  and	  462.	  
252	  Case	  C-­‐233/94	  Deposit	  Guarantees	  [1997]	  ECR	  I-­‐2405.	  	  
253	  ibid	  para	  48.	  	  
254	  Case	  C-­‐319/07	  P	  3F	  v	  Commission	   [2009]	  ECR	  I-­‐5963,	  para	  58.	  Article	  151	  TFEU	  can,	  thus,	  be	  used	  to	  
interpret	  other	  Treaty	  provisions.	  See:	  F	  Lecomte,	   'Embedding	  Employment	  Rights	   in	  Europe'	   (2010)	  17	  
Columbia	  Journal	  of	  European	  Law	  1,	  13.	  
255	  Case	  C-­‐438/05	  Viking	  (n	  71)	  paras	  78-­‐79.	  	  
256	  Case	  C-­‐341/05	  Laval	  [2007]	  ECR	  I-­‐11767,	  paras	  104-­‐105.	  	  
257	  Case	  C-­‐438/05	  Viking	  (n	  71)	  para	  84;	  Case	  C-­‐341/05	  Laval	  (n	  256)	  para	  101.	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fulfilled	  before	  they	  allow	  for	  derogations	  from	  any	  of	  the	  fundamental	  freedoms.258	  This	  
outcome	  is	  in	  broad	  terms	  compatible	  with	  the	  initial	  rationale	  behind	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  
internal	  market	  as	  expressed	  in	  the	  Spaak	  report,	  namely	  the	  convergence	  of	  economic	  
and	   social	   standards	   across	   the	  EU	  which	  will,	   eventually,	   lead	   to	   an	  overall	   beneficial	  
situation	   for	   the	   citizens	   of	   both	   the	   economically	   further	   and	   less	   advanced	  Member	  
States.259	  	  
The	   balancing	   of	   economic	   interests	   against	   fundamental	   rights	   deserves	   special	  
attention,	   especially	   as	   many	   of	   the	   cases	   where	   such	   balancing	   takes	   place	   concern	  
fundamental	  social	  rights.	  While	  it	  may	  have	  taken	  the	  EU	  legislator	  a	  long	  time	  to	  grant	  
social	  policy	  a	  significant	  role	  in	  the	  internal	  market,	  the	  Court	  was	  early	  to	  recognise	  the	  
social	  dimension	  of	   the	  market.	  Fundamental	  rights	  apply	  both	  as	  general	  principles	  of	  
EU	  law	  as	  well	  as	  by	  virtue	  of	  Article	  51(1)	  of	  the	  Charter	  of	  Fundamental	  Rights.	  They	  
affect	  not	  only	  the	  validity	  of	  EU	  or	  national	  measures	  but	  also	  their	  interpretation.260	  	  
Fundamental	  rights	  can	  be	  relied	  upon	  as	  mandatory	  requirements	  to	  justify	  derogations	  
from	  the	  fundamental	  freedoms.	  In	  Schmidberger261	  and	  Omega262,	  the	  Court	  found	  that	  a	  
Member	  State	  may	  have	  recourse	  to	  fundamental	  rights	  to	  justify	  a	  derogation	  from	  the	  
provisions	   on	   the	   free	   movement	   of	   goods	   and	   the	   freedom	   to	   provide	   services,	  
respectively.	  	  
However,	   not	   even	   fundamental	   rights	   are	   unrestricted	   and	   enjoy	   automatic	   primacy	  
over	   other	   EU	   law.263	   Despite	   being	   recognised	   as	   fundamental	   principles	   of	   EU	   law,	  
fundamental	   rights	   are	   not	   absolute.264	   They	   must	   be	   viewed	   in	   light	   of	   their	   ‘social	  
function’,	   i.e.	  the	  objectives	  and	  general	  interest	  of	  the	  EU	  provided	  that	  the	  latter	  aims	  
are	  proportionate	  and	  do	  not	  constitute	   ‘intolerable	  interference’	  with	  the	  substance	  of	  
the	   fundamental	   right	   in	   question.265	   As	   with	   other	   derogations	   and	   mandatory	  
requirements,	  the	  application	  of	  the	  fundamental	  rights	  must	  fall	  within	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  
                                            
258	  Case	  C-­‐265/95	  Commission	  v	  France	  (Spanish	  Strawberries)	  [1997]	  ECR	  I-­‐6959,	  para	  32.	  	  
259	  C.	  Barnard,	  'Internal	  Market	  v.	  Labour	  Market:	  A	  Brief	  History'	  (n	  108)	  43.	  
260	  When	  transposing	  and	  implementing	  EU	  law,	  national	  authorities	  and	  courts	  must	  avoid	  conflicts	  with	  
both	   fundamental	   rights	   and	   general	   principles	   of	   EU	   law:	   Case	   C-­‐275/06	   Promusicae	   v	   Telefónica	   de	  
España	  [2008]	  ECR	  I-­‐271,	  para	  68.	  
261	  Case	  C-­‐112/00	  Schmidberger	  [2003]	  ECR	  I-­‐5659,	  para	  74.	  
262	  Case	  C-­‐36/02	  Omega	  (n	  215)	  para	  35.	  
263	  Case	  C-­‐438/05	  Viking	  (n	  71)	  para	  44;	  Case	  C-­‐341/05	  Laval	  (n	  256)	  para	  91.	  
264	  Case	  C-­‐200/96	  Metronome	  Musik	  [1998]	  ECR	  I-­‐1953,	  para	  21.	  
265	  Case	  265/87	  Schraeder	  [1989]	  ECR	  2237,	  para	  15.	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Treaty	  and,	   consequently,	   be	  balanced	  against	  other	   rights	  protected	  under	   the	  Treaty	  
and	   be	   proportional	   to	   the	   aim	   pursued.266	   A	  mere	   reference	   to	   the	   need	   to	   protect	   a	  
fundamental	   right	   is,	   therefore,	   insufficient	   to	   justify	   restrictions	   to	   the	   fundamental	  
freedoms.267	  	  
In	  Viking	  and	  Laval,	  the	  fundamental	  right	  under	  scrutiny	  –	  the	  right	  of	  collective	  action	  –	  
is	  also	  a	  social	  right.	  These	  cases	  illustrate	  how,	  eventually,	  the	  role	  of	  fundamental	  rights	  
protection	   is	   similar	   to	   the	   balancing	   undertaken	   in	   the	   case	   of	   other	   mandatory	  
requirements.	  The	  distinction	  lies	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  in	  the	  application	  of	  fundamental	  rights	  
the	   Court	   may	   also	   have	   recourse	   to	   the	   Member	   States’	   common	   constitutional	  
traditions.268	  Whenever	   a	   horizontal	   provision	   is	   also	   deemed	   a	   social,	   environmental,	  
etc.	   fundamental	   right	   their	   scope	   of	   application	   is,	   therefore,	   broadened	   by	   the	  
possibility	  of	  having	  recourse	  beyond	  the	  level	  of	  protection	  of	  the	  right	  provided	  by	  the	  
EU.	  	  
In	  Lindqvist,	  the	  Court	  dealt	  with	  a	  situation	  where	  the	  same	  legal	  measure	  pursues	  both	  
the	  aims	  of	  the	  free	  movement	  of	  data	  between	  the	  Member	  States	  and	  the	  protection	  of	  
the	  fundamental	  rights	  of	  individuals.269	  The	  Court	  recognised	  that	  those	  two	  aims	  may	  
also	   be	   incompatible	   with	   one	   another.	  While	   the	   particular	   provision	   under	   scrutiny	  
was	  found	  not	  to	  infringe	  fundamental	  rights,	  it	  was	  the	  task	  of	  the	  national	  authorities	  
to	  ensure	  that	  in	  the	  application	  of	  the	  national	  provisions	  implementing	  the	  directive	  a	  
‘fair	   balance’	   is	   struck	   between	   the	   rights	   and	   interests	   at	   stake,	   including	   the	  
fundamental	  freedoms.270	  	  
Fundamental	   rights	   can	   also	   in	   themselves	   pursue	   both	   economic	   and	   non-­‐economic	  
                                            
266	  Case	  C-­‐112/00	  Schmidberger	   (n	  261)	  para	  77;	  Case	  C-­‐36/02	  Omega	   (n	  215)	  para	  36;	  Case	  C-­‐438/05	  
Viking	   (n	  71)	  para	  46;	  Case	  C-­‐341/05	  Laval	   (n	  256)	  para	  94;	  Case	  C-­‐368/95	   Familiapress	   [1997]	  ECR	   I-­‐
3689,	  para	  27.	  
267	  Case	  C-­‐470/03	  A.G.M-­COS.MET	  [2007]	  ECR	  I-­‐2749,	  para	  72.	  
268	  Case	  4/73	  Nold	  (n	  179)	  para	  13.	  
269	  Case	  C-­‐101/01	  Lindqvist	  [2003]	  ECR	  I-­‐2971,	  para	  79.	  
270	   ibid	  para	  90.	  Other	  similar	  cases	  of	  the	  Court	  have	  dealt	  with	  the	  balancing	  of	  the	  right	  of	  free	  transit	  
with	  the	  protection	  of	  the	  fundamental	  right	  to	  protest	  and	  demonstrate	  (Case	  C-­‐112/00	  Schmiedberger	  (n	  
261))	   and	   the	  protection	  of	   the	   environment	   (Case	  C-­‐320/03	  Commission	   v	  Austria	   [2005]	  ECR	   I-­‐9871).	  
Moreover,	  the	  Court	  has	  dealt	  with	  questions	  concerning	  measures	  having	  equivalent	  effect	  to	  quantitative	  
restrictions	  and	  road	  safety	  (Case	  C-­‐55/93	  van	  Schaik	  [1994]	  ECR	  I-­‐4837,	  para	  19;	  Case	  C-­‐314/98	  Snellers	  
[2000]	   ECR	   I-­‐8633,	   para	   55;	   Case	   C-­‐54/05	   Commission	   v	   Finland	   [2007]	   ECR	   I-­‐2473,	   para	   40;	   Case	   C-­‐
297/05	   Commission	   v	   Netherlands	   [2007]	   ECR	   I-­‐7467,	   para	   77;	   Case	   C-­‐265/06	   Commission	   v	   Portugal	  
[2008]	  ECR	  I-­‐2245,	  para	  38;	  and	  Case	  C-­‐170/07	  Commission	  v	  Poland	  [2008]	  ECR	  I-­‐87,	  para	  49.)	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aims.	   In	  Schröder,	   the	  Court	   relied	  on	   its	  earlier	  affirmations	   that	   the	  principle	  of	  non-­‐
discrimination	   is	   a	   fundamental	   right	   observed	   by	   the	   Court.271	   As	   such,	   the	   Court	  
deemed	   the	   economic	   aim	  of	  Article	   119	  EC	  Treaty	   on	   equal	   pay	   for	  men	   and	  women	  
(Maastricht	  numbering,	  now	  Article	  157	  TFEU)	  to	  be	  secondary	  to	  the	  social	  aim	  pursued	  
by	  the	  same	  provision	  as	  the	  latter	  constituted	  ‘the	  expression	  of	  a	  fundamental	  human	  
right’.272	  	  
It	   remains	   questionable,	   though,	   whether	   mandatory	   requirements	   constitute	   an	  
exception	   from	   the	   fundamental	   freedoms	   or	   a	   clarification	   of	   the	   scope	   thereof.	   For	  
example,	   do	   collective	   action	   or,	   on	   the	   contrary,	   the	   practice	   of	   social	   dumping	   and	  
other	   social	   and	   other	   non-­‐economic	   aspects	   form	   part	   of	   the	   concept	   of	   the	   internal	  
market	  or	  are	  the	  latter	  to	  be	  considered	  restrictions	  thereof,	  albeit	  justifiable?273	  In	  the	  
example	  of	  competition	  policy,	  the	  answer	  may	  lie	  in	  the	  assessment	  of	  the	  ‘fairness’	  of	  
competition,	   i.e.	  whether	   fair	   competition	   is	   completely	   free	  of	   restrictions	  or	  whether	  
the	   prevention	   of	   social	   dumping	   is	   an	   inherent	   component	   of	   the	   concept	   of	   fair	  
competition.274	   The	   above	   examples	   demonstrate	   that	  mandatory	   requirements	   play	   a	  
vital	   role	   in	   clarifying	   the	   scope	   of	   the	   internal	  market	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   balance	   struck	  
between	   economic	   and	  non-­‐economic	   considerations,	   including	   fundamental	   rights,	   on	  
many	  levels.	  	  	  
6	  EU	  citizenship	  
The	  original	  range	  of	  free	  movers	  in	  the	  European	  Union	  –	  the	  importers	  and	  exporters	  
of	  goods,	  services	  and	  capital,	  and	  the	  mobile	  labour	  force	  –	  has	  been	  gradually	  widened	  
to	   include	   family	  members,	   students,	   old-­‐age	   pensioners	   and	   other	   economically	   non-­‐
active	  persons.	  Maastricht	  Treaty	  introduced	  the	  concept	  of	  EU	  citizenship.	  Prior	  to	  that,	  
                                            
271	  Case	  149/77	  Defrenne	  III	  [1978]	  ECR	  1365,	  paras	  26-­‐27;	  Joined	  Cases	  75/82	  and	  117/82	  Razzouk	  and	  
Beydoun	  v	  Commission	  [1984]	  ECR	  1509,	  para	  16;	  Case	  C-­‐13/94	  P.	  v	  S.	  and	  Cornwall	  County	  Council	  [1996]	  
ECR	  I-­‐2143,	  para	  19.	  
272	  Case	  C-­‐50/96	  Schröder	  [2000]	  ECR	  I-­‐743,	  para	  57;	  Joined	  Cases	  C-­‐270/97	  and	  C-­‐271/97	  Deutsche	  Post	  v	  
Sievers	  and	  Schrage	  [2000]	  ECR	  I-­‐929,	  para	  57.	  
273	  B	  Bercusson,	  European	  Labour	  Law	  (Cambridge	  University	  Press	  2009)	  394-­‐395.	  
274	   F	   Dorssemont,	   'The	   Right	   to	   Take	   Collective	   Action	  v.	   Fundamental	   Economic	   Freedoms	   in	   the	  
Aftermath	  of	  Laval	  and	  Viking'	  in	  M	  De	  Vos	  (ed),	  European	  Union	  internal	  Market	  and	  Labour	  Law:	  Friends	  
or	  Foes?	  (Intersentia	  2009)	  45,	  49.	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the	   free	   movement	   rights	   were	   extended	   to	   the	   non-­‐economic	   movers	   mainly	   by	  
secondary	  law	  and	  the	  case	  law	  of	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice.	  
The	   Court’s	   judgment	   in	   Lawrie-­Blum275	   has	   been	   considered	   one	   that	   introduced	   the	  
concept	  of	  EU	  citizenship	  even	  before	  it	  appeared	  in	  the	  Treaties.	  The	  case	  was	  followed	  
by	   judgments	   in	   Reed,276	   Cowan,277	   and	   Gravier278	   –	   all	   dealing	   with	   the	   question	   of	  
discrimination	   on	   grounds	   of	   nationality	   of	   (unmarried)	   family	  members,	   tourists	   and	  
students,	   respectively.	   In	   secondary	   law,	   the	   right	   of	   non-­‐market	   participants	   to	  move	  
freely	   within	   the	   Union	   was	   first	   granted	   by	   three	   residence	   directives	   adopted	   in	  
1990.279	  These	  directives	  provided	  retired	  persons,	  students	  and	  other	  non-­‐workers	  the	  
right	   to	   residence	   within	   the	   EU	   on	   the	   condition	   that	   they	   are	   covered	   by	  
comprehensive	  medical	   insurance	  and	  have	   sufficient	   resources	   so	  as	  not	   to	  become	  a	  
burden	   on	   the	   social	   security	   system	   of	   the	   host	   Member	   State.	   In	   2004,	   the	   three	  
directives	  were	  replaced	  by	  a	  comprehensive	  residence	  directive.280	  
EU	   citizenship	   is	   the	   ‘fundamental	   status	   of	   nationals	   of	   the	   Member	   States’,281	  
substantiated	  by	   the	  principle	  of	   equal	   treatment	  of	  Article	  18	  TFEU.	   In	  Martínez	  Sala,	  
the	  Court,	  for	  the	  first	  time,	  tied	  Union	  citizenship	  to	  the	  non-­‐discrimination	  provision	  of	  
Article	  6	  EC	  Treaty	  (Maastricht	  numbering,	  now	  Article	  18	  TFEU)	  ‘in	  all	  situations	  which	  
fall	  within	  the	  scope	  ratione	  materiae	  of	  Community	  law’.282	  By	  virtue	  of	  EU	  citizenship,	  
persons	  who	  are	  lawfully	  resident	  in	  the	  host	  Member	  State	  may	  invoke	  the	  principle	  of	  
non-­‐discrimination.283	  Pursuant	  to	  Article	  21	  TFEU,	  all	  European	  citizens,	  thus	  not	  only	  
those	   directly	   participating	   in	   the	   market	   as	   traders,	   workers,	   service	   providers	   or	  
service	   receivers,	   are	   entitled	   to	  move	   and	   reside	   freely	  within	   the	   EU,	   yet	   subject	   to	  
limits	   and	   conditions	   elaborated	   by	   the	   Treaties	   and	   implementing	   measures.	   All	   EU	  
                                            
275	  Case	  66/85	  Lawrie-­Blum	  [1986]	  ECR	  2121.	  
276	  Case	  59/85	  Reed	  [1986]	  ECR	  1283.	  
277	  Case	  186/87	  Cowan	  (n	  90).	  
278	  Case	  293/83	  Gravier	  [1985]	  ECR	  593.	  
279	  Council	  Directive	  90/364/EEC	  of	  28	   June	  1990	  on	   the	   right	  of	   residence	   [1990]	  OJ	  L180/26;	  Council	  
Directive	  90/365/EEC	  of	  28	  June	  1990	  on	  the	  right	  of	  residence	  for	  employees	  and	  self-­‐employed	  persons	  
who	   have	   ceased	   their	   occupational	   activity	   [1990]	   OJ	   L180/28;	   Council	   Directive	   93/96/EEC	   of	  
29	  October	  1993	  on	  the	  right	  of	  residence	  for	  students	  [1993]	  OJ	  L317/59.	  
280	  Directive	  2004/38/EC	  of	   the	  European	  Parliament	  and	  of	   the	  Council	  of	  29	  April	  2004	  on	  the	  right	  of	  
citizens	   of	   the	   Union	   and	   their	   family	   members	   to	   move	   and	   reside	   freely	   within	   the	   territory	   of	   the	  
Member	  States	  [2004]	  OJ	  L158/77.	  
281	  Case	  C-­‐184/99	  Grzelczyk	  (n	  91)	  para	  31;	  Case	  C-­‐413/99	  Baumbast	  (n	  91)	  para	  82.	  
282	  Case	  C-­‐85/96	  Martínez	  Sala	  (n	  91)	  para	  63.	  
283	  Case	  C-­‐184/99	  Grzelzcyk	  (n	  91)	  para	  32.	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citizens	  also	  enjoy	  political	  rights,	  such	  as	  a	  right	  to	  vote	  in	  the	  European	  Parliament	  and	  
local	  government	  elections	  and	  diplomatic	  and	  consular	  protection	  of	  another	  Member	  
State.284	   Citizenship	   rights	   comprise	   a	   ‘genuine	   enjoyment’	   of	   the	   right,	   including	   both	  
the	   existing	   right	   of	   free	  movement	   as	  well	   as	   the	   protection	   of	   a	   future	   possibility	   of	  
movement	   within	   the	   EU.285	   Moreover,	   a	   Union	   citizen	   cannot	   be	   expelled	   from	   a	  
Member	  State	  when	  that	  would	  render	  the	  person	  without	  EU	  citizenship	  altogether.286	  	  
The	   core	   of	   the	   protection	   accorded	   by	   EU	   citizenship	   –	   the	   principle	   of	   non-­‐
discrimination	   –	   is	   substantiated	   identically	   in	   citizenship	   and	   in	   free	   movement	  
provisions,	   rendering	   different	   only	   the	   scope	   of	   application	   in	   personal	   terms.287	   EU	  
citizenship,	   therefore,	   provides	   no	   rights	   beyond	   those	   granted	   under	   the	   internal	  
market	   provisions	   to	   those	   who	   already	   derive	   rights	   from	   the	   Treaties	   via	   their	  
participation	   in	   the	   internal	   market.288	   In	   the	   meantime,	   the	   contrary	   holds	   true	   –	  
economic	  nature	  brings	  an	  activity	  into	  the	  scope	  of	  free	  movement	  provisions	  and,	  thus,	  
accords	  to	  it	  all	  rights	  deriving	  from	  the	  Treaties.289	  	  
The	   importance	   of	   the	   potential	   effect	   of	   EU	   citizenship	   to	   the	   establishing	   and	  
functioning	  of	  the	  internal	  market	  is	  different,	  though,	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  dimension	  of	  EU	  
citizenship	   as	   regulating	   not	   only	   cross-­‐border	   situations	   but	   also	   wholly	   internal	  
situations.	  O’Leary	  has	  argued	  that	  EU	  citizenship	  case	  law	  has	  had	  a	  ‘cross-­‐pollenisation’	  
effect	   on	   free	   movement	   case	   law,	   particularly	   in	   the	   case	   of	   the	   free	   movement	   of	  
workers.290	  She	  presents	  case	  law	  in	  which	  the	  Court	  has	  started	  to	  search	  for	  a	  real	  or	  
genuine	   link	   between	   a	   job	   seeker	   or	   worker	   and	   the	   host	   Member	   State	   in	   order	   to	  
decide	  on	  the	  person’s	  entitlement	  to	  social	  benefits	   in	  the	  host	  state.	  The	  requirement	  
for	   a	   genuine	   link	   first	   appeared	   in	   cases	   concerning	   citizenship.	   Recently,	   it	   has	   also	  
been	  extended	  to	  case	  law	  on	  the	  free	  movement	  of	  workers	  where	  the	  genuine	  link	  has	  
                                            
284	  Article	  20(2)	  TFEU.	  
285	  Case	  C-­‐34/09	  Ruiz	  Zambrano	   [2011]	  ECR	   I-­‐1177,	  para	  42,	  citing	  Case	  C-­‐135/08	  Rottmann	  v	  Freistaat	  
Bayern	  [2010]	  ECR	  I-­‐1449,	  para	  42.	  
286	  Case	  C-­‐135/08	  Rottmann	  v	  Freistaat	  Bayern	  (n	  285)	  para	  54.	  
287	  G	  Davies,	  Nationality	  Discrimination	  in	  the	  European	  Internal	  Market	  (Kluwer	  Law	  International	  2003)	  
188.	  
288	  Joined	  Cases	  C-­‐64/96	  and	  C-­‐65/96	  Uecker	  and	  Jacquet	  [1997]	  ECR	  I-­‐3171,	  para	  23.	  
289	  Case	  C-­‐519/04	  P	  Meca	  Medina	  [2006]	  ECR	  I-­‐6991,	  para	  22.	  
290	  S	  O'Leary,	  'Developing	  an	  Ever	  Closer	  Union	  between	  the	  Peoples	  of	  Europe?	  A	  Reappraisal	  of	  the	  Case	  
Law	  of	  the	  Court	  of	   Justice	  on	  the	  Free	  Movement	  of	  Persons	  and	  EU	  Citizenship'	  (2008)	  27	  Yearbook	  of	  
European	  Law	  167.	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previously	  been	  implied	  to	  have	  existed	  with	  the	  host	  state,	  thus	  justifying	  the	  extension	  
of	   social	   benefits	   of	   the	   host	  Member	   State	   to	   the	   non-­‐national	   worker.291	   It	   remains,	  
however,	  questionable	  whether	  there	  exists	  a	  direct	  link	  between	  EU	  citizenship	  law	  and	  
the	   free	   movement	   of	   persons	   beyond	   the	   Court’s	   shifting	   interpretation	   of	   the	  
requirements	  imposed	  on	  job	  seekers	  and	  workers	  in	  specific	  circumstances,	  e.g.	  frontier	  
workers	  or	  those	  in	  minor	  employment	  to	  demonstrate	  a	  degree	  of	  integration	  with	  the	  
host	   Member	   State	   before	   such	   integration	   is	   established	   definitely	   through	   an	  
employment	  relationship.	  As	  O’Leary	  points	  out,	  the	  shift	  in	  the	  Court’s	  case	  law	  may	  be	  
motivated	  equally	  by	  the	  need	  to	  deal	  with	  benefit	  tourism	  within	  the	  EU.292	  	  
It	  can	  thus	  be	  concluded	  that	  EU	  citizenship	  shapes	  the	  EU	  legal	  order	  as	  a	  whole	  and	  the	  
rights	  of	  EU	  citizens	  within	  the	  EU	  legal	  order	  but	  has	  little	  effect	  on	  either	  the	  scope	  of	  
fundamental	   freedoms	   and	   competition	   law	   or	   the	   functioning	   of	   the	   internal	  market.	  
Subsequently,	  EU	  citizenship	  has	  modest	  impact	  on	  the	  expandability	  of	  the	  EU	  internal	  
market	   beyond	   the	   EU.	   This	   is	   notwithstanding	   the	   fact	   that	   ‘Citizenship	   Directive’	  
2004/38/EC	   has	   been	   declared	   EEA	   relevant	   and	   is	   applied	   by	   the	   EFTA	  Court	   to	   the	  
extent	   that	   its	   provisions	   are	   applicable	   for	   the	   free	  movement	   of	   persons	  within	   the	  
EEA.293	  Not	  all	  parts	  of	  the	  Directive	  form	  part	  of	  the	  EEA	  acquis	  such	  as	  EU	  immigration	  
law,	  political	  rights	  deriving	  from	  EU	  citizenship	  and	  the	  notion	  of	  EU	  citizenship	  itself.294	  	  
7	  Sectoral	  internal	  market	  
The	   internal	   market	   consists	   of	   a	   variety	   of	   economic	   sectors.	   As	   a	   general	   rule,	   the	  
fundamental	   freedoms,	   EU	   competition	   law,	   horizontal	   provisions	   and	   permissible	  
derogations	  apply	  to	  the	  specific	  sectors	  unless	  exceptions	  are	  provided	  by	  the	  Treaties.	  	  
                                            
291	  ibid	  192-­‐193.	  
292	  ibid	  177.	  	  
293	  See,	  for	  example,	  Case	  E-­‐15/12	  Wahl	  [2013]	  EFTA	  Ct	  Rep	  534;	  Case	  E-­‐26/13	  Gunnarsson	  [2014]	  EFTA	  
Ct	  Rep	  254.	  	  
294	  Recital	   8	   of	   the	  Preamble	   to	  Decision	  of	   the	  EEA	   Joint	   Committee	  No	  158/2007	  of	   7	  December	  2007	  
amending	   Annex	  V	   (Free	   movement	   of	   workers)	   and	   Annex	  VIII	   (Right	   of	   establishment)	   to	   the	   EEA	  
Agreement	  that	   incorporated	  the	  Citizenship	  Directive	   into	  the	  EEA	  Agreement	  [2008]	  OJ	  L124/20;	   Joint	  
Declaration	  by	  the	  Contracting	  Parties	  to	  Decision	  of	  the	  EEA	  Joint	  Committee	  No	  158/2007	  incorporating	  
Directive	   2004/38/EC	   of	   the	   European	   Parliament	   and	   of	   the	   Council	   into	   the	   Agreement	   [2008]	   OJ	  
L124/20.	   See	   also	   H	   Haukeland	   Fredriksen	   and	   CNK	   Franklin,	   'Of	   Pragmatism	   and	   Principles:	   The	   EEA	  
Agreement	  20	  Years	  On'	  (2015)	  52	  Common	  Market	  Law	  Review	  629,	  639;	  J	  Breidlid	  and	  M	  Vahl,	  '20	  years	  
on:	  Current	  and	  future	  challenges	  for	  the	  EEA'	  (2015)	  EFTA	  Bulletin	  (forthcoming),	  5.	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One	   example	   of	   an	   economic	   sector	   that	   has	   been	   granted	   special	   exceptions	   is	   the	  
energy	   sector	   that	   has	   been	   extended	   to	   non-­‐EU	   Member	   States	   by	   the	   Energy	  
Community	  Treaty.	  In	  principle,	  the	  internal	  market	  rules	  apply	  to	  the	  European	  energy	  
sector.	  Article	  194	  TFEU	  –	  the	  only	  Treaty	  article	  governing	  EU	  energy	  policy	  –	  explicitly	  
states	  that	  the	  EU	  energy	  policy	   is	  to	  be	  conducted	   ‘in	  the	  context	  of	   the	  establishment	  
and	  functioning	  of	  the	  internal	  market’.	  This	  means	  that	  the	  four	  fundamental	  freedoms	  
and	   rules	   on	   competition	   apply	   to	   the	   energy	   sector	   without	   distinction,	   as	   well	   as	  
horizontal	  provisions,	  derogations	  and	  exceptions	  from	  the	  fundamental	   freedoms.	  The	  
specific	   characteristics	   of	   the	   internal	   market	   in	   energy	   envisage	   a	   special	   focus	   on	  
environmental	   concerns	   that	   are	   manifested	   in	   the	   integration	   of	   energy	   concerns	   as	  
well	  as	  the	  possibility	  to	  undergo	  more	  stringent	  environmental	  measures	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  
preserving	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  national	  energy	  supply	  sector.	  Since	  direct	  impact	  on	  the	  
environment	   is	   intrinsic	   to	   the	   energy	   sector,	   Article	   194(1)	   TFEU	   accords	   special	  
attention	  to	  the	  need	  to	  preserve	  and	  improve	  the	  environment.	  Article	  192(2)(c)	  TFEU	  
on	   the	   EU	   environmental	   policy	   contains	   a	   possibility	   for	   Member	   States	   to	   object	   to	  
environmental	   policy	   instruments	   ‘significantly	   affecting	   a	   Member	   State’s	   choice	  
between	   different	   energy	   sources	   and	   the	   general	   structure	   of	   its	   energy	   supply’	   by	  
setting	  up	  a	  requirement	  of	  unanimity	  for	  the	  adoption	  of	  such	  measures	  in	  the	  Council.	  
Furthermore,	   pursuant	   to	   Article	   194(2)	   TFEU,	   Member	   States	   retain	   their	   right	   to	  
determine	  how	  to	  exploit	  their	  own	  energy	  resources,	  which	  energy	  sources	  to	  use	  and	  
how	  to	  ensure	  energy	  supply	  within	  the	  country.	  	  
The	   European	   common	   transport	   policy	   is	   expanded	   to	   third	   countries	   by	   the	   ECAA	  
Agreement	  in	  the	  aviation	  sector	  and	  the	  TCT	  in	  the	  field	  of	  land,	  rail,	  inland	  waterways	  
and	  maritime	   transport.	   Common	   transport	   policy,	   the	   rail,	   road	   and	   inland	  waterway	  
sectors	   of	   which	   are	   governed	   by	   Articles	   90-­‐100	   TFEU,	   forms	   part	   of	   the	   internal	  
market.	   Similarly	   to	   the	   common	   agricultural	   policy,	   however,	   there	   are	   many	  
specifications	  as	  regards	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  free	  movement	  rights	   in	  the	  transport	  sector.	  
The	   special	   rules	   concern,	   in	   particular,	   the	   freedom	   to	   provide	   services295	   and	  
competition	   law,	   and	  are	   justified	  mainly	  on	  grounds	  of	   regional	  development	   and	   the	  
provision	  of	  public	  service.	  	  
                                            
295	  Article	  58(1)	  TFEU.	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Pursuant	   to	   Article	   100(2)	   TFEU,	   the	   specific	   measures	   for	   sea	   and	   air	   transport	  
secondary	   law	   will	   be	   provided	   in	   secondary	   legislation.	   The	   application	   of	   the	   free	  
movement	  provisions	  to	   the	  transport	  sector	   is	  not	  always	  clear.	   In	   the	  French	  Seamen	  
case,	  which	  dealt	  with	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  treaty	  provisions	  on	  the	  free	  movement	  of	  
workers	  apply	  in	  the	  context	  of	  maritime	  transport,	  the	  Court	  established	  that	  exceptions	  
from	   the	   application	   of	   the	   fundamental	   freedoms	  must	   be	   provided	   expressly	   in	   the	  
Treaties.296	  The	  exemption	  was	  deemed	  to	  exist	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  common	  agricultural	  
policy	   by	   virtue	   of	   Article	   38(2)	   EEC	   Treaty	   (Article	   38(2)	   TFEU).	   Article	   38(1)	   EEC	  
Treaty	  (Article	  38(1)	  TFEU),	  moreover,	  explicitly	  states	  that	  the	  internal	  market	  extends	  
to	   the	   field	   of	   agriculture.	   There	   is	   no	   similar	   provision	   in	   the	   TFEU	   as	   regards	   the	  
common	  transport	  policy.	  However,	  by	  virtue	  of	  Article	  74	  EEC	  Treaty	  (now	  Article	  90	  
TFEU),	   which	   provides	   that	   common	   transport	   policy	   incorporates	   the	   pursuit	   of	   the	  
objectives	  of	  the	  Treaties	  as	  laid	  out	  in	  Articles	  2	  and	  3	  EEC	  Treaty	  (now	  Article	  3	  TEU)	  –	  
‘for	  the	  attainment	  of	  which	  the	  fundamental	  provisions	  applicable	  to	  the	  whole	  complex	  
of	  economic	  activity	  are	  of	  prime	  importance’	  –	  the	  fundamental	  freedoms	  apply	  also	  in	  
the	  field	  of	  maritime	  transport.297	  Instead	  of	  regarding	  the	  common	  transport	  policy	  as	  a	  
departure	   from	   the	   fundamental	   freedoms,	   the	   Court	   interpreted	   the	   objective	   of	  
common	  action	   in	   the	   common	   transport	  policy	  as	   complementary	   to	   the	   fundamental	  
freedoms.	  The	  four	  fundamental	  freedoms	  are,	  thus,	  applicable	  insofar	  as	  they	  enable	  the	  
achievement	  of	  the	  objectives	  of	  the	  common	  transport	  policy.298	  According	  to	  the	  Court,	  
the	   rationale	   behind	   a	   separate	   transport	   policy	   lies	   in	   the	   fact	   that	   being	   a	   service,	   a	  
separate	   set	   of	   provisions	  makes	   it	   possible	   to	   take	   into	   consideration	   its	   specificities;	  
the	  common	  rules	  apply,	  however,	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  they	  are	  not	  explicitly	  excluded.299	  
As	   concerns	   sea	   and	   air	   transport	   in	   particular,	  which	   are	   exempted	   from	   the	   general	  
regulatory	  system	  of	  the	  Treaties	  by	  Article	  84(2)	  EEC	  Treaty	  (Article	  100(2)	  TFEU),	  the	  
Court	   confirmed	   that	   the	   aim	   of	   the	   special	   provision	   was	   not	   to	   set	   up	   a	   special	  
regulatory	   framework	   for	   these	   fields	   in	   particular	   but	   rather	   to	   exempt	   sea	   and	   air	  
transport	   from	   the	   specific	   rules	   laid	   down	   with	   respect	   to	   rail,	   road	   and	   inland	  
                                            
296	  Case	  167/73	  Commission	  v	  France	  (French	  Seamen)	  [1974]	  ECR	  359,	  para	  21.	  
297	  ibid	  para	  24.	  	  
298	  ibid	  paras	  25-­‐26.	  	  
299	  ibid	  paras	  27-­‐28.	  	  
 
	   95 
waterways	   transport.300	   In	  Nouvelles	   Frontières,	   the	   Court	   confirmed	   that	   the	   findings	  
with	  regard	  to	  maritime	  transport	  apply	  equally	  in	  the	  case	  or	  air	  transport.301	  
An	  important	  aspect	  to	  consider	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  energy	  and	  transport	  sectors	  are	  the	  
derogations	  accorded	   to	  many	  of	   the	  undertakings	  covered	  by	   the	  common	  policies	  by	  
virtue	  of	  Articles	  93,	  106	  and	  107	  TFEU.	  These	  articles	  provide	  for	  exceptions	  from	  the	  
general	  rules	  of	  competition	  policy,	  especially	  state	  aid,	  to	  the	  generally	  Member-­‐State-­‐
defined302	   ‘services	   of	   general	   economic	   interest’	   (SGEIs).303	   SGEIs	   are	   provided	   in	  
Article	  14	  TFEU	  and	  Protocol	  No	  26	  of	  the	  Treaties.	  They	  comprise	  services	  that	  must	  be	  
provided	   due	   to	   public	   need	   even	   if	   they	   do	   not	   prove	   economically	   profitable.304	  
Pursuant	   to	  Article	  106(2)	  TFEU,	   they	  are	   subject	   to	  EU	  competition	   law	   to	   the	  extent	  
that	   they	   do	   not	   ‘obstruct	   the	   performance,	   in	   law	   or	   in	   fact,	   of	   the	   particular	   task	  
assigned	   to	   them’.	   In	   the	   energy	   and	   transport	   sectors,	   this	   provision	   concerns,	   in	  
particular,	   the	   Member	   States’	   energy	   monopolies,	   transport	   networks,	   and	   public	  
transport.305	  
A	   similar	   discussion	   as	   regards	   exceptions	   from	   the	   internal	   market	   rules	   to	   the	  
provision	  of	  public	  services	  has	   taken	  place	   in	   the	  context	  of	  Articles	  45(4),	  51	  and	  62	  
                                            
300	  ibid	  para	  31.	  
301	  Joined	  Cases	  209-­‐213/84	  Nouvelles	  Frontières	  [1986]	  ECR	  1425,	  paras	  42	  and	  45.	  
302	  Subject	  to	  a	  test	  of	  ‘manifest	  error	  of	  appraisal’,	  see	  Case	  T-­‐289/03	  BUPA	  [2008]	  ECR	  II-­‐741,	  paras	  168-­‐
169.	  Exceptions	  include	  sectors	  which	  have	  been	  harmonised,	  e.g.	  postal	  and	  telecommunications	  sectors,	  
harmonised	  by	  Directive	  2002/22/EC	  of	  the	  European	  Parliament	  and	  of	  the	  Council	  of	  7	  March	  2002	  on	  
universal	  service	  and	  users'	  rights	  relating	  to	  electronic	  communications	  networks	  and	  services	  [2002]	  OJ	  
L108/51	  (Universal	  Service	  Directive);	  Directive	  97/67/EC	  of	  the	  European	  Parliament	  and	  of	  the	  Council	  
of	  15	  December	  1997	  on	  common	  rules	  for	  the	  development	  of	  the	  internal	  market	  of	  Community	  postal	  
services	   and	   the	   improvement	   of	   quality	   of	   service	   [1998]	   OJ	   L15/14;	   Directive	   2009/72/EC	   of	   the	  
European	  Parliament	  and	  of	  the	  Council	  of	  13	  July	  2009	  concerning	  common	  rules	  for	  the	  internal	  market	  
in	  electricity	  [2009]	  OJ	  L211/55.	  	  
303	  Article	  14	  TFEU	  reads	  as	  follows:	  ‘[...]	  given	  the	  place	  occupied	  by	  services	  of	  general	  economic	  interest	  
in	   the	   shared	   values	   of	   the	  Union	   as	  well	   as	   their	   role	   in	   promoting	   social	   and	   territorial	   cohesion,	   the	  
Union	  and	  the	  Member	  States,	  each	  within	  their	  respective	  powers	  and	  within	  the	  scope	  of	  application	  of	  
the	   Treaties,	   shall	   take	   care	   that	   such	   services	   operate	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   principles	   and	   conditions,	  
particularly	  economic	  and	  financial	  conditions,	  which	  enable	  them	  to	  fulfil	  their	  missions.	  [...]’	  
304	  H	  Schweitzer,	   'Services	  of	  General	  Economic	   Interest:	  European	  Law's	   Impact	  on	   the	  Role	  of	  Markets	  
and	  of	  the	  Member	  States'	  in	  M	  Cremona	  (ed),	  Market	  Integration	  and	  Public	  Services	  in	  the	  European	  Union	  
(Oxford	   University	   Press	   2011)	   11,	   34.	   A	   definition	   of	   SGEIs	   is	   provided	   in	   Commission,	   ‘A	   Quality	  
Framework	  for	  Services	  of	  General	  Interest	  in	  Europe’	  (Communication)	  COM	  (2011)	  900	  final.	  	  	  
305	   A	   separate	   category	   among	   services	   of	   general	   interest	   are	   social	   services	   of	   general	   interest,	  which	  
may	  include	  both	  economic	  and	  non-­‐economic	  activities;	  those	  which	  are	  economic	  in	  nature	  are	  treated	  
as	   SGEIs.	   See	   Commission,	   ‘Implementing	   the	   Community	   Lisbon	   programme:	   Social	   services	   of	   general	  
interest	  in	  the	  European	  Union’	  (Communication)	  COM	  (2006)	  177	  final;	  Commission,	  ‘Services	  of	  general	  
interest,	  including	  social	  services	  of	  general	  interest:	  a	  new	  European	  commitment’	  (Communication)	  COM	  
(2007)	  725	  final.	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TFEU.	  It	  concerns	  the	  exemptions	  from	  the	  rules	  on	  the	  free	  movement	  of	  persons	  and	  
services	  granted	  to	  public	  service	  employees	  and	  activities	   in	  which	  the	  state	  exercises	  
official	   authority.	   The	   exceptions	   are	  motivated	   by	   the	   idea	   of	   public	   service	   being	   an	  
expression	  of	  state	  sovereignty.306	  The	  general	  scope	  of	  the	  exception	  was	  defined	  by	  the	  
Court	   in	  Sotgiu,307	   and	   the	  concept	  of	  public	   service	   in	  Commission	  v	  Belgium.308	  There	  
has	   been	   considerable	   debate	   on	   the	   range	   of	   jobs	   that	   fall	   within	   the	   public	   sector	  
exception.	   Being	   vital	   sectors	   in	   a	   state’s	   economy,	   it	   has	   often	   been	   asked	   whether	  
transport	  or	  energy	   sectors	   include	   such	  activities	  or	  positions	   that	  must	  be	  protected	  
under	   the	   public	   service	   exceptions.	   The	   Court	   has	   given	   the	   exception	   a	   functional	  
rather	   than	   institutional	   interpretation,309	   assessing	   whether	   the	   post	   in	   question	  
‘involve[s]	  direct	  or	  indirect	  participation	  in	  the	  exercise	  of	  powers	  conferred	  by	  public	  
law	  and	  duties	  designed	  to	  safeguard	  the	  general	  interests	  of	  the	  state	  or	  of	  other	  public	  
authorities’	  and	  requires	  ‘the	  existence	  of	  a	  special	  relationship	  of	  allegiance	  to	  the	  state	  
and	   reciprocity	   of	   rights	   and	   duties	   which	   form	   the	   foundation	   of	   the	   bond	   of	  
nationality’.310	  Excluded	  are	  positions	   in	  organisations	  covered	  by	  public	   law	  which	  do	  
not	  constitute	  public	  service	  ‘properly	  so	  called’.311	  A	  number	  of	  positions	  in	  the	  national	  
railways	  have,	  for	  example,	  not	  been	  considered	  to	  constitute	  employment	  in	  the	  public	  
service,312	  nor	  have	  positions	  in	  public	  transport;	  water,	  gas	  and	  electricity	  supply;	  and	  
airline	   and	   shipping	   companies	   done	   so.313	   Captains	   and	   first	   officers	   on	   ships	  may	   in	  
some	  circumstances	  fall	  within	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  exception	  of	  Article	  45(4)	  TFEU.314	  
                                            
306	  Case	  307/84	  Commission	  v	  France	  [1986]	  ECR	  1725,	  Opinion	  of	  AG	  Mancini,	  para	  2.	  
307	  Case	  152/73	  Sotgiu	  [1974]	  ECR	  153,	  para	  5.	  
308	  Case	  149/79	  Commission	  v	  Belgium	  [1980]	  ECR	  3881,	  para	  10.	  	  
309	  Case	  307/84	  Commission	  v	  France	  [1986]	  ECR	  1725,	  para	  12.	  
310	  Case	  149/79	  Commission	  v	  Belgium	  (n	  308)	  para	  10.	  	  
311	  ibid	  para	  11.	  
312	  Case	  149/79	  Commission	  v	  Belgium	  [1982]	  ECR	  1845.	  
313	   These	   areas,	   among	   others,	   were	   pointed	   out	   in	   Commission,	   ‘Freedom	   of	   workers	   and	   access	   to	  
employment	  in	  the	  public	  service	  of	  Member	  States	  —	  Commission	  action	  in	  respect	  of	  the	  application	  of	  
Article	  48(4)	  of	   the	  EEC	  Treaty’	   [1988]	  OJ	  C72/2	  as	  generally	  exempted	   from	   the	   scope	  of	  Article	  48(4)	  
EEC	   Treaty	   (now	   Article	   45(4)	   TFEU)	   and	   confirmed	   by	   the	   Court	   in	   Case	   C-­‐473/93	   Commission	   v	  
Luxemburg	   [1996]	   ECR	   I-­‐3207,	   para	   31.	   For	   confirmation	   by	   the	   Court	   in	   individual	   cases	   see	   Case	   C-­‐
173/94	  Commission	  v	  Belgium	  [1996]	  ECR	  I-­‐3265;	  Case	  C-­‐290/94	  Commission	  v	  Greece	  [1996]	  ECR	  I-­‐3285.	  
314	  Case	  C-­‐405/01	  Colegio	  de	  Oficiales	  de	  la	  Marina	  Mercante	  Española	  [2003]	  ECR	  I-­‐10391;	  Case	  C-­‐47/02	  
Anker	   [2003]	   ECR	   I-­‐10447;	   Case	   C-­‐89/07	   Commission	   v	   France	   [2008]	   ECR	   I-­‐45;	   Case	   C-­‐447/07	  
Commission	  v	  Italy	  [2008]	  ECR	  I-­‐125;	  Case	  C-­‐94/08	  Commission	  v	  Spain	  [2008]	  ECR	  I-­‐160;	  Case	  C-­‐460/08	  
Commission	  v	  Greece	  [2009]	  ECR	  I-­‐216.	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The	   legal	   content	   of	   the	   sectors	   of	   the	   internal	   market,	   including	   the	   particular	  
exceptions	   granted	   by	   primary	   law,	   are	   easier	   to	   circumscribe	   in	   detail	   than	   the	   EU	  
internal	  market	  as	  a	  whole	  because	  of	  the	  comparatively	  narrower	  scope	  of	  the	  former.	  
However,	   there	   is	   little	   that	   distinguishes	   between	   the	   substantive	   content	   of	   the	  
comprehensive	   and	   sectoral	   internal	   markets	   except	   for	   a	   limited	   number	   of	   sector	  
specific	   derogations.	   There	   is	   nothing	   to	   exempt	   from	   the	   cores	   of	  market	   sectors	   the	  
application	   of	   horizontal	   provisions	   or	   mandatory	   requirements	   motivated	   by	   non-­‐
market	   concerns.	   It,	   therefore,	  makes	   little	  difference	   that	   in	   some	   sectors,	   such	   as	   air	  
transport,	  a	  significant	  portion	  of	  the	  acquis	  is	  specified	  in	  secondary	  law.	  In	  the	  context	  
of	   exporting	   the	   acquis,	   the	   distinction	   between	   primary/secondary	   law	   becomes	  
irrelevant	  as	  all	  acquis	  becomes	  part	  of	  an	  international	  agreement.	  	  
8	  Conclusion	  
Pursuant	  to	  its	  definition,	  the	  internal	  market	  must	  warrant	  the	  free	  movement	  of	  goods,	  
workers,	   services	   and	   capital	   within	   the	   market	   while	   ensuring	   fair	   conditions	   for	  
competition,	   the	  protection	  of	   fundamental	   rights	   and	  other	  non-­‐economic	   interests	  of	  
the	  market	  participants	  as	   laid	  out	   in	   the	  Treaties.	  Whereas	   the	   fundamental	   freedoms	  
and	  competition	  policy	  have	  been	  in	  the	  centre	  of	  the	  internal	  market	  integration	  project	  
from	   its	   beginning,	   fundamental	   rights	   and	   non-­‐economic	   concerns	   have	   entered	   the	  
scene	  gradually	  in	  the	  course	  of	  time.	  At	  the	  same	  time	  as	  they	  gain	  importance	  as	  EU’s	  
objectives	   aside	   economic	   integration,	   non-­‐economic	   considerations	   are	   embedded	   in	  
horizontal	   provisions	   and	   various	   derogations	   assume	   ever	   greater	   relevance	   for	   the	  
internal	   market.	   They	   influence	   the	   economic	   heart	   of	   the	   internal	   market	   in	   various	  
ways,	  from	  the	  policy-­‐making	  stage	  to	  that	  of	  implementation	  and	  application.	  	  
Two	  main	  conclusions	  can	  be	  drawn	  from	  the	  developments	   in	   the	   internal	  market	   for	  
the	   purposes	   of	   the	   possibility	   of	   extending	   the	   internal	   market	   by	   exporting	   the	  
provisions.	  Firstly,	  although	   the	  Treaties	  provide	  a	  definition	  of	   the	   internal	  market	   its	  
scope	   remains	   just	   as	   ambiguous	   as	   that	   of	   the	   common	   market.	   A	   large	   part	   of	   the	  
balancing	  between	  economic	  and	  non-­‐economic	   concerns	   is	   conducted	  by	   the	  Court	  of	  
Justice	  on	  a	  case-­‐to-­‐case	  basis	  which	  renders	  the	  actual	  scope	  of	  the	  economic	  principles	  
in	   the	   internal	   market	   difficult	   to	   circumscribe	   with	   precision.	   Secondly,	   the	   internal	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market	   is	   a	   constantly	   changing	   notion	   without	   a	   clear	   final	   destination.	   For	   third	  
countries	  setting	  out	  to	  align	  their	  legal	  systems	  with	  that	  of	  the	  EU,	  the	  internal	  market	  
is	   not	   a	   constant	   value	   that	   can	   easily	   be	   kept	   within	   the	   frames	   of	   an	   international	  
agreement	   having	   more	   limited	   aims	   than	   the	   EU	   Treaties.	   It	   is	   demanding	   both	   to	  
achieve	   a	   homogeneous	   internal	   market	   expanded	   outside	   the	   Union	   by	   exporting	  
constantly	   changing	   internal	   market	   acquis	   that	   has	   an	   ambiguous	   scope,	   and	   to	  
construct	   an	   institutional	   framework	   that	   is	   both	   capable	   of	   indentifying	   the	   relevant	  
internal	  market	  acquis	  among	  EU	  acquis	  in	  general	  and	  incorporating	  the	  changes	  in	  the	  
acquis	  to	  the	  international	  agreements	  without	  delay.	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Chapter	  3	   Internal	  market:	  unity	  
1	  Introduction	  
The	  broad	  objective	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  is	  to	  achieve	  an	  ever	  closer	  union	  among	  the	  
peoples	   of	   Europe	   by,	   among	   other	   means,	   creating	   a	   highly	   competitive	   market	  
economy.	  The	  objectives	  of	  the	  EU	  not	  only	  influence	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  internal	  market	  
in	  substantive	  terms	  as	  discussed	  in	  the	  preceding	  chapter	  but	  also	  prescribe	  a	  particular	  
level	  of	  uniformity	  among	  the	  elements	  of	  the	  EU	  legal	  order	  generally	  and	  the	  internal	  
market	   specifically.	   While	   substantive	   aspects	   of	   the	   internal	   market	   determine	   the	  
content	   of	   the	   rights	   and	   obligations	   deriving	   from	   the	   acquis	   and	   the	   interaction	  
between	   the	   economic	   and	   non-­‐economic	   elements,	   the	   uniformity	   aspect	   pertains	  
specifically	  to	  the	  notion	  of	  acquis	  and	  asks	  for	  what	  level	  of	  adherence	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  
entire	   body	   of	   internal	  market	   acquis	   is	   necessary	   in	   order	   to	   be	   able	   to	   consider	   an	  
expansion	  of	   the	   internal	  market	   to	   third	  countries	  by	  means	  of	  exporting	  EU	  acquis	   a	  
true	  extension	  of	  the	  internal	  market.	  	  
The	  general	  aim	  of	  the	  multilateral	  agreements	  exporting	  the	  acquis	   is	  homogeneity	  –	  a	  
term	  comparable	   in	  meaning	  to	  uniformity	  and	  unity.	  The	  aim	  of	  homogeneity	  has	  two	  
dimensions:	   firstly,	   homogeneity	   within	   the	   realm	   of	   the	   particular	   international	  
agreement	  in	  question	  and,	  secondly,	  homogeneity	  between	  the	  market	  space	  created	  by	  
the	  international	  agreement	  and	  the	  internal	  market	  of	  the	  EU.	  Whereas	  the	  question	  of	  
homogeneity	   in	  the	   former	  dimension	   is	  not	  problematic	   it	   is	   the	   latter	  dimension	  that	  
raises	  a	  number	  of	  questions	  and	  concerns.	  In	  order	  to	  be	  able	  to	  determine	  whether	  the	  
expanded	  internal	  market	  is,	  indeed,	  a	  genuine	  extension	  of	  the	  EU	  internal	  market	  it	  is	  
necessary	   that	   the	   scope	   of	   the	   internal	  market	   be	   delimited	  with	   sufficient	   precision,	  
both	  in	  terms	  of	  substance	  and	  unity.	  Defining	  the	  necessary	  level	  of	  commonality	  within	  
the	   EU	   internal	   market	   and	   legal	   order	   generally	   will	   serve	   as	   a	   benchmark	   for	   the	  
purpose	   of	   indicating	   whether	   or	   not	   a	   set	   of	   acquis	   exported	   to	   third	   countries	  
constitutes	  a	  mirror	  image	  of	  the	  internal	  market	  or	  whether	  the	  result	  is	  only	  a	  type	  of	  a	  
single	  market	  that	  operates	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  rules	  originating	  from	  the	  EU.	  
The	   level	   of	   conformity	   with	   the	   common	   rules	   within	   the	   EU	   internal	   market	   is	   not	  
absolute.	  While	  unity,	  and	  in	  some	  circumstances	  even	  uniformity,	  is	  a	  crucial	  element	  of	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the	  internal	  market,1	  the	  internal	  market	  also	  encompasses	  numerous	  opt-­‐outs	  and	  other	  
types	   of	   derogations	   for	   the	   Member	   States.	   This	   chapter	   endeavours	   to	   analyse	   the	  
concept	   of	   the	   internal	   market	   from	   the	   perspective	   of	   the	   level	   of	   commonality	   it	  
requires	   from	   the	   Member	   States	   and	   from	   the	   third	   countries	   in	   order	   to	   retain	   its	  
specific	   character	   as	   the	  EU’s	   internal	  market.	   Section	   2	   scrutinises,	   in	   the	   light	   of	   the	  
aims	  of	   the	  EU,	   the	  concept	  of	  unity	   in	   the	  context	  of	   the	   internal	  market	  and	  the	   legal	  
order	  of	  the	  EU	  more	  generally	  focusing	  on	  the	  level	  of	  integration.	  Section	  3	  deals	  with	  
the	  question	  of	  permissible	  and	  impermissible	  disintegration	  in	  the	  internal	  market	  and	  
the	   EU	   legal	   order,	   respectively.	   Section	   4	   outlines	   the	   exact	   objectives	   of	   the	  
international	   agreements	   exporting	   the	   acquis	   as	   regards	   commonality	   within	  
themselves	  and	  vis-­à-­vis	   the	   internal	  market	  acquis,	  covering	  both	  of	   the	  dimensions	  of	  
homogeneity	   mentioned	   above.	   The	   chapter	   concludes	   with	   an	   overview	   of	   the	   legal	  
nature	  of	  the	  homogeneity	  clauses	  in	  the	  multilateral	  agreements.	  
2	  Integration	  in	  the	  internal	  market	  
The	  unity	  of	  the	  internal	  market	  appears	  in	  two	  contexts.	  The	  first	  concerns	  the	  unity	  of	  
the	  EU’s	  legal	  order	  of	  which	  the	  internal	  market	  forms	  part.	  It	  denotes	  the	  unity	  of	  the	  
parts	   that	   form	  the	  whole	  and	  draws	   largely	  on	   the	  application	  of	   the	  same	   legal	   rules	  
across	   the	  geographical	  borders	  of	   the	  EU.	  The	  second	   is	   the	  unity	  of	   the	  market	   itself,	  
referring	  to	  the	  orderly	  composition	  of	  the	  constituent	  elements	  of	  the	  market	  that	  must	  
be	   in	   place	   for	   its	   optimal	   functioning.	   Both	   contexts	   are	   relevant	   for	   the	   purposes	   of	  
establishing	  the	  necessary	  commonality	  in	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  internal	  market	  and	  will	  be	  
considered	  in	  turn.	  
2.1	  Unity	  of	  the	  internal	  market	  
As	   an	   essential	   element	   of	   the	   internal	   market,	   unity	   refers	   to	   the	   ‘substance	   of	   the	  
common	  and	  complete	  order	  of	  the	  internal	  market.’2	  It	  requires	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  set	  of	  
elements	  that	  define	  the	  rights	  and	  obligations	  of	  market	  participants	  across	  the	  Union	  
territory.	  The	  internal	  market	  of	  the	  EU	  enjoys	  a	  degree	  of	  unity	  by	  virtue	  of	  the	  common	  
rules	  that	  guide	  the	  activities	  of	  market	  participants	  in	  the	  common	  market	  space.	  	  
                                            
1	  Case	  14/68	  Walt	  Wilhelm	  [1969]	  ECR	  1,	  para	  5.	  
2	  R	  Barents,	  The	  Autonomy	  of	  Community	  Law	  (Kluwer	  Law	  International	  2004)	  208.	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Unity	  of	  the	  internal	  market	  is	  based	  on	  the	  concept	  of	  unhindered	  movement	  of	  factors	  
of	  production	  and	  builds,	  as	  such,	  on	  the	  free	  movement	  of	  goods,	  services,	  people	  and	  
capital	   and	   rules	   on	   competition	   which	   support	   the	   establishment	   and	   the	   proper	  
functioning	  of	  the	  market.	  In	  the	  most	  basic	  terms,	  the	  borderless	  internal	  market	  means	  
that	   undertakings	   are	   able	   to	   operate	   and	  workers	   take	   up	   employment	   in	   any	   of	   the	  
Member	  States	  without	  discrimination	  based	  on	  their	  country	  of	  origin.	  Internal	  market	  
legislation	  must	  eliminate	  any	  discrimination	  in	  a	  comprehensive	  and	  complete	  manner,	  
meaning	   that	   unity	   is	   achieved	   through	   the	   application	   of	   a	   common	   set	   of	   rules	   that	  
regulate	   all	   of	   the	   relevant	   aspects	   of	   intra-­‐EU	   trade.	   The	   relevant	   aspects	   of	   intra-­‐EU	  
trade	  are	  limited	  by	  the	  principle	  of	  conferral	  and	  the	  competences	  of	  the	  EU	  and	  do	  not,	  
thus,	   apply	   to	  all	   fields	  of	   life.	  Neither	  does	   the	   internal	  market	   regulate	  differences	   in	  
conditions	  of	  competition	  arising	  from	  non-­‐human	  factors,	  such	  as	  natural	  phenomena,	  
but	  apply	  mainly	  to	  ‘differences	  in	  treatment	  arising	  from	  human	  activity,	  and	  especially	  
from	  measures	  taken	  by	  public	  authorities’.3	  This	  holds	  true	  notwithstanding	  occasional	  
compensation	  for	  natural	  inequalities.4	  	  
Pursuant	   to	  Walt	  Wilhelm,	   the	  backbone	  of	   the	   internal	  market	  –	   the	   four	   fundamental	  
freedoms	  and	  equal	  conditions	  for	  competition	  –	  is	  the	  ‘primary	  object’	  of	  the	  EU	  as	  well	  
as	  the	  means	  of	  achieving	  it.5	  In	  the	  same	  vein	  is	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  internal	  market	  both	  
a	  separate	  objective	  of	  the	  EU	  and	  a	  means	  of	  achieving	  the	  broader	  aim	  of	  an	  ever	  closer	  
union	  among	  the	  peoples	  of	  Europe.	  A	  primary	  object	  of	  the	  Treaties	  is,	  in	  turn,	  also	  ‘to	  
confirm	   and	   safeguard	   the	   unity	   of	   that	   market’.6	   Consequently,	   the	   Court	   of	   Justice	  
considers	  the	  unity	  of	  the	  market	  to	  be	  a	  value	  in	  itself	  –	  a	  ‘fundamental	  principle’7	  or	  an	  
essential	   characteristic	   of	   the	   internal	   market	   that	   must	   be	   preserved	   by	   means	   of	   a	  
single	   legislator	   and	   various	   actors	   implementing,	   applying8	   and	   interpreting9	   the	  
acquis.10	  	  
                                            
3	  Case	  52/79	  Debauve	  [1980]	  ECR	  833,	  para	  21.	  
4	  ibid.	  
5	  Case	  14/68	  Walt	  Wilhelm	  (n	  1)	  para	  5.	  
6	  ibid.	  
7	  Case	  193/80	  Commission	  v	  Italy	  [1981]	  ECR	  3019,	  para	  17.	  	  
8	  Case	  324/85	  Foto-­Frost	  [1987]	  ECR	  4199,	  para	  16;	  Case	  61/79	  Denkavit	  II	  [1980]	  ECR	  1205,	  para	  18.	  
9	  Case	  299/84	  Neumann	  [1985]	  ECR	  3663,	  para	  25.	  
10	  Case	  40/70	  Sirena	  v	  Eda	  [1971]	  ECR	  69,	  para	  10.	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The	   concept	   of	   the	   internal	  market,	   therefore,	   not	   only	   includes	   the	   four	   fundamental	  
freedoms	  and	  rules	  on	  competition	  as	  provided	  in	  the	  Treaties	  and	  secondary	  legislation,	  
interpreted	   by	   the	   Court	   of	   Justice	   and	   defined	   and	   circumscribed	   by	   a	   series	   of	   non-­‐
economic	  considerations.	  It	  also	  includes	  the	  idea	  that	  these	  elements	  inherently	  belong	  
together	  to	  make	  up	  the	  very	  specific	  ‘EU	  internal	  market’	  distinct	  from	  any	  other	  inter-­‐
state	  single	  market	  formation.	  According	  to	  Barents,	  unity	  of	  the	  internal	  market	  is	  thus	  
not	  a	  best	  efforts	  obligation	  of	  the	  parties	  to	  the	  EU	  Treaties	  but,	  indeed,	  the	  status	  quo	  of	  
the	  internal	  market.11	  
2.2	  Unity	  of	  the	  EU	  legal	  order	  
Very	   closely	   connected	   to	   the	   notion	   of	   unity	   of	   the	   internal	  market	   is	   the	   concept	   of	  
unity	  of	  the	  EU	  legal	  order	  –	  the	  idea	  that	  EU	  law	  has	  the	  same	  effect	  in	  all	  Member	  States	  
in	  all	  circumstances.12	  Differently	  from	  the	  unity	  of	  the	  internal	  market,	  the	  unity	  of	  the	  
legal	  order	  does	  not	  look	  at	  the	  essential	  characteristics	  of	  the	  legal	  order	  but	  rather	  the	  
similarity	  of	  its	  component	  elements.	  Different	  terms	  are	  used	  to	  denote	  the	  same	  set	  of	  
rules	   applied	   across	   the	   Union	   –	   and	   beyond	   in	   the	   case	   of	   international	   agreements	  
seeking	   to	   extend	   the	   internal	   market	   to	   third	   countries.	   These	   notions	   include	  
‘homogeneity’,	   ‘coherence’,	   ‘uniformity’	   and	   ‘unity’,	   each	   having	   a	   slightly	   different	  
meaning.	  	  
The	  first	  of	  the	  terms	  –	  ‘homogeneity’	  –	  is	  most	  frequently	  used	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  EEA.13	  
Integration	  theorists	  define	   ‘homogeneous	  integration’	  as	  normative	  and	  organisational	  
convergence	   that	   leads	   to	   a	   uniform	   outcome	   across	   the	   Union,14	   but	   the	   term	   is	  
otherwise	  seldom	  used	  in	  relation	  to	  EU	  law.15	  Instead,	  the	  comprehensiveness	  of	  the	  EU	  
legal	  order	  is	  usually	  described	  using	  the	  notions	  of	  ‘coherence’,	  ‘unity’	  and	  ‘uniformity’.	  
‘Coherence’	  generally	  implies	  a	  logical	  and	  orderly	  organisation	  of	  the	  constituent	  parts	  
                                            
11	  R	  Barents	  (n	  2)	  214.	  
12	  Case	  166/73	  Rheinmühlen	  I	  [1974]	  ECR	  33,	  para	  2.	  
13	   ‘Considering	   the	   objective	   of	   establishing	   a	   dynamic	   and	   homogeneous	   European	   Economic	   Area’:	  
Recital	  4,	  Preamble	   to	   the	  EEA	  Agreement,	  see	  below	  section	  4.1.	   In	   this	   thesis,	   ‘homogeneity’	   is	  used	   to	  
refer	  to	  the	  objectives	  regarding	  unity	  of	  all	  of	  the	  three	  multilateral	  agreements	  under	  scrutiny.	  	  
14	   S	   Andersen	   and	   N	   Sitter,	   'Differentiated	   Integration:	   What	   is	   it	   and	   How	   Much	   Can	   the	   EU	  
Accommodate?'	  (2006)	  28	  European	  Integration	  313,	  321.	  	  
15	   The	   term	   ‘homogeneity’	   occurs	   predominantly	   in	   the	   field	   of	   competition	   law	   and	   is	   used	   to	   refer	   to	  
homogeneous	  markets.	  Competition	  law	  is	  also	  regarded	  as	  the	  most	  ‘homogeneous’	  among	  the	  EU’s	  policy	  
fields:	  see	  ibid	  321-­‐322.	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of	   a	   system,	   including	   a	   legal	   system.16	  One	   example	   of	   coherence	  within	   the	   EU	   legal	  
order	   is	   the	   system	   of	   EU’s	   judiciary.	   In	   this	   example,	   competences	   are	   allocated	  
systematically	   between	   the	   EU	   and	   the	   national	   courts	   leaving,	   for	   instance,	   the	  
procedures	   for	   reviewing	   the	   legality	   of	   the	   acts	   of	   EU	   institutions	   exclusively	   to	   the	  
Union	   courts.17	   The	   ‘fundamental	   mechanism’	   in	   maintaining	   coherence	   of	   the	   EU’s	  
judicial	   system	   is	   the	  preliminary	  reference	  procedure	  provided	   in	  Article	  267	  TFEU.18	  
The	   procedure	   guarantees	   coherence	   in	   a	   number	   of	  ways:	   it	   creates	   a	   necessary	   link	  
between	   Member	   States’	   national	   courts	   and	   the	   Court	   of	   Justice,	   safeguards	   the	  
authoritative	  interpretation	  of	  EU	  law	  as	  provided	  by	  the	  Court,	  and,	  finally,	  ensures	  that	  
the	   Court’s	   interpretation	   of	   EU	   law	   is	   applied	   in	   the	   national	   legal	   orders	   by	   the	  
referring	   national	   court.	   The	   expected	   outcome	   of	   the	   preliminary	   ruling	   procedure	   is	  
the	   uniform	   interpretation	   and	   application	   of	   EU	   law	   in	   the	   EU	   and	   in	   the	   Member	  
States.19	  It	  also	  serves	  to	  protect	  the	  autonomy	  of	  the	  EU	  legal	  order	  and	  especially	  the	  
role	   of	   the	   Court	   as	   the	   sole	   authoritative	   interpreter	   of	   EU	   law.20	   The	   ideas	   of	   the	  
uniform	  interpretation	  and	  application	  of	  EU	  law,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  autonomy,	  on	  the	  
other,	   are	   also	   strongly	   connected	   to	   the	   ideas	  of	   uniformity	   and	  unity	   of	   the	  EU	   legal	  
order.	  Coherence	   itself	  does	  not,	  however,	  concern	  the	  application	  of	   the	  same	  rules	   in	  
each	  constituent	  part	  of	  a	  legal	  system	  such	  as	  in	  every	  Member	  State	  of	  the	  EU.	  
‘Uniformity’,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   refers	   specifically	   to	   identical	   quality.	   In	   the	   EU	   legal	  
order	   the	   concept	   of	   uniformity	  manifests	   itself	   in	   the	   adoption	   of	   uniform	   rules	   and	  
their	  subsequent	  application	  and	   interpretation	  across	   the	  Union	   in	  a	  uniform	  manner.	  
The	  principal	  means	  of	  achieving	  uniformity	  is	  through	  positive	  integration	  in	  the	  form	  
of	  harmonising	  laws.	  Nevertheless,	  in	  the	  United	  States	  the	  first	  step	  towards	  creating	  a	  
‘more	  perfect	  Union’	  by	  the	  Constitution	  was	  to	  eliminate	  the	  principal	  barriers	  in	  trade	  
between	   the	  states.	  After	   that	  had	  proven	  unsuccessful	  as	   the	  single	  solution,	   recourse	  
                                            
16	  Balkin	  distinguishes	  between	  logical,	  narrative	  and	  normative	  coherence,	  see	  JM	  Balkin,	  'Understanding	  
Legal	  Understanding:	  The	  Legal	  Subject	  and	  the	  Problem	  of	  Legal	  Coherence'	  (1993)	  103	  Yale	  Law	  Journal	  
105,	  114.	  On	  whether	  or	  not	  a	   legal	   system	  as	  a	  whole	   can	  be	   coherent	   see	  BB	  Levenbook,	   'The	  Role	  of	  
Coherence	  in	  Legal	  Reasoning'	  (1984)	  3	  Law	  and	  Philosophy	  355.	  
17	  K	  Lenaerts,	  'The	  Rule	  of	  Law	  and	  the	  Coherence	  of	  the	  Judicial	  System	  of	  the	  European	  Union'	  (2007)	  44	  
Common	  Market	  Law	  Review	  1625,	  1631-­‐1632.	  	  
18	  Court	  of	  Justice,	  ‘Information	  Note	  on	  references	  from	  national	  courts	  for	  a	  preliminary	  ruling’	  [2005]	  OJ	  
C	  143/01,	  para	  1.	  
19	  Case	  166/73	  Rheinmühlen	  I	  (n	  12).	  	  
20	  See	  further	  below	  chapter	  5.	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was	  had	  to	  the	  codification	  of	  state	  laws.21	  Integration	  in	  the	  EU’s	  internal	  market	  has	  in	  
broad	   terms	   followed	   the	   American	   example.	   Initially,	   market	   integration	   in	   the	   EU	  
mainly	   took	   place	   by	  means	   of	   negative	   integration	   and	   the	   elimination	   of	   barriers	   to	  
trade,	  mainly	  through	  mutual	  recognition.	  Harmonisation	  did	  not	  pick	  up	  until	  negative	  
integration	  was	  perceived	  as	  insufficient	  for	  reaching	  the	  established	  objectives	  and	  the	  
SEA	   in	   1986	   introduced	   qualified	   majority	   voting	   in	   the	   Council.	   Until	   the	   Treaty	   of	  
Maastricht	   –	   the	   so-­‐called	   ‘market-­‐building’	   stage	   –	   harmonisation	  played	   a	   significant	  
role	  in	  the	  European	  integration	  process,22	  even	  though	  recourse	  was	  more	  often	  had	  to	  
minimum	   rather	   than	   exhaustive	   harmonisation.	   Since	   after	   1992,	   however,	   the	  
legislative	   ambition	   of	   the	   Union	   has	   been	   redirected	   towards	   less	   harmonisation	   but	  
instead	  ‘better’	  laws	  and	  ‘better’	  enforcement.23	  	  
The	  development	  of	   the	  EU’s	   legal	   order	   in	   general	   and	   the	   integration	   in	   the	   internal	  
market	  in	  particular	  is,	  thus,	  not	  characterised	  by	  uniformity	  of	  rules	  and	  procedures	  in	  
the	  meaning	  of	  absolute	  identical	  quality	  or	  equivalence.	  The	  legal	  order	  of	  the	  EU	  strives	  
for	   legal	  unity	  but	   is	  not	   and	  does	  not	   intend	   to	  be	  uniform	  by	  definition.	  Rather	   than	  
being	   a	   complete	   and	   fully	   comprehensive	   legal	   order	   of	   its	   own,	   the	   EU	   legal	   order	  
builds	   upon	   those	   of	   the	   Member	   States.	   None	   of	   the	   Member	   States,	   especially	   the	  
federal	   states	   among	   them,	   have	   completely	   uniform	   legal	   orders.	   Not	   more	   can,	  
therefore,	  be	  expected	  from	  a	  union	  comprising	  28	  states	  having	  different	  legal,	  political,	  
economic,	  social,	  and	  cultural	  backgrounds.	  Because	  of	   the	   two-­‐tier	  system	  made	  up	  of	  
the	  EU	  and	  its	  Member	  States,	  diversification	  is	  inherent	  to	  the	  EU	  legal	  order.	  The	  unity	  
and	  uniformity	  of	  EU	   law	  pertain	  both	   to	   the	  EU-­‐law	  dimension	  of	   the	  Member	  States’	  
legal	   orders	   and	   to	   the	   institutional	   and	   procedural	   rules	   for	   the	   Union’s	   own	  
functioning.	  The	  non-­‐EU	   relevant	   areas	  of	  national	   legal	   orders,	   insofar	   as	   they	  do	  not	  
give	   effect	   to	   EU	   law,	   fall	   outside	   the	   outer	   limits	   of	   the	   EU	   legal	   order.	   The	   unitary	  
characteristics	   of	   those	   areas	   are,	   therefore,	   a	   consequence	   of	   the	   national	   legal	   and	  
constitutional	  culture	  rather	  than	  EU	  membership.	  The	  boundaries	  of	  the	  EU	  legal	  order	  
within	   the	   national	   legal	   order	   are	   established	   by	   the	   national	   courts,	   whereas	   the	  
                                            
21	   JAC	  Grant,	   'The	  Search	   for	  Uniformity	  of	  Law'	   (1938)	  32	  The	  American	  Political	  Science	  Review	  1082,	  
1083-­‐1085.	  	  
22	  S	  Weatherill,	  'New	  Strategies	  for	  Managing	  the	  EC's	  Internal	  Market'	  (2000)	  53	  Current	  Legal	  Problems	  
595,	  597-­‐598.	  
23	  ibid	  598.	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ultimate	  authority	   to	  determine	   the	   limits	  between	  national	  and	  EU	   law	   is	  vested	  with	  
the	   Court	   of	   Justice.24	   Furthermore,	   the	   EU’s	   legislative	   activity	   in	   its	   own	   areas	   of	  
competence	   is	   restricted	   by	   three	   factors:25	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   competence	   –	   exclusive,	  
shared	  and	  complementary;	  the	  legal	  basis	  stipulating	  either	  unification	  of	   law	  through	  
regulations,	   harmonisation	   through	   directives	   or	   co-­‐ordination	   of	   the	   Member	   States’	  
policies	   through	   recommendations	   and	   other	   soft	   law	   instruments;	   and,	   finally,	   the	  
principles	  of	  subsidiarity	  and	  proportionality.	  The	  latter	  two	  limit	  the	  EU’s	   influence	  to	  
areas	  where	   the	   goals	   of	   the	  Union	   cannot	  be	   reached	  by	  other	  means	   than	   concerted	  
action,	  as	  well	  as	  determine	  the	  choice	  of	  the	  legal	  instrument	  to	  be	  used.	  While	  it	  is	  true	  
that	   the	   EU	   is	   expanding	   its	   reach	   into	   more	   and	   more	   fields	   of	   life,	   even	   the	   most	  
integrated	   areas	   feature	   a	   certain	   degree	   of	   differentiation.26	   Lastly,	   complete	  
harmonisation	  of	  the	  Member	  States’	  laws	  is	  seldom	  the	  preferred	  option	  for	  integration,	  
leaving	  the	  Member	  States	  enough	  leeway	  to	  reconcile	  EU	  legislation	  with	  their	  national	  
settings	  in	  terms	  of	  time,	  degree	  and/or	  substance.	  This	  renders	  the	  EU	  legal	  system,	  as	  
well	  as	  the	  legal	  systems	  of	  the	  Member	  States	  in	  EU-­‐relevant	  areas,	  far	  from	  uniform.	  	  
The	   notion	   of	   ‘unity’	   indicates	   harmony	   and	   accord	   between	   rules	   in	   a	   legal	   space	  
without	   putting	   forward	   a	   claim	   for	   identical	   quality	   as	   in	   the	   case	   of	   uniformity.	   A	  
uniform	  legal	  order	   features	  unity	  but	  unity	   in	  a	   legal	  order	  does	  not	  require	  complete	  
uniformity	  of	  rules,	  their	  application	  and	  interpretation.	  Minor	  differences	  between	  the	  
constituent	  parts	  of	  a	  system	  are	  generally	  not	  considered	  detrimental	  to	  the	  unity	  of	  a	  
legal	   order	   whereas	   they	   would	   defeat	   the	   idea	   of	   uniformity.	   This	   conclusion	   is	  
supported	  by	  von	  Bogdandy	  who	  finds	  that	  ‘coherence’	  is	  not	  a	  precondition	  for	  ‘unity’	  in	  
the	  EU	  legal	  order	  and	  that,	  to	  a	  certain	  extent,	  divergences	  in	  the	  application	  of	  EU	  law	  
among	   the	   different	   Member	   States	   do	   not	   play	   a	   decisive	   role	   in	   the	   process	   of	  
identifying	  the	  EU	  legal	  system	  as	  a	  unitary	  legal	  system.27	  In	  this	  context,	  von	  Bogdandy	  
uses	  ‘coherence’	  in	  a	  meaning	  of	  ‘uniformity’	  –	  the	  general	  application	  of	  identical	  rules	  
                                            
24	  N	  Walker,	   'Sovereignty	  and	  Differentiated	   Integration	   in	   the	  European	  Union'	   (1998)	  4	  European	  Law	  
Journal	  355,	  375.	  
25	  L	  Senden,	  'Conceptual	  Convergence	  and	  Judicial	  Cooperation	  in	  Sex	  Equality	  Law'	  in	  S	  Prechal	  and	  G	  van	  
Roermund	  (eds),	  The	  Coherence	  of	  EU	  Law:	  The	  Search	  for	  Unity	  in	  Divergent	  Concepts	  (Oxford	  University	  
Press	  2008)	  363,	  366.	  
26	  CD	  Ehlermann,	  'How	  Flexible	  is	  Community	  Law?	  An	  Unusual	  Approach	  to	  the	  Concept	  of	  "Two	  Speeds"'	  
(1984)	  82	  Michigan	  Law	  Review	  1274,	  1281-­‐1282.	  
27	   A	   von	   Bogdandy,	   'Founding	   Principles	   of	   EU	   Law:	   A	   Theoretical	   and	   Doctrinal	   Sketch'	   (2010)	   16	  
European	  Law	  Journal	  95,	  109.	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all	  across	  the	  EU.	  Delving	  deeper	  into	  the	  concepts	  of	  ‘unity’	  and	  ‘uniformity’,	  it	  becomes	  
clear	   that	   the	  unity	  of	   the	  EU	   legal	  order	  entails,	   indeed,	  a	  great	  deal	  of	   coherence	  but	  
much	  less	  so	  of	  uniformity.	  	  
The	  concept	  of	  unity	  has	  a	  political	   as	  well	   as	  a	   legal	  dimension.	   In	   the	  EU,	   legal	  unity	  
enjoys	   the	   central	   position,28	   serving	   as	   an	   intermediary	   step	   on	   the	   path	   towards	  
possible	  political	  unity	   in	  the	  future.29	  The	  gradual	  expansion	  and	  diversification	  of	  the	  
initially	   small	   and	   homogeneous	   group	   of	   Member	   States,	   the	   gradual	   increase	   in	   the	  
Union’s	   competences	  and	   the	  emergence	  of	   a	  number	  of	   alternative	   international	   legal	  
fora30	  have	  altered	  the	  functions	  of	  the	  EU	  and	  called	  for	  a	  different	  approach	  as	  regards	  
the	  level	  of	  legal	  and	  political	  integration	  of	  the	  Member	  States	  within	  and	  non-­‐Member	  
States	   to	   the	  Union.	   In	   the	  early	  decades	  of	   the	  EU,	   the	  ultimate	   aim	  of	   the	  Union	  was	  
closer	  to	  the	  ideal	  situation	  of	  uniformity31	  –	  at	  least	  as	  concerns	  the	  internal	  market.32	  
Since	  a	  while	  ago	  this	  approach	  has	  been	  deemed	  both	  impossible	  and	  unnecessary	  and	  
has,	   subsequently,	   been	   discarded.	   The	   ‘classic	   Community	   method’	   of	   uniform	  
legislation	  and	  harmonisation	  has	  been	  replaced	  with	  more	  flexible	  means	  of	  legislation	  
that	   allow	   the	   EU	   legal	   system	   to	   accommodate	   relevant	   differences	   between	   the	  
Member	   States.	   As	   a	   result,	   the	   Union	   has	   become	  much	  more	   diverse	   but	   also	  more	  
fragmented.33	  	  
Legislative	   integration	   within	   the	   EU	   can	   be	   pictured	   as	   an	   inverted	   pyramid	   with	  
unification/full	  harmonisation	  on	  top,	  followed	  by	  harmonisation	  in	  the	  middle	  and	  co-­‐
operation	   in	   the	   bottom.	   The	   inverted	   pyramid	   represents	   the	   different	   means	   of	  
achieving	  unity	   in	  a	   legal	  system.	  Among	   those,	  unification	  (statutory	  uniformity,	   ‘legal	  
                                            
28	  A	  von	  Bogdandy,	  'Doctrine	  of	  Principles'	  (2003)	  Jean	  Monnet	  Working	  Paper	  9/03,	  12;	  A	  von	  Bogdandy,	  
'The	  Legal	  Case	  for	  Unity:	  The	  European	  Union	  as	  a	  Single	  Organization	  with	  a	  Single	  Legal	  System'	  (1999)	  
36	  Common	  Market	  Law	  Review	  887,	  889-­‐890.	  
29	  L	  Senden	  (n	  25)	  364.	  
30	  G	  De	  Búrca	  and	  J	  Scott,	   'Introduction'	   in	  G	  De	  Búrca	  and	  J	  Scott	  (eds),	  Constitutional	  Change	   in	  the	  EU:	  
From	  Uniformity	  to	  Flexibility?	  (Hart	  Publishing	  2000)	  1,	  2.	  
31	  N	  Walker	  (n	  24)	  363.	  
32	   ‘The	   general	   task	   of	   the	   Union	   to	   establish	   a	   common	  market	   and	   progressively	   to	   approximate	   the	  
economic	   policies	   of	   the	   Member	   States	   creates	   a	   presumption	   in	   favour	   of	   uniformity	   –	   as	   a	   result	   a	  
uniform	  rule	  cannot	  be	  considered	  discriminatory’:	  CD	  Ehlermann	  (n	  26)	  1288.	  
33	  G	  De	  Búrca	  and	  J	  Scott	  (n	  30)	  1;	  This	   fragmentation	  is	  characterised	  by	  notions	  such	  as	   ‘differentiated	  
integration’,	   ‘multi-­‐speed’,	   ‘variable	   geometry’,	   ‘à	   la	   carte’.	   Within	   the	   multitude	   of	   terminology,	  
‘differentiated	   integration’	   is	   the	  general	   term	  used	  to	  point	  at	   the	   lack	  of	  homogeneity	  within	   the	  EU:	  A	  
Stubb,	   'A	  Categorization	  of	  Differentiated	  Integration'	  (1996)	  34	  Journal	  of	  Common	  Market	  Studies	  283,	  
283-­‐284.	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homogeneity’)	  is	  the	  most	  intense	  yet	  only	  one	  means	  of	  achieving	  unity	  and	  not	  its	  sine	  
qua	  non.34	  Instead,	  the	  uniformity	  of	  laws	  has	  to	  be	  reconciled	  with	  the	  need	  for	  a	  legal	  
system	  to	  retain	  a	  degree	  of	  flexibility	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  its	  effectiveness.	  Contrary	  to	  Shaw,	  
who	  perceives	   flexibility	  as	  a	  sign	  of	   the	  Member	  States	   lacking	  an	  objective	  of	  unity,35	  
the	   unity	   –	   differently	   from	   uniformity	   –	   of	   a	   legal	   order	   cannot	   be	   considered	   to	   be	  
adversely	  affected	  by	  minor	  divergences	  among	   its	  constitutive	  elements.	  A	   legal	  order	  
must	  demonstrate	  flexibility	  to	  accommodate	  the	  differences	  in	  society	  as	  well	  as	  adapt	  
to	  the	  changing	  circumstances	  in	  the	  course	  of	  time.	  Flexibility	  is	  even	  more	  important	  to	  
the	   EU	   than	   to	   the	   individual	  Member	   States.	   As	   an	   evolving	   system,	   law	  must	   not	   be	  
uniform	  in	  the	  meaning	  of	  identical	  across	  its	  entire	  field	  of	  application	  but	  rather	  have	  
in	  common	  certain	  fundamental	  qualities.36	  The	  role	  of	  unification	  is,	  first	  and	  foremost,	  
to	  avoid	  a	  mismatch	  between	  the	  parties’	  rights	  and	  obligations	  owing	  to	  a	  multiplicity	  of	  
rules	   regulating	   a	   single	   area.37	   As	   long	   as	   the	   principal	   components	   identifying	   the	  
crucial	  rights	  and	  obligations	  –	  the	  ‘fundamental	  acquis’	  according	  to	  Pescatore38	  –	  are	  in	  
place,	  a	  legal	  order	  can	  accommodate	  some	  divergence	  in	  procedural	  rules,	  rule-­‐making	  
and	  legal	  instruments	  without	  becoming	  fragmented.39	  The	  current	  legislative	  practice	  in	  
the	  EU	   is	  geared	   towards	  differentiated	   integration,	  which	  corresponds	  much	  better	   to	  
the	  reality	  of	  a	  heterogenic	  Europe.40	  In	  sum,	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  diversification	  clearly	  
signals	  the	  end	  of	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  uniform	  Europe,	  it	  is	  not	  the	  end	  of	  a	  unified	  Europe.	  
                                            
34	   See	   E	   Christodoulidis	   and	   R	   Dukes,	   'On	   the	   Unity	   of	   European	   Labour	   Law'	   in	   S	   Prechal	   and	   B	   van	  
Roermund	  (eds),	  The	  Coherence	  of	  EU	  Law:	  The	  Search	  for	  Unity	  in	  Divergent	  Concepts	  (Oxford	  University	  
Press	  2008)	  397,	  398-­‐399.	  The	  lesser	  of	   importance	  of	  uniformity	  as	  compared	  to	  unity	  has	  been	  vividly	  
described	  by	  Brand:	  ‘[…]	  uniformity	  of	  EU	  law	  is	  not	  a	  sacred	  value.	  EU	  law	  is	  not	  being	  enforced	  coute	  que	  
coute	   and	   its	   ‘uniformity’	   is	   ‘sacrificed’	   in	   the	   interests	   of	   divergence	   and,	   ultimately,	   unity.’	   M	   Brand,	  
'Divergence,	  Discretion,	  and	  Unity'	  in	  S	  Prechal	  and	  B	  van	  Roermund	  (eds),	  The	  Coherence	  of	  EU	  Law:	  The	  
Search	  for	  Unity	  in	  Divergent	  Concepts	  (Oxford	  University	  Press	  2008)	  217,	  231.	  	  
35	  J	  Shaw,	  'Relating	  Constitutionalism	  and	  Flexibility	  in	  the	  European	  Union'	  in	  G	  De	  Búrca	  and	  J	  Scott	  (eds),	  
Constitutional	  Change	  in	  the	  EU:	  From	  Uniformity	  to	  Flexibility?(Hart	  Publishing	  2000)	  337,	  341.	  
36	  E	  Christodoulidis	  and	  R	  Dukes	  (n	  34)	  397.	  
37	  R	  Sacco,	  'Diversity	  and	  Uniformity	  in	  the	  Law'	  (2001)	  49	  American	  Journal	  of	  Comparative	  Law	  171,	  179.	  
38	  P	  Pescatore,	   'Aspects	   judiciaires	  de	   l’«acquis	   communautaire»'	   (1981)	  20	  Revue	   trimestrielle	  de	  droit	  
européen	  617,	  620.	  
39	  A	  von	  Bogdandy,	  'The	  Legal	  Case	  for	  Unity’	  (n	  28)	  908.	  
40	  A	  Stubb	  (n	  33)	  283.	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3	  Disintegration	  in	  the	  internal	  market	  
The	  above	  analysis	  demonstrated	  not	  only	  that	  the	  concepts	  of	  a	  unified	  internal	  market	  
and	  legal	  order	  differ	  but	  also	  that	  the	  level	  of	  uniformity	  in	  the	  two	  varies.	  This	  section	  
aims	  to	  clarify	  to	  which	  extent	  diversification	  can	  be	  accommodated	  within	  the	  internal	  
market	   and	   the	   EU	   legal	   order,	   respectively,	   and	   what	   are	   the	   possible	   criteria	   for	  
distinguishing	  between	  divergences	  that	  can	  be	  accommodated	  within	  the	  EU’s	  internal	  
market	  and	  divergences	  that	  cannot.	  
3.1	  Differentiation	  in	  the	  EU	  legal	  order	  
Differentiation	  in	  the	  EU	  takes	  a	  number	  of	  different	  forms	  –	  temporal,	  substantive	  and	  
leads	  to	  a	  number	  of	  different	  outcomes	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  depth	  of	  integration.	  Each	  of	  the	  
outcomes	  is	  an	  expression	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  integration	  within	  the	  EU.	  	  
A	   comprehensive	   overview	   of	   these	   different	   outcomes	   has	   been	   provided	   by	  Walker	  
who	  has,	  in	  turn,	  borrowed	  from	  Stubb41	  and	  Dewatripont	  and	  others.42	  The	  five	  models	  
of	  differentiated	  integration	  within	  the	  EU	  as	  identified	  by	  Walker	  are	  demonstrated	  in	  
the	  pyramid	  below.43	  	  
	  
The	   ideal	   situation	  of	  uniformity	  pictured	  at	   the	  bottom	  of	   the	  pyramid	  represents	   the	  
idea	   of	   the	   European	   Union	   with	   the	   most	   commonality,	   whereas	   Europe	   à	   la	   carte	  
                                            
41	  ibid.	  
42	   M	   Dewatripont	   and	   others,	   Flexible	   integration:	   Towards	   a	   more	   effective	   and	   democratic	   Europe	  
(Monitoring	  European	  Integration	  1995)	  80.	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characterises	  the	  extreme	  opposite.	  In	  between	  those	  two	  models	  of	  integration	  are	  the	  
following	   constellations:	   ‘Europe	   of	   concentric	   circles’,	   ‘Europe	   of	   flexible	   integration’	  
and	  ‘multi-­‐speed	  Europe’.	  
The	  model	   of	   a	   multi-­‐speed	   Europe	   is	   flexible	   but	   only	   in	   a	   temporal	   dimension	   –	   in	  
substantive	  terms,	  the	  aim	  of	  a	  common	  level	  of	  integration	  is	  maintained.44	  Multi-­‐speed	  
Europe	  refers	  to	  a	  situation	  where	  one	  or	  more	  Member	  States	  are	  granted	  an	  extension	  
as	  regards	  the	  deadline	  of	  implementation	  or	  entry	  into	  force	  of	  common	  EU	  standards	  if	  
they	   are	   unable	   to	   fulfil	   the	   obligations	   at	   the	   time	   of	   the	   adoption	   of	   an	  EU	   legal	   act.	  
Postponed	  deadlines	  enable	  those	  Member	  States	  to	  whom	  the	  exceptions	  apply	  to	  enter	  
a	   ‘slow	   lane’	  while	  allowing	  other	  Member	  States	   to	  move	  on	  with	   the	   implementation	  
agenda,	  hence	  the	  various	  speeds	  in	  European	  integration.	  Extensions	  such	  as	  mentioned	  
above	   appear	   most	   frequently	   in	   the	   accession	   process.	   Additional	   substantive	  
requirements	  may	  apply	  to	  the	  multi-­‐speed	  model.	  For	  example,	  Article	  27	  TFEU	  allows	  
for	   derogations	   to	   be	   made	   to	   internal	   market	   legislation	   with	   a	   view	   to	   gradually	  
preparing	   less	   developed	   economies	   for	   the	   establishment	   of	   the	   internal	   market	   but	  
restricts	   the	   possibility	   of	   such	   derogations	   to	   temporary	   measures	   and	   those	   least	  
disruptive	  to	  the	  functioning	  of	   the	   internal	  market.	   In	  such	  cases,	  economic	  and	  social	  
considerations	  are	  acceptable	  as	  derogations	  but	  political	  reasons	  are	  not.45	  The	  model	  
of	  multi-­‐speed	  Europe	  does	   generally	  not	   allow	   for	  permanent	  opt-­‐outs	   from	  common	  
rules.	  	  
The	  model	  of	  concentric	  circles	  represents	  a	   less	   intense	  model	  of	   integration	  than	  the	  
previous	  two.	  The	  model	  is	  based	  on	  dividing	  Member	  States	  into	  spheres	  according	  to	  
their	  willingness	  and	  capability	  of	  integration.	  The	  core	  of	  the	  most	  progressive	  Member	  
States	   is	   located	   in	  the	  middle	  of	   the	  circle	  and	  at	   the	  outer	  edge	  one	  can	  find	  Member	  
States	  with	  the	  most	  loose	  integration	  aims.	  The	  core	  is	  composed	  of	  Member	  States	  who	  
have	   not	   opted	   out	   of	   common	   policies.	   Differently	   from	  multi-­‐speed	   integration,	   the	  
model	  of	  concentric	  circles	  grants	  permanent	  exceptions	  to	  the	  outer	  layers	  of	  Member	  
States.	  The	  model	  of	  flexible	  integration	  is	  somewhat	  similar	  to	  the	  model	  of	  concentric	  
                                            
44	  ibid	  364-­‐365.	  
45	   CD	   Ehlermann	   (n	   26)	   1289.	   As	   elaborated	   further	   below,	   though,	   this	   restriction	   applies	   only	   to	  
derogations	   from	   secondary	   law	   that	   are	   approved	   by	   the	   EU	   institutions	   rather	   than	   to	   opt-­‐outs	   from	  
primary	  law.	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circles	  but	   focuses	  on	  a	   substantive	  common	  base	  and	  voluntary	  areas	  of	   co-­‐operation	  
beyond	   the	   common	   base.46	   To	   this	   category	   belong	   also	   Member	   States	   who	   have	  
entered	  a	  ‘fast	  lane’	  of	  European	  integration	  by	  engaging	  in	  enhanced	  cooperation	  under	  
Article	  20	  TEU.	  	  
The	  most	  liberal	  mode	  of	  integration	  in	  the	  EU	  is	  represented	  by	  the	  model	  of	  Europe	  à	  la	  
carte.	  It	  imposes	  a	  framework	  of	  a	  few	  common	  objectives	  but	  leaves	  free	  to	  the	  Member	  
States	  the	  opportunity	  to	  ‘pick-­‐and-­‐choose,	  as	  from	  a	  menu’	  the	  specific	  areas	  in	  which	  to	  
co-­‐operate.47	  Differently	  from	  flexible	  integration,	  Europe	  à	  la	  carte	  does	  not	  envisage	  a	  
substantive	  common	  base,	  rendering	  the	  level	  of	  uniformity	  and,	  in	  this	  case,	  even	  unity	  
relatively	  low.	  
A	   further,	   rather	  unconventional	  mode	  of	  differentiation	   is	   ‘structural	   variability’.48	  An	  
example	   of	   this	   is	   the	   former	   pillar	   system	   of	   the	   EU	   where	   the	   organisation	   of	  
institutions	  and	  decision-­‐making	  of	  the	  Union	  varied	  according	  to	  the	  policy	  field	  and	  the	  
nature	  of	  EU	  competence.	  Some	  differences	  between	  the	  former	  pillars	  have	  survived	  the	  
changes	   brought	   about	   by	   the	   Lisbon	   Treaty.	   While	   the	   institutional	   and	   procedural	  
structure	   of	   the	   EU	   is	   not	   uniform	   The	   Lisbon	   Treaty	   amendments	   have	   certainly	  
increased	  unity	  within	  the	  EU	  across	  the	  former	  pillars	  by	  merging	  the	  former	  first	  and	  
third	  pillars	  and	  articulating	  the	  overarching	  objectives	  of	  the	  Union.	  
3.1.1	  Primary	  law	  
The	   models	   of	   integration	   summarised	   above	   concern	   uniformity/flexibility/	  
differentiation	   on	   various	   levels	   –	   the	   adoption,	   implementation	   and	   interpretation	   of	  
primary	   law	  and	   secondary	   law	  as	  well	   as	  procedural	   law.	  The	  uniformity	  of	   each	  has	  
different	  dimensions.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  primary	  law,	  for	  example,	  the	  first	  dimension	  is	  that	  
of	   common	   values.	   The	   common	   values	   are	   provided	   in	   Article	   2	   TEU	   and	   have	   been	  
regarded	  as	  representing	  ‘constitutional	  homogeneity’	  in	  the	  EU.49	  Authors	  who	  refer	  to	  
the	  term	  ‘constitutional	  homogeneity’	  are	  generally	  in	  agreement	  that	  the	  actual	  level	  of	  
                                            
46	  M	  Dewatripont	  and	  others	  (n	  42).	  
47	  A	  Stubb	  (n	  33)	  288.	  
48	  N	  Walker	  (n	  24)	  363.	  	  
49	  S	  Mangiameli,	  'The	  Union's	  Homogeneity	  and	  Its	  Common	  Values	  in	  the	  Treaty	  on	  European	  Union'	  in	  H-­‐
J	  Blanke	  and	  S	  Mangiameli	  (eds),	  The	  European	  Union	  after	  Lisbon	  (Springer	  2012)	  21,	  21ff.	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homogeneity	  in	  the	  meaning	  of	  uniformity	  is	  low,50	  owing	  greatly	  to	  the	  factual	  diversity	  
among	  the	  constitutions	  of	  the	  Member	  States.51	  	  
The	   second	  dimension	  of	  uniformity	   in	  primary	   law	  concerns	   the	  provisions	  of	   the	  EU	  
Treaties.	  Here,	   the	   claim	   for	  uniformity	  has	  a	   stronger	  basis	  but	   is	   limited	  by	  different	  
flexibility	  schemes	  and	  opt-­‐outs.	  Ehlermann	  has	  provided	  a	  detailed	  categorisation	  of	  the	  
diverse	  appearances	  of	  flexibility	  in	  primary	  law.52	  The	  first,	  and	  very	  common	  instance	  
is	  the	  transitional	  period	  in	  which	  flexibility	  occurs	  with	  regard	  to	  both	  substantive	  and	  
institutional	   provisions.	   As	   mentioned	   above,	   though,	   the	   differentiation	   that	   occurs	  
during	  the	  transitional	  period	  is	  usually	  temporary.	  Substantive	  uniformity	  is,	  therefore,	  
programmed	  to	  be	  restored	  within	  a	  certain	  timeframe.	  	  
The	  third	  example	  of	  differentiation	  provided	  by	  primary	   law	  is	  more	  of	  an	  ad	  hoc,	  yet	  
permanent	   nature	   and	   concerns	   derogations	   from	   internal	   market	   harmonisation	  
measures	   justified	   ‘on	   grounds	   of	  major	   needs’,	   such	   as	   public	  morality,	   public	   policy,	  
public	  security,	  public	  health,	  protection	  of	  the	  natural	  environment	  and	  of	  the	  working	  
environment,	   and	   a	   range	   of	   other	   grounds	   protected	   by	   public	   interest.53	   All	   of	   the	  
above	  are	  subject	  to	  EU	  control	  measures.	  	  
The	  fourth	  example	  pointed	  out	  by	  Ehlermann’s	  concerns	  safeguard	  clauses	  –	  flexibility	  
clauses	   ‘par	   excellence’	   –	   which	   can	   be	   found	   in	   several	   Treaty	   provisions	   and	   which	  
allow	   the	   Member	   States	   to	   deviate	   from	   harmonisation	   measures	   in	   exceptional	  
circumstances	  and	  temporarily,	  usually	  during	  the	  transitional	  period.54	  	  
Further	  differentiation	  in	  primary	  law	  appears	  in	  the	  form	  of	  procedural	  differentiation.	  
It	   is	   reflected	   in	   the	   composition	  of	   the	  European	  Parliament	  and	   the	  number	  of	  votes	  
allocated	  to	  the	  different	  Member	  States	  in	  the	  Council.	  The	  numbers	  of	  votes	  and	  voting	  
majorities	  are	  further	  adjusted	  pursuant	  to	  opt-­‐outs	  from	  and	  opt-­‐ins	  to	  certain	  policies.	  
Furthermore,	   general	   exceptions	   have	   been	   laid	   out	   in	   the	   protocols	   attached	   to	   the	  
                                            
50	  ibid	  25.	  Article	  2	  TEU	  reads	  as	  follows:	  ‘The	  Union	  is	  founded	  on	  the	  values	  of	  respect	  for	  human	  dignity,	  
freedom,	  democracy,	  equality,	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  and	  respect	  for	  human	  rights,	  including	  the	  rights	  of	  persons	  
belonging	  to	  minorities.	  These	  values	  are	  common	  to	  the	  Member	  States	   in	  a	  society	   in	  which	  pluralism,	  
non-­‐discrimination,	  tolerance,	  justice,	  solidarity	  and	  equality	  between	  women	  and	  men	  prevail.’	  
51	  A	  von	  Bogdandy,	  'Doctrine	  of	  Principles'	  (n	  28)	  39.	  
52	  CD	  Ehlermann	  (n	  26)	  1279-­‐1281.	  
53	  Article	  36	  TFEU.	  
54	  Articles	  114(10),	  191(2)	  TFEU.	  D	  Hanf,	  'Flexibility	  Clauses	  in	  the	  Founding	  Treaties,	  from	  Rome	  to	  Nice'	  
in	  B	  De	  Witte,	  D	  Hanf	  and	  E	  Vos	  (eds),	  The	  Many	  Faces	  of	  Differentiation	  in	  EU	  Law	  (Intersentia	  2001)	  3,	  9.	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Treaties	  for	  disadvantaged	  regions	  as	  well	  as	  specific	  derogations	  from	  common	  policies	  
accorded	   to	   particular	   Member	   States.	   Finally,	   Article	   184	   TFEU	   provides	   for	  
supplementary	  research	  programmes	  in	  which	  a	  limited	  number	  of	  Member	  States	  may	  
decide	   to	   participate	   and	  which	   are	   subsequently	   financed	   by	   the	   participating	   states	  
only.	   All	   of	   the	   above	   examples	   demonstrate	   that	   differentiation	   and	   flexibility	   are	  
programmed	  into	  the	  foundations	  of	  the	  EU.	  
True	  ad	  hoc	  differentiation	  from	  primary	  law,	  as	  opposed	  to	  derogations	  under	  Article	  36	  
TFEU,	  are	  Member	  States’	  opt-­‐outs	   from	  entire	  policy	   fields	   for	  which	  no	   legal	  basis	   is	  
provided	  in	  the	  Treaties	  and	  which	  are,	  thus,	  negotiated	  separately	  between	  the	  Member	  
States,	   usually	   in	   the	   course	   of	   negotiating	   Treaty	   amendments.	   Before	   the	  Maastricht	  
Treaty,	   amendments	   to	   the	  EU	  Treaties	   seldom	  brought	   about	   serious	  deviations	   from	  
the	   commonly	   agreed	   policies.	   The	   Treaties	   of	   Maastricht	   and	   Amsterdam,	   however,	  
heralded	  a	  new	  era	  of	  opt-­‐outs.55	  The	  Maastricht	  Treaty	  granted	  opt-­‐outs	  to	  the	  United	  
Kingdom	   and	   Denmark	   from	   the	   Social	   Policy	   Protocol	   and	   the	   third	   stage	   of	   the	  
Economic	  and	  Monetary	  Union	  (EMU),	  respectively.	  These	  opt-­‐outs	  have	  been	  regarded	  
as	   examples	   of	   ‘unreasoned	   differentiation’.56	   The	   criticism	   is	   directed	   towards	   them	  
representing	   ‘subjective’	   differentiation	   between	   the	   Member	   States	   that	   wish	   to	  
participate	   in	   common	   policies	   and	   those	   who	   do	   not	   as	   opposed	   to	   the	   ‘objective’	  
differentiation	   between	   the	  Member	   States	   that	   have	   fulfilled	   the	   necessary	   economic	  
criteria	   to	   participate	   in	   the	   EMU	   and	   those	   which	   have	   not.57	   This	   distinction	   also	  
reflects	   the	  dichotomy	  between	  derogations	  under	  Article	  36	  TFEU	  and	   the	  general	  ad	  
hoc	  opt-­‐outs	  mentioned	  above.	  Political	  reasons	  are	  generally	  not	  considered	  suitable	  to	  
justify	  derogations	  from	  the	  general	  Union	  policies.	  Yet	  the	  Maastricht	  opt-­‐outs	  assumed	  
great	   economic	   and	   symbolic	   significance.58	   Importantly,	   the	   examples	   of	   the	   opt-­‐outs	  
from	  the	  Social	  Policy	  Protocol	  and	  the	  EMU	  represent	  divergence	  from	  an	  entire	  policy	  
field,	   whereas	   other	   notable	   opt-­‐outs,	   such	   as	   the	   Protocols	   on	   the	   acquisition	   of	  
secondary	  homes	   in	  Denmark	   and	  on	   abortions	   in	   Ireland,	   are	   fairly	   specific	   and	  have	  
                                            
55	  N	  Walker	  (n	  24)	  355.	  
56	  G	  De	  Búrca,	  'Differentiation	  within	  the	  Core:	  The	  Case	  of	  the	  Common	  Market'	  in	  G	  De	  Búrca	  and	  J	  Scott	  
(eds),	  Constitutional	  Change	  in	  the	  EU:	  From	  Uniformity	  to	  Flexibility?	  (Hart	  Publishing	  2000)	  133,	  148.	  
57	  D	  Hanf	  (n	  54)	  14-­‐15.	  
58	  G	  De	  Búrca	  (n	  56)	  148.	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little	  if	  any	  effect	  on	  other	  policies.59	  Developing	  further	  the	  differentiation	  process	  that	  
started	   with	   the	   Maastricht	   Treaty,	   the	   Treaty	   of	   Amsterdam	   introduced	   enhanced	  
cooperation	   in	   a	   number	   of	   First,	   Second	   and	   Third	   Pillar	   policies	   as	   well	   as	   granted	  
exceptions	  to	  the	  United	  Kingdom,	  Ireland	  and	  Denmark	  as	  regards	  the	  Schengen	  acquis.	  
Other	  notable	  examples	  of	  general	  opt-­‐outs	  include	  those	  granted	  to	  Denmark	  from	  the	  
Common	  Security	  and	  Defence	  Policy	  (CSDP),	  Poland	  and	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  from	  the	  
Charter	   of	   Fundamental	   Rights60	   and	   the	   United	   Kingdom	   from	   the	   EMU.	   Denmark,	  
Ireland	  and	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  have,	  furthermore,	  opted	  out	  from	  the	  AFSJ	  although	  the	  
flexible	  nature	  of	  the	  opt-­‐outs	  of	  Ireland	  and	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  allows	  them	  to	  opt	  in	  to	  
legislation	  if	  they	  so	  wish.	  
Although	  the	  Maastricht	  and	  Amsterdam	  opt-­‐outs	  covered	  large	  policy	  fields	  they	  were	  
not	  considered	  detrimental	  to	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  unity	  of	  the	  of	  the	  EU,	  this	  owing	  to	  the	  fact	  
that	  the	  opt-­‐outs	  did	  not	  concern	  the	  core	  commitments	  of	  the	  Member	  States	  towards	  
the	  EU	  –	  the	  internal	  market.61	  The	  idea	  of	  the	  internal	  market	  as	  the	  ‘core’	  of	  the	  EU	  is	  
further	   expressed	   in	   the	   example	   of	   enhanced	   cooperation.	   Both	   the	   Treaty	   of	  
Amsterdam62	   and	   the	   current	   TEU63	   and	   TFEU64	   require	   enhanced	   co-­‐operation	   to	  
maintain	  the	  unity	  of	  principle	  and	  institutional	  framework	  of	  the	  EU,	  be	  used	  to	  ‘further	  
the	   objectives	   of	   the	   Union,	   protecting	   its	   interests	   and	   reinforcing	   its	   integration	  
process’	   and	   to	   avoid	   disturbance	   to	   the	   internal	   market.	   The	   Member	   States	   are	  
generally	   free	   to	   co-­‐operate	   outside	   the	   framework	   of	   the	   EU,	   but	   are	   restricted	   from	  
doing	   so	   in	   areas	   of	   exclusive	   EU	   competence,	   as	   well	   as	   areas	   of	   non-­‐exclusive	   EU	  
competence,	  unless	  absolutely	  indispensable.65	  	  	  
3.1.2	  Secondary	  law	  
In	   substantive	   terms,	   secondary	   EU	   law	   and	   all	   implementing	   legislation	   and	  
administrative	   acts	   are	   even	   less	   uniform	   than	   primary	   EU	   law.	   On	   the	   one	   hand,	   the	  
                                            
59	  D	  Hanf	  (n	  54)	  16-­‐17.	  
60	  See	  also	  above	  chapter	  2	  section	  5.1.4.	  	  
61	  De	  Búrca	  (n	  56)	  149.	  
62	  Article	  K.15(1).	  
63	  Article	  20	  TEU.	  
64	  Articles	  326-­‐334	  TFEU.	  	  
65	  Article	  20(1),(2)	  TEU;	  G	  Edwards	  and	  E	  Philippart,	  Flexibility	  and	  the	  Treaty	  of	  Amsterdam:	  Europe's	  New	  
Byzantium?	  (1997)	  CELS	  Occasional	  Paper	  No.	  3,	  13.	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Member	  States	  have	  claimed	  many	  more	  opt-­‐outs	  from	  secondary	  law,	  not	  least	  because	  
of	  the	  quantity	  of	  secondary	  law	  being	  significantly	  larger	  than	  primary	  law.	  On	  the	  other	  
hand,	  while	  harmonisation	  in	  general	  and	  maximum	  harmonisation	  in	  particular	  are	  the	  
principal	  tools	  for	  achieving	  uniformity	  in	  the	  EU	  legal	  system	  and	  the	  internal	  market,	  
not	   all	   harmonisation	   measures	   envisage	   maximum	   harmonisation.	   Maximum	  
harmonisation	   is	   a	  means	   of	   legislative	   harmonisation	   –	   harmonisation	   occurring	   as	   a	  
result	   of	   EU	   legislation	   in	   contrast	   to	   judicial	   harmonisation	   where	   the	   Court	   strikes	  
down	  incompatible	  national	  legislation,	  or	  mutual	  recognition.	  Minimum	  harmonisation	  
establishes	   a	   common	  European	  minimum	   for	   national	   legislation	  but	   does	  not	   aim	   at	  
full	   uniformity.66	   Generally,	   ‘positive’	   harmonisation	   by	   means	   of	   EU	   legislation	   –	  
regulations	   and	   directives	   –	   is	   the	   method	   most	   effective	   in	   terms	   of	   establishing	   a	  
uniform	  legal	  order.	  ‘Negative’,	  or	  ‘judicial’	  harmonisation	  by	  which	  national	  barriers	  to	  
trade	  are	  removed	  by	  the	  Court,67	  however,	  are	  of	  a	  more	  ad	  hoc	  nature.	  Yet	  one	  must	  
also	   question	   the	   true	   uniformity	   of	   otherwise	   uniform	   rules	   in	   the	   light	   of	   their	  
implementation	  and	  application.68	  Ineffective	  implementation	  and	  application	  of	  uniform	  
rules	   does	   not	   lead	   to	   a	   uniform	   outcome.	   A	   contrary	   example	   is	   that	   of	   voluntary	  
harmonisation	   whereby	   Member	   States	   voluntarily	   adhere	   to	   non-­‐compulsory	   EU	  
standards	  such	  as	  recommendations.	  This	  frequently	  takes	  place	  in	  practice	  and	  belongs,	  
therefore,	   to	   the	  same	  category	  of	  establishing	  a	   level	  of	  uniformity	   through	   the	  actual	  
implementation	  and	  application	  of	  legally	  binding	  rules.	  	  
Other	   factors	   than	   legislation,	   too,	   play	   role	   in	   the	   creation	   and,	   especially,	   the	  
management69	   of	   the	   EU	   legal	   order	   in	   general	   and	   the	   internal	   market	   in	   particular.	  
Neither	  regulations	  that	  lay	  down	  minimum	  requirements	  nor	  directives	  lead	  to	  a	  strictly	  
uniform	   outcome	   in	   the	   EU	   legal	   order.	   Directives	   are	   by	   definition	   less	   efficient	   in	  
creating	   uniformity	   than	   regulations.	  Neither	   are	   decisions	   and	   recommendations	   that	  
are	   either	   directed	   towards	   a	   single	  Member	   State	   or	   only	   have	   a	   soft	   law	   nature	   the	  
proper	  tools	  for	  achieving	  absolute	  uniformity	  in	  the	  EU	  legal	  order.	  Recommendations	  
                                            
66	  For	  details	  about	   the	  division	  of	  minimum	  harmonisation	   into	  sub-­‐groups	  see	  S	  Weatherill,	   'Supply	  of	  
and	  demand	  for	  internal	  market	  regulation:	  strategies,	  preferences	  and	  interpretation'	  in	  N	  Nic	  Shuibhne	  
(ed),	  Regulating	  the	  Internal	  Market	  (Edward	  Elgar	  Publishing	  2006)	  29,	  46.	  
67	  A	  McGee	  and	  S	  Weatherill,	  'The	  Evolution	  of	  the	  Single	  Market	  -­‐	  Harmonisation	  or	  Liberalisation'	  (1990)	  
53	  The	  Modern	  Law	  Review	  578,	  580.	  
68	  S	  Weatherill,	  'New	  Strategies	  for	  Managing	  the	  EC's	  Internal	  Market'	  (n	  22)	  606.	  
69	  ibid	  595.	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that	  are	  directed	  to	  all	  Member	  States,	  albeit	  not	  legally	  binding,	  may,	  however,	  provide	  
an	  EU	  policy	   field	  with	   common	  direction	  with	   the	  help	   of	   a	   sufficient	   amount	   of	   self-­‐
regulation.	  In	  line	  with	  the	  principle	  of	  subsidiarity,	  EU	  institutions	  should	  prefer,	  where	  
compatible	   with	   the	   objective	   and	   the	   effectiveness	   of	   the	   outcome	   the	   following:	  
minimum	   harmonisation,	   measures	   with	   a	   smaller	   harmonising	   effect,	   and	   soft	   law	  
instruments	   rather	   than	   binding	   legislation.70	   Similarly	   to	   primary	   EU	   law,	   secondary	  
law,	   too,	   features	  various	  methods	   for	  differentiation	   in	   time	  and	  substance,	   safeguard	  
clauses,	   quotas	   and	   compensation	   differing	   from	   one	  Member	   State	   to	   another.71	   This	  
kind	   of	   differentiation	   is,	   nevertheless,	   limited	   by	   the	   requirement	   of	   objectivity	   of	  
criteria	  in	  order	  to	  ‘ensure	  a	  proportionate	  distribution	  of	  advantages	  and	  disadvantages’	  
within	  the	  Union	  and	  the	  territory	  of	  the	  internal	  market.72	  Since	  these	  mostly	  pertain	  to	  
internal	  market	  legislation	  they	  will	  be	  considered	  in	  detail	  below.73	  	  	  
3.1.3	  Interpretation,	  procedure	  and	  implementation	  
The	   third	   large	   category	   of	   divergences	   in	   EU	   law,	   apart	   from	   those	   in	   primary	   and	  
secondary	  law,	  comprises	  the	  interpretation	  of	  EU	  law.	  Threats	  to	  the	  uniformity	  of	  EU	  
law	  as	  concerns	  its	  interpretation	  are	  twofold.	  Firstly,	  divergences	  in	  the	  interpretation	  
of	  EU	  law	  provided	  by	  national	  courts	  appear	  in	  two	  dimensions:	  from	  one	  Member	  State	  
to	  another	  and	  between	  the	  authoritative	  interpretations	  provided	  by	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice	  
and	   the	   interpretations	   given	   by	   the	   national	   courts	   of	   the	   Member	   States.	   Secondly,	  
similar	  and	  even	  identical	  legal	  concepts	  often	  assume	  different	  meanings	  in	  the	  different	  
national	   legal	   systems.	   This	   phenomenon,	   known	   as	   the	   ‘keyword	   trap’,74	   affects	   the	  
                                            
70	   European	   Council,	   ‘Conclusions	   of	   the	   Presidency	   –	   Edinburgh,	   12	   December	   1992,	   Annex	   I	   Overall	  
approach	   to	   the	   application	   by	   the	   Council	   of	   the	   subsidiarity	   principle	   and	  Article	   3b	   of	   the	   Treaty	   on	  
European	  Union’	  SN	  456/92,	  21-­‐22.	  
71	  	  For	  examples	  see	  CD	  Ehlermann	  (n	  26)	  1282-­‐1285.	  
72	   Case	   106/83	   Sermide	   v	   Cassa	   Conguaglio	   Zucchero	   [1984]	   ECR	   4209,	   para	   28.	   The	   Court	   made	   a	  
reference	  to	  the	  general	  principle	  of	  non-­‐discrimination,	  which	  requires	  that	  ‘comparable	  situations	  must	  
not	   be	   treated	   differently	   and	   different	   situations	   must	   not	   be	   treated	   in	   the	   same	   way	   unless	   such	  
treatment	  is	  objectively	  justified.’	  
73	  See	  section	  3.2.	  
74	  F	  Chirico	  and	  P	  Larouche,	  'Conceptual	  Divergence,	  Functionalism,	  and	  the	  Economics	  of	  Convergence'	  in	  
S	  Prechal	  and	  B	  van	  Roermund	  (eds),	  The	  Coherence	  of	  EU	  Law:	  The	  Search	  for	  Unity	  in	  Divergent	  Concepts	  
(Oxford	  University	  Press	  2008)	  463,	  472-­‐473.	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accurate	  and	  uniform	  interpretation	  of	  EU	  law,	  which	  occasionally	  makes	  use	  of	  the	  same	  
concepts	  as	  the	  national	  legal	  systems.75	  	  
It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  no	  distinction	  can	  be	  made	  between	  the	  unity	  and	  uniformity	  
of	   interpretation	   of	   EU	   law.	  Uniform	   interpretation	   is	   indispensable	   in	   a	   uniform	   legal	  
order	  but	  it	  also,	  inevitably,	  leads	  to	  the	  more	  realistic	  situation	  of	  unity	  in	  a	  legal	  order.	  
As	   regards	   the	   importance	   of	   uniform	   interpretation	   of	   law	   in	   the	   EU	   legal	   order,	   the	  
Court	  of	  Justice	  has	  stated	  that	  ‘[…]	  it	  is	  manifestly	  in	  the	  interest	  of	  the	  Community	  legal	  
order	  that,	  in	  order	  to	  forestall	  differences	  of	  interpretation,	  every	  Community	  provision	  
should	  be	  given	  a	  uniform	  interpretation,	  irrespective	  of	  the	  circumstances	  in	  which	  it	  is	  
to	  be	  applied’.76	  Contrary	  to	  legislative	  exceptions,	  which	  are	  approved	  and	  endorsed	  by	  
the	   EU	   institutions,	   divergences	   in	   the	   interpretation	   and	   application	   of	   EU	   law	   are	   in	  
most	   cases	   unwelcome	   and	   difficult	   for	   the	   Union	   to	   exercise	   complete	   control	   over.	  
Empirically,	  the	  difficulty	  of	  enforcing	  the	  requirement	  for	  uniform	  interpretation	  of	  EU	  
law	  in	  the	  Member	  States	  renders	  the	  EU	  legal	  system	  inherently	  non-­‐uniform.77	  	  
The	   fourth	   category	   of	   structural	   divergences	   in	   EU	   law	   concerns	   the	   uniformity	   of	  
procedure.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  diverging	  national	  procedural	  rules	  may	  hamper	  both	   the	  
uniformity	   and	   the	   effective	   implementation	   of	   EU	   law.78	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   it	   is	  
necessary	   that	   the	   application	   and	   interpretation	   of	   procedural	   and	   institutional	  
provisions	   in	   the	   Member	   States	   mirror	   the	   application	   and	   interpretation	   of	  
corresponding	  EU	   law	  just	  as	   in	  the	  case	  of	  substantive	  provisions.79	  The	  uniformity	  of	  
                                            
75	  See	  Case	  283/81	  CILFIT	  [1982]	  ECR	  3415,	  para	  19.	  
76	  Case	  C-­‐126/97	  Eco	  Swiss	  [1999]	  ECR	  I-­‐3055,	  para	  40.	  
77	   The	   preliminary	   ruling	   procedure	   has	   been	   designed	   and	   perfected	   to	   the	   extent	   of	   modifying	   the	  
national	   court	   systems.	   The	   EU	   is	   tied	   by	   only	   being	   able	   to	   give	   an	   interpretation	   on	   EU	   law	  where	   a	  
national	  court	  requests	  a	  preliminary	  ruling.	  Although	  infringement	  proceedings	  can	  be	  brought	  against	  a	  
Member	   State	   if	   its	   national	   court	   that	  must	  make	   a	   reference	   for	   a	   preliminary	   ruling	   to	   the	   Court	   of	  
Justice	   under	   Article	   267	   TFEU	   fails	   to	   do	   so,	   the	   question	   is	   very	   sensitive.	   For	   discussion	   see	   below	  
chapter	  7	  section	  3.2.1.	  
78	  K	  Lenaerts,	  I	  Maselis	  and	  K	  Gutman,	  EU	  Procedural	  Law	  (Oxford	  University	  Press	  2014)	  109,	  referring	  to	  
Case	  130/79	  Express	  Dairy	  Foods	  [1980]	  ECR	  1887	  and	  Case	  54/81	  Fromme	  [1982]	  ECR	  1449	  –	  ‘judgments	  
where	   the	  Court	  has	  expressed	   regret	  at	   the	   lack	  of	  Union	  provisions	  harmonizing	  procedures	  and	   time	  
limits’.	  
79	  S	  Magnusson,	  'Procedural	  Homogeneity	  v.	  Inconsistency	  of	  European	  Courts	  -­‐	  Comments	  on	  Order	  of	  the	  
EFTA	  Court	  President	  of	  15	  June	  2012	  in	  Case	  E-­‐16/11	  EFTA	  Surveillance	  Authority	  V.	  Iceland'	  (2012),	  2	  
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2140717>	  accessed	  24	  June	  2015.	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procedure	   is	   crucial	   in	   the	   EU,	   setting	   the	   foundation	   for	   the	   ‘European	   substantive	  
supremacy’.80	  
Finally,	   divergences	   in	   the	   application	   of	   EU	   law	   are	   caused	   by	   unsatisfactory	  
implementation	   by	   the	   Member	   States.	   Although	   there	   is	   no	   longer	   an	   intention	   to	  
‘finalise’	   the	   internal	  market,	   the	  Member	  States	   still	   often	   lack	  motivation	   to	  properly	  
transpose	   and	   implement	   the	   EU	   measures	   already	   adopted.	   Paper	   transposition	  
continues	   to	   be	   a	   problem	   as	   well	   as	   uniform	   application	   of	   common	   rules.81	   The	  
inclusion	  of	  new	  Member	  States	  to	  the	  Union	  through	  the	  enlargement	  process,82	  as	  well	  
as	   technical	   innovations	  which	  require	   legislative	  plans	   to	  be	  updated	  on	  a	  continuous	  
basis,83	  make	  the	  task	  of	  uniformity	  ever	  more	  difficult	  in	  practice.	  	  
3.1.4	  From	  uniformity	  to	  unity:	  permissible	  differentiation	  
Having	  reached	  the	  conclusion	  that	  one	  can	  hardly	  speak	  of	  uniformity	  of	  EU	  law	  in	  the	  
meaning	   of	   the	   identical	   interpretation	   and	   application	   of	   identical	   laws	   in	   all	   EU	  
Member	  States,	  one	  is	   left	  to	  consider	  what	  makes	  the	  EU	  legal	  system	  a	  unified	  one	  in	  
terms	  of	  ‘unity’	  of	  the	  system.	  Von	  Bogdandy’s	  answer	  to	  the	  question	  is	  that	  principles,	  
specifically	  those	  outlined	  in	  the	  pre-­‐Lisbon	  Articles	  2	  and	  3	  EC	  Treaty	  and	  2	  TEU	  (now	  
Article	  3	  TEU)	  create	  unity	  as	  well	  as	  necessary	  flexibility	  within	  the	  EU.84	  Moreover,	  the	  
principle	  of	  rule	  of	  law	  acts	  as	  a	  creator	  of	  unity	  between	  the	  Member	  States’	  legal	  orders	  
in	   the	   dimensions	   of	   both	   legal	   and	   procedural	   unity.85	   Sacco,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	  
introduces	   the	   concept	   of	   cultural	   unity	   –	   the	   commonality	   of	   language,	   history,	  
traditions,	   etc.,	   which	   lays	   a	   necessary	   foundation	   for	   uniting	   peoples	   by	   virtue	   of	   a	  
uniform	   body	   of	   rules.86	   The	   level	   of	   cultural	   unity	   among	   the	   EU	   member	   States,	  
especially	  in	  a	  Union	  composed	  of	  28	  nation	  states	  can	  be	  presumed	  not	  to	  reach	  a	  high	  
enough	   level	   to	   sustain	   uniformity.	   Whereas	   the	   EU	   is	   constantly	   working	   towards	  
                                            
80	   JS	   Delicostopoulos,	   'Towards	   European	   Procedural	   Primacy	   in	   National	   Legal	   Systems'	   (2003)	   9	  
European	  Law	  Journal	  599,	  609.	  
81	  S	  Weatherill,	  ‘'New	  Strategies	  for	  Managing	  the	  EC's	  Internal	  Market'	  (n	  22)	  606.	  
82	  European	  Union	  Committee,	  The	  Single	  Market:	  Wallflower	  or	  Dancing	  Partner?	  (HL	  2007–08,	  5-­‐I)	  paras	  
29ff.	  
83	   Commission,	   ‘The	   Internal	   Market	   for	   Goods:	   a	   cornerstone	   of	   Europe’s	   competitiveness’	  
(Communication)	  COM	  (2007)	  35	  final,	  6.	  
84	  A	  von	  Bogdandy,	  'Doctrine	  of	  Principles'	  (n	  28)	  36-­‐38.	  
85	   A	   von	   Bogdandy,	   'Founding	   Principles'	   in	   A	   von	   Bogdandy,	   J	   Bast	   (eds),	   Principles	   of	   European	  
Constitutional	  Law	  (Hart	  Publishing	  2009)	  11,	  28-­‐38.	  
86	  R	  Sacco	  (n	  37)	  172.	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raising	   awareness	   of	   the	   cultural	   and	   linguistic	  multitude	   in	   the	   Union	   it	   does	   not,	   as	  
reflected	   in	   its	   own	  motto	   ‘United	   in	   diversity’	   aspire	   to	   assimilate	   the	  Member	   States	  
into	   a	   group	   of	   culturally	   homogeneous	   states.	   A	   certain	   commonality	   of	   values	   and	  
mutual	   cultural	   understanding	   is	   necessary	   for	   the	   proper	   functioning	   of	   an	   economic	  
union,	  which	  could	  then	  possibly	  develop	  into	  a	  political	  union	  but,	  equally,	   there	  is	  an	  
economic	  value	  to	  specialisation	  and	  decentralisation.87	  The	  effects	  of	  cultural	  diversity	  
in	   the	  EU	   lead	   in	   the	   legal	   sphere	   to	   the	  need	   to	   ensure	   judicial	   homogeneity,	   such	   as	  
through	  the	  preliminary	  reference	  procedure.	  
Within	   the	  EU	   legal	  order,	   specifically,	   there	   is	   the	   realm	  of	   substantive	   legal	  elements	  
that	  unite	   the	  Member	  States	   together	   in	   the	  EU.	  According	   to	  De	  Búrca	  and	  Scott,	   the	  
foundation	  of	  unity	   in	  the	  EU	  is	   laid	  by	  the	  broad	  commitments	  shared	  by	  the	  Member	  
States.88	  The	  centre	  of	  the	  Union,	  the	  sine	  qua	  non	  elements	  of	   its	   legal	  order,	  the	   ‘hard	  
core’89	   of	   the	   Member	   States’	   commitments	   towards	   the	   Union	   forms	   the	   nucleus	   of	  
European	   integration	   and	   is	   the	   key	   to	   maintaining	   the	   identity	   of	   the	   Union	   in	   the	  
myriad	  of	  the	  different	  models	  of	  flexible	  integration.	  In	  the	  context	  of	  the	  EU	  as	  a	  whole,	  
defining	   the	   core	  of	  obligations	  of	  membership	   is	  necessary	  mainly	   in	  order	   to	  delimit	  
the	  range	  of	  acceptable	  differentiation.	  	  
The	   concept	   of	   a	   ‘hard	   core’	   of	   the	   EU	   accommodates	   well	   the	   tension	   between	  
uniformity	  and	  unity	  examined	  above	  by	  limiting	  flexible	  differentiation	  in	  the	  EU	  to	  the	  
peripheral	  policy	  areas	  only.90	  What	  exactly	  belongs	  to	  the	  hard	  core	  of	  the	  EU	  is,	  in	  the	  
light	  of	   the	  ever-­‐expanding	  Union	  subject	   to	  continuous	  debate	  yet	  the	  general	  opinion	  
agrees	  on	  giving	  this	  status	  to	  the	  norms	  and	  policies	  constituting	  the	  internal	  market.91	  
                                            
87	  L	  Bovenberg,	   'Unity	  produces	  diversity:	  The	  economics	  of	  Europe's	  social	  capital'	  in	  W	  Arts	  and	  others	  
(eds),	  The	  Cultural	  Diversity	  of	  European	  Identity	  (Brill	  2003)	  403,	  412-­‐413.	  
88	  G	  De	  Búrca	  and	  J	  Scott	  (n	  30)	  7.	  
89	   A	   Stubb	   (n	   33);	   S	  Weatherill,	   'On	   the	   Depth	   and	   Breadth	   of	   European	   Integration'	   (1997)	   17	   Oxford	  
Journal	  of	  Legal	  Studies	  537;	  N	  Walker	  (n	  24);	  A	  von	  Bogdandy,	  'The	  European	  Union	  as	  a	  Human	  Rights	  
Organization?	  Human	  Rights	  and	  the	  Core	  of	  the	  European	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Journal	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The	  elevated	  position	  of	  the	  internal	  market	  is	  underpinned	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  its	  essential	  
features	  have	  never	  been	  significantly	  altered	  by	  treaty	  amendments.92	  
Similarly	  to	  many	  authors	  discussed	  above,	  Grabitz	  and	  Langeheine	  agree	  that	  a	  ‘two-­‐tier	  
system’	   of	   flexible	   integration	   along	   the	   lines	   of	   a	   multi-­‐speed	  model	   is	   acceptable	   in	  
objectively	   justifiable	   circumstances	   insofar	   as	   suitable	   instruments	   are	   employed	   for	  
pursuing	   a	   ‘high	   degree	   of	   conformity	   with	   the	   aims	   of	   integration’.93	   The	   authors	  
suggest	   a	   three-­‐level	   formula	   to	   determine	   whether	   or	   not	   their	   proposed	   two-­‐tier	  
system	   can	   be	   rendered	   admissible	   within	   the	   EU	   legal	   system.	   The	   formula	   includes	  
tests	   on	   compatibility	   with	   the	   basic	   principles	   of	   EU	   law,	   primary	   EU	   law,	   and	   the	  
specific	   policy	   fields,	   including	   the	   internal	   market.94	   Where	   one	   cannot	   agree	   with	  
Grabitz	   and	   Langeheine,	   though,	   is	   their	   definition	   of	   what	   is	   acceptable	   as	  
differentiation	   –	   an	   agreement	   on	   the	   common	   aim	   and	   on	   the	   ‘preliminary	   status	   of	  
differentiation’.95	   The	   latter	   is	   subject,	   primarily,	   to	   political	   agreement	   and	   is	   thereby	  
likely	  to	  render	  subjective	  any	  objective	  criteria	  for	  the	  common	  aim.	  
Given	  that	  the	  procedures	  for	  attaining	  and	  discarding	  Union	  membership	  are	  formalised	  
in	  the	  Treaties,	  the	  core	  of	  the	  Member	  States’	  commitments	  does	  not	  serve	  as	  a	  tool	  for	  
identifying	   the	  membership	   status	  of	   these	   states.	  The	   situation	   is	  different	   as	   regards	  
the	   indeterminate	   notion	   of	   an	   internal	   market	   extended	   to	   cover	   non-­‐EU	   Member	  
States.	  For	  the	  purpose	  of	  being	  able	  to	  recognise	  the	  internal	  market	  which	  includes	  EU	  
Member	  States	  as	  well	  as	  third	  countries	  as	  an	  extension	  of	  the	  EU	  internal	  market,	  it	  is	  
indispensable	  to	  identify	  the	  defining	  elements	  of	  the	  latter.	  
3.2	  Differentiation	  in	  the	  internal	  market	  
Enjoying	  the	  status	  of	  the	  hard	  core	  of	  the	  EU,	  the	  internal	  market	  consists	  of	  a	  package	  
of	   obligations	   to	   which	   the	   member	   states	   must	   adhere	   within	   the	   limits	   of	   their	  
membership.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  an	  expanded	  market,	  which	  includes	  non-­‐EU	  Member	  States,	  
the	  membership	   aspect	   obviously	   becomes	   redundant.	   Instead,	   identifying	   the	   core	   of	  
                                            
92	  J	  Wouters,	  'Constitutional	  Limits	  of	  Differentiation:	  the	  Principle	  of	  Equality'	  in	  B	  De	  Witte,	  D	  Hanf	  and	  E	  
Vos	  (eds),	  The	  Many	  Faces	  of	  Differentiation	  in	  EU	  Law	  (Intersentia	  2001)	  301,	  327.	  
93	  B	  Grabitz	   and	  E	  Langeheine,	   'Legal	  Problems	  Related	   to	  a	  Proposed	   "Two-­‐Tier	  System"	  of	   Integration	  
within	  the	  European	  Community'	  (1981)	  18	  Common	  Market	  Law	  Review	  33,	  38.	  
94	  ibid	  39.	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  ibid	  40.	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the	   internal	   market	   becomes	   indispensable	   for	   assessing	   the	   unity	   of	   the	   expanded	  
internal	   market	   vis-­à-­vis	   the	   internal	   market	   that	   only	   comprises	   EU	   Member	   States.	  
Clearly,	   in	   order	   to	   be	   considered	   equivalent	   to	   the	   internal	   market,	   the	   expanded	  
market	  needs	  to	  feature	  the	  same	  key	  elements	  as	  the	  internal	  market	  in	  the	  EU.	  	  
There	  is,	  as	  of	  now,	  no	  commonly	  accepted	  set	  of	  criteria	  for	  what	  constitutes	  the	  core	  of	  
the	   internal	   market.	   This	   is	   so	   because	   flexibility	   in	   the	   EU	   legal	   order	   is	   most	   often	  
perceived	   in	   the	   context	   of	   membership	   generally	   without	   a	   need	   to	   go	   beyond	  
establishing	   that	   the	   internal	   market	   represents	   the	   core	   of	   the	   membership	  
commitments.	  The	  core	  of	  the	  internal	  market	  can	  be	  scrutinised	  both	  from	  an	  empirical	  
and	   a	   functionalist	   perspective.	   The	   first,	   empirical	   approach	   focuses	   on	   the	   internal	  
market	  relevant	  legislation	  that	  is	  actually	  in	  force	  in	  the	  Member	  States.	  Subsequently,	  
the	  hard	  core	  should	  be	  constructed	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  highest	  common	  denominator	  of	  
elements	  empirically	  applied	  by	  all	  Member	  States.96	  Leaving	  aside	  the	  components	  from	  
which	   one	   or	   more	   Member	   States	   have	   opted	   out,	   the	   remaining	   core	   reflects	   a	  
fragmentary	  yet	  strongest	  common	  commitment	  to	  the	  internal	  market.	  The	  weakness	  of	  
the	  empirical	  method	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  hard	  core	  of	  the	  market	  changes	  constantly	  in	  
time.	  Neither	  can	  the	  empirical	  method	  do	  entirely	  without	  a	  functionalist	  understanding	  
of	  which	  legislation	  is	  relevant	  to	  the	  functioning	  of	  the	  internal	  market,	  i.e.	  which	  legal	  
acts	  pertain	  to	  the	  fundamentals	  of	  the	  latter.	  Better	  suited	  for	  identifying	  the	  core	  of	  the	  
internal	  market	  is,	  therefore,	  the	  second,	  functionalist	  approach.	  This	  method	  draws	  on	  
the	   objectives	   of	   the	   EU	   with	   regard	   to	   the	   internal	   market	   and	   demonstrates	   the	  
defining	   features	   of	   the	   internal	  market	   through	   their	   purpose.	   As	   put	   by	   Grabitz	   and	  
Langeheine,	  ‘uniformity	  as	  such	  cannot	  be	  looked	  upon	  as	  an	  isolated	  value,	  but	  one	  that	  
has	  to	  be	  weighed	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  intended	  ultimate	  state’.97	  
The	   analysis	   in	   chapter	   2	   demonstrated	   that	   in	   addition	   to	   the	   elements	   found	   in	   the	  
definition	  of	   the	   internal	  market	   –	   the	   fundamental	   freedoms	  and	  equal	   conditions	   for	  
competition	  –	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  internal	  market	  is	  interwoven	  with	  a	  number	  of	  other,	  
non-­‐economic	   policies	   and	   concepts.	   From	   a	   formal	   perspective,	   the	   economic	  
foundation	  of	  the	  internal	  market	  as	  expressed	  in	  the	  definition	  should	  be	  considered	  the	  
                                            
96	  De	  Búrca	  has	  used	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  approach,	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  G	  De	  Búrca	  (n	  56)	  141.	  
97	  B	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  and	  E	  Langeheine	  (n	  93)	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hard	   core	  of	   the	   internal	  market.	   Considering	   the	  broader	   aims	  of	   the	   internal	  market	  
beyond	  unhindered	  trade	  between	  the	  Member	  States,	  however,	  the	  limits	  of	  permissible	  
differentiation	   in	   the	   internal	   market	   cannot	   be	   based	   on	   the	   overly	   narrow	   purely	  
economic	   understanding	   of	   the	   internal	  market.	  While	   the	   fundamental	   freedoms	   and	  
equal	  conditions	  for	  competition	  form	  the	  non-­‐derogable	  core	  of	  the	  internal	  market	  the	  
limits	  of	  permissible	  differentiation	  must	  lay	  much	  further	  into	  the	  broad	  concept	  of	  the	  
internal	   market	   including	   also	   the	   relevant	   non-­‐economic	   aspects	   discussed	   in	   the	  
previous	  chapter.	  	  
The	  establishment	  of	  the	  internal	  market	  is	  the	  most	  central	  aspect	  of	  the	  commitment	  of	  
the	   Member	   States	   to	   ‘ensure	   the	   economic	   and	   social	   progress	   of	   their	   States	   by	  
common	  action	  to	  eliminate	  the	  barriers	  which	  divide	  Europe’	  but	  being	  the	  core	  of	  the	  
EU	   legal	   order	   does	   not	   mean	   that	   no	   flexibility	   is	   allowed	   from	   internal	   market	  
provisions.98	   Differentiation	   does	   not	   as	   such	   conflict	   with	   the	   idea	   of	   integration	   in	  
general	  or	  with	  the	  internal	  market	  concept	  in	  particular.99	  Distinction,	  however,	  must	  be	  
made	   between	   the	   essential	   principles	   of	   the	   internal	   market	   –	   the	   fundamental	  
freedoms,	   the	   principles	   of	   equality	   and	   non-­‐discrimination,	   etc.	   –	   and	   the	   specific	  
provisions	  laid	  down	  in	  primary	  and	  secondary	  legislation	  in	  which	  differentiation	  may	  
occur	   without	   necessarily	   defeating	   the	   object	   and	   purpose	   of	   the	   internal	   market.	  
According	   to	   de	   Búrca,	   the	   core	   of	   the	   internal	   market	   should	   pertain	   to	   both	   the	  
substance	  of	  the	  specific	  policies	  and	  the	  ‘specific	  legal	  and	  constitutional	  characteristics	  
of	   such	  measures’.100	  Viewing	   the	   internal	  market	   as	   a	   collection	  of	  principles	  brought	  
into	  effect	  by	  secondary	   law	  rather	   than	  specific	  policy	  measures,	   the	  substance	  of	   the	  
specific	  policy	  fields	  should	  only	  play	  a	  role	  in	  the	  case	  of	  particular	  sectoral	  markets	  and	  
not	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  general	  idea	  of	  the	  internal	  market.	  	  
According	   to	   the	   philosophy	   underpinning	   its	   creation,	   for	   the	   internal	   market	   to	  
function	  properly	  not	  all	  relevant	   legislation	  in	  all	  Member	  States	  needs	  to	  be	  perfectly	  
identical.	   ‘One	   legislative	   size	   cannot	   fit	   all’101	   nor	   is	   it	   always	   necessary.	   Instead,	   the	  
functionalist	  approach	  accommodates	  well	  the	  conclusion	  reached	  above	  on	  that	  the	  idea	  
                                            
98	  Recital	  2,	  Preamble	  to	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  TFEU.	  
99	  B	  Grabitz	  and	  E	  Langeheine	  (n	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100	  G	  De	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  (n	  56)	  135.	  
101	  S	  Weatherill,	  'New	  Strategies	  for	  Managing	  the	  EC's	  Internal	  Market'	  (n	  22)	  600.	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of	  ‘common	  rules	  for	  a	  common	  market’	  has	  been	  outlived	  and	  deemed	  an	  unnecessary	  
restriction	   to	   the	   integration	   process.102	   Some	   barriers	   to	   trade	   are	   considered	  
permissible	   whereas	   others,	   notably	   those	   that	   impede	   with	   the	   functioning	   of	   the	  
internal	  market,	  are	  deemed	  incompatible	  with	  EU	  law.103	  Often,	  the	  necessary	  flexibility	  
of	  the	  market	  can	  be	  guaranteed	  by	  minimum	  harmonisation	  which	  abolishes	  the	  most	  
detrimental	  barriers	  to	  trade	  while	  allowing	  the	  market	  to	  adjust	   itself	   to	  the	  changing	  
economic	   and	   technological	   conditions.104	   On	   other	   occasions,	   recourse	   is	   had	   to	  
harmonisation	   through	   directives	   or	   the	   issuing	   of	   decisions	   directed	   at	   one	   Member	  
State	  or	  non-­‐binding	  recommendations	  and	  opinions.	  	  
Apart	  from	  the	  legislative	  means	  of	  creating	  flexibility,	  most	  of	  the	  differentiation	  in	  the	  
internal	  market	  occurs	  in	  the	  form	  of	  fairly	  specific	  opt-­‐outs	  from	  secondary	  law.	  These	  
opt-­‐outs	   have	   to	   conform	   to	   the	   general	   principles	   of	   EU	   law	   as	   well	   as	   to	   the	   more	  
specific	   requirements	   established	   by	   the	   Treaties.	   Generally,	   secondary	   law	   has	   to	  
conform	  to	  the	  objectives	  and	  tasks	  of	   the	  Union,	   the	  general	  principles	  of	  EU	   law,	  and	  
fundamental	   rights	   as	   well	   as	   be	   proportional	   as	   to	   the	   perceived	   aims.105	   The	   same	  
applies	  to	  the	  derogations	  from	  secondary	  law.	  
The	  general	  principles	  of	  EU	  law	  are	  generally	  considered	  to	  include,	  among	  others,	  the	  
respect	   of	   fundamental	   rights,	   proportionality,	   legal	   certainty,	   equality	   and	   non-­‐
discrimination,	   effectiveness	   and	   subsidiarity.	   In	   the	   context	   of	   flexibility	   within	   the	  
internal	  market,	   the	   principles	  most	   relevant	   appear	   to	   be	   those	   of	   equality	   and	   non-­‐
discrimination.	   The	   principle	   of	   equality	   is	   connected	   to	   the	   principle	   of	   solidarity.106	  
This	  connection	  is	  based	  on	  the	  assumption	  that	  the	  Treaties	  lay	  out	  a	  balanced	  account	  
of	  benefits	   and	  obligations	   for	   the	  Member	  States	   thereby	   leading	   to	   equality	  between	  
them.	  A	  disruption	  of	  the	  equilibrium	  not	  only	  distorts	  the	  equality	  but	  also	  the	  principle	  
of	  solidarity	  between	  the	  Member	  States.107	  However,	  the	  absoluteness	  of	  the	  principles	  
of	   equality	   and	   solidarity	   depends	   on	   whether	   one	   adopts	   a	   strict	   or	   flexible	  
                                            
102	  S	  Weatherill,	  'On	  the	  Depth	  and	  Breadth	  of	  European	  Integration'	  (n	  89)	  537.	  
103	  A	  McGee	  and	  S	  Weatherill	  (n	  67)	  578.	  
104	  S	  Weatherill,	  'New	  Strategies	  for	  Managing	  the	  EC's	  Internal	  Market'	  (n	  22)	  601-­‐602.	  
105	  Case	  11/70	  Internationale	  Handelsgesellschaft	  [1970]	  ECR	  1125.	  
106	  Laid	  out	  in	  detail	  with	  references	  to	  case	  law	  in	  J	  Wouters	  (n	  92)	  317.	  	  
107	  Case	  39/72	  Commission	  v	  Italy	  [1973]	  ECR	  101,	  paras	  24-­‐25;	  Case	  128/78	  Commission	  v	  United	  Kingdom	  
[1979]	  ECR	  419,	  para	  12.	  
 
	   123 
understanding	   of	   the	   objectives	   of	   the	   EU.108	   Equality	   and	   solidarity	   between	   the	  
Member	   States	   are	   endangered	   primarily	   by	   a	   ‘unilateral	   [breach]’	   of	   a	  member	   State	  
‘according	  to	  its	  own	  conception	  of	  national	  interest’.109	  Wherever	  the	  flexible	  approach	  
has	  become	  the	  chosen	  option	  in	  practice	  and	  occurs	  with	  the	  approval	  of	  the	  EU	  and	  the	  
other	  Member	   States,	   one	   cannot	   consider	   such	   a	   unilateral	   breach	   to	   have	   occurred.	  
This	   includes	   derogations	   explicitly	   permitted	   by	   the	   Treaties.	   It	   follows	   that	  
differentiation	   in	   the	   internal	  market	   is	   compatible	  with	   the	  principles	  of	   equality	   and	  
solidarity	  insofar	  as	  deviations	  meet	  general	  approval	  and	  do	  not,	  as	  unilateral	  breaches,	  
dilute	  the	  commonly	  agreed	  core.	  Whether	  primary	  law	  opt-­‐outs,	  which	  are	  the	  results	  of	  
political	   bargaining	   and	   outside	   the	   scope	   of	   review	   of	   the	   Court	   of	   Justice	   can	   be	  
justified	   in	   the	   light	   of	   the	   above-­‐mentioned	   principles	   is	   questionable,110	   even	   if	   one	  
cannot	  deny	  the	  existence	  of	  political	  approval.	  
Similarly	  to	  the	  case	  of	  the	  EU	  legal	  order	  discussed	  above,	  the	  main	  question	  concerning	  
permissible	   differentiation	   from	   the	   internal	   market	   is	   whether	   one	   can	   ascertain	   a	  
common	   set	   of	   rules	   about	   what	   constitutes	   the	   hard	   core	   of	   the	   internal	   market	   or	  
whether	   the	   determination	   is	   entirely	   in	   the	   hands	   of	   the	   political	   actors.	   	   The	  
requirement	  of	  cohesion	  in	  the	  internal	  market	  is	  qualified	  by	  the	  functionalist	  claim	  for	  
establishing	  a	  well-­‐functioning	  market	  and	  as	  established	  above,111	  unity	  itself	  –	  but	  not	  
uniformity	  –	  is	  part	  of	  the	  very	  concept	  of	  the	  internal	  market.	  The	  unity	  of	  the	  internal	  
market	   finds	   expression	   in	   its	   ‘common	   and	   complete	   order'.112	   This	   common	   and	  
complete	  order	  is	  precisely	  the	  objective	  core	  from	  which	  no	  derogations	  can	  be	  allowed	  
without	   the	  EU’s	   internal	  market	   losing	   its	   special	   character.	  The	   limits	   of	   permissible	  
differentiation	   to	   internal	  market	   rules	   are	   in	  practice	  often	  elaborated	   in	   the	  political	  
process	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  subjective	  perception	  of	  the	  Member	  States	  as	  to	  what	  level	  of	  
differentiation	   they	  can	  accept	  within	   the	   framework	  of	   the	   internal	  market.	  This	  does	  
not,	   however,	   render	   all	   differentiation	   compatible	   with	   the	   purposes	   of	   the	   internal	  
market	  as	  laid	  out	  in	  the	  Treaties.	  The	  core	  elements	  include	  the	  main	  principles	  of	  the	  
                                            
108	  B	  Grabitz	  and	  E	  Langeheine	  (n	  93)	  42.	  
109	  Case	  39/72	  Commission	  v	  Italy	  (n	  107)	  para	  24;	  Case	  128/78	  Commission	  v	  United	  Kingdom	  (n	  107)	  para	  
12.	  
110	  F	  Tuytschaever,	  Differentiation	  in	  European	  Union	  Law	  (Hart	  Publishing	  1999)	  113;	  G	  De	  Búrca	  (n	  56)	  
143.	  
111	  See	  subsection	  2.1.	  
112	  R	  Barents	  (n	  2)	  208,	  see	  above	  n	  2.	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internal	  market	   as	  well	   as	   the	   concept	   of	   its	   unity.	   This	   conclusion	   about	   the	   internal	  
market	   as	   a	   whole	   applies	   equally	   to	   the	   cores	   of	   the	   specific	   sectors	   of	   the	   internal	  
market	   –	   any	   divergences	   from	   the	   common	   core	  must	   be	   justified	   in	   the	   light	   of	   the	  
specific	  purpose	  of	  that	  particular	  policy	  sector	  in	  order	  to	  fit	  within	  the	  framework	  of	  a	  
unified	  internal	  market.	  	  
4	  Integration	  and	  disintegration	  in	  the	  expanded	  internal	  market	  	  
Just	  as	  the	  paradigm	  of	   the	   internal	  market	  has	  changed	  from	  a	   finished	  project	   to	  one	  
that	   is	   constantly	   developing	   and	   adapting	   to	   changes	   in	   time	   the	   entire	   discourse	   on	  
European	   integration,	   too,	  has	   turned	   into	  one	  on	   flexibility	  and	  differentiation.113	  The	  
extension	  of	  the	  internal	  market	  to	  non-­‐EU	  Member	  States	  by	  exporting	  the	  acquis,	  which	  
is	   a	   wholly	   new	   phenomenon	   of	   limited	   and	   differentiated	   integration	   into	   the	   EU	  
without	   formal	   accession	   to	   the	   Union,	   is	   undoubtedly	   proof	   of	   such	   flexibility.	   The	  
question	   that	   remains	   is	   what	   kind	   of	   ‘different	   ‘Europes’’	   can	   the	   internal	   market	  
accommodate	  even	  in	  the	  light	  of	  integrating	  into	  it	  third	  countries.114	  	  
While	   the	   extension	  of	   the	  acquis	   to	   third	   countries	   constitutes	   a	   type	  of	   flexibility	   for	  
integration	   in	   the	   EU,	   the	   exported	   acquis	   and	   the	   extended	   internal	   market	   do	   not	  
necessarily	  enjoy	  more	  flexibility	  and	  differentiation	  than	  the	  same	  acquis	  within	  the	  EU.	  
All	  three	  of	  the	  multilateral	  agreements	  which	  seek	  to	  extend	  the	  EU’s	  internal	  market	  or	  
a	  sector	  thereof	  to	  neighbouring	  countries	  do	  so	  by	  exporting	  relevant	  parts	  of	  EU	  acquis.	  
They,	   thus,	   share	   both	   the	   objective	   and	   the	   general	  means	   of	   doing	   so.	   The	   concrete	  
objectives	  of	  each	  of	  the	  agreements,	  however,	  are	  worded	  in	  a	  slightly	  different	  manner.	  
The	   following	   analysis	   focuses	   on	   the	   stated	   objectives	   of	   the	   three	   multilateral	  
agreements	   under	   scrutiny	   as	   regards	   upholding	   the	   unity	   inherent	   to	   the	   internal	  
market	   with	   the	   aim	   of	   establishing	   the	   extent	   of	   uniformity,	   unity	   and	   permissible	  
differentiation	  in	  the	  internal	  market	  extended	  beyond	  the	  borders	  of	  the	  EU.	  	  
                                            
113	  G	  De	  Búrca	  and	  J	  Scott	  (n	  30)	  2.	  
114	   ‘[…]	   a	   number	   of	   different	   ‘Europes’,	   their	   breadth	   and	   depth	   dependent	   upon	   the	   integration	  
arrangements	  specific	  to	  the	  policy	  field	  in	  question,	  and	  embedded	  in	  a	  complex	  network	  of	  relations	  with	  
one	  another	  and	  with	  the	  various	  Member	  States’:	  N	  Walker	  (n	  24)	  356.	  
 
	   125 
4.1	  European	  Economic	  Area	  
The	  EEA	  EFTA	  countries	  are	  linked	  to	  the	  EU	  by	  the	  legal	  rules	  and	  principles	  provided	  in	  
the	  EEA	  Agreement.	  The	  objective	  of	   the	   latter	   is	   to	  create	  a	   ‘common	  economic	  space’	  
between	  the	  EU	  Member	  States	  and	  the	  EEA	  EFTA	  countries.115	  The	  common	  economic	  
space	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  is	  the	  internal	  market	  –	  an	  area	  without	  internal	  frontiers	  in	  
which	  the	  free	  movement	  of	  goods,	  persons,	  services	  and	  capital	  is	  ensured.	  The	  EEA	  was	  
not	  intended	  to	  become	  a	  literal	  extension	  of	  the	  internal	  market	  in	  the	  current	  definition	  
of	   the	   latter.	  Rather,	   the	  EEA	   is	  a	  common	  economic	  space	   that	  comprises	  both	   the	  EU	  
and	  the	  EEA	  EFTA	  States.	  This	  is	  affirmed	  by	  Article	  2	  EEA	  Agreement	  and	  Recital	  5	  of	  its	  
preamble	  which	  list	  the	  free	  movement	  of	  goods,	  persons,	  services	  and	  capital,	  rules	  on	  
competition	   law	   and	   ‘strengthened	   and	   broadened	   cooperation	   in	   flanking	   and	  
horizontal	  policies’	  such	  as	  research	  and	  development,	   the	  environment,	  education	  and	  
social	   policy	   as	   the	   specific	   objectives	   of	   the	   EEA.	   A	   specific	   reference	   to	   a	   borderless	  
area	  –	  a	  defining	  feature	  of	  the	  ‘internal	  market’	  –	  is,	  nevertheless,	  excluded.	  	  
The	   EEA	   Agreement	   further	   specifies	   that	   the	   legal	   area	   thus	   created	   is	   to	   be	  
‘homogeneous’.	   Homogeneity	   is	   one	   of	   the	   ‘fundamental	   principles’	   of	   the	   EEA	  
Agreement.116	   The	   main	   question	   is	   whether	   ‘homogeneity’	   in	   this	   context	   is	   to	   be	  
understood	   as	   uniformity	   of	   law	  within	   the	  EEA,	   uniformity	   between	  EEA	   law	   and	  EU	  
law,	  or	  rather	  the	  chosen	  and	  accepted	  path	  in	  European	  integration	  –	  unity	  constructed	  
around	   a	   common	   hard	   core	   while	   allowing	   for	   permissible	   differentiation.	   Another	  
question	  is	  whether	  the	  internal	  market	  as	  extended	  to	  third	  countries	  retains	  the	  same	  
component	  of	  unity	  that	  is	  inherent	  to	  the	  EU	  internal	  market.	  	  
When	   looking	   at	   the	   uniformity/unity/homogeneity	   of	   a	   legal	   order	   that	   incorporates	  
parts	   of	   EU	   law,	   such	   as	   the	  multilateral	   agreements	   establishing	   the	   EEA,	   the	   Energy	  
Community	  and	  the	  ECAA,	  the	  notion	  of	  unity	  gains	  two	  dimensions.117	  The	  first	  of	  these	  
dimensions	  is	  unity	  within	  the	  legal	  order	  that	  is	  created	  by	  the	  ‘exporting’	  of	  the	  internal	  
                                            
115	   A	   Lazowski,	   'Box	   of	   chocolates	   integration:	   the	   European	   Economic	   Area	   and	   the	   Swiss	   models	  
revisited'	   in	   S	   Blockmans	   and	   S	   Prechal	   (eds),	   Reconciling	   the	   Deepening	   and	  Widening	   of	   the	   European	  
Union	  (T.M.C.	  Asser	  Press	  2007)	  87,	  89.	  
116	  Case	  E-­‐3/97	  Opel	  Norge	  [1998]	  EFTA	  Ct	  Rep	  1,	  para	  30.	  
117	  Haukeland	  Fredriksen	  distinguishes	  between	  two	  meanings	  of	  homogeneity	  within	  the	  EEA	  –	  uniform	  
interpretation	  of	  the	  EEA	  rules	  in	  the	  EU	  and	  in	  the	  EEA,	  and	  uniform	  interpretation	  of	  EEA	  rules	  and	  the	  
corresponding	  identical	  EU	  rules,	  see	  H	  Haukeland	  Fredriksen,	   'One	  Market,	  Two	  Courts:	  Legal	  Pluralism	  
vs.	  Homogeneity	  in	  the	  European	  Economic	  Area'	  (2010)	  79	  Nordic	  Journal	  of	  International	  Law	  481,	  483.	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market	   rules.	   From	   an	   empirical	   point	   of	   view,	   it	   calls	   for	   comparing	   the	   adoption,	  
implementation	  and	  application	  of	  the	  rules	  in	  all	  of	  the	  states	  parties	  to	  the	  respective	  
multilateral	   agreements.	   From	   a	   functional	   point	   of	   view,	   it	   calls	   for	   the	   proper	  
functioning	  of	  the	  legal	  order	  in	  accordance	  with	  its	  stated	  aims.	  This	  dimension	  of	  unity	  
is,	   subsequently,	   called	   the	   uniformity/unity/homogeneity	   of	   the	   EEA,	   the	   Energy	  
Community	  or	   the	  ECAA.118	  For	   those	  parts	  of	   the	  multilateral	   agreements	   that	  do	  not	  
reproduce	   EU	   law,	   homogeneity	   cannot	   assume	   but	   this	   dimension.	   The	   second	  
dimension	  of	  unity,	   or	  homogeneity,	  pertains	   to	   the	   ‘EU—non-­‐EU	  Member	  States’	   axis.	  
This	   latter	   situation	   is	   roughly	   similar	   to	   the	   relationship	   between	   the	   EU	   and	   its	  
Member	  States	  but	  refrains	  from	  looking	  at	  the	  differences	  in	  the	  internal	  application	  of	  
rules	   in	   the	   countries	   parties	   to	   the	   multilateral	   agreement.	   To	   some	   extent,	   the	   two	  
dimensions	  are	  intertwined.	  	  
Recital	  4	  of	  the	  preamble	  to	  the	  EEA	  Agreement	  makes	  an	  attempt	  to	  clarify	  the	  objective	  
of	  homogeneity	  in	  the	  EEA:	  	  
[…]	   [T]he	   objective	   of	   establishing	   a	   dynamic	   and	   homogeneous	   European	  
Economic	  Area,	  based	  on	  common	  rules	  and	  equal	  conditions	  of	  competition	  and	  
providing	   for	   the	  adequate	  means	  of	  enforcement	   including	  at	   the	   judicial	   level,	  
and	  achieved	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  equality	  and	  reciprocity	  and	  of	  an	  overall	  balance	  of	  
benefits,	  rights	  and	  obligations	  for	  the	  Contracting	  Parties.	  	  
On	  the	  basis	  of	  this	  provision,	  the	  answer	  to	  the	  first	  question	  is	  that	   ‘homogeneous’	   in	  
the	  context	  of	  the	  EEA	  is	  to	  be	  understood	  as	  referring	  to	  the	  EEA	  as	  a	  whole,	  including	  
the	  EU,	   its	  Member	  States	  and	  the	  EEA	  EFTA	  States,	  and	  not	  as	  creating	  a	  direct	   link	  of	  
uniformity	  with	  the	  EU	  legal	  order.	  For	  a	  common	  economic	  space	  to	  come	  into	  existence	  
no	  uniformity	  as	  between	  itself	  and	  the	  EU’s	   internal	  market	   is	  necessary	  by	  definition	  
because	   this	   common	   space	   exists	   independently	   of	   the	   EU.	   In	   this	   respect,	   it	   is	   not	  
relevant	  to	  regard	  the	  EEA	  as	  a	  legal	  framework	  resting	  on	  two	  distinct	  pillars	  –	  the	  EU	  
and	  its	  Member	  States	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  and	  the	  EEA	  EFTA	  States	  on	  the	  other	  –	  as	  is	  the	  
case	   regarding	   the	   institutional	   set-­‐up	   of	   the	   EEA.119	   The	   EEA	   Agreement	   is	   an	  
                                            
118	  For	  example,	  ‘homogeneity	  in	  the	  interpretation	  and	  application	  of	  the	  law	  in	  the	  EEA’	  in	  S	  Norberg	  and	  
others,	  The	  European	  Economica	  Area:	  A	  Commentary	  on	  the	  EEA	  Agreement	  (Fritzes	  1993)	  187.	  
119	  C	  Baudenbacher,	   'If	  Not	  EEA	  State	  Liability,	  Then	  What:	  Reflections	  Ten	  Years	  after	   the	  EFTA	  Court's	  
Sveinbjornsdottir	   Ruling'	   (2009)	   10	   Chicago	   Journal	   of	   International	   Law	   333,	   338.	   The	   Court,	   too,	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international	   agreement	   that	   derives	   its	   legal	   context	   from	   the	   EU	   and	   has	   set	   up	  
mechanisms	  which	  allow	  for	  a	   legislative	  updating	  in	  the	  EEA	  parallel	  to	  the	  legislative	  
developments	  in	  the	  EU	  but	  the	  EU	  and	  the	  EEA	  are	  not	  identical	  twins.	  ‘Homogeneity’	  in	  
the	  EEA	  Agreement	  should,	  thus,	  be	  considered	  to	  be	  referring	  to	  the	  harmony	  between	  
the	  different	  components	  of	  the	  EEA	  legal	  order.	  	  
On	  the	  scale	  uniformity-­‐unity	  the	  homogeneity	  of	  the	  EEA	  resembles	  unity	  of	  the	  EU	  legal	  
order	   rather	   than	   uniformity	   as	   both	   strive	   towards	   achieving	   a	   particular	   aim	   –	  
integration	  through	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  single	  market	  –	  in	  which	  total	  uniformity	  is	  not	  the	  
crucial	  factor.	   	  In	  Recital	  4,	  the	  qualities	  of	  ‘dynamic	  and	  homogeneous’,	  which	  describe	  
the	   EEA,	   are	   presented	   not	   as	   a	   means	   of	   achieving	   a	   broader	   aim	   as	   to	   the	   level	   of	  
integration	  but	  rather	  as	  a	  description	  of	  the	  economic	  area.	  This	  is	  similar	  to	  the	  idea	  of	  
unity	  forming	  an	  inherent	  part	  of	  the	  internal	  market.	  How	  the	  homogeneous	  EEA	  is	  to	  
be	   achieved	   is	   explained	   in	   the	   same	   provision:	   the	   EEA	   is	   grounded	   on	   ‘equality	   and	  
reciprocity’	  and	  ‘overall	  balance	  of	  benefits,	  rights	  and	  obligations’.120	  	  
Recital	   15	   of	   the	   preamble	   to	   the	   EEA	   Agreement	   further	   elaborates	   on	   the	   aspect	   of	  
equality	  which	  was	  first	  introduced	  in	  Recital	  4	  through	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  balance	  of	  benefits,	  
rights	  and	  obligations:	   ‘[the	  objective]	  is	  to	  arrive	  at	  equal	  treatment	  of	  individuals	  and	  
economic	   operators	   as	   regards	   the	   four	   freedoms	   and	   the	   conditions	   of	   competition.’	  
This	  provision	   reflects	   the	   functional	   rather	   than	  empirical	   character	  of	   the	   concept	  of	  
homogeneity.	  The	  driving	  force	  behind	  integration	  in	  the	  EEA	  is	  the	  common	  objective	  of	  
equality	  rather	  than	  the	  application	  of	   identical	   legislation	  that	  may	  or	  may	  not	   lead	  to	  
equality	   in	  effect.	  Further	   support	   for	   the	   functional	  aspect	  of	  homogeneity	   in	   the	  EEA	  
can	   be	   found	   in	  Article	   1	   EEA	  Agreement,	  which	   summarises	   Recitals	   4	   and	   15	   of	   the	  
Preamble:	  
The	  aim	  of	  this	  Agreement	  of	  association	  is	  to	  promote	  a	  continuous	  and	  balanced	  
strengthening	   of	   trade	   and	   economic	   relations	   between	   the	   Contracting	   Parties	  
                                            
understands	  the	  ‘twin-­‐pillar’	  system	  of	  the	  EEA	  as	  institutional	  rather	  than	  substantive,	  see	  Opinion	  1/00	  
ECAA	  [2002]	  ECR	  I-­‐3493,	  para	  7.	  A	  complete	  analysis	  is	  provided	  below	  in	  chapters	  6	  and	  7.	  
120	  Recital	  4,	  Preamble	  to	  the	  EEA	  Agreement	  reads	  as	  follows:	  ‘…	  [T]he	  objective	  of	  establishing	  a	  dynamic	  
and	  homogeneous	  European	  Economic	  Area,	  based	  on	  common	  rules	  and	  equal	  conditions	  of	  competition	  
and	  providing	  for	  the	  adequate	  means	  of	  enforcement	  including	  at	  the	  judicial	   level,	  and	  achieved	  on	  the	  
basis	   of	   equality	   and	   reciprocity	   and	   of	   an	   overall	   balance	   of	   benefits,	   rights	   and	   obligations	   for	   the	  
Contracting	  Parties.’	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with	   equal	   conditions	   of	   competition,	   and	   the	   respect	   of	   the	   same	   rules,	  with	   a	  
view	  to	  creating	  a	  homogeneous	  European	  Economic	  Area	  […]	  
Recital	  15	  goes	  on	  to	  link	  EEA	  law	  with	  EU	  law	  by	  stating	  the	  objective	  of	  the	  contracting	  
parties	   to	   ‘arrive	   at,	   and	   maintain,	   a	   uniform	   interpretation	   and	   application	   of	   this	  
Agreement	   and	   those	   provisions	   of	   Community	   legislation	   which	   are	   substantially	  
reproduced	  in	  this	  Agreement	  […]’.	  The	  link	  reflects	  the	  choice	  made	  of	  using	  EU	  law	  as	  a	  
framework	  of	  reference	  on	  which	  to	  base	  the	  legal	  framework	  of	  the	  EEA	  but	  it	  does	  not	  
create	  a	  functional	  link	  of	  uniformity	  between	  the	  two	  legal	  orders.	  Complete	  uniformity	  
of	  interpretation	  would	  require	  both	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice	  and	  the	  EFTA	  Court	  to	  interpret	  
the	   ‘exported’	   rules	   in	   an	   identical	   manner	   and	   follow	   in	   so	   doing	   the	   former’s	  
interpretation	   of	   ‘original’	   EU	   law	   but	   as	   demonstrated	   below,121	   this	   possibility	   was	  
never	  made	  use	  of	  due	  to	  the	   incompatibility	  of	   this	  solution	  with	  the	  autonomy	  of	   the	  
EU	  legal	  order.	  	  	  
The	   provisions	   mentioned	   above	   clearly	   point	   at	   the	   EEA-­‐internal	   dimension	   of	  
homogeneity.	   The	  EEA	   legal	   order	   is	   homogeneous	  with	   regard	   to	   its	   own	   constituent	  
elements	  and	  their	  application	  in	  the	  states	  parties	  to	  the	  EEA	  Agreement	  rather	  than	  to	  
the	   legal	   order	   of	   the	   EU.	   Equal	   conditions	   and	   the	   respect	   for	   the	   same	   rules,	   for	  
example,	  do	  not	  require	  that	  the	  legal	  framework	  of	  the	  EEA	  be	  based	  exclusively	  on	  EU	  
rules.	   A	   choice	  was	  made	   for	   EU	   law	   as	   the	   law	  of	   integration	   among	   the	  EU	  Member	  
States	   to	   be	   applied	   as	   the	   substantive	   regulatory	   basis	   for	   the	   newly	   established	  
European	   Economic	   Area.	   It	   is	   this	   choice	   of	   regulatory	   basis	   that	   connects	   the	   two	  
dimensions	  –	  the	  EEA-­‐internal	  and	  the	  EU-­‐EEA	  level	  –	  of	  homogeneity.	  	  
The	   normative	   framework	   of	   the	   EEA	   originating	   from	   the	   EU	   is	   dynamically	   updated	  
and	  developed	  along	  the	  three	  foundations	  of	  homogeneity,	  pertaining	  to	  the	  legislative,	  
enforcement	   and	   judicial	   review	   procedures.	   On	   the	   one	   hand,	   Article	   6	   of	   the	   EEA	  
Agreement	  provides	  a	  mechanism	  for	   the	  dynamic	  evolution	  of	  EEA	  acquis	   in	   line	  with	  
developments	   in	   the	   EU	   internal	  market	   legislation.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   the	   EEA	   rules	  
must	  be	  applied	  and	  interpreted	  in	  conformity	  with	  EU	  law	  following	  the	  procedures	  of	  
                                            
121	  Chapters	  5	  and	  7.	  
 
	   129 
surveillance	   and	   judicial	   review	   established	   under	   the	   EEA	   Agreement.122	   Contrary	   to	  
Haukeland	  Fredriksen,123	  this	  interpretation	  of	  Article	  6	  EEA	  Agreement	  does	  not	  imply	  
the	   ‘legal	   homogeneity	   between	   the	   EEA	   rules	   and	   the	   interpretation	   of	   the	   Court	   of	  
Justice	  on	  underlying	  EU	  law’	  as	  an	  objective	  of	  the	  EEA	  Agreement.	  Article	  6	  paves	  the	  
ground	  for	  judicial	  homogeneity	  in	  terms	  of	  uniform	  interpretation	  of	  identically	  worded	  
EU	  and	  EEA	  rules	  but	  the	  uniform	  interpretation	  shall	  be	  ensured	  on	  the	  EU	  side	  by	  the	  
national	  courts	  of	  EU	  Member	  States	  and	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice,	  and	  on	  the	  EEA	  EFTA	  side	  
the	  national	  courts	  of	  the	  EEA	  EFTA	  States	  and	  the	  EFTA	  Court.	  	  	  
According	  to	  Hartley’s	  definition,	  homogeneity	  in	  the	  EEA	  means	  identical	  quality	  to	  EU	  
law.124	   In	   a	   more	   nuanced	   contribution,	   Magnússon	   has	   substantiated	   the	   concept	   of	  
homogeneity	  with	  the	  idea	  of	  comparable	  rights	  and	  obligations	  between	  the	  EU	  and	  the	  
EEA	   States	   leading	   to	   comparable	   rights	   and	   obligations	   of	   individuals	   regardless	   on	  
which	   ‘side’	   of	   the	   EEA	   Agreement	   they	   are	   located.125	   Magnússon’s	   interpretation	  
constitutes	  one	   further	  example	  of	   the	  distinction	  made	  between	   the	  EU	  and	   the	  EFTA	  
pillars	   within	   the	   EEA.	   Strangely	   enough,	   neither	   of	   the	   commentators	   pays	   any	  
particular	  attention	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  not	  only	  the	  EEA	  EFTA	  States	  but	  also	  the	  EU	  Member	  
States	  are	  bound	  by	  EEA	  rules.	  Under	  the	  EEA	  Agreement,	   the	   latter	  are	  not,	   therefore,	  
subject	   to	   rights	   and	   obligations	   different	   from	   those	   conferred	   upon	   the	   EEA	   EFTA	  
States.	  Differences	  can	  only	  occur	  on	  the	  institutional	  level	  owing	  specifically	  to	  the	  fact	  
that	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice	  interprets	  the	  acquis	  in	  the	  EU	  pillar	  and	  the	  EFTA	  Court	  in	  the	  
EFTA	  pillar	  of	  the	  EEA.	  	  
The	  EEA	  was	  created	  as	  a	  separate	  legal	  order.	  It	  has	  its	  own	  objectives	  and	  methods	  for	  
achieving	  these	  objectives,	  different	  from	  those	  of	  the	  EU.	  According	  to	  the	  EFTA	  Court	  in	  
Sveinbjörnsdóttir,	   the	   EEA	   Agreement	   is	   an	   ‘international	   treaty	   sui	   generis	   which	  
contains	  a	  distinct	  legal	  order	  of	  its	  own’.126	  The	  EEA	  Agreement	  is,	  thus,	  not	  only	  distinct	  
from	  traditional	  international	  agreements	  but	  also	  from	  the	  EU	  Treaties.	  The	  EFTA	  Court	  
                                            
122	  The	  EFTA	  Court	  recognises	  these	  as	  two	  foundations.	  See	  Case	  E-­‐9/97	  Sveinbjörnsdóttir	  [1998]	  EFTA	  Ct	  
Rep	  95,	  paras	  52-­‐54.	  
123	  H	  Haukeland	  Fredriksen,	  'The	  EFTA	  Court	  15	  Years	  on'	  (2010)	  59	  International	  and	  Comparative	  Law	  
Quarterly	  731,	  733.	  
124	  TC	  Hartley,	  'The	  European	  Court	  and	  the	  EEA'	  (1992)	  41	  International	  and	  Comparative	  Law	  Quarterly	  
841,	  845.	  
125	  S	  Magnusson	  (n	  79)	  9.	  
126	  Case	  E-­‐9/97	  Sveinbjörnsdóttir	  (n	  122)	  para	  59.	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further	   specified	   that	   the	  EEA	  Agreement	  differs	   from	   the	  EU	  Treaties	  by	   the	   ‘less	   far-­‐
reaching’	   depth	   of	   integration	   whereas	   both	   the	   scope	   and	   objective	   of	   the	   EEA	  
Agreement	  are	  more	  extensive	  than	  those	  of	  regular	  agreements	  concluded	  under	  public	  
international	  law.127	  	  
Contesting	   the	   interpretation	   of	   the	  EFTA	  Court,	  Haukeland	   Fredriksen	  has	   contended	  
that	   if	  anything,	   the	  EEA	  represents	  an	  extension	  of	   the	  EU	   legal	  order.128	  Displaying	  a	  
high	  degree	  of	  integration,	  the	  EEA,	  indeed,	  represents	  an	  enhanced	  free	  trade	  area	  the	  
objectives	   of	   which	   go	   beyond	   a	   mere	   customs	   union	   as	   well	   as	   a	   regular	   free	   trade	  
area.129	  However,	  the	  level	  of	  integration	  envisaged	  by	  the	  EEA	  Agreement	  is	  lower	  than	  
that	  perceived	  by	  the	  EU	  Treaties.130	  In	  the	  Maglite	  case,	  the	  EFTA	  Court	  interpreted	  the	  
objectives	  of	  the	  EEA	  Agreement	  as	  setting	  up	  a	  ‘fundamentally	  improved	  free	  trade	  area	  
but	   no	   customs	   union	  with	   a	   uniform	   foreign	   trade	   policy.’131	   The	   EEA	   EFTA	  Member	  
States	  did	  not,	  upon	  concluding	   the	  EEA	  Agreement,	   adhere	   to	   the	  EU	  policies	  on	  CCP,	  
common	  customs	  tariff,	  borderless	  area,132	  agriculture	  and	  fisheries,	  taxation,	  economic	  
and	   monetary	   union,	   and	   common	   foreign	   and	   security	   policy.133	   Because	   of	   these	  
restrictions	  in	  terms	  of	  policy	  areas	  covered	  –	  several	  of	  which	  form	  if	  not	  the	  core	  then	  
at	  least	  very	  crucial	  elements	  of	  the	  EU	  legal	  order	  –	  one	  cannot	  consider	  the	  EEA	  to	  be	  a	  
true	   extension	   of	   the	   EU	   legal	   order	   in	   the	   broadest	   sense	   of	   the	   term.	   Differences	   in	  
objectives	  and	  substance	  may	  in	  some	  instances	  also	  lead	  to	  differences	  in	  effect.134	  	  
The	  homogeneity	  claim	  in	  the	  EEA	  Agreement	   is	  not	  an	  objective	   it	   itself.	   It	   is	   first	  and	  
foremost	  a	  term	  for	  describing	  the	  common	  economic	  space	  as	  envisaged	  by	  the	  treaty	  
makers	   rather	   than	   an	   objective	   of	   the	   Agreement.	   Admittedly,	   in	   terms	   of	   common	  
quality	   the	   term	   ‘homogeneity’	   corresponds	   in	   the	   EEA	   context	   to	   unity	   rather	   than	  
uniformity.	   Account	   here	   must	   be	   taken	   of	   the	   same	   considerations	   as	   were	  
                                            
127	  ibid.	  	  
128	  H	  Haukeland	  Fredriksen.	   'Bridging	  the	  Widening	  Gap	  between	  the	  EU	  Treaties	  and	  the	  Agreement	  on	  
the	  European	  Economic	  Area'	  (2012)	  18	  European	  Law	  Journal	  868,	  881.	  
129	  Case	  T-­‐115/94	  Opel	  Austria	  v	  Council	  [1997]	  ECR	  II-­‐39,	  para	  107;	  Case	  E-­‐9/97	  Sveinbjörnsdóttir	  (n	  122)	  
para	  59.	  
130	  Case	  E-­‐9/97	  Sveinbjörnsdóttir	  (n	  122)	  para	  59.	  
131	  Case	  E-­‐2/97	  Maglite	  [1997]	  EFTA	  Ct	  Rep	  127,	  para	  27.	  
132	  All	  four	  EFTA	  countries	  participate	  in	  the	  Schengen	  area	  but	  the	  Schengen	  Agreement	  is	  not	  part	  of	  the	  
EEA	  Agreement.	  
133	  W	   van	   Gerven,	   'The	   Genesis	   of	   EEA	   Law	   and	   the	   Principles	   of	   Primacy	   and	  Direct	   Effect'	   (1992)	   16	  
Fordham	  International	  Law	  Journal	  955,	  960.	  
134	  See	  below	  chapters	  4	  and	  7.	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demonstrated	   above	   with	   regard	   to	   the	   EU	   legal	   order	   and	   the	   internal	   market.	   The	  
establishment	   and	   functioning	  of	   a	   single	  market	   requires	  not	   a	   set	  of	   identical	  norms	  
but	  rather	  a	  core	  set	  of	  elements	  representing	  the	  defining	  features	  of	  the	  market	  and/or	  
legal	  order	  in	  question.	  There	  are	  three	  possible	  ways	  of	  looking	  at	  the	  defining	  features	  
of	  the	  single	  market	  created	  by	  exporting	  EU	  internal	  market	  acquis:	  firstly,	  the	  defining	  
features	  of	  a	  single	  market	  as	  such;	  secondly,	  the	  defining	  features	  of	  a	  single	  market	  that	  
includes	  the	  four	  fundamental	  freedoms	  and	  competition	  policy	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  EEA,	  
the	  Energy	  Community	  and	   the	  ECAA;	  and,	   thirdly,	   the	  core	  of	   the	  EU	   internal	  market.	  
The	  three	  ‘cores’	  may	  coincide	  but	  may	  also	  differ	  significantly.	  
The	  benchmark	  for	  determining	  the	  existence	  of	  unity	  in	  the	  EEA-­‐internal	  dimension	  of	  
its	  legal	  order	  is	  a	  similar	  ‘core’	  of	  the	  main	  elements	  of	  the	  agreement	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  
the	  EU	  legal	  order.	  In	  the	  EU-­‐EEA	  dimension,	  the	  benchmark	  should	  be	  a	  ‘core’	  consisting	  
of	   the	   defining	   elements	   commonly	   shared	   by	   both	   the	   EU	   Treaties	   and	   the	   EEA	  
Agreement.	  Comparing	  the	  definitions	  of	  the	  internal	  market	  and	  the	  common	  economic	  
space	   of	   the	   EEA	   it	   becomes	   apparent	   that	   the	   concept	   of	   homogeneity	   in	   the	   EEA	  
pertains	  to	  the	  core	  economic	  freedoms	  of	  the	  internal	  market.	  Since	  the	  aims	  of	  the	  EU	  
are,	  still,	  deeper	  as	  concerns	   integration	  and	  unity	  of	   the	  Europe,	   it	   is	  possible	  that	   the	  
core	   of	   the	   single	   market	   of	   the	   EEA,	   insofar	   as	   the	   latter	   does	   not	   partake	   in	   the	  
achievement	   of	   the	   European	   unity	   idea	   but	   ‘merely’	   cooperation	   in	   trade	   and	   certain	  
flanking	  areas,	  comprises	  a	  more	   limited	  set	  of	  essential	  elements	  than	  the	  EU	  internal	  
market,	  at	  least	  as	  far	  as	  policy	  areas	  such	  as	  agriculture	  and	  fisheries	  are	  concerned.	  	  
It	   was	   claimed	   above	   that	   the	   core	   of	   the	   internal	   market	   can	   be	   viewed	   from	   an	  
empirical	  or	  a	  functionalist	  perspective.	  From	  an	  empirical	  point	  of	  view,	  participation	  in	  
the	  EEA	  amounts	  to	  a	  ‘quasi-­‐	  or	  semi-­‐membership’	  of	  the	  EEA	  EFTA	  States	  in	  the	  EU.135	  
On	  the	  one	  hand,	  the	  policy	  areas	  featured	  in	  the	  EEA	  Agreement	  are	  often	  harmonised	  in	  
the	  EEA	  EFTA	  States	  on	  a	  level	  comparable	  to	  that	  of	  EU	  Member	  States	  or	  even	  more.136	  
Due	  to	  the	  homogeneity	  requirement	  the	  interpreters	  of	  EEA	  law	  in	  the	  EEA	  EFTA	  States	  
may,	  at	  times,	  also	  take	  account	  of	  EU	  legislation	  that	  has	  not	  yet	  been	  transposed	  within	  
the	  EEA.	  The	  existing	   level	  of	  harmonisation	   in	   the	   field	  of	  competition	  policy	  may,	   for	  
                                            
135	   M	   Egeberg	   and	   J	   Trondal,	   'Differentiated	   Integration	   in	   Europe:	   The	   Case	   of	   EEA	   Country,	   Norway'	  
(1999)	  37	  Journal	  of	  Common	  Market	  Studies	  133,	  134.	  
136	  ibid.	  
 
	   132 
example,	   require	   a	   consideration	   of	   the	   general	   context	   in	   order	   to	   ensure	   equal	  
conditions	  of	  competition.137	  	  
The	   objectives	   of	   EEA	  Agreement,	   however,	   point	   at	   a	   functional	   interpretation	   of	   the	  
term	   ‘homogeneity’	   as	   it	   is	   used	   in	   the	   EEA	  Agreement.	   In	   its	  written	   observations	   to	  
Opinion	   1/91,	   the	   Commission	   claimed	   that	   the	   EEA	   was	   established	   as	   ‘…	   a	  
homogeneous	   economic	   area	   in	   which	   law,	   substantially	   identical	   to	   that	   which	   is	   in	  
force	  within	  the	  EEC,	  is	  to	  be	  applied	  as	  uniformly	  as	  possible’.138	  From	  this	  statement	  it	  
can	  be	  deduced	  that,	  along	  the	  EU-­‐EEA	  axis	  absolute	  uniformity	  has	  not	  been	  perceived	  
as	  a	  goal	  in	  itself.	  The	  emphasised	  part	  of	  the	  observation	  leaves	  leeway	  for	  a	  functional	  
interpretation	  of	   the	  EEA	  homogeneity	  clauses.	  On	   the	  one	  hand,	   the	  Commission	  calls	  
for	  homogeneity	  within	  the	  EEA,	  yet	  ‘as	  uniformly	  as	  possible’	  suggests	  unity	  rather	  than	  
uniformity	  in	  the	  EU-­‐EEA	  dimension	  of	  the	  EEA	  Agreement.	  This	  enables	  the	  interpreters	  
of	  the	  EEA	  Agreement	  to	  take	  into	  account	  the	  specific	  aims	  of	  the	  EEA	  vis-­à-­vis	  the	  EU.	  
The	  benchmark	  for	  assessing	  the	  level	  of	  homogeneity	  in	  the	  EEA	  along	  the	  EU-­‐EEA	  axis	  
should,	   therefore,	   not	   be	   considered	   different	   from	   the	   case	   of	   the	   EEA-­‐internal	  
dimension	   and	   amount	   to	   unity	   rather	   than	   uniformity.	   The	   ‘core’	   that	   defines	   the	  
necessary	   elements	   of	   the	   internal	   market	   expanded	   to	   the	   EEA	   EFTA	   States	   must,	  
subsequently,	   be	   considered	   to	   include	   the	   same	   vertical	   elements	   as	   the	   core	   of	   the	  
internal	   market	   with	   the	   possibility	   of	   excluding	   certain	   horizontal	   policy	   areas	   that	  
otherwise	   belong	   to	   the	   core	   of	   the	   internal	   market	   within	   the	   EU.	   The	   horizontal-­‐
vertical	  division	  of	  the	  core	  elements	  of	  the	  internal	  market	  will	  be	  the	  focus	  of	  the	  next	  
subsections	   on	   the	   homogeneity	   requirements	   in	   the	   Energy	   Community	   and	   ECAA	  
agreements.	  
4.2	  Energy	  Community	  	  
The	  Energy	  Community	  Treaty	  is	  much	  less	  elaborate	  in	  scope	  than	  the	  EEA	  Agreement.	  
Being	  of	   sectoral	   remit	  only,	   the	  Treaty	  aims	   to	  establish	  a	   ‘single	   regulatory	  space	   for	  
trade	   in	  gas	  and	  electricity’.139	  This	  objective	   is	   to	  be	  achieved	  by	   implementing	  by	  the	  
                                            
137	  Joined	  Cases	  E-­‐5/04,	  E-­‐6/04	  and	  E-­‐7/04	  Fesil	  and	  Finnfjord	  [2005]	  EFTA	  Ct	  Rep	  117,	  para	  110.	  
138	  General	  observations	  submitted	  by	   the	   Institutions	  and	  the	  Governments,	  Opinion	  1/91	  EEA	  I	   [1991]	  
ECR	  I-­‐6079,	  6092	  (emphasis	  added).	  	  
139	  Recitals	  10,	  13	  and	  16,	  Preamble	  to	  the	  ECT;	  Article	  2(1)(b)	  ECT.	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contracting	   parties	   of	   the	   acquis	   communautaire	   on	   energy,140	   and	   creating	   for	   the	  
parties	   a	  market	   in	   Network	   Energy	  without	   internal	   frontiers.141	   In	   broad	   terms,	   the	  
ECT	  employs	  the	  same	  type	  of	  methods	  for	  expanding	  the	  EU	  internal	  market	  in	  energy	  
as	  does	  the	  EEA	  Agreement	  in	  respect	  of	  the	  internal	  market	  as	  a	  whole.	  Compared	  to	  the	  
EEA	  Agreement,	  though,	  the	  ECT	  features	  much	  less	  explicit	  aims	  as	  regards	  the	  link	  of	  
homogeneity	  between	  the	  EU	  acquis	  and	  the	  Energy	  Community	  acquis	  and	  the	  level	  of	  
integration	  envisaged	  between	  the	  EU	  and	  the	  Energy	  Community	  treaties	  that	  features	  
essentially	   identical	   sets	   of	   rules.	   Differently	   from	   the	   EEA	   Agreement,	   the	   Energy	  
Community	  Treaty	  is	  silent	  on	  any	  references	  to	  ‘uniformity’,	  ‘unity’	  or	  ‘homogeneity’	  of	  
the	  Energy	  Community	  legal	  order	  vis-­à-­vis	  the	  EU	  legal	  order.	  
Closest	  to	  a	  reference	  to	  homogeneity	  is	  the	  ambitious	  heading	  of	  Title	  IV	  of	  the	  Energy	  
Community	  Treaty	  that	  reads	  ‘The	  Creation	  of	  a	  Single	  Energy	  Market’.	  The	  Single	  Energy	  
Market	   comprises	   the	   prohibition	   of	   quantitative	   restrictions	   and	   measures	   having	  
equivalent	  effect	  as	  well	  as	   justifications	   for	  deviations	  equivalent	   to	   those	  provided	   in	  
Article	  36	  TFEU.142	  Also,	  the	  Treaty	  lays	  out	  that	  the	  parties	  may	  agree	  upon	  creating	  a	  
‘single	  market	  without	  internal	  frontiers’	  for	  Network	  Energy	  –	  hence	  an	  internal	  market	  
–	  and	  take	  the	  necessary	  measures	  to	  that	  effect.143	  Yet	  the	  creation	  of	  an	  internal	  market	  
in	  Network	  Energy	  that	  would	  constitute	  a	  direct	  extension	  of	   the	  EU’s	   internal	  energy	  
market	   is	   not	   the	   proclaimed	   objective	   of	   the	   Energy	   Community	   Treaty.	   Being	   very	  
limited	  in	  scope,	  this	  sectoral	  market	  in	  energy	  is	  not	  to	  cover	  either	  fiscal	  measures,	  the	  
free	   movement	   of	   persons	   or	   provisions	   on	   the	   rights	   of	   workers.144	   Freedom	   of	  
establishment	  may	   be	   gradually	   granted	   to	  Network	  Energy	   companies	   upon	   separate	  
agreement	  between	  the	  parties	  to	  the	  Treaty,145	  but	  no	  provision	  on	  the	  free	  movement	  
of	  services	  or	  capital	  is	  included.	  	  
Being	  closest	  to	  a	  true	  extension	  of	  the	  internal	  market	  by	  the	  first	  part	  of	  the	  definition,	  
the	   limited	   substantive	   scope	   of	   the	   envisaged	   internal	   market	   in	   Network	   Energy,	  
nevertheless,	   makes	   it	   questionable	   whether	   this	   particular	   sectoral	   market	   would,	  
                                            
140	  Article	  3(a)	  ECT.	  
141	  Article	  3(c)	  ECT.	  
142	  Article	  41	  ECT.	  
143	  Article	  42(1)	  ECT.	  
144	  Article	  42(2)	  ECT.	  
145	  Article	  34	  ECT.	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indeed,	  correspond	  to	  an	  extension	  of	  the	  EU’s	  internal	  market.	  Since	  it	  excludes	  several	  
of	   the	   core	   elements	   of	   the	   internal	  market	   –	   the	   free	  movement	   of	   persons,	   services,	  
capital	   and,	   unless	   the	   contracting	   parties	   decide	   otherwise,	   the	   freedom	   of	  
establishment	  –	  it	  is	  difficult	  if	  not	  impossible	  to	  regard	  the	  internal	  market	  in	  Network	  
Energy	  as	  an	  example	  of	  true	  extension	  of	  the	  internal	  market.	  The	  conclusion	  would	  be	  
different	   if	   the	   specific	   nature	   of	   both	   the	   sectoral	  market	   in	  Network	  Energy	   and	   the	  
EU’s	  internal	  market	  in	  energy	  did	  not	  at	  all	  include	  an	  element	  of,	  for	  example,	  the	  free	  
movement	  of	  persons	  or	  services.	  In	  such	  a	  case	  it	  would	  be	  impossible	  to	  regard	  these	  
fundamental	   freedoms	   as	   an	   essential	   element	   of	   the	   core	   of	   this	   sector	   of	   the	   EU’s	  
internal	   market	   and	   the	   internal	   market	   in	   Network	   Energy	   could,	   subsequently,	   be	  
considered	   equivalent	   to	   the	   EU	   internal	   market.	   No	   such	   exceptions	   from	   the	  
fundamental	  freedoms	  are,	  however,	  explicitly	  envisaged	  in	  the	  EU’s	  internal	  market	  in	  
energy.	  	  
Article	  5	  ECT	  provides	   that	   the	  Energy	  Community	   is	   to	   follow	   the	  development	  of	  EU	  
acquis	   in	   the	   relevant	   areas	   –	   energy,	   environment,	   competition	   and	   renewables.	  
Throughout	  the	  Treaty,	  the	  term	  ‘extension	  of	  the	  acquis	  communautaire’	  is	  used	  but	  the	  
reference	  to	  the	  EU	  acquis	  does	  not	  envisage	  any	  level	  of	  uniformity	  comparable	  to	  the	  
EEA	  Agreement.	  The	  relevant	  EU	  acquis	  must	  be	  modified	  before	  implementation	  in	  the	  
Energy	  Community	   to	  suit	  both	   the	   institutional	   framework	  of	   the	   latter	  as	  well	  as	   the	  
specific	  needs	  of	  the	  contracting	  parties	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  investment	  security	  and	  optimal	  
investments.146	  	  
The	  Single	  Energy	  Market	  set	  up	  by	  the	  ECT	  functions	  separately	  from	  the	  EU	  legal	  order.	  
Of	  sectoral	  scope	  and	  custom	  designed	  for	  the	  participants	  of	  the	  Energy	  Community,	  the	  
Treaty	   does	   not	   present	   the	   Single	   Energy	  Market	   as	   a	   literal	   extension	   of	   the	   energy	  
sector	   of	   the	  EU	   internal	  market.	   This	   approach	   is	   in	  principle	   similar	   to	   the	  EEA	   that	  
forms	  a	  separate	  legal	  order	  albeit	  drawing	  heavily	  on	  the	  regulatory	  framework	  of	  the	  
EU.	  	  
Drawing	  parallels	  with	  the	  EEA	  Agreement,	  the	  ECT	  seeks	  to	  ensure	  uniformity	  neither	  
within	   the	  Energy	  Community	   itself	   nor	   between	   the	  acquis	   of	   the	  EU	   internal	  market	  
and	   the	   law	   of	   the	   Energy	   Community.	   Firstly,	   the	   method	   used	   by	   the	   Energy	  
                                            
146	  	  Articles	  5	  and	  24	  ECT.	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Community	   to	   update	   its	   legal	   framework	   to	   changes	   in	   EU	   law	   is	   expressed	   in	   a	   less	  
imperative	  manner	  than	  the	  equivalent	   in	  the	  EEA	  Agreement.147	  Although	  both	  Article	  
98	   EEA	  Agreement148	   and	   Articles	   25	   and	   42(1)	   ECT149	   state	   that	   the	   respective	   legal	  
areas	  may	   amend	   their	   legal	   frameworks	   to	   follow	   changes	   in	   the	   EU	  aqcuis,	   the	   EEA	  
Agreement	   provides	   for	   an	   extensive	   procedural	   framework	   for	   the	   simultaneous	  
updating	  of	  EU	  and	  EEA	  law.150	  Secondly,	   the	  EEA	  Agreement	  does	  not	  provide	  for	  any	  
possibility	  to	  take	  into	  account	  the	  particular	  circumstances	  of	  the	  contracting	  parties	  in	  
the	  implementation	  of	  new	  or	  amended	  EU	  acquis.	  The	  only	  exception	  is	  provided	  by	  the	  
procedure	   in	  which	   the	  EEA	   Joint	  Committee	  approves	  amendments	   to	   the	  Agreement	  
and	  its	  Annexes.	  Pursuant	  to	  Article	  102(3)	  EEA	  Agreement	  both	  the	  contracting	  parties	  
and	  the	  Joint	  Committee	  must	  make	  all	  efforts	   in	  order	  to	  ensure	  the	  homogeneity	  and	  
proper	  functioning	  of	   the	  Agreement.	  The	  ECT,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	   is	  ready	  to	  take	   into	  
account	   any	   special	   needs	   of	   the	   contracting	   parties	   when	   updating	   the	   Treaty,	   thus	  
paving	  way	  for	  greater	  divergences	  in	  the	  Energy	  Community	  legal	  order.	  	  
The	   ‘exceptions	   clause’	   of	   Article	   24	   ECT	   is	   comparable	   with	   Article	   27	   TFEU,	   which	  
allows	   for	   temporary	   exceptions	   from	   internal	   market	   harmonisation	   measures	   for	  
developing	   economies.	   Considering	   that	   the	   TFEU	   exceptions	   clause	   does	   not	   conflict	  
with	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  unity	  of	  the	  internal	  market,	  especially	  due	  to	  the	  temporary	  nature	  
of	   the	  derogations	  allowed	  by	  Article	  27	  TFEU,	   if	   the	  exceptions	  allowed	  by	  Article	  24	  
ECT,	  too,	  are	  only	  temporary	  in	  nature	  there	  is	  little	  ground	  to	  consider	  them	  contrary	  to	  
the	   idea	  of	  a	  uniform151	  Energy	  Community.	  As	  concerns	   the	  single	  market	   in	  Network	  
Energy,	   the	  ECT	   refrains	   from	   specifying	   any	   grounds	   for	   deviation	  by	   the	   contracting	  
parties	  from	  the	  Measures	  that	  the	  Energy	  Community	  may	  adopt	  in	  order	  to	  create	  the	  
                                            
147	  For	  details	  see	  below	  chapter	  6.	  	  
148	   ‘The	   Annexes	   to	   this	   Agreement	   and	   Protocols	   […]	  may	   be	   amended	   by	   a	   decision	   of	   the	   EEA	   Joint	  
Committee	  […].’	  
149	  Article	  25	  ECT	  reads	  as	  follows:	  ‘The	  Energy	  Community	  may	  take	  Measures	  to	  implement	  amendments	  
to	   the	   acquis	   communautaire	   described	   in	   [Title	   II],	   in	   line	  with	   the	   evolution	   of	   European	   Community	  
law’;	  Article	  42(1)	  ECT	  reads:	  ‘The	  Energy	  Community	  may	  take	  Measures	  with	  the	  aim	  of	  creating	  a	  single	  
market	  without	  internal	  frontiers	  for	  Network	  Energy.’	  
150	  See	  Article	  102	  EEA	  Agreement.	  Article	  102(1)	  reads:	  ‘In	  order	  to	  guarantee	  the	  legal	  security	  and	  the	  
homogeneity	  of	   the	  EEA,	   the	  EEA	   Joint	  Committee	  shall	   take	  a	  decision	  concerning	  an	  amendment	  of	  an	  
Annex	   to	   this	  Agreement	   as	   closely	   as	  possible	   to	   the	   adoption	  by	   the	  Community	  of	   the	   corresponding	  
new	  Community	  legislation	  with	  a	  view	  to	  permitting	  a	  simultaneous	  application	  of	  the	  latter	  as	  well	  as	  of	  
the	  amendments	  of	  the	  Annexes	  to	  the	  Agreement.[…]’	  	  
151	  In	  the	  meaning	  of	  unity,	  not	  uniformity.	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single	   market.	   Any	   further	   forms	   of	   differentiation	   between	   the	   EU	   and	   the	   Energy	  
Community	  acquis	  are	  to	  be	  introduced	  via	  the	  normal	  decision-­‐making	  procedure.	  
In	   order	   for	   the	   Single	   Energy	  Market	   to	   be	   regarded	   as	   an	   extension	   of	   the	   internal	  
market	  of	   the	  EU,	   full	   uniformity	   is	  not	   required.	  Unity	  of	   a	   true	   extension	  of	   the	  EU’s	  
internal	  market	   in	   energy	   demands	   adherence	   to	   the	   basic	   set	   of	   core	   principles	   that	  
apply	   to	   the	   overall	   concept	   of	   a	   single	  market.	   In	   the	   case	   of	   the	   Energy	   Community	  
Treaty,	  the	  objectives	  as	  concern	  uniformity	  with	  EU	  acquis	  are	  worded	  in	  an	  ambiguous	  
manner.	   This	   imprecision,	   in	   turn,	   is	   greatly	   reflected	   in	   the	   limited	   scope	   of	   the	  
application	   of	   the	   fundamental	   freedoms	   in	   the	   Energy	   Community	   as	   well	   as	   in	   its	  
institutional	   framework.152	  Differently	   from	  the	  EEA	  and	  the	  ECAA,	   the	  Court	  of	   Justice	  
has,	  unfortunately,	  not	  yet	  scrutinised	  the	  aims	  of	  the	  Energy	  Community	  Treaty	  with	  the	  
view	  of	  identifying	  the	  depth	  of	  integration	  between	  the	  two	  legal	  orders.	  
4.3	  European	  Common	  Aviation	  Area	  
Compared	   to	   the	   Energy	   Community	   Treaty,	   the	   aims	   of	   the	   ECAA	   Agreement	   are	  
significantly	  more	  ambitious	  and,	  indeed,	  similar	  to	  those	  of	  the	  EEA	  Agreement.	  The	  aim	  
of	   the	  ECAA	  Agreement	   is	   to	   create	   a	   highly	   integrated153	   ECAA	  based	  on	  mutual/free	  
market	   access	   to	   the	   air	   transport	   markets	   of	   the	   contracting	   parties	   along	   with	   the	  
freedom	   of	   establishment,	   equal	   conditions	   of	   competition,	   and	   respect	   of	   the	   same	  
rules.154	   In	   Opinion	   1/00,	   the	   Court	   of	   Justice	   has	   had	   the	   opportunity	   to	   directly	  
compare	   the	   aims	   of	   the	   ECAA	   Agreement	   with	   those	   of	   the	   EEA	   Agreement.	   In	   the	  
Opinion,	   the	   Court	   affirmed	   the	   similarity	   of	   the	   aims	   of	   the	   EEA	   and	   the	   ECAAA	  
agreements	  in	  ‘extend[ing]	  the	  acquis	  communautaire	  to	  new	  States,	  by	  implementing	  in	  
a	   larger	   geographical	   area	   rules	   which	   are	   essentially	   those	   of	   Community	   law’	  
notwithstanding	   the	   narrower,	   sectoral	   scope	   of	   the	   latter.155	   The	   text	   of	   the	   ECAA	  
Agreement	  itself	  contains	  no	  references	  to	  ‘homogeneity’.	  In	  Opinion	  1/00,	  however,	  the	  
Court	   refers	   to	   the	   uniformity	   objectives	   of	   the	   ECAA	   both	   in	   terms	   of	   ‘uniform	  
interpretation’	  and	  ‘homogeneous	  interpretation’.156	  
                                            
152	  Elaborated	  below	  in	  chapters	  6	  and	  7.	  
153	  Opinion	  1/00	  ECAA	  [2002]	  ECR	  I-­‐3493,	  para	  2.	  
154	  Recital	  1,	  Preamble	  to	  the	  ECAA	  Agreement;	  Article	  1(1)	  ECAA	  Agreement.	  
155	  Opinion	  1/00	  (n	  147)	  paras	  3	  and	  7.	  
156	  ibid	  paras	  11	  and	  40.	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The	  basic	  idea	  of	  homogeneity	  in	  the	  ECAA,	  too,	  lies	  in	  equal	  conditions	  of	  access	  to	  the	  
aviation	  markets	  of	  all	  contracting	  parties,	  both	  in-­‐	  and	  outside	  the	  EU.157	  For	  this,	  Article	  
1	   ECAA	   Agreement	   envisages	   free	   market	   access,	   freedom	   of	   establishment,	   equal	  
conditions	   of	   competition,	   and	   common	   rules	   in	   certain	   key	   areas	   –	   all	   based	   on	   EU	  
acquis.	  Equal	  access	   to	   the	  common	  aviation	  market	  requires	   that	   the	  uniform	  rules	  as	  
well	  as	  the	  permissible	  derogations	  from	  them,	  which	  are	  considered	  compliant	  with	  the	  
idea	  of	  unity	  of	  the	  market,	  must	  extend	  to	  the	  third	  country	  contracting	  parties.	  A	  case	  
in	  point	  are	  the	  transitional	  arrangements	  provided	  in	  Article	  27	  ECAA	  Agreement	  that	  
also	   occur	   in	   the	   EU	  Treaties	   and	   are	   generally	   considered	   an	   example	   of	   permissible	  
differentiation.	   Homogeneity	   in	   the	   ECAA	   does	   not,	   therefore,	   amount	   to	   complete	  
uniformity	  of	  rules	  and	  interpretation	  as	  the	  objective	  of	  the	  agreement	  –	  equal	  market	  
access	   –	   can	   be	   fulfilled	   under	   the	   conditions	   of	   unity,	   just	   as	   in	   the	   case	   of	   the	   EU	  
internal	  market.	  Alike	  the	  latter,	  the	  ECAA	  is	  constructed	  upon	  a	  core	  of	  internal	  market	  
principles	  and	  permissible	  derogations	  surrounded	  by	  peripheral	  provisions,	   the	   latter	  
of	  which	  do	  not	  need	   to	  be	  complied	  with	   in	  a	  uniform	  manner	   in	  order	   to	  ensure	   the	  
proper	  functioning	  of	  the	  Agreement.	  As	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  Energy	  Community,	  however,	  
unless	   the	   specificities	   of	   the	   EU	   aviation	   market	   allow	   for	   the	   absence	   of	   certain	  
fundamental	  freedoms,	  such	  as	  the	  free	  movement	  of	  goods,	  persons	  and	  capital,	  the	  lack	  
of	   these	   elements	   in	   the	  ECAA	   is	  detrimental	   to	   the	  unity	  of	   the	  ECAA	  vis-­à-­vis	   the	  EU	  
internal	  market	  in	  aviation.	  
4.4	  The	  legal	  nature	  of	  homogeneity	  clauses	  	  
The	  above	  analysis	  demonstrates	   that	  each	  of	   the	   three	  multilateral	  agreements	  under	  
scrutiny	  share	  a	  common	  objective	  to	  create	  a	  common	  legal	  space	  bringing	  together	  the	  
EU	  and,	   in	  some	  cases,	  the	  EU	  Member	  States,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  third	  countries,	  on	  
the	  other.	  Another	  common	  feature	  of	  the	  agreements	  is	  the	  central	  method	  of	  achieving	  
this	  common	  legal	  space	  –	  the	  export	  and	  corresponding	  adoption	  of	  EU	  acquis	  by	  third	  
countries.	   The	   three	   agreements,	   however,	   differ	   somewhat	   as	   to	   the	   breadth	   of	  
integration	   –	   comprehensive	   or	   sectoral	   –	   and	   to	   some	   extent	   also	   the	   depth	   of	  
integration	  as	   regards	   the	   inclusion	  of	   all	   or	   some	  of	   the	   core	  elements	  of	   the	   internal	  
market.	  In	  the	  internal	  dimension,	  it	  is	  reasonable	  to	  conclude	  that	  the	  EEA,	  the	  Energy	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Community	   and	   the	   ECAA	   do	   not	   diverge	   from	   the	   EU	   in	   terms	   of	   either	   the	   aims	   of	  
commonness	   featured	   in	   the	   respective	   agreements	   or	   the	   efforts	   to	   maintain	   unity	  
within	  the	  legal	  orders.	  In	  the	  dimension	  of	  the	  EU	  and	  the	  multilateral	  agreements,	  the	  
connection	   is	   not	   expressed	   in	   an	   explicit	   but	   an	   implicit	  manner	   and	   can	  be	  deduced	  
primarily	   from	   the	   specific	  means	   adopted	   to	  maintain	   ‘homogeneity’	   between	   the	   EU	  
and	  the	  EEA,	  the	  Energy	  Community	  and	  the	  ECAA	  legal	  orders,	  respectively.	  The	  specific	  
means	  in	  question	  are,	  primarily,	   the	  extension	  of	  the	  EU	  acquis	   to	  third	  countries	  and,	  
secondly,	  the	  institutional	  and	  procedural	  means	  for	  ensuring	  that	  the	  exported	  acquis	  is	  
properly	   applied	   and	   implemented.158	   From	   the	   setting	  up	  of	   this	   particular	   system	  of	  
norms	   export	   it	   can	   be	   inferred	   that	   the	   objective	   of	   the	   contracting	   parties	   to	   the	  
multilateral	  agreements	  has	  been	  to	  create	  a	   link	  of	  homogeneity	  also	  between	  the	  EU,	  
on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  the	  EEA,	  the	  Energy	  Community	  and	  the	  ECAA,	  on	  the	  other	  hand.	  	  
The	  question	  that	  remains	  is	  what	  exactly	  is	  the	  legal	  nature	  of	  the	  homogeneity	  clauses	  
featured	   in	   the	   multilateral	   agreements,	   both	   in	   the	   internal	   and	   the	   EU-­‐related	  
dimensions.	  The	  question	  pertains	   to	   the	  existence	  of	  an	  actual	  and	   legally	  enforceable	  
obligation	   of	   the	   contracting	   parties	   to	   uphold	   homogeneity	   within	   the	   legal	   orders	  
created	  by	  the	  agreements	  and	  between	  those	  legal	  orders	  and	  that	  of	  the	  EU.	  	  
In	   sections	   2	   and	  3	   of	   this	   chapter	   it	  was	   concluded	   that	   the	   internal	  market	   enjoys	   a	  
degree	  of	  unity	  that	  is	  inherent	  to	  it	  and	  forms	  part	  of	  its	  definition.	  The	  unity	  of	  a	  legal	  
order,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   is	   necessary	   for	   upholding	   the	   balance	   of	   the	   rights	   and	  
obligations	  among	  the	  parties	  to	  a	  common	  undertaking.	  The	  unity	  in	  both	  a	  legal	  order	  
and	   the	   internal	   market	   is	   determined	   by	   the	   presence	   of	   a	   distinct	   set	   of	   central	  
elements	   –	   the	   core.	   In	   the	   EU-­‐related	   dimension	   of	   homogeneity	   of	   the	   multilateral	  
agreements,	  the	  unity	  of	  the	  extended	  internal	  market	  or	  a	  sector	  thereof	  is	  determined	  
by	  the	  core	  which	  is	  characteristic	  to	  the	  internal	  market	  or	  the	  particular	  sector,	  be	  it	  all	  
four	   fundamental	   freedoms	   and	   competition	   policy	   plus	   the	   relevant	   non-­‐economic	  
elements	  or	  only	  those	  aspects	  which	  are	  relevant	  for	  the	  particular	  sector	  of	  the	  internal	  
market	  in	  question.	  According	  to	  Barents,	  unity	  is	  not	  ‘a	  legal	  principle,	  to	  be	  upheld	  as	  
much	  as	  possible’	  nor	  an	  objective	  but	  precisely	  the	  status	  quo	  of	  the	  internal	  market	  in	  
order	   not	   to	   avoid	   balancing	   against	   other	   interests	   and,	   thereby,	   the	   dilution	   of	   the	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  These	  means	  are	  discussed	  in	  detail	  below	  in	  chapters	  6	  and	  7.	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importance	  of	  unity.159	  For	   the	   idea	  of	   an	  extended	  EU	   internal	  market	   it	   is,	   therefore,	  
important	  that	  the	  extended	  market	  in	  its	  entirety	  feature	  the	  unity	  which	  is	  inherent	  to	  
its	  definition.	  	  
With	   respect	   to	   the	   EEA,	   Energy	   Community	   and	   ECAA	   legal	   orders,	   it	  must	   be	   asked	  
whether	   the	   homogeneity	   claim	   is,	   as	   with	   the	   unity	   of	   the	   EU	   internal	   market,	   an	  
inherent	   feature	   of	   the	   extended	   internal	   market	   or	   the	   respective	   legal	   orders	   or,	  
indeed,	  an	  objective	   to	  be	  striven	  after.	  As	  a	  second	  aspect	   it	   should	  be	  asked	  whether	  
homogeneity	  in	  the	  legal	  orders	  created	  by	  the	  multilateral	  agreements	  refers	  to	  the	  legal	  
orders	  themselves	  as	  they	  share	  broadly	  the	  same	  objectives	  as	  the	  EU	  internal	  market,	  
or	  the	  relationship	  between	  these	  legal	  orders	  and	  the	  EU.	  	  
In	  general	   terms,	   it	   is	  not	   justified	  to	  regard	  the	  homogeneity	  claim	  put	   forward	   in	   the	  
multilateral	  agreements	  any	  differently	  from	  the	  unity	  in	  the	  EU	  legal	  order.	  As	  concerns	  
homogeneity	   of	   the	   extended	   internal	  market,	   it	   requires	   that	   all	   core	   elements	   of	   the	  
internal	  market	  be	  in	  place	  as	  well	  as	  the	  inherent	  unity	  of	  those	  elements.	  Whether	  this	  
is	   the	   case	   in	   the	  EEA,	   the	  Energy	  Community	   and	   the	  ECAA	   is	   a	  question	  of	  whether,	  
indeed,	  all	  the	  relevant	  elements	  are	  included	  in	  the	  respective	  agreements.	  According	  to	  
a	  functional	  approach,	  homogeneity	  in	  the	  expanded	  market	  is	  guaranteed	  to	  the	  extent	  
that	   the	   market	   features	   elements	   which	   enable	   the	   market	   to	   fulfil	   its	   function.	   The	  
function	  of	  the	  internal	  market	  can	  be	  traced	  back	  to	  the	  definition	  of	  the	  internal	  market	  
as	  provided	  in	  the	  EU	  Treaties,	   the	  specific	  objectives	  of	   the	  EU	  as	  regards	  the	   internal	  
market,	  and	  the	  general	  objectives	  of	  the	  Union.	  	  	  	  
In	   order	   to	   export	   the	   EU	   internal	   market	   acquis	   to	   non-­‐EU	   Member	   States	   it	   is	   not	  
necessary	  to	  copy	  all	   legislation	  adopted	  in	  the	  EU.	  For	  the	  functioning	  of	  the	  market	  it	  
suffices	   if	   there	   is	  unity,	   i.e.	  shared	  core	  elements	  surrounded	  by	  more	  or	   less	  optional	  
elements	   connected	  by	  means	  of	   a	  dimension	  of	  permissible	  differentiation.	  Moreover,	  
instead	  of	  a	  collection	  of	   individual	   legal	  acts	   in	   force	   in	   the	  EU	  that	  would	  provide	   for	  
empirical	  homogeneity	  in	  the	  market	  spaces	  created	  by	  the	  multilateral	  agreements,	  it	  is	  
a	  set	  of	  principles	   that	  make	  up	  the	   internal	  market.	  The	  composition	  of	   the	  principles	  
and	   their	   interaction	   with	   one	   another	   is	   not	   static.	   It	   is	   subject	   to	   modifications	   in	  
primary	  and	  secondary	  EU	  law	  as	  well	  as	  in	  the	  case	  law	  of	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice.	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As	  regards	  homogeneity	  of	  the	  legal	  orders	  set	  up	  by	  the	  multilateral	  agreements,	  in	  the	  
internal	   dimension	   homogeneity	   should,	   firstly,	   be	   equalised	   with	   unity	   rather	   than	  
uniformity.	  Concerning	  the	  link	  between	  the	  EEA,	  the	  Energy	  Community	  and	  the	  ECAA	  
and	   the	  EU,	   there	   is	  neither	  any	   reason	   to	   impose	  on	   the	   third-­‐country	   counterparts	  a	  
stronger	  obligation	  of	   adherence	   to	  EU	   rules	   than	  on	  EU	  Member	  States.	  Unity	   should,	  
thus,	  be	  the	  norm	  even	  in	  this	  dimension	  of	  homogeneity.	  
The	   final	   question	   pertains	   to	   the	   legal	   nature	   of	   the	   homogeneity	   claims	   in	   the	  
multilateral	  agreements.	  It	  was	  concluded	  above	  that	  unity	  of	  the	  internal	  market	  is	  not	  a	  
legal	   obligation	   incumbent	   upon	   the	   contracting	   parties.	   The	   provisions	   of	   an	  
international	  agreement	  lay	  out	  obligations	  as	  well	  as	  the	  means	  of	  achieving	  them.	  Both	  
are	  determined	  in	  mutual	  agreement	  between	  the	  parties.	  A	  proper	  performance	  of	  the	  
provisions	  of	  the	  agreement	  by	  employing	  the	  substantive,	   institutional	  and	  procedural	  
means	  provided	  therein	  should	  lead	  to	  a	  homogeneous	  EEA,	  Energy	  Community	  or	  ECAA.	  
The	   task	   of	   creating	   homogeneity	   rests	   on	   the	   treaty	   fathers	   and	   the	   decision-­‐making	  
bodies	  of	  the	  relevant	  agreements	  whereas	  the	  obligation	  to	  maintain	  the	  homogeneity	  is	  
equally	  the	  responsibility	  of	  the	  states	  parties	  to	  the	  agreement.	  	  
The	   homogeneity	   clauses	   can	   be	   considered	   either	   an	   obligation	   of	   result	   or	   best	  
endeavour.160	   Obligations	   of	   result	   set	   very	   clear	   goals	   to	   be	   achieved	   whereas	  
obligations	   of	   best	   efforts	   require	   that	   all	   necessary	   means	   be	   employed	   without	   an	  
imperative	  compulsion	  of	  actually	  reach	  the	  goal,	  notwithstanding	  the	  legal	  character	  of	  
the	   obligation.	   The	   latter	   type	   of	   obligations	   is	   particularly	   characteristic	   of	   public	  
international	   law.161	   The	   distinction	   between	   a	   legal	   or	   normative	   and	   a	   non-­‐legal,	  
political	  or	  pre-­‐normative	  obligation	  lies	  in	  the	  enforceability	  of	  the	  obligation	  in	  a	  court	  
or	   tribunal	   and	   the	   possibility	   of	   incurring	   responsibility	   for	   non-­‐performance.162	   The	  
performance	   of	   the	   substantive	   provisions	   of	   an	   international	   agreement	   is	   in	   EU	   law,	  
with	   regard	   to	   the	   EU	   Treaties,	   further	   strengthened	   by	   the	   principle	   of	   sincere	  
                                            
160	   French	   law	   knows	   obligations	   de	   résultat	   directed	   at	   achieving	   a	   result	   and	   obligations	   des	   moyens	  
concerning	  the	  use	  of	  appropriate	  means,	  see	  EA	  Farnsworth,	  'On	  Trying	  to	  Keep	  One's	  Promises:	  The	  Duty	  
of	  Best	  Efforts	  in	  Contract	  Law'	  (1984)	  46	  University	  of	  Pittsburgh	  Law	  Review	  1,	  3.	  	  
161	   See	   P	   Weil,	   'Towards	   Relative	   Normativity	   in	   International	   Law'	   (1983)	   77	   American	   Journal	   of	  
International	  Law	  413.	  
162	  ibid	  415.	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cooperation,163	  and	  in	  public	  international	  law	  by	  the	  general	  principle	  of	  good	  faith.164	  
An	  example	  of	  an	  obligation	  of	  result	  in	  EU	  law	  includes	  the	  rule	  of	  equal	  treatment	  that	  
‘by	  its	  nature’	  is	  enforceable	  in	  a	  court.165	  An	  example	  of	  an	  obligation	  of	  best	  endeavour	  
is	   contained	   in	  Article	   2	   of	  Annex	   III	   to	   the	  ECAA	  Agreement	   providing	   that	   the	  ECAA	  
contracting	   parties	   shall	   seek	   to	   gradually	   approximate	   their	   laws	   on	   state	   aid	   and	  
competition	  to	  the	  EU	  acquis.	  
The	  homogeneity	  clauses	  of	  the	  multilateral	  agreements	  are	  not	  as	  explicit	  as	  the	  latter	  
example	   and	   are,	   moreover,	   often	   located	   in	   the	   preambles	   to	   the	   agreements.	   The	  
homogeneity	   clauses	   resemble	   more	   closely	   the	   general	   political	   objectives	   of	   the	   EU	  
found	  in,	  for	  example,	  Article	  3(3)	  TEU	  than	  the	  concrete	  legal	  obligations	  regarding	  the	  
means	   of	   establishing	   the	   internal	   market	   provided	   in	   the	   TFEU.	   The	   programmatic	  
nature	   of	   the	   homogeneity	   clauses	  makes	   them	   legally	   unenforceable.	   They,	   therefore,	  
serve	   primarily	   as	   guidance	   to	   lawmakers.	   As	   such,	   it	   is	   unnecessary	   to	   regard	   the	  
question	  of	  homogeneity	  in	  the	  multilateral	  agreements	  vis-­à-­vis	  the	  EU	  legal	  order	  as	  a	  
question	   of	   compliance	   but	   rather	   as	   the	   common	   objective	   justifying	   the	   means	  
employed	  for	  achieving	  it.	  
5	  Conclusion	  
The	   above	   analysis	   has	   demonstrated	   that	   both	   the	   EU	   legal	   order	   in	   general	   and	   the	  
internal	   market	   in	   particular	   are	   to	   some	   extent	   flexible	   notions.	   Strict	   uniformity	   is	  
neither	   required	   nor	   always	   desirable	   in	   order	   to	   accommodate	   various	   differences	  
between	  the	  EU	  Member	  States.	  Neither	  is	  the	  EU	  or	  the	  internal	  market	  a	  collection	  of	  
separate	   national	   legal	   orders.	   A	   certain,	   and	   important,	   notion	   of	   unity	   is	   inherent	  
especially	  to	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  internal	  market	  but	  also	  to	  the	  EU	  legal	  order	  as	  a	  whole.	  
The	  perception	  of	  unity	  as	  part	  of	  the	  definition	  of	  the	  EU	  and	  the	  central	  part	  of	  its	  legal	  
order	   –	   the	   internal	  market	   –	   is	   closely	   related	   to	   the	   functional	   understanding	   of	   the	  
tasks	  of	   the	  Union.	   In	  order	   for	   the	  EU	   to	  be	  able	   to	   successfully	   deliver	   the	  outcomes	  
expected	   from	   it	  by	   the	   contracting	  parties	   it	   is	  necessary	   that	   the	   legal	  order	  and	   the	  
internal	  market	  feature	  a	  certain	  degree	  of	  unity.	  All	  derogations,	  in	  order	  to	  comply	  with	  
                                            
163	  Article	  4(3)	  TEU.	  
164	  Nuclear	  Tests	  (Australia	  v	  France),	  Judgment,	  1974	  ICJ	  Reports	  253,	  268.	  
165	  Case	  C-­‐171/01	  Wählergruppe	  Gemeinsam	  [2003]	  ECR	  I-­‐4301,	  para	  58.	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the	  understanding	  of	  unity,	  must	  be	  accepted	  by	  the	  other	  Member	  States	  either	   in	  the	  
form	   of	   generally	   agreed	   derogations	   provided	   in	   the	   Treaties	   or	   individual	   opt-­‐outs	  
separately	   negotiated	   by	   the	   individual	   Member	   States.	   The	   limits	   of	   permissible	  
differentiation	  are	   found	   in	   the	  core	  of	   the	  EU	   legal	  order	  and	   the	   internal	  market	  and	  
amount	  in	  the	  latter	  to	  the	  four	  fundamental	  freedoms,	  equal	  conditions	  for	  competition	  
and	   the	   relevant	   non-­‐economic	   elements	   that	   affect	   the	   scope	   of	   the	   economic	   core	  
principles.	  	  	  	  
As	  well	   as	   EU	  acquis,	   the	   international	   agreements	   that	   extend	   the	   internal	  market	   to	  
third	   countries	   also	   extend	   the	   concepts	   of	   EU	   law	   and	   the	   EU’s	   internal	   market	   as	  
consisting	  of	  a	  uniform	  set	  of	  rules.	  The	  legal	  orders	  of	  the	  EEA,	  the	  Energy	  Community	  
and	  the	  ECAA	  feature	  an	  inherent	  unity,	  or	  homogeneity,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  degree	  of	  unity	  vis-­
à-­vis	  the	  EU	  internal	  market.	  To	  constitute	  a	  real	  extension	  of	  the	  EU’s	  internal	  market	  or	  
a	  sector,	   thereof,	   the	  EEA,	   the	  Energy	  Community	  and	  the	  ECAA	   legal	  orders	  must	  also	  
comprise	   the	   same	   core	   set	   of	   indispensable	   elements	   that	   are	   characteristic	   of	   the	  
internal	  market	  as	  a	  whole	  or	  the	  corresponding	  sector	  of	  the	  EU’s	  internal	  market	  in	  the	  
case	   of	   sectoral	   agreements.	   Without	   a	   sufficient	   link	   between	   the	   international	  
agreements	   exporting	   the	  acquis	   and	   the	   EU	   internal	  market	   to	   the	   extent	   of	   the	   core	  
elements	   of	   the	   internal	  market	   these	   extensions	   cannot,	   however,	   neither	   empirically	  
nor	  functionally,	  be	  equalised	  with	  the	  conditions	  offered	  to	  market	  participants	  by	  the	  
internal	  market	  of	  the	  EU.	  	  
In	   addition	   to	   substantive	   provisions,	   the	   equality	   of	   the	   conditions	   for	   market	  
participation	   and,	   thereby,	   unity	   of	   the	   enlarged	   market	   depends	   also	   on	   the	   special	  
principles	  giving	  effect	   to	  EU	   law,	   the	   foundational	  principles,	  which	  are	   considered	   in	  
the	  following	  chapter.	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Chapter	  4	   Internal	  market:	  the	  context	  
1	  Introduction	  
Before	   the	   famous	   assertion	   of	   the	   Court	   of	   Justice	   in	  Van	   Gend	   en	   Loos	   that	   the	   EEC	  
constituted	  a	   ‘new	   legal	  order	  of	   international	   law’,1	   there	  must	  have	  been	   little	  doubt	  
that	   the	   European	   Communities	   as	   established	   by	   the	   European	   Coal	   and	   Steel	  
Community	   (ECSC)	   Treaty	   and	   the	   Rome	   Treaties	   were	   yet	   another	   example	   of	  
international	   organisations	   established	   under	   public	   international	   law	   and	   functioning	  
under	   the	   rules	   of	   the	   latter.	   It	   took,	   however,	   little	   time	   for	   the	   Court	   of	   Justice	   to	  
confirm	  that	  the	  legal	  character	  of	  the	  Communities,	  and	  especially	  of	  the	  rules	  created	  
by	   it	   went,	   in	   fact,	   beyond	   the	   traditional	   concept	   of	   an	   international	   organisation.	  
Subsequently,	  the	  traditional	  conception	  of	  the	  effect	  in	  the	  national	  legal	  orders	  of	  rules	  
developed	  on	  the	  international	  plane	  underwent	  a	  significant	  change.	  	  
Countless	  scholarly	  works	  have	  been	  dedicated	  to	  the	  foundational	  principles	  of	  the	  EU,	  
including	   their	  emergence,	   their	  application	  and	   their	   reception	  by	   the	  Member	  States.	  
The	   following	   analysis	   is	   dedicated	   to	   the	   question	   of	   how	   the	   changing	   nature	   of	   the	  
Union	   from	   an	   international	   organisation	   to	   a	   ‘new	   legal	   order’	   created	   by	   a	  
‘constitutional	  charter’2	  affects	  the	  internal	  market.	  Focusing	  on	  four	  of	  the	  constitutional	  
principles	   –	   direct	   effect,	   primacy,	   state	   liability	   and	   consistent	   interpretation	   –	  
comparisons	  are	  made	  between	  the	  potential	  operation	  of	  internal	  market	  rules	  in	  legal	  
settings	  governed	  by	  public	  international	  law,	  EU	  law,	  and	  the	  multilateral	  legal	  orders	  of	  
the	   EEA,	   the	   Energy	   Community	   and	   the	   ECAA,	   the	   latter	   operating	   in	   the	   grey	   area	  
somewhere	  in	  between	  the	  former	  two.	  	  
2	  The	  effect	  of	  internal	  market	  provisions	  in	  national	  legal	  orders	  	  
2.1	  Public	  international	  law	  
The	   EU	   has	   not	   been	   a	   supranational	   organisation	   since	   the	   very	   foundation	   of	   the	  
European	  Communities.	  The	  founding	  Treaties	  were	  concluded	  as	  ordinary	  multilateral	  
                                            
1	  Case	  26/62	  Van	  Gend	  en	  Loos	  [1963]	  ECR	  1,	  para	  3.	  
2	  Opinion	  1/91	  EEA	  I	  [1991]	  ECR	  I-­‐6079,	  para	  21.	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international	   agreements	   between	   the	   six	   original	   members	   of	   the	   original	   European	  
Communities	   –	   sovereign	   states	   exercising	   their	   sovereign	   powers.	   Being	   regular	  
international	  agreements,	   their	  operation	  was	  determined	  by	   the	  rules	  of	   international	  
treaty	   law	   and	   the	   domestic	   effects	   of	   their	   provisions	   by	   the	   national	   legal	   systems.	  
Pursuant	  to	  one	  of	  the	  most	  fundamental	  provisions	  of	  the	  international	  law	  of	  treaties	  
the	  states	  by	  concluding	  international	  agreements	  bind	  only	  themselves	  with	  respect	  to	  
one	  another.	  This	   is	  an	  expression	  of	   the	  concept	  of	   international	   legal	  personality	  and	  
the	  idea	  that	  the	  subjects	  of	  international	  law	  can	  assume	  rights	  and	  obligations	  only	  vis-­
à-­vis	  other	  subjects	  of	  international	  law.	  Consequently,	  the	  responsibility	  for	  breaches	  of	  
international	  obligations	  rests	  with	  states	  as	  the	  bearers	  of	  the	  obligation	  in	  question	  and	  
not	  with	  the	  citizens	  of	  that	  state.	  Neither	  can	  the	  aggrieved	  individuals	  generally3	  have	  
recourse	   to	   remedies	   such	   as	   bringing	   a	   case	   against	   the	   breaching	   state,	   either	   their	  
own	   or	   another,	   to	   an	   international	   court	   or	   tribunal.	   The	   foregoing	   reflects	   the	  
traditional	   idea	   of	   national	   states	   as	   sovereign	   and	   autonomous	   in	   relation	   to	   one	  
another.	  	  
The	   concept	   of	   state	   sovereignty	   has	   generally	   been	   the	   primary	   factor	   shaping	   the	  
relationship	   between	   international	   law	   and	  national	   law	   and	  determining	   the	   effect	   of	  
rules	  of	   international	   law	  origin	   in	   the	  national	   legal	  orders.	   Insofar	   as	   individuals	   are	  
traditionally	  not	  seen	  as	  subjects	  of	   international	   law,	   international	  agreements	  cannot	  
usually	  bind	  them	  directly	  either	  in	  the	  form	  of	  rights	  or	  obligations.	  In	  order	  to	  fulfil	  the	  
obligations	   arising	   from	   the	   treaty	   vis-­à-­vis	   the	   other	   contracting	   parties,	   the	   state	   in	  
question	  in	  most	  cases	  needs	  to,	  first,	  give	  effect	  to	  the	  provisions	  of	  international	  law	  by	  
translating	   them	   into	   the	   national	   legal	   system.	   Whether	   there	   exists	   a	   general	  
constitutional	  provisions	  giving	  effect	  to	  all	  international	  agreements	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  set	  
of	  predetermined	  criteria	  or	  whether	  each	  treaty	  needs	  to	  be	  introduced	  to	  the	  national	  
legal	   order	   separately	   is	   a	   question	   left	   to	   be	   determined	   the	   constitutions	   of	   each	  
individual	  state.	  The	  existence	  and	  effect	  of	  international	  law	  in	  the	  national	  legal	  orders	  
is,	  thereby,	  always	  to	  be	  determined	  by	  a	  provision	  of	  national	  constitutional	  law.	  	  
International	  law	  does	  not	  prescribe	  the	  methods	  by	  which	  international	  law	  should	  be	  
made	   part	   of	   the	   national	   legal	   order.	   The	   choice	   of	   methods	   for	   introducing	  
                                            
3	  Unless	  the	  particular	  agreements	  so	  provide,	  for	  example	  the	  ECHR	  and	  bilateral	  investment	  treaties.	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internationally	   binding	   norms	   into	   the	   national	   legal	   orders	   and	   thereby	   giving	   them	  
effect	   is	  up	  to	  the	  states	  and	  their	  constitutional	   law	  and	  practice	  to	  determine.	  On	  the	  
international	  plane,	  states	  are	  bound	  by	  the	  principle	  of	  pacta	  sunt	  servanda	  established	  
by	   Article	   26	   of	   the	   1969	   Vienna	   Convention	   on	   the	   Law	   of	   Treaties	   (VCLT)	   and	  
recognised	  as	  a	  general	  principle	  of	  international	  law,	  to	  perform	  every	  treaty	  in	  force	  in	  
good	  faith	  as	  it	  is	  binding	  upon	  the	  parties.4	  
The	   two	   well-­‐known	   positions	   on	   the	   relationship	   between	   international	   law	   and	  
national	   law	   –	   monism	   and	   dualism	   –	   and	   their	   many	   variations	   have	   been	   widely	  
discussed	   in	   literature.5	   In	   states	  which	   adhere	   to	   the	  Kelsenian	  model	   of	  monism	   the	  
international	   obligations	   assumed	   by	   the	   state	   become	   part	   of	   national	   law	   from	   the	  
moment	  the	  treaty	  enters	  into	  force	  for	  that	  state.	  Strict	  adherence	  to	  the	  constitutional	  
law	  of	  the	  state	  in	  question	  is	  required	  at	  the	  moment	  the	  international	  obligations	  are	  
assumed.	  Treaties	  which	  have	  been	  concluded	  ultra	  vires	  do	  not	  become	  legally	  binding	  
for	  the	   individuals	  of	   the	  country	  because	  the	  national	  constitutional	   law	  requirements	  
have	   not	   been	   met.	   Generally,	   no	   further	   national	   legislation	   needs	   to	   be	   adopted	   in	  
order	  to	  render	  the	  rules	  binding	  on	  the	  state	  and	  on	  its	  citizens.	  	  
The	  fact	  that	  the	  rules	  of	  an	  international	  agreement	  have	  become	  ‘the	  law	  of	  the	  land’6	  
does	  not,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  give	  definite	  information	  about	  the	  possibility	  for	  citizens	  to	  
extract	  from	  the	  provisions	  of	  the	  agreement	  specific	  rights	  and	  obligations.	  The	  status	  of	  
‘the	   law	  of	   the	   land’	   is	   inconclusive	  as	   to	   the	   judicial	  enforceability	  of	   the	   international	  
norm.	   In	   reference	   to	   the	   latter,	   the	   terms	   ‘self-­‐executing’	   and	   ‘non-­‐self-­‐executing’	  
treaties	  are	  often	  used.7	  Self-­‐executing	  treaties,	  originating	  in	  the	  United	  States	  (US)	  legal	  
system,8	  grant	  rights	  and	  obligations	  to	  individuals	  directly	  from	  the	  moment	  the	  treaty	  
has	  been	  ratified	  by	  the	  state.	  For	  that	  effect,	  no	  further	  legislation	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  state	  
                                            
4	  Recital	  3,	  Preamble	  to	  the	  VCLT.	  
5	  See,	  for	  example,	  A	  Aust,	  Modern	  Treaty	  Law	  and	  Practice	  (Cambridge	  University	  Press	  2013);	  J	  Crawford,	  
Brownlie's	  Principles	  of	  Public	  International	  Law	  (Oxford	  University	  Press	  2012);	  MD	  Evans,	  International	  
Law	  (Oxford	  University	  Press	  2014);	  MN	  Shaw,	  International	  Law	  (Cambridge	  University	  press	  2014);	  FG	  
Jacobs	  and	  S	  Roberts,	  The	  Effect	  of	  Treaties	  in	  Domestic	  Law	  (Sweet	  &	  Maxwell	  1987).	  
6	   Article	   VI	   US	   Constitution	   reads	   as	   follows:	   ‘[…]	   all	   Treaties	  made,	   or	  which	   shall	   be	  made,	   under	   the	  
authority	  of	  the	  United	  States,	  shall	  be	  the	  Supreme	  Law	  of	  the	  Land’.	  	  	  
7	   In	   fact,	  what	  should	  be	  considered	  self-­‐executing	  or	  not	  are	  the	  separate	  provisions	  of	  an	   international	  
agreement	  and	  not	  necessarily	  the	  agreement	  in	  its	  entirety.	  
8	  See	  Y	  Iwasawa,	   'The	  Doctrine	  of	  Self-­‐Executing	  Treaties	  in	  the	  United	  States:	  A	  Critical	  Analysis'	  (1985)	  
26	  Virginia	  Journal	  of	  International	  Law	  627,	  627-­‐628.	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is	   required.	  Non-­‐self-­‐executing	   treaties,	   such	   as	   all	   international	   agreements	   in	   dualist	  
legal	   systems,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   require	   implementing	   legislation	   to	   take	   effect	   in	  
relation	  to	  individuals.	  Their	  position	  in	  the	  national	  legal	  systems	  –	  directly	  applicable	  
or	  not	  –	  is	  subject	  to	  debate.9	  	  
Questions	  often	  asked	  are	  what	  determines	  the	  self-­‐executing	  character	  of	  a	  treaty	  and	  
whether	  that	  character	  depends	  on	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  provisions	  of	  the	  treaty	  or	  a	  formal	  
determination	   by	   the	   legislature	   or	   the	   judiciary.	   There	   is	   no	   single	   answer	   to	   these	  
questions.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  self-­‐executing	  treaties	  in	  the	  US,	  the	  answer	  incorporates	  both	  
elements.	  Both	  the	  provisions	  of	  the	  treaty	  that	  may	  require	  implementing	  legislation	  as	  
well	   as	   the	   subject	  matter	  of	   the	   treaty	   insofar	   as	   it	   falls	  within	   the	   realm	  of	  Congress	  
powers10	  play	  a	  role	  in	  determining	  whether	  the	  concrete	  provisions	  of	  an	  international	  
agreement	   is	   self-­‐executing	   and	   thus	   directly	   incorporated	   into	   US	   law	   or	   not.11	   In	  
determining	  whether	  a	  treaty	  is	  self-­‐executing	  or	  not	  the	  separation	  of	  powers	  between	  
the	  legislative	  and	  the	  judiciary	  is	  the	  key	  issue.12	  Aust	  adds	  to	  this	  list	  of	  characteristics	  
also	  those	  specific	  to	  the	  treaty	  on	  question:	  the	  language	  and	  purpose	  of	  the	  treaty,	  the	  
specific	   circumstances	   of	   its	   conclusion,	   and	   the	   question	   of	   whether	   further	  
specification	   is	   needed	   in	   order	   to	   grant	   a	   right	   enforceable	   by	   individuals	   from	   the	  
treaty.13	  The	  latter	  point,	  however,	  departs	  from	  the	  idea	  that	  monism	  and	  dualism	  are	  
used	   in	   order	   to	   denote	   the	   ‘validity’	   or	   ‘existence’	   of	   international	   law	   norms	   in	   the	  
national	  legal	  orders,	  as	  compared	  to	  the	  ‘applicability’	  of	  the	  provisions.14	  The	  monism-­‐
dualism	   divide	   provides	   no	   information	   as	   to	   the	   possibility	   for	   individuals	   to	   extract	  
rights	  from	  those	  provisions.	  Vazquez,	  instead,	  classifies	  as	  non-­‐self-­‐executing	  treaties	  on	  
the	  basis	  of	  which	   individuals	  would	  otherwise	  have	  no	  course	  of	  action	   to	  claim	  their	  
                                            
9	   D	   Sloss,	   'Domestic	   Application	   of	   Treaties'	   in	   DB	   Hollis	   (ed),	   The	   Oxford	   Guide	   to	   Treaties	   (Oxford	  
University	  Press	  2012)	  367,	  386-­‐388.	  
10	  The	  executive	  cannot,	  by	  adopting	  an	  international	  agreement,	  circumvent	  the	  powers	  of	  the	  Congress	  to	  
legislate	  in	  a	  given	  area.	  	  
11	  RE	  Dalton,	  'United	  States'	  in	  DB	  Hollis,	  ML	  Blakeslee	  and	  LB	  Ederington	  (eds),	  National	  Treaty	  Law	  and	  
Practice	  (Martinus	  Nijhoff	  Publishers	  2005)	  765,	  788.	  For	  a	  comprehensive	  list	  of	  criteria	  for	  determining	  
the	  self-­‐executing	  character	  of	  treaties,	  see	  Y	  Iwasawa	  (n	  8)	  653ff.	  
12	  C	  Vazquez,	  'The	  Four	  Doctrines	  of	  Self-­‐Executing	  Treaties'	  (1995)	  89	  American	  Journal	  of	  International	  
Law	  695,	  696.	  	  
13	  A	  Aust	  (n	  5)	  176.	  	  
14	   RA	  Wessel,	   'Reconsidering	   the	   Relationship	   between	   International	   and	   EU	   Law:	   Towards	   a	   Content-­‐
Based	   Approach?'	   in	   E	   Cannizzaro,	   P	   Palchetti	   and	   RA	   Wessel	   (eds),	   International	   Law	   as	   Law	   of	   the	  
European	  Union	  (Martinus	  Nijhoff	  Publishers	  2012)	  7,	  13;	  Y	  Iwasawa	  (n	  8)	  643.	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rights	  under	  the	  treaty	  as	  such.15	  The	  existence	  of	  a	  particular	  ‘cause	  of	  action’,16	  or	  the	  
existence	   of	   a	   private	   right	   is	   not	   indispensable	   because	   not	   all	   provisions	   require	   a	  
private	   right	   of	   action	   to	   exist	   in	   order	   for	   the	   treaty	   to	   be	   enforced	   by	   the	   courts.17	  
Winter	   finds	   that	   the	   defining	   feature	   of	   a	   self-­‐executing	   treaty	   is	   the	   creation	   of	  
individual	  rights	  without	  prior	  legislative	  action,18	  while	  Koller	  adds	  that	  the	  creation	  of	  
rights	  for	  individuals	  does	  not	  stand	  in	  the	  centre	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  self-­‐execution	  in	  the	  
US.19	  	  	  
In	   dualist	   systems,	   the	   state	   assumes	   the	   rights	   and	   obligations	   conferred	   by	   the	  
international	  agreement	  upon	  expressing	  its	  consent	  to	  be	  bound	  by	  the	  agreement	  and	  
the	  entry	  into	  force	  of	  the	  latter.	  In	  order	  for	  the	  treaty	  to	  assume	  effect	  in	  the	  national	  
legal	   order	   further	   national	   legislative	   action	   is	   needed	   in	   accordance	   with	   national	  
constitutional	   law.	   In	   dualist	   legal	   systems,	   the	   rights	   and	   obligations	   which	   can	   be	  
assumed	  by	  citizens	  are	  provided	  in	  national	  law	  and	  not	  in	  the	  international	  agreement	  
itself.	   The	   means	   of	   transposing	   or	   incorporating	   international	   law	   provisions	   into	  
national	   law	   differ	   from	   one	   dualist	   country	   to	   another.	   In	   some	   states,	   it	   is	   common	  
practice	   to	   adopt	   laconic	   legislation	   stating	   only	   that	   the	   international	   agreement	   in	  
question	   has	   been	   ratified	   according	   to	   the	   domestic	   procedures	   –	   approval	   by	   the	  
legislature	   –	   and	   includes	   the	   text	   of	   the	   agreement	   as	   an	   attachment.	   This	   procedure	  
exemplifies	   the	   division	   of	   powers	   between	   the	   executive	   and	   the	   legislature.	   In	   these	  
cases,	   the	   treaty	   is	   domestically	   ‘valid’	   but	   little	   is	   revealed	   about	   the	   effect	   of	   its	  
provisions	  and	  their	  justiciability	  by	  individual	  actors.	  In	  other	  dualist	  states,	  provisions	  
of	   international	   agreements	   are	   transposed	   into	   national	   legislation	   in	   their	   entirety,	  
their	   international	   law	   origin	   of	   the	   provisions	   subsequently	   losing	   all	   relevance.	  
Whether	   the	   particular	   provision	   in	   question	   confers	   rights	   and	   obligations	   on	  
individuals	   that	   the	   latter	   can	   invoke	   in	   courts	   depends	  on	   the	  provision	   at	   hand.	  The	  
pure	   dualist	   model	   does	   not	   recognise	   the	   effect	   of	   unincorporated	   treaties	   in	   the	  
national	   legal	   order.	   In	   practice	   hybrid	   states	   exist	   including,	   for	   example	   the	   United	  
                                            
15	  C	  Vazquez	  (n	  12)	  697.	  
16	  S	  Prechal,	  'Does	  Direct	  Effect	  Still	  Matter?'	  (2000)	  37	  Common	  Market	  Law	  Review	  1047,	  1053-­‐1054.	  
17	  C	  Vazquez	  (n	  12)	  719-­‐720;	  also	  Y	  Iwasawa	  (n	  8)	  631.	  	  
18	   JA	  Winter,	   'Direct	   Applicability	   and	  Direct	   Effect:	   Two	  Distinct	   and	  Different	   Concepts	   in	   Community	  
Law'	  (1972)	  9	  Common	  Market	  Law	  Review	  425,	  429.	  
19	   	   AE	   Evans,	   'Self-­‐Executing	   Treaties	   in	   the	   United	   States	   of	   America'	   (1953)	   30	   British	   Yearbook	   of	  
International	  Law	  178,	  190.	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Kingdom	   where,	   being	   a	   dualist	   state,	   unincorporated	   treaties	   can	   be	   used	   for	  
interpreting	  domestic	  statues.20	  	  	  
The	   self-­‐executing	   character	   of	   a	   provision	   of	   an	   international	   agreement	   is	   generally	  
determined	  by	  a	  court,	  either	  national	  or	  international,	  with	  the	  exception	  of	  treaties	  that	  
explicitly	   require	   implementation	  by	  national	   legislation.21In	  monist	   legal	   systems	   it	   is	  
most	   often	   the	   judiciary	   that	   decides	   whether	   a	   provision	   of	   a	   treaty	   should	   be	  
considered	  directly	  applicable	  or	  not.	   In	  dualist	   legal	  systems	  the	  analysis	   is	  rather	  the	  
task	  of	   the	   legislature	  that	  has	  to	  establish	  whether	  precise	   implementing	   legislation	   is	  
needed.22	   In	   some	   instances,	   the	   provisions	   of	   a	   treaty	   are	   generally	   regarded	   as	   self-­‐
executing,	   also	   in	   the	   meaning	   of	   creating	   private	   rights	   that	   individuals	   can	   invoke	  
directly	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   the	   treaty.	   This	   is	   increasingly	   the	   case	   for	   human	   rights	   and	  
environmental	   treaties	   that	   create	   individual	   rights,	   such	   as	   the	   ECHR.23	   The	   task	   of	  
creating	   appropriate	   remedies	   in	   the	   national	   legal	   system	   rests	   with	   the	   national	  
legislature	   but	   by	   virtue	   of	   Article	   13	   ECHR,	  which	   states	   that	   the	   contracting	   parties	  
must	  ensure	  that	  ‘effective	  remedies	  before	  a	  national	  authority’	  are	  in	  place.	  Depriving	  
individuals	  of	  such	  effective	  recourse	  will	  constitute	  a	  direct	  breach	  of	  the	  international	  
law	  obligation	  that	  the	  contracting	  states	  have	  assumed	  upon	  concluding	  the	  convention.	  
Another	   example	   of	   international	   agreements	   that	   contain	   specific	   provisions	   allowing	  
individuals	   to	   bring	   claims	   against	   States	   for	   breaches	   of	   the	   treaty	   obligations	   are	  
bilateral	  investment	  treaties	  which	  establish	  tribunals	  for	  the	  settlement	  of	  disputes.24	  	  
Rightly	   so,	   a	   number	   of	   authors	   have	   considered	   the	   monist-­‐dualist	   dichotomy	   both	  
unnecessary	   and	   uninformative.25	   A	   reasonable	   alternative	   to	   this	   formalistic	  
                                            
20	  Examples	  of	  United	  Kingdom	  case	  law:	  James	  Buchanan	  &	  Co.	  Ltd.	  v	  Babco	  Forwarding	  and	  Shipping	  (UK)	  
Ltd.	   [1978]	   AC	   141;	   Fothergill	   v	   Monarch	   Airlines	   Ltd.	   [1981]	   AC	   251;	   TC	   Hartley,	   The	   Foundations	   of	  
European	  Union	  Law	  (Oxford	  University	  Press	  2014)	  204.	  
21	  A	  distinctive	  case	  is	  that	  of	  ‘non-­‐self-­‐executing	  declarations’	  issued	  by	  the	  US	  Senate	  and	  subject	  to	  great	  
controversy	  because	  of	   their	  effect	  on	   the	  domestic	  application	  of	   the	   treaties	  subject	   to	   the	  declaration,	  
see	   LF	   Damrosch,	   'Role	   of	   the	   United	   States	   Senate	   Concerning	   Self-­‐Executing	   and	   Non-­‐Self-­‐Executing	  
Treaties'	  (1991)	  67	  Chicago-­‐Kent	  Law	  Review	  515.	  
22	  A	  Aust	  (n	  5)	  174.	  
23	   EB	  Weiss,	   'Invoking	   State	   Responsibility	   in	   the	   Twenty-­‐first	   Century'	   (2002)	   96	   American	   Journal	   of	  
International	  Law	  798,	  809ff.	  
24	  G	  Van	  Harten	  and	  M	  Loughlin,	  'Investment	  Treaty	  Arbitration	  as	  a	  Species	  of	  Global	  Administrative	  Law'	  
(2006)	  17	  European	  Journal	  of	  International	  Law	  121,	  129.	  
25	  ‘There	  are	  almost	  as	  many	  ways	  of	  giving	  effect	  to	  international	  law	  as	  there	  are	  national	  legal	  systems.’:	  
E	  Denza,	   'The	  Relationship	  between	  International	  and	  National	  Law'	  in	  MD	  Evans	  (ed),	  International	  Law	  
(Oxford	  University	  Press	  2006)	  423,	  429.	  According	  to	  von	  Bogdandy,	  they	  constitute	  ‘intellectual	  zombies	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construction	  has	  been	  offered	  by	  Sloss	  who	   takes	   a	   functional	   approach	  and	  asks	  how	  
national	   courts	   actually	   deal	   with	   treaty	   obligations	   and	   the	   situations	   of	   granting	  
individuals	  the	  rights	  provided	  to	  them	  by	  an	  international	  agreement.26	  The	  functional	  
approach	   asserts	   that	   judges	   in	   dualist	   systems	   often	   find	   ways	   to	   incorporate	  
international	   agreements	   concluded	  by	   the	   state	  whether	   incorporated	   in	   the	   national	  
legal	  order	  or	  not;	  judges	  in	  monist	  legal	  systems,	  in	  the	  meantime,	  seek	  possibilities	  to	  
avoid	   applying	   ratified	   treaties	   relying	   on	   their	   non-­‐self-­‐executing	   character.27	   The	  
growing	   inclination	   of	   national	   courts	   to	   give	   effect	   to	   unincorporated	   international	  
norms	  has	  been	  called	  ‘creeping	  monism’.28	  Courts	  are	  most	  likely	  to	  apply	  the	  functional	  
approach	   in	   cases	   where	   an	   international	   agreement	   creates	   rights	   either	   between	  
individuals	  within	   one	   country	   or	   between	   individuals	   in	   different	   countries	   –	   vertical	  
and	   transnational	   provisions,	   respectively.29	   To	   denote	   the	   monist-­‐dualist	   dichotomy,	  
Sloss	   instead	   refers	   to	   ‘transnationalist	   and	   ‘nationalist’	   decisions	   which	   describe	   the	  
inclination	   of	   national	   courts	   towards	   fulfilling	   international	   obligations	   or	   the	  
prescribed	  division	  of	  powers,	  respectively;	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  one	  needs	  to	  safeguard	  the	  
rights	   of	   private	   actors	   whereas,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   one	   needs	   to	   duly	   respect	   the	  
separation	  of	  powers	  within	  the	  state.30	  When	  it	  comes	  to	  the	  recognition	  of	  the	  ‘validity’	  
or	   ‘existence’	   of	   international	   norms,	   the	   transnationalist	   judges	   are	   more	   keen	   to	  
approve	  such	  validity	  than	  their	  colleagues	  representing	  the	  nationalist	  camp.	  	  
Not	   only	   national	   courts	   but	   also	   international	   courts	   deal	   with	   the	   question	   of	   the	  
domestic	   effect	   of	   international	   rules,	   albeit	   in	   a	   more	   implicit	   form.	   The	   first	  
international	   court	   to	   recognise	   the	   direct	   effect	   of	   the	   provisions	   of	   an	   international	  
agreement	   was	   the	   Permanent	   Court	   of	   International	   Justice	   (PCIJ).	   In	   the	   case	  
Jurisdiction	   of	   the	   Courts	   of	   Danzig,	   the	   PCIJ	   was	   asked	   to	   determine	   whether	   the	  
‘Beamtenabkommen’	  concluded	  between	  Poland	  and	  the	  Free	  City	  of	  Danzig	  provided	  the	  
Danzig	  railway	  officials	  who	  had	  passed	  to	  the	  Polish	  railway	  service	  the	  right	  to	  bring	  
                                            
of	  another	  time	  and	  should	  be	  put	  to	  rest’:	  A	  von	  Bogdandy,	  'Pluralism,	  direct	  effect,	  and	  the	  ultimate	  say:	  
On	  the	  relationship	  between	  international	  and	  domestic	  constitutional	  law'	  (2008)	  6	  International	  Journal	  
of	  Constitutional	  Law	  397,	  400.	  
26	  D	  Sloss	  (n	  9)	  368.	  
27	  ibid	  376.	  
28	  For	  definition,	  see	  MA	  Waters,	  'Creeping	  Monism:	  The	  Judicial	  Trend	  Toward	  Interpretive	  Incorporation	  
of	  Human	  Rights	  Treaties'	  (2007)	  107	  Columbia	  Law	  Review	  628,	  633.	  
29	  D	  Sloss	  (n	  9)	  377-­‐378.	  
30	  ibid	  378-­‐379.	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claims	   against	   the	  Polish	  Railways	  Administration.31	   The	   question	  did	   not	   concern	   the	  
validity	  of	  the	  agreement	  in	  Poland	  or	  the	  Free	  City	  of	  Danzig	  but	  rather,	  the	  direct	  effect	  
of	  those	  provisions	  in	  the	  meaning	  of	  whether	  or	  not	  they	  confer	  rights	  on	  individuals.	  In	  
other	  words,	   and	   as	   submitted	   by	   the	   Free	   City	   of	  Danzig	   during	   the	   proceedings,	   the	  
question	   was	   about	   whether	   the	   domestic	   effect	   of	   the	   provisions	   of	   an	   international	  
agreement	   should	   be	   determined	   by	   each	   contracting	   party	   on	   the	   national	   plane	   or	  
whether	   the	   effect	   of	   the	   provisions	   could	   be	   ascertained	   internationally	   and,	   thus,	  
extracted	   from	   the	   intention	   of	   the	   parties	   and	   the	   wording	   of	   the	   treaty.32	   The	   PCIJ	  
affirmed	  the	  latter.	  	  
In	  its	  reasoning,	  the	  PCIJ	  restated	  the	  general	  principle	  of	  international	  law	  according	  to	  
which	  international	  agreements	  only	  bind	  the	  contracting	  parties	  yet	  recognised	  that	   if	  
the	  contents	  of	  the	  agreement	  showed	  that	  the	  essence	  of	  the	  international	  obligation	  is	  
to	  grant	  rights	  and	  obligations	  to	  individuals	  that	  the	  latter	  can	  enforce	  in	  national	  courts	  
then	  this	  must	  be	  considered	  to	  be	  the	  very	  substance	  of	  the	  obligation.33	  The	  PCIJ	  found	  
that	  the	  object	  of	  the	  agreement	  and	  the	  intention	  of	  the	  parties	  was	  the	  establishment	  of	  
‘a	   special	   regime	   governing	   the	   relations	   between	   the	   Polish	   Railways	   Administration	  
and	   the	   Danzig	   officials,	   workmen	   and	   employees’	   –	   thus,	   individuals	   –	   and	   also	  
identified	  the	  practice	  of	  the	  parties	  of	  giving	  effect	  to	  the	  provisions	  of	  the	  agreement.34	  
What	  sufficed	  for	  the	  PCIJ	  in	  order	  to	  establish	  the	  direct	  effect	  of	  the	  Beamtenabkommen	  
were,	   firstly	   and	   implicitly,	   the	   sufficiently	   clear	   and	   unconditional	   wording	   of	   the	  
provision	   to	   create	   rights	   for	   individuals	   that	   renders	   a	   different	   interpretation	  
impossible	   and,	   in	   fact,	   amounting	   to	   a	   breach	   of	   the	   treaty;	   and,	   secondly,	   that	   the	  
contracting	  parties	  through	  the	  execution	  of	  the	  provisions	  of	  the	  agreement	  had	  given	  
effect	  to	  them	  even	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  implementing	  legislation.	  	  
Among	   international	   agreements,	   the	   doctrine	   of	   direct	   effect	   has	   been	  most	   carefully	  
carved	  out	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  EU.	  
                                            
31	  Jurisdiction	  of	  the	  Courts	  of	  Danzig,	  Advisory	  Opinion,	  1928	  PCIJ	  Series	  B	  No	  15,	  17.	  
32	  ibid	  17.	  
33	  ibid	  17-­‐18.	  	  
34	  ibid	  18.	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2.2	  EU	  law	  
The	   introduction	   of	   the	   principle	   of	   direct	   effect	   of	   international	   law	   in	   national	   legal	  
orders	   is	   not	   attributable	   to	   the	   EU.	   There	   was,	   however,	   one	   substantive	   aspect	  
introduced	  by	  the	  founding	  Treaties	  that	  gave	  the	  European	  Communities	  an	  impetus	  for	  
a	  development	  that	  was	  fundamentally	  different	  from	  other	  international	  organisations	  
created	  to	  that	  date.	  This	  distinctive	  element	  was	  of	  an	  institutional	  nature	  and	  provided	  
for	   the	   setting	   up	   of	   a	   Court	   of	   Justice	   to	   adjudicate	   on	   disputes	   arising	   from	   the	  
application	   of	   the	   Treaties	   as	   well	   as	   to	   give	   binding	   interpretations	   of	   the	   rules	  
contained	  therein.	  As	  concerns	  the	  principle	  of	  direct	  effect,	  the	  role	  of	  the	  Court	  was	  not	  
to	  introduce	  it	  to	  the	  international	  scene	  but	  to	  lay	  down	  the	  criteria	  for	  its	  application	  
coherently	  across	   the	  EU.35	  The	  domestic	  effect	  of	  EU	   law	  provisions	   is	  determined	  by	  
one	   authoritative	   source,	   although	   in	   practice	   the	   principle	   is	  mainly	   enforced	   by	   the	  
national	  courts	  of	  the	  Member	  States.	  
Already	   the	   founding	   fathers	   of	   the	   European	  Communities	   had	   the	   intention	   of	   going	  
beyond	   what	   was	   offered	   by	   international	   law	   at	   that	   moment,	   namely	   the	   ad	   hoc	  
recognition	  of	  the	  direct	  effect	  of	  international	  law	  by	  international	  courts	  and	  tribunals.	  
The	  original	  contracting	  states	  envisaged	  a	  different	  type	  of	  an	  international	  organisation	  
–	  one	  which	  would	  not	  only	  comprise	  interaction	  and	  cooperation	  between	  the	  Member	  
States	   but	   go	   beyond	   and	  penetrate	   the	   sovereignty	   of	   the	  Member	   States	   to	   a	   degree	  
until	  then	  unprecedented	  in	  international	  law.	  The	  founding	  members	  of	  the	  EU	  aimed	  at	  
joining	   together	   not	   only	   the	   Member	   States	   but	   also	   their	   citizens.	   The	   ‘ever	   closer	  
union	  between	  the	  peoples	  of	  Europe’	  as	  articulated	  in	  the	  preamble	  to	  the	  EEC	  Treaty	  
has	  proven	  crucial	  to	  the	  development	  of	  EU	  law.	  In	  the	  course	  of	  the	  decades	  that	  have	  
passed	  since	  the	  founding	  of	  the	  Communities,	  the	  ‘peoples	  of	  Europe’	  have	  progressively	  
become	  the	  European	  individuals.	  This	  difference	  between	  the	  actors	  –	  the	  states	  and	  the	  
peoples	  –	  is	  at	  the	  first	  sight	  just	  about	  noticeable.	  Yet	  it	  has	  assumed	  great	  importance	  
in	  the	  narrative	  of	  the	  EU	  and	  may	  prove	  to	  be	  one	  of	  the	  main	  reasons	  for	  why	  rules	  of	  
EU	  origin,	  such	  as	  those	  of	  the	  internal	  market,	  may	  function	  differently	  in	  the	  EU	  than	  
outside.	  
                                            
35	  E	  Denza	  (n	  25)	  437-­‐438.	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From	   the	   perspective	   of	   international	   treaty	   law,	   EU	   Treaties	   are	   not	   completely	  
revolutionary.	  They	  are	  concluded	  under	   international	   law	  by	  subjects	  of	   international	  
law	  –	  states	  –	  and	  are,	  as	  well	  as	  amendments	  to	  them,	  subject	  to	  the	  conventional	  rules	  
of	  international	  treaty	  law.	  This	  includes	  both	  the	  rules	  of	  customary	  international	  law	  as	  
well	   as	   the	   VCLT	   which	   largely	   codifies	   the	   former.	   As	   a	   result,	   the	   Member	   States	  
determine	   the	   international	   validity	   of	   the	   provisions	   of	   the	   treaty	   and	   their	  
constitutional	  law	  the	  validity	  of	  the	  provisions	  in	  the	  national	  legal	  orders.	  The	  national	  
legal	  orders	  fall	  either	  into	  the	  category	  of	  a	  monist	  or	  a	  dualist	  state	  or	  a	  hybrid	  between	  
the	  two.	  For	  the	  monist	  Member	  States,	  the	  introduction	  of	  EU	  law	  into	  the	  national	  legal	  
order	   was	   uncomplicated	   whereas	   the	   dualist	   states	   needed	   to	   adopt	   implementing	  
legislation	   or	   even	   amend	   their	   constitutions.	   Unsurprisingly,	   the	   provisions	   of	   EU	  
Treaties	  are	  binding	  on	  all	  Member	  States	  and	   their	  applicability	  –	  direct	  or	   indirect	  –,	  
therefore,	  not	  subject	  to	  discussion.	  Questions	  as	  to	  the	  direct	  effect	  or	  the	  justiciability	  
of	   the	  provisions,	  on	   the	  contrary,	   continue	   to	  be	  subject	   to	  a	  debate.	  The	  effect	  which	  
provisions	  that	  are	  identical	  to	  the	  EU	  internal	  market	  acquis	  have	  in	  the	  legal	  orders	  of	  
non-­‐EU	  Member	  States	  is	  also	  a	  crucial	  aspect	  in	  determining	  whether	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  
EU	  internal	  market	  can	  be	  extended	  beyond	  the	  EU	  while	  maintaining	  its	  effectiveness.	  
Despite	  some	  opinions	  to	  the	  opposite,36	  the	  distinction	  between	  ‘direct	  application’	  and	  
‘direct	  effect’	  of	  EU	  law	  is,	  indeed,	  relevant	  for	  the	  present	  discussion.	  In	  the	  first	  place,	  
the	  difference	  between	  the	  two	  terms	  is	  a	  linguistic	  one.	  Since	  one	  of	  them	  appears	  in	  the	  
language	  of	   the	  Treaties	  and	  both	   can	  be	   found	   in	   the	   case	   law	  of	   the	  Court	  of	   Justice,	  
there	   arose	   a	   need	   to	   also	   substantiate	   them	   differently.37	   ‘Direct	   applicability’	   is	  
generally	  used	   to	  denote	   the	   immediate	   legal	   force	   that	  a	  provision,	  or	  a	   legal	   act	   as	  a	  
whole,	  assumes	  in	  the	  legal	  orders	  of	  the	  Member	  States.	  Direct	  applicability	  entails	  that	  
the	  Member	  States	  do	  not	  need	   to	   take	   further	   legislative	  action,	  nor	  are	   they	   in	   some	  
instances	  allowed	  to,38	  in	  order	  to	  make	  the	  rules	  ‘the	  law	  of	  the	  land’.	  The	  provisions	  of	  
the	   Treaties	   are	   directly	   applicable	   because	   all	   Member	   States	   have	   fulfilled	   the	  
                                            
36	  TC	  Hartley	  (n	  20)	  215.	  	  
37	  ibid	  215;	  A	  Dashwood,	  'The	  Principle	  of	  Direct	  Effect	  in	  European	  Community	  Law'	  (1977)	  16	  Journal	  of	  
Common	  Market	  Studies	  229,	  230.	  
38	   Case	  39/72	  Commission	   v	   Italy	   [1973]	  ECR	  101,	   para	  17.	  Unless	   the	   regulation	   explicitly	   or	   implicitly	  
allows	   for	   implementing	  measures.	   See,	   respectively,	   Case	  128/78	  Commission	   v	  United	  Kingdom	   [1979]	  
ECR	  419;	  and	  Case	  31/78	  Bussone	  [1978]	  ECR	  2429,	  para	  32.	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requirements	  under	  their	  national	  constitutional	  law	  to	  give	  force	  to	  them	  domestically.	  
The	  direct	  applicability	  of	  regulations	  has	  never	  been	  subject	  to	  controversy	  because	  of	  
Article	  288	  TFEU.	  Decisions,	  too,	  can	  be	  directly	  applicable.39	  Neither	  is	  there	  a	  problem	  
as	  regards	  the	  enforceability	  of	  recommendations	  which	  have	  no	  binding	  force	  at	  all.	  It	  is	  
in	   the	   case	   of	   directives	   that	   both	   the	   notions	   of	   direct	   applicability	   and	   direct	   effect	  
assume	  great	  relevance.	  	  
The	  direct	  applicability	  of	  directives	  was	  not	  envisaged	  by	   the	   founders	  of	   the	  EU	  who	  
intended	  directives	  to	  reflect	  more	  general	  policy	  objectives	  whereas	  the	  Member	  States	  
retain	   under	   the	   now	  Article	   288	  TFEU	   ‘a	   choice	   of	   form	   and	  methods’	   to	   achieve	   the	  
results	  envisaged	  by	  the	  directives.	  This	  idea,	  also	  expressed	  by	  the	  subsidiarity	  principle	  
provided	  in	  Article	  5(3)	  TEU	  is,	  however,	  without	  prejudice	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  Member	  
States	   are	   not	   entirely	   free	   to	   choose	   whatever	   implementation	   methods	   available.40	  
Until	   the	   implementation	   deadline	   of	   the	   directive	   has	   passed	   it	   is	   neither	   directly	  
applicable	  nor	  directly	   effective.	  Direct	   applicability	  of	  EU	   law	   serves	   to	   give	   the	   same	  
binding	   force	   to	   EU	   provisions	   in	   all	   Member	   States,	   thus	   leading,	   ideally,	   to	   uniform	  
application.	  	  
Differently	   from	  direct	   applicability,	   direct	   effect	   concerns	   the	  objective	   ‘nature’	   of	   the	  
legal	  provisions,	  subject	  to	  defined	  criteria,	  and	  not	  the	  effect	  attributed	  to	  them	  by	  the	  
constitutional	   law	   of	   the	  Member	   States.41	   Not	   all	   directly	   applicable	   regulations	   have	  
direct	  effect.42	  Some	  decisions	  that	  do	  not	  have	  direct	  applicability	  may,	  however,	  have	  
direct	  effect.43	  Direct	  effect	  can	  be	  classified	  in	  two	  ways.	  The	  one	  called	  ‘objective	  direct	  
                                            
39	  LJ	  Brinkhorst,	   'S.A.C.E.	  v.	  Ministry	  of	  Finance	  of	  the	  Italian	  Republic.	  Case	  33/70.	  Decision	  of	  December	  
17,	  1970.	  Preliminary	   ruling	  on	  request	  of	   the	  District	  Court	  of	  Brescia,	   Italy'	   (1971)	  8	  Common	  Market	  
Law	  Review	  384,	  388.	  For	  direct	  effect	  of	  decisions,	  see	  Case	  20/70	  Transports	  Lesage	  &	  Cie	   [1970]	  ECR	  
861,	  para	  10;	  Case	  9/70	  Grad	  v	  Finanzamt	  Traunstein	  [1970]	  ECR	  825,	  para	  5.	  
40	  For	  restrictions	  in	  the	  form	  of	  ‘guidelines’,	  effectiveness	  and	  appropriateness,	  see	  case	  law	  indicated	  in	  D	  
Curtin,	  'Directives:	  The	  Effectiveness	  of	  Judicial	  Protection	  of	  Individual	  Rights'	  (1990)	  27	  Common	  Market	  
Law	  Review	  709,	  715-­‐716.	  	  
41	  For	  example,	  Case	  26/62	  Van	  Gend	  en	  Loos	  (n	  1)	  para	  11:	  ‘The	  very	  nature	  of	  this	  prohibition	  makes	  it	  
ideally	   adapted	   to	   produce	   direct	   effects	   in	   the	   legal	   relationship	   between	   member	   states	   and	   their	  
subjects.’;	   Case	   13/68	   SpA	   Salgoil	   v	   Italian	   Ministry	   of	   Foreign	   Trade	   [1968]	   ECR	   453,	   461:	   ‘[…]	   this	  
provision	   lends	   itself	  of	   its	  very	  nature	   to	  producing	   identical	   effects	  on	   the	   legal	   relationships	  between	  
member	  states	  and	  those	  subject	  to	  their	  jurisdiction’.	  
42	  JA	  Winter	  (n	  18)	  435.	  
43	  LJ	  Brinkhorst	  (n	  39)	  390.	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effect’	   refers	   to	   the	   obligations	   that	   bind	   the	   authorities	   of	   the	   Member	   States.44	   The	  
other,	  called	  ‘subjective’	  direct	  effect	  of	  EU	  law,	  pertains	  to	  the	  possibility	  for	  individuals	  
to	  derive	  rights	  from	  the	  directive	  that	  can	  be	  invoked	  before	  a	  court.45	  In	  other	  words,	  
going	  beyond	  the	  question	  of	  incorporating	  EU	  law	  into	  the	  national	  legal	  order,	  which	  is,	  
first	  and	   foremost,	   for	   the	  constitutional	   law	  of	  a	  particular	   state	   to	  determine,	   for	   the	  
direct	  effect	  of	  a	  provision	  one	  has	  to	  look	  at	  the	  specific	  provision	  at	  hand.	  Despite	  the	  
distinction	  made	  between	  the	   ‘objective’	  and	   ‘subjective’	  dimensions	  of	  direct	  effect	  on	  
the	   basis	   of	   the	   German	   model	   of	   Schutznorm,	   the	   question	   of	   whether	   a	   particular	  
provision	  has	  direct	   effect	  or	  not	  does	  not	  depend	  on	  whether	   it	   is	   intended	   to	   confer	  
rights	   on	   individuals.46	   The	   reason	   for	   why	   an	   individual	   may	   rely	   on	   a	   provision	  
conferring	  individual	  rights	  is	  that	  the	  obligations	  have	  become	  binding	  on	  the	  Member	  
States	   from	   the	   date	   of	   the	   implementation	   deadline.47	   It	   is,	   moreover,	   not	   only	  
individuals	  who	  need	  to	  take	  action	  in	  order	  to	  ascertain	  the	  direct	  effect	  of	  EU	  law.	  The	  
somewhat	  disputed	   ‘administrative	  direct	  effect’48	   requires	  national	  administrations	  as	  
well	  as	  national	  courts	  to	  enforce	  the	  provisions	  that	  have	  direct	  effect.49	  
The	   direct	   applicability	   of	   EU	   law	   includes	   the	   obligation	   to	   apply	   directly	   effective	  
provisions	  of	  EU	  law	  and	  to	  refrain	  from	  applying	  conflicting	  provisions	  of	  national	  law.50	  
The	  obligation	  exists	  even	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  an	  individual	  claim	  that	  has	  been	  brought	  to	  
a	  court.51	  According	  to	  Prechal,	  the	  direct	  effect	  of	  EU	  law	  is	  generally	  applied	  in	  two	  sets	  
of	  circumstances.52	   In	   the	   first	   type	  of	  a	  situation,	   the	  directly	  effective	  provisions	   take	  
the	   place	   of	   incompatible	   national	   legislation;	   in	   the	   second,	   inconsistent	   national	   law	  
                                            
44	  E	  Klein,	   'Objektive	  Wirkungen	  von	  Richtlinien'	   in	  O	  Due,	  M	  Lutter	  and	  J	  Schwarze	  (eds),	  Festschrift	   für	  
Ulrich	  Eveling	   I	  (Nomos	  1995)	  641,	  642;	  W	  van	  Gerven,	   'Of	  Rights,	  Remedies	  and	  Procedures'	   (2000)	  37	  
Common	  Market	  Law	  Review	  501,	  506.	  
45	  M	  Ruffert,	  'Rights	  and	  Remedies	  in	  European	  Community	  Law:	  A	  Comparative	  View'	  (1997)	  34	  Common	  
Market	  Law	  Review	  307,	  320.	  
46	  ibid,	  321.	  
47	  Case	  103/88	  Fratelli	  Costanzo	  [1989]	  ECR	  1839,	  para	  30.	  	  
48	   M	   Verhoeven,	   'The	   ‘Costanzo	   Obligation’	   of	   National	   Administrative	   Authorities	   in	   the	   Light	   of	   the	  
Principle	  of	  Legality:	  Prodigy	  or	  Problem	  Child?'	  (2009)	  5	  Croatian	  Yearbook	  of	  European	  Law	  and	  Policy	  
65.	  
49	  B	  de	  Witte,	  'Direct	  effect,	  primacy,	  and	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  legal	  order'	  in	  P	  Craig	  and	  G	  De	  Búrca	  (eds),	  The	  
Evolution	  of	  EU	  Law	  (Oxford	  University	  Press	  2011)	  323,	  333;	  Case	  103/88	  Fratelli	  Costanzo	  (n	  47)	  paras	  
31-­‐32;	   Case	   C-­‐431/92	   Grosskrotzenburg	   [1996]	   ECR	   I-­‐2189,	   para	   26;	   Case	   C-­‐224/97	   Ciola	   v	   Land	  
Vorarlberg	  [1999]	  ECR	  I-­‐2517,	  para	  33.	  	  
50	  Case	  103/88	  Fratelli	  Costanzo	  (n	  47)	  para	  31.	  
51	  Joined	  Cases	  C-­‐430/93	  and	  C-­‐431/93	  Van	  Schijndel	  and	  Van	  Veen	  v	  SPF	  [1995]	  ECR	  I-­‐4705,	  para	  13;	  Case	  
C-­‐312/93	  Peterbroeck	  [1995]	  ECR	  I-­‐4599,	  para	  21;	  Case	  C-­‐72/95	  Kraaijeveld	  [1996]	  ECR	  I-­‐5403,	  para	  57.	  
52	  S	  Prechal,	  'Does	  Direct	  Effect	  Still	  Matter?'	  (n	  16)	  1059.	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must	  be	  disregarded.	  Both	  of	  these,	  in	  fact,	  are	  expressions	  of	  the	  principle	  of	  primacy	  of	  
EU	  law.	  	  
The	   three	   traditional	   criteria	   for	   determining	   the	   existence	   of	   direct	   effect	   –	   the	  
provision	   being	   clear,	   unconditional	   and	   not	   requiring	   any	   further	   legislative	   action	   –	  
were	  developed	  by	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice	  in	  Van	  Gend	  en	  Loos.53	  A	  margin	  of	  discretion	  left	  
for	  the	  Member	  States	  in	  the	  implementation	  of	  a	  directive	  may	  render	  it	  without	  direct	  
effect.54	  Even	  where	  national	  authorities	  enjoy	  a	  margin	  of	  appreciation	  in	  their	  choice	  of	  
implementing	   a	   directive,	   the	   limits	   of	   this	   margin	   still	   remain	   subject	   to	   judicial	  
review.55	  The	  above	  criteria	  refer	  to	  the	  ‘justiciability’	  of	  the	  directly	  effective	  provisions	  
rather	   than	   to	   the	   substantive	   characteristics	   of	   the	   respective	   provision.56	   The	   EU	  
system	  of	  protection	  of	   individual	   rights	   is	   constructed	  upon	   the	   individuals’	   ability	   to	  
enforce	  their	  rights	  through	  having	  recourse	  to	  national	  courts.	  
The	   reasoning	   of	   the	  Court	   leading	   to	   the	  possible	   direct	   effect	   of	   EU	   law	  was	  not	   the	  
result	  of	  the	  ‘new	  legal	  order’.	  As	  discussed	  above,	  the	  recognition	  of	  direct	  effect	  by	  the	  
Court	   was	   not	   unprecedented	   in	   international	   law.57	   Rather,	   the	   rationale	   behind	   the	  
proclamation	   that	   the	  EU	   constitutes	   a	   ‘new	   legal	   order’	   followed	   from	   the	   fact	   that	   it	  
was	  the	  Court	  and	  not	  the	  constitutional	  law	  of	  the	  Member	  States	  that	  could	  make	  such	  
determination.	  The	  factor	  that	  triggered	  the	  Court’s	  recognition	  of	  the	  direct	  effect	  of	  EU	  
law	  was,	  as	  said	  above,	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  EU	  being	  founded	  for	  the	  benefit	  of	  the	  European	  
peoples.	   The	   spirit	   and	   nature	   of	   the	   treaties,	   implicitly	   and	   echoing	   the	   will	   of	   the	  
contracting	  parties	  as	  interpreted	  by	  the	  Court,	  required	  that	  EU	  law	  become	  enforceable	  
directly	  by	  the	  EU	  individuals	  without,	   in	  certain	  cases,	   the	  prior	  action	  of	   the	  Member	  
States.	  In	  the	  words	  of	  Winter,	  the	  Court	  thus	  interpreted	  the	  Treaties	  not	  by	  ‘what	  the	  
drafters	   of	   the	   Treaty	   had	   in	   mind	   but	   what	   they	   ought	   to	   have	   had	   in	   mind’.58	   The	  
Court’s	  teleological	  approach	  to	  interpreting	  the	  Treaty	  provisions	  have	  equipped	  the	  EU	  
                                            
53	  Case	  26/62	  Van	  Gend	  en	  Loos	  (n	  1)	  paras	  11-­‐12.	  	  	  
54	  Case	  13/68	  SpA	  Salgoil	  v	  Italian	  Ministry	  of	  Foreign	  Trade	  (n	  41)	  461.	  	  
55	  Case	  51/76	  Verbond	  van	  Nederlandse	  Ondernemingen	  [1977]	  ECR	  113,	  paras	  27-­‐29.	  
56	  P	  Pescatore,	   'The	  Doctrine	  of	  "Direct	  Effect":	  An	  Infant	  Disease	  of	  Community	  Law'	  (1983)	  8	  European	  
Law	  Review	  155,	  176-­‐177.	  
57	   O	   Spiermann,	   'The	   Other	   Side	   of	   the	   Story:	   An	   Unpopular	   Essay	   on	   the	   Making	   of	   the	   European	  
Community	  Legal	  Order'	  (1999)	  10	  European	  Journal	  of	  International	  Law	  763,	  766.	  
58	  JA	  Winter	  (n	  18)	  433.	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with	  a	  set	  of	  concepts	  and	  principles	  characteristic	  of	  a	  federal	  system	  and	  have,	  thereby,	  
removed	  the	  EU	  legal	  order	  from	  a	  pure	  international	  law	  setting.59	  	  
The	  functional	  purpose	  of	  direct	  effect	  in	  EU	  law	  and	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  existence	  of	  direct	  
effect	  is	  determined	  by	  the	  Court	  is	  primarily	  to	  maintain	  unity	  in	  the	  EU	  legal	  order	  and	  
ensure	  the	  uniform	  application	  of	  EU	  law	  throughout	  the	  Union.	  Direct	  effect	  contributes	  
to	  the	  ‘operability’	  of	  EU	  law,	  which,	  through	  the	  principle	  of	  effectiveness,60	  is	  ‘the	  very	  
soul	   of	   legal	   rules’.61	   Since	   the	  EU	  aims	  at	   a	   level	   of	   integration	  unprecedented	  among	  
other	   international	  organisations	   it	   is	  of	  paramount	   importance	   that	   the	   rules	  adopted	  
by	  the	  organisation	  be	  applied	  uniformly	  across	  the	  Union.	  For	  the	  internal	  market,	  the	  
idea	  of	  uniform	  application	  of	   rules	   is	   central	   for	   the	   task	  of	  abolishing	   the	  barriers	   to	  
trade	   that	   exist	   between	   the	   Member	   States,	   especially	   non-­‐tariff	   barriers.	   There	   are	  
three	   fundamental	   functions	   of	   the	   internal	   market	   which	   direct	   effect	   has	   made	   a	  
significant	   contribution	   to:	   liberalisation,	   harmonisation	   and	   equal	   competitive	  
conditions.62	  The	  effective	  application	  of	  EU	  law	  is	  paramount	  to	  the	  achievement	  of	  the	  
ambitious	  objectives	  of	  the	  Union.	  Yet	  what	  is	  missing	  from	  a	  full	  effect	  of	  EU	  law	  in	  the	  
national	   legal	   systems	   is	   the	   horizontal	   direct	   effect	   of	   directives	   –	   the	   possibility	   for	  
individuals	   to	   enforce	   directly	   effective	   provisions	   of	   directives	   in	   disputes	   between	  
themselves	  and	  other	  individuals	  rather	  than	  the	  state.63	  	  
The	   direct	   effect	   of	   EU	   law,	   moreover,	   establishes	   a	   division	   of	   powers	   between	   the	  
institutions	   of	   the	   EU	   –	   on	   the	   one	   hand,	   the	   legislative	   and	   the	   executive	   and,	   on	   the	  
other,	   the	   judiciary.64	   While	   the	   former	   determine	   the	   content	   of	   EU	   law	   the	   latter	  
determines	   its	   effect.	   By	   vesting	   the	   Court	   of	   Justice	  with	   the	   task	   of	   determining	   the	  
effect	  of	  the	  EU	  Treaties	  –	  a	  task	  which	  the	  Court	   itself	   implied	  from	  the	  Treaties	  –	  the	  
Member	   States,	   furthermore,	   gave	   the	   national	   courts	   the	   possibility	   to	   establish	   the	  
limits	   of	   their	   powers	   vis-­à-­vis	   their	   legislature	   and	   executive	   by	   means	   of	   the	  
                                            
59	  A	  Dashwood	  (n	  37)	  245.	  
60	  Case	  C-­‐213/89	  Factortame	  [1990]	  ECR	  I-­‐2433,	  paras	  20-­‐22.	  
61	  P	  Pescatore	  (n	  56)	  177.	  
62	  A	  Dashwood	  (n	  37)	  232.	  
63	  D	  Curtin	  (n	  40)	  738.	  	  
64	  See	  submissions	  of	  the	  Commission	  during	  the	  oral	  procedure:	  Case	  270/80	  Polydor	  v	  Harlequin	  Records	  
[1982]	  ECR	  329,	  343.	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preliminary	   reference	  procedure.65	  The	   latter	  aspect	  has	   rendered	  Prechal	   to	   conclude	  
that	   since	   the	  national	   courts	  have	   gained	  more	  powers	  over	   the	  national	   parliaments	  
and	   governments,	   the	   value	   of	   the	   doctrine	   of	   direct	   effect	   might	   even	   have	   lost	   its	  
function.66	  	  
The	  principal	  rationale	  behind	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  doctrine	  of	  direct	  effect	  arises	  from	  
the	   question	   of	   individual	   rights	   that	   give	   ‘concrete	  meaning’	   to	   EU	   citizenship.67	   In	   a	  
broad	  sense,	  direct	  effect	  serves	  to	  ensure	  Member	  States’	  compliance	  with	  EU	  law.	  The	  
obligation	  of	   the	  Member	  States	  to	  observe	  EU	  law	  includes,	  among	  others,	   the	  duty	  to	  
grant	  rights	   to	   individuals	  which	   the	   latter	  derive	  directly	   from	  EU	   law.68	  The	   fact	   that	  
individuals	  have	  the	  possibility	  to	  hold	  the	  Member	  States	  liable	  for	  breaches	  of	  EU	  law	  
before	   national	   courts	   is	   a	   greater	   contributor	   to	   the	   due	   observance	   of	   EU	   law	   than	  
decisions	  of	   the	  Court.69	  This,	   in	   turn,	   has	   advanced	   integration	   in	   the	   internal	  market	  
and	  the	  EU	  more	  generally.70	  	  
The	  scope	  of	  the	  provisions	  of	  EU	  Treaties	  granting	  rights	  to	  individuals	  were	  at	  the	  time	  
of	   the	   conclusions	   of	   the	   founding	  Treaties	   unprecedented	   under	   international	   law.	   In	  
Van	  Gend	  en	  Loos,	  the	  Court	  stated	  that	  individuals	  enjoy	  rights	  –	  and	  not	  just	  obligations	  
–	   ‘not	   only	   where	   they	   are	   expressly	   granted	   by	   the	   Treaty,	   but	   also	   by	   reason	   of	  
obligations	  which	  the	  Treaty	  imposes	  in	  a	  clearly	  defined	  way	  upon	  individuals	  as	  well	  as	  
upon	  the	  Member	  States	  and	  upon	  the	   institutions	  of	   the	  Community’.71	   In	  a	  sense,	   the	  
recognition	  of	   individual	   rights	  was	  a	  result	  of	   the	  direct	  applicability	  of	  EU	   law.72	  The	  
position	   of	   the	   individuals	   in	   the	   European	  Union	   is,	  moreover,	   strengthened	   by	   their	  
participation	   in	   the	   activities	   and	   the	   governance	   of	   the	   EU	   via,	   for	   example,	   the	  
European	  Parliament	  and	  the	  Economic	  and	  Social	  Committee.73	  	  
                                            
65	  D	  Edward,	  'Direct	  Effect,	  the	  Separation	  of	  Powers	  and	  the	  Judicial	  Enforcement	  of	  Obligations'	  in,	  Scritti	  
in	  onore	  di	  Giuseppe	  Federico	  Mancini,	  Volume	  II	  (Dott.	  A.	  Giuffrè	  1998)	  423,	  442-­‐443.	  
66	  S	  Prechal,	  'Does	  Direct	  Effect	  Still	  Matter?'	  (n	  16)	  1065-­‐1066.	  
67	  A	  Dashwood	  (n	  37)	  244.	  
68	  Case	  C-­‐213/89	  Factortame	  (n	  60)	  para	  19;	  Joined	  Cases	  C-­‐430/93	  and	  C-­‐431/93	  Van	  Schijndel	  and	  Van	  
Veen	  v	  SPF	  (n	  51)	  para	  14;	  Case	  C-­‐72/95	  Kraaijeveld	  (n	  51)	  para	  58.	  
69	  D	  Curtin	  (n	  40)	  712.	  
70	  A	  Dashwood	  (n	  37)	  232.	  
71	  Case	  26/62	  Van	  Gend	  en	  Loos	  (n	  1)	  para	  9.	  
72	  C	  Kilpatrick,	   'Turning	  Remedies	  Around:	  A	  Sectoral	  Analysis	  of	   the	  Court	  of	   Justice'	   in	  G	  de	  Búrca	  and	  
JHH	  Weiler	  (eds),	  The	  European	  Court	  of	  Justice	  (Oxford	  University	  Press	  2001)	  143,	  143.	  
73	  Case	  26/62	  Van	  Gend	  en	  Loos	  (n	  1)	  para	  8.	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The	   fact	   that	   EU	   law	   confers	   rights	   on	   individuals	   directly	   without	   requiring	   further	  
implementation	  by	  the	  Member	  States	  meant	  that	  an	  appropriate	  system	  had	  to	  be	  set	  up	  
for	  pursuing	  those	  rights.	  In	  fact,	  according	  to	  the	  Court	  in	  Van	  Gend	  en	  Loos,	  the	  setting	  
up	  of	  the	  system	  of	  national	  courts	  that	  ensure	  the	  uniform	  interpretation	  of	  EU	  law	  via	  
the	  preliminary	  ruling	  procedure	  enshrined	  in	  Article	  177	  EC	  Treaty	  was	  an	  expression	  
of	  the	  Member	  States’	  will	   to	  grant	  their	  nationals	  the	  possibility	  to	  rely	  directly	  on	  EU	  
law.74	  In	  turn,	  this	  leads	  to	  the	  other,	  connected	  doctrines	  of	  primacy	  of	  EU	  law,	  indirect	  
effect/consistent	  interpretation	  and	  state	  liability.	  	  
A	  slightly	  different	   issue	   than	   the	  direct	  effect	  of	  EU	   law	   is	   the	  possible	  direct	  effect	  of	  
international	   agreements	   concluded	   by	   the	   EU.	   The	   Court	   of	   Justice	   determines	   the	  
existence	  of	  direct	  effect	  of	  international	  agreements	  in	  the	  EU	  legal	  order75	  whereas	  the	  
Member	   States,	   in	   the	   instance	   of	   mixed	   agreements,76	   and	   third	   country	   contracting	  
parties	  make	  their	  own	  determination	  vis-­à-­vis	  their	  own	  constitutional	  law.	  Uniformity	  
in	   the	   EU	   legal	   order,	   though,	   is	   guaranteed	   by	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   provisions	   of	  
international	  agreements	  that	   fall	  within	  the	  scope	  of	  EU	   law	  are	  given	  the	  same	  effect	  
across	   the	   Union	   regardless	   of	   who,	   the	   EU	   or	   the	   Member	   States,	   give	   effect	   to	   its	  
provisions.77	  
The	   EU	   may,	   together	   with	   the	   other	   contracting	   parties,	   determine	   the	   effect	   of	   the	  
provisions	   of	   an	   international	   agreement	   during	   the	   negotiations.	   If	   the	   agreement	   is	  
silent	   on	   the	   effect	   of	   its	   provisions	   then	   it	   is	   the	   Court	   of	   Justice	   that	   determines	   the	  
effect	  of	   the	  provisions	  of	   the	  agreement	   in	  the	  EU	  legal	  order.78	  However,	   the	  Court	   is	  
not	  bound	  to	  recognise	  direct	  effect	  even	   if	   the	  other	  contracting	  parties	  do	  so.79	  Since	  
the	  effect	  of	  treaty	  provisions	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  national	  constitutional	   law	  and	  serves	  as	  a	  
protector	   of	   the	   sovereign	   rights	   of	   a	   state,	   granting	   automatic	   direct	   effect	   to	   all	  
international	  agreements	  that	  satisfy	  the	  criteria	  for	  direct	  effect	  of	  EU	  law,	  the	  EU	  may	  
place	  itself	  in	  a	  less	  favourable	  position	  in	  comparison	  to	  the	  other	  contracting	  parties.	  	  
                                            
74	  ibid	  para	  9.	  	  
75	  Case	  C 240/09	  Lesoochranárske	  zoskupenie	  VLK	  [2011]	  ECR	  I-­‐1255,	  para	  33.	  
76	  Joined	  Cases	  C-­‐300/98	  and	  C-­‐392/98	  Dior	  [2000]	  ECR	  I-­‐11307,	  para	  48.	  
77	  Case	  104/81	  Kupferberg	  [1982]	  ECR	  3641,	  para	  14.	  
78	  Case	  270/80	  Polydor	  v	  Harlequin	  Records	  (n	  64)	  para	  17.	  
79	  Case	  104/81	  Kupferberg	  (n	  77)	  para	  18.	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The	   court	   uses	   a	   two-­‐stage	   test	   to	   determine	   the	   existence	   of	   direct	   effect	   of	   the	  
provisions	  of	  international	  agreements.	  In	  the	  first	  stage,	  ‘the	  spirit,	  the	  general	  scheme	  
and	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  general	  agreement’	  are	  considered.80	  In	  Kupferberg,	  the	  Court	  found	  
that	   the	   facts	  of	   reciprocity,	   possibility	  of	   consultations	   and	   the	   existence	  of	   safeguard	  
clauses	  do	  not,	  in	  themselves,	  preclude	  the	  existence	  of	  direct	  effect	  of	  those	  provisions,81	  
but	   that	   the	   direct	   effect	   of	   the	   particular	   provisions	   of	   the	   agreement	   has	   to	   be	  
determined	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  agreement,	  taking	  into	  account	  its	  object	  and	  purpose.82	  
Once	  it	  has	  been	  confirmed	  that	  the	  purpose	  and	  nature	  of	  the	  agreement	  allow	  for	  direct	  
effect	  the	  Van	  Gend	  en	  Loos	  criteria	  are	  applied.83	  	  
Generally,	   the	   Court	   has	   been	   accommodating	   as	   concerns	   the	   direct	   effect	   of	   the	  
provisions	   of	   association	   agreements.84	   Firstly,	   in	  Haegeman,	   the	  Court	   considered	   the	  
association	  agreement	  concluded	  between	  the	  EEC	  and	  Greece	  to	  form	  an	  integral	  part	  of	  
Community	   law.85	   In	   Kziber,	   the	   Court	   gave	   direct	   effect	   to	   the	   national	   treatment	  
provisions	   of	   the	   EEC-­‐Morocco	   Cooperation	   Agreement.86	   For	   the	   purposes	   of	  
establishing	   direct	   effect,	   the	   objectives	   of	   the	   agreement	   do	   not,	   however,	   have	   to	  
amount	   to	  setting	  up	  association	  with	   the	  EU	  or	  referring	   to	   future	  membership	   in	   the	  
Union.87	  In	  Simutenkov,	  the	  Court	  found	  that	  the	  narrower	  scope	  of	  PCAs	  as	  compared	  to	  
association	   agreements	   and	   the	  EU	  Treaties	   does	   not	   necessarily	   limit	   the	   effect	   of	   its	  
provisions	   in	   the	  EU	   legal	  order.	  Simutenkov	   concerned	   the	  possible	  direct	   effect	  of	   an	  
equal	  treatment	  provision	  in	  the	  EC-­‐Russia	  PCA.	  AG	  Stix-­‐Hackl	  found	  that	  the	  PCA	  ‘lags	  
behind’	   the	  EAs	  with	  respect	   to	   its	  substantive	  content	  by	  not	  establishing	  an	  FTA	  and	  
providing	  only	  for	  a	  limited	  freedom	  of	  movement;	  the	  institutional	  set-­‐up	  including	  the	  
dispute	   resolution	   mechanism;	   as	   well	   as	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   PCA	   does	   not	   aim	   at	   an	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  Joined	  Cases	  21-­‐24/72	  International	  Fruit	  Company	  [1972]	  ECR	  1219,	  para	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81	  Case	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  ibid	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   Case	   104/81	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  of	  International	  Law	  (T.M.C.	  Asser	  Press	  2008)	  87,	  
98.	  
85	  Case	  181/73	  Haegeman	  [1974]	  ECR	  449,	  paras	  4-­‐5.	  	  
86	  Case	  C-­‐18/90	  Kziber	  [1991]	  ECR	  I-­‐199,	  paras	  15-­‐22.	  
87	  See,	  for	  example,	  ibid	  paras	  21-­‐22.	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association	   with	   the	   EU	   let	   alone	   accession	   to	   the	   Union.88	   The	   Court	   confirmed	   the	  
findings	   of	   the	   AG	   and,	   recalling	   the	   more	   limited	   purpose	   of	   PCAs	   as	   compared	   to	  
association	  agreements,	  concluded	  that	  the	  PCA	  was	  limited	  to	  setting	  up	  a	  partnership	  
entailing	   'the	   gradual	   integration	   between	   [a	   third	   country]	   and	   a	   wider	   area	   of	  
cooperation	   in	   Europe'89	   without	   a	   further	   association	   or	   accession	   of	   the	   Russian	  
Federation	  into	  the	  EU.90	  When	  considering	  the	  legal	  effect	  of	  the	  provisions	  of	  the	  PCA	  
within	  the	  EU	  legal	  order,	  however,	  the	  Court	  disregarded	  the	  disparities	  and	  accorded	  
the	   same	   direct	   effect	   to	   the	   PCA	   provision	   of	   non-­‐discrimination	   on	   the	   basis	   of	  
nationality	   as	   to	   the	   corresponding	   provisions	   in	   association	   agreements	   or	   in	   the	   EC	  
Treaty.91	  	  
In	  the	  case	  law	  of	  the	  Court	  dealing	  with	  the	  recognition	  of	  direct	  effect	  of	  international	  
agreements	  concluded	  by	  the	  EU,	  one	  of	  the	  fundamental	  aspects	  has	  been	  determining	  
whether	  the	  system	  of	  reciprocal	  rights	  and	  obligations	  set	  up	  by	  the	  agreement	  would	  
preclude	  the	  recognition	  of	  direct	  effect	  on	  behalf	  of	   the	  EU	  because	  of	   the	  EU	   losing	  a	  
certain	  advantage.	  This	  is	  specific	  to	  the	  General	  Agreement	  on	  Tariffs	  and	  Trade	  (GATT)	  
and	  WTO	  agreements	   that	  are	   characterised	  by	   ‘reciprocal	   and	  mutually	  advantageous	  
arrangements’	   allowing	   for	   considerable	   flexibility	   of	   its	   provisions.92	   Negotiations	  
between	  the	  contracting	  parties	  and	  countervailing	  measures	  form	  a	  crucial	  part	  of	  these	  
agreements	   and	   the	   EU	  would	   place	   itself	   in	   a	   less	   advantageous	   position	   by	   granting	  
direct	  effect	  to	  their	  provisions	  in	  the	  EU	  legal	  order.	  This	  flexibility	  was	  the	  reason	  for	  
the	  Court	  denying	  the	  direct	  effect	  of	  the	  provisions	  of	  the	  1947	  GATT.93	  In	  the	  landmark	  
case	  Portugal	  v	  Council,	  the	  Court	  held	  that	  the	  provisions	  of	  the	  WTO	  agreements	  cannot	  
be	   given	   direct	   effect	   as	   this	   would	   not	   enable	   the	   EU	   to	   adequately	   respond	   to	   the	  
                                            
88	  Case	  C-­‐265/03	  Simutenkov	  [2005]	  ECR	  1-­‐2581,	  Opinion	  of	  AG	  Stix-­‐Hackl,	  paras	  33-­‐34.	  
89	  Case	  C-­‐265/03	  Simutenkov	  [2005]	  ECR	  1-­‐2579,	  para	  35.	  
90	  ibid	  paras	  27-­‐28.	  
91	  C	  Hillion,	  'Case	  C-­‐265/03,	  Igor	  Simutenkov	  v.	  Ministerio	  de	  Educación	  y	  Cultura,	  Real	  Federación	  Española	  
de	  Fútbol'	   (2008)	  45	  Common	  Market	  Law	  Review	  815,	  827.	  The	  possible	  grounds	   for	  derogations	   from	  
the	   general	   non-­‐discrimination	   clause,	   nevertheless,	   differ.	   This	   suggests	   that	   the	   function	   of	   the	   non-­‐
discrimination	   clause	   in	   the	   EC	   Treaty	   is	   not	   the	   same	   as	   in	   the	   PCA,	   referring	   in	   turn	   to	   the	   distinct	  
objectives	  of	  the	  two	  agreements:	  ibid	  830.	  This	  reasoning	  is	  in	  line	  with	  the	  Court’s	  ruling	  in	  Case	  270/80	  
Polydor	  v	  Harlequin	  Records	  (n	  64)	  paras	  14-­‐21,	  for	  detailed	  discussion	  see	  below	  section	  4.1.3.	  
92	  Joined	  Cases	  21-­‐24/72	  International	  Fruit	  Company	  (n	  80)	  para	  21.	  
93	  ibid	  para	  27.	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actions	   of	   the	   other	   contracting	   parties	   and,	   thus,	   upset	   the	   balance	   of	   reciprocal	  
relations	  within	  the	  WTO.94	  	  
Not	   always,	   though,	   is	   the	   question	   of	   reciprocity	   in	   the	   relations	   between	   the	  
contracting	  parties	  been	  decisive	  in	  recognising	  direct	  effect.	  This	  concerns	  in	  particular	  
development	   cooperation	   agreements	   where	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   agreement	   already	  
determines	   that	   the	   one	   party	   is	   at	   the	   giving	   and	   the	   other	   at	   the	   receiving	   end.	   The	  
Yaoundé	  Convention,	  for	  example,	  is	  a	  development	  cooperation	  agreement	  that	  sets	  up	  
an	   unbalanced	   relationship	   between	   the	   contracting	   parties	   yet	   the	   Court	   deemed	   its	  
provisions	  to	  have	  direct	  effect.95	  The	  same	  holds	  true	  for	  the	  Lomé	  Convention.96	  	  
In	   general,	   the	   determination	   as	   to	   the	   direct	   effect	   of	   international	   agreements	  
concluded	  by	  the	  EU	  is	  subject	  to	  the	  same	  test	  as	  the	  direct	  effect	  of	  EU	  law	  whereas	  in	  
the	   case	   of	   the	   latter	   the	   Court	   already	   in	   Van	   Gend	   en	   Loos	   recognised	   that	   the	   EU	  
Treaties	  pass	  the	  first	  step	  of	  the	  test.	  The	  only	  major	  difference	  between	  the	  procedures	  
is,	   therefore,	   the	   occasional	   consideration	   of	  whether	   the	   granting	   of	   direct	   effect	   to	   a	  
particular	  agreement	  at	  hand	  may	  adversely	  affect	  the	  reciprocal	  relations	  between	  the	  
parties.	   The	   following	   subsection	   analyses	  whether	   or	  not	   the	  multilateral	   agreements	  
exporting	  EU	  internal	  market	  acquis	  guarantee	  the	  exported	  rules	  the	  same	  effect	  in	  the	  
third	  country	  legal	  orders	  as	  EU	  law	  in	  the	  legal	  orders	  of	  the	  EU	  Member	  States.	  	  
2.3	  Multilateral	  agreements	  exporting	  EU	  internal	  market	  acquis	  
As	  discussed	  above,	   the	  sovereignty	  of	  states	   is	  not	  absolute	  as	  regards	  giving	  effect	   to	  
international	  law	  in	  domestic	  legal	  orders.	  Determining	  the	  direct	  effect	  of	  international	  
agreements	  by	  authorities	  other	   than	   the	  national	   judiciaries	   is	  a	  growing	   trend	   in	   the	  
light	  of	  ever	   increasing	  regulatory	  cooperation	  between	  states.	  Most	  clearly	  this	  can	  be	  
witnessed	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  EU	  but	  it	  is	  not	  impossible	  that	  direct	  effect	  be	  granted	  also	  
to	  the	  provisions	  of	  the	  multilateral	  agreements	  that	  export	  the	  internal	  market	  acquis	  to	  
non-­‐EU	   Member	   States	   by	   bodies	   other	   than	   the	   third	   country	   national	   courts.	   Two	  
dimensions	   of	   direct	   effect	   are	   relevant	   here:	   firstly,	   the	   possible	   direct	   effect	   of	   the	  
                                            
94	  Case	  C-­‐149/96	  Portugal	  v	  Council	  [1999]	  ECR	  I-­‐08395,	  paras	  45-­‐47.	  	  
95	  Case	  87/75	  Bresciani	  [1976]	  ECR	  129,	  paras	  22-­‐23.	  
96	  Case	  C-­‐469/93	  Chiquita	  Italia	  [1995]	  ECR	  I-­‐4533,	  para	  35.	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provisions	  of	   the	  agreements	   in	  the	  EU	  legal	  order	  and,	  secondly,	   in	  the	   legal	  orders	  of	  
the	  third	  countries.	  
The	  EU	  stands	  out	  among	  other	  international	  organisations	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  its	  legal	  order	  
affects	   directly	   not	   only	   its	   Member	   States	   but	   also	   the	   peoples	   and,	   subsequently,	  
individual	  actors.	  Internal	  market	  rules	  can	  in	  some	  circumstances	  be	  enforced	  directly	  
by	   individuals	  without	  prior	   implementation	  action	  undertaken	  by	   the	  Member	  States.	  
When	   it	   comes	   to	   the	  direct	  effect	  of	   the	  provisions	  of	   international	  agreements	   in	   the	  
EU,	  it	  is	  the	  aspects	  of	  the	  nature	  and	  structure	  of	  the	  particular	  agreement	  including	  the	  
question	   of	   reciprocity	   that	   require	   special	   attention	   before	   one	   can	   proceed	   with	   an	  
analysis	  of	  whether	  the	  conditions	  for	  clarity,	  unconditional	  nature	  and	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  
need	  to	  adopt	  further	  implementing	  measures	  have	  been	  fulfilled.	  	  
Reciprocity	   is	  crucial	  also	   in	   the	  EEA	  Agreement.	  As	  regards	  the	   free	   trade	  agreements	  
concluded	  between	  the	  EEC	  and	  the	  former	  EFTA	  countries,	  the	  Commission	  considered	  
the	  ‘balance	  of	  advantages	  and	  disadvantages’	  is	  especially	  disturbed	  as	  the	  EFTA	  states	  
assumed	   all	   advantages	   but	   rejected	   all	   disadvantages	   associated	   with	   Community	  
membership.97	   The	   preamble	   to	   the	   EEA	   Agreement	   speaks	   of	   ‘the	   objective	   of	  
establishing	  a	  dynamic	  and	  homogeneous	  European	  Economic	  Area’	  that	  is	  grounded	  on	  
‘equality	  and	  reciprocity	  and	  [...]	  an	  overall	  balance	  of	  benefits,	  rights	  and	  obligations	  for	  
the	   Contracting	   Parties’.	   The	   overall	   balance	  mentioned	   in	   the	   preamble	   is	   significant	  
from	  the	  point	  of	  view	  of	  establishing	  direct	  effect	  of	  its	  provisions,	  at	  least	  within	  the	  EU.	  
The	  EEA	  Agreement	  does	  not	  contain	  a	  reference	  to	  the	  peoples	  of	  the	  EU	  and	  the	  EFTA	  
as	  did	   the	  original	  EEC	  Treaty	   yet	   the	  preamble	   recognises	   in	  Recital	   8	   ‘the	   important	  
role	  that	  individuals	  will	  play	  in	  the	  European	  Economic	  Area	  through	  the	  exercise	  of	  the	  
rights	   conferred	   on	   them	  by	   this	  Agreement	   and	   through	   the	   judicial	   defence	   of	   these	  
rights’.	   This	   is	   a	   textbook	   example	   of	   the	   connection	   between	   the	   rights	   conferred	   to	  
individuals,	   the	   individuals	   exercising	   those	   rights,	   and	   the	   subsequent	   direct	   effect	   of	  
the	  provisions	  which	  the	  Court	  has	  used	  in	  establishing	  the	  direct	  effect	  of	  EU	  law.	  
Although	  the	  EEA	  agreement	  does	  not,	  similarly	  to	  the	  EU	  Treaties,	  determine	  the	  direct	  
applicability	   of	   its	   provisions	   in	   the	   national	   legal	   orders,	   or	   the	   incorporation	   of	   the	  
                                            
97	  Submissions	  of	  the	  Commission	  during	  the	  oral	  procedure,	  Case	  270/80	  Polydor	  v	  Harlequin	  Records	  (n	  
64)	  343.	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rules	  of	  international	  law	  in	  general,	  the	  last	  cited	  recital	  contains	  an	  explicit	  reference	  to	  
the	  potential	  direct	  effect	  of	  the	  provisions	  of	  the	  EEA	  Agreement	  in	  the	  EU	  legal	  order.	  
As	  concluded	  above,	  this	  is	  a	  result	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  provisions	  seen	  in	  the	  context	  of	  
the	  object	  and	  purpose	  of	  the	  agreement.	  Just	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  EU	  Treaties,	  the	  direct	  
applicability	   	   -­‐	  but	  not	  necessarily	  the	  direct	  effect	  –	  of	   the	  EEA	  Agreement	   in	  the	   legal	  
orders	  of	  the	  contracting	  parties	  is	  uncontroversial	  because	  the	  national	  procedures	  for	  
making	   the	   provisions	   of	   the	   agreement	   valid	   in	   the	   national	   legal	   orders	   have	   been	  
complied	  with	  upon	  conclusion.	  Clearly,	   the	  preamble	  to	  the	  EEA	  Agreement	  expresses	  
the	  explicit	  will	  of	  the	  contracting	  parties	  to	  a	  similar	  degree	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  EU	  to	  
confer	   rights	   on	   the	   individuals	   as	   well	   as	   the	   ‘judicial	   defence	   of	   these	   rights’.	   This	  
grants	  perfect	  potential	   for	   the	   recognition	  of	   the	  direct	   effect	   of	   the	  provisions	  of	   the	  
EEA	  Agreement	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  protecting	  individual	  rights	  and,	  possibly	  beyond	  to	  
achieve	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  EEA	  Agreement	  more	  generally	  provided	  that	  the	  Van	  Gend	  
en	  Loos	  conditions	  are	  fulfilled.	  	  
In	   Sveinbjörnsdottir,	   the	   EFTA	   Court	   acknowledged	   that	   the	   depth	   of	   integration	  
envisaged	   by	   the	   EEA	   Agreement	   is	   less	   far	   reaching	   than	   that	   provided	   by	   the	   EC	  
Treaty.98	   The	   degree	   of	   integration	   in	   the	   EEA	   is,	   however,	   higher	   than	   in	   a	   customs	  
union	  or	  a	  regular	  free	  trade	  area,99	  even	  though	  the	  EEA	  itself	  is	  not	  a	  customs	  union.100	  
The	  Court	  of	  Justice,	  too,	  contended	  in	  the	  landmark	  Opinion	  1/91	  that	  no	  parallel	  can	  be	  
drawn	  between	   the	  objectives	  of	   the	  EU	  Treaties	   and	   the	  EEA	  Agreement	  which	  has	   a	  
more	   limited	   scope.101	  The	  more	   limited	   scope	  of	   the	  EEA	  Agreement	   is,	   however,	   not	  
conclusive	  as	   to	   the	  potential	  direct	  effect	  of	   it	  provisions.	  Article	  6	  EEA	  Agreement,	   in	  
fact,	  precludes	  consideration	  being	  given	  to	  the	  different	  scopes	  of	  the	  two	  agreements.	  
The	  reason	  for	  this	  is	  well	  articulated	  by	  van	  Gerven	  who	  considers	  that	  the	  direct	  effect	  
of	  EU	  law,	  also	  when	  extended	  to	  third	  countries,	  which	  is	  connected	  to	  the	  fundamental	  
freedoms	  should	  not	  be	  affected	  by	  the	  broader	  scope	  of	  the	  legislative	  activity	  of	  the	  EU	  
                                            
98	  Case	  E-­‐9/97	  Sveinbjörnsdóttir	  [1998]	  EFTA	  Ct	  Rep	  95,	  para	  59.	  
99	  ibid	  para	  59;	  Case	  T-­‐115/94	  Opel	  Austria	  v	  Council	  [1997]	  ECR	  II-­‐39,	  para	  107.	  	  
100	  Case	  E-­‐2/97	  Maglite	  [1997]	  EFTA	  Ct	  Rep	  127,	  para	  27.	  
101	  Opinion	  1/91	  EEA	  I	  (n	  2)	  paras	  15-­‐16.	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which	   includes	   positive	   integration	   in	   a	   number	   of	   various	   areas	   even	   outside	   the	  
internal	  market.102	  
As	   a	   preliminary	   remark,	   it	   can	   be	  mentioned	   at	   this	   point103	   that	   the	   requirement	   of	  
homogeneous	   interpretation	   of	   EU	   law	   and	   the	   identically	  worded	   EEA	   rules	   formally	  
only	  applies	  to	  case	  law	  dating	  prior	  to	  the	  date	  of	  signature	  of	  the	  EEA	  Agreement	  on	  2	  
May	   1992.	   One	   further	   formal	   requirement	   but	   one	   containing	   more	   flexibility	   is	  
contained	  in	  Article	  3(2)	  of	  the	  EFTA	  Surveillance	  and	  Court	  Agreement	  (SCA).	  According	  
to	   that	   provisions,	   the	  EFTA	  Court	   and	   the	  EFTA	   Surveillance	  Authority	  must	   pay	  due	  
account	  to	  the	  principles	  laid	  down	  by	  the	  Court’s	  case	  law	  on	  identical	  provisions	  in	  EU	  
law	  given	  after	  2	  May	  1992	  when	  interpreting	  and	  applying	  the	  EEA	  Agreement.	  
In	  Opinion	  1/91,	   the	  Court	   found	   that	  because	  of	   the	  Sole	  Article	  of	  Protocol	  35	  of	   the	  
EEA	  Agreement	  on	  the	  Implementation	  of	  EEA	  Rules,	  which	  provides	  that	  the	  EEA	  EFTA	  
States	  are	  to	   introduce	   in	  their	  national	   legal	  orders	   ‘a	  statutory	  provision	  to	  the	  effect	  
that	   EEA	   rules	   prevail’	   in	   cases	   of	   conflict	   between	   the	   EEA	   and	   national	   law,	   the	  
homogeneity	   requirement	   in	   Article	   6	   EEA	   Agreement	   which	   provides	   for	   the	  
homogeneous	   interpretation	   of	   identically	   worded	   EU	   and	   EEA	   provisions	   does	   not	  
convey	   to	   the	   EEA	   legal	   order	   the	   ‘essential	   elements	   of	   that	   case	   law	   which	   are	  
irreconcilable	  with	  the	  characteristics	  of	  the	  agreement’.104	  A	  question	  that	  remains,	  still,	  
is	  whether	  the	  principles	  of	  direct	  effect	  and	  primacy	  really	  are	   irreconcilable	  with	  the	  
characteristics	   of	   the	   EEA	   Agreement.105	   Van	   Gerven,	   for	   example,	   finds	   that	   a	   broad	  
interpretation	  of	  Article	  6	  EEA	  can	  also	  accommodate	  foundational	  principles	  of	  EU	  law	  
such	   as	   primacy	   and	   direct	   effect	   insofar	   as	   Protocol	   35	   of	   the	   EEA	   Agreement	   so	  
allows.106	  He	  rightly	  asserts	  that	  the	  principles	  of	  direct	  effect	  and	  primacy	  form	  the	  core	  
of	  the	  EU	  legal	  order	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  which	  in	  the	  EEA	  one	  can	  hardly	  speak	  of	  a	  legal	  
                                            
102	  W	   van	   Gerven,	   'The	   Genesis	   of	   EEA	   Law	   and	   the	   Principles	   of	   Primacy	   and	  Direct	   Effect'	   (1992)	   16	  
Fordham	  International	  Law	  Journal	  955,	  977.	  
103	  Further	  discussed	  below	  in	  chapter	  7.	  
104	  Opinion	  1/91	  EEA	  I	  (n	  2)	  paras	  27-­‐28;	  for	  support	  of	  this	  opinion	  on	  the	  EFTA	  side,	  see	  S	  Magnússon	  
and	  ÓÍ	  Hannesson,	  'State	  Liability	  in	  EEA	  Law:	  Towards	  Parallelism	  or	  Homogeneity?'	  (2013)	  38	  European	  
Law	  Review	  167,	  168.	  
105	  Van	  Gerven	  believes	  this	  is	  not	  the	  case,	  see	  W	  van	  Gerven,	  'The	  Genesis	  of	  EEA	  Law	  and	  the	  Principles	  
of	  Primacy	  and	  Direct	  Effect'	  (n	  102)	  971.	  
106	  ibid	  971.	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order	  ‘homogeneous’	  with	  the	  EU.107	  This	  interpretation	  is	  backed	  up	  by	  Baudenbacher	  
who	   has	   in	   the	   context	   of	   the	   EEA	   offered	   an	   alternative	   classification	   of	   the	   types	   of	  
homogeneity	   adding	   to	   the	   groups	   of	   substantive	   and	   procedural	   homogeneity	  
‘homogeneity	  with	  regard	  to	  effect’	  which	  pertains	  to	  the	  implicit	  application	  in	  the	  EEA	  
legal	   order	   of	   the	   foundational	   principles	   of	   the	   EU	   –	   primacy,	   direct	   effect	   and	   state	  
liability.108	  	  
In	  answer	  to	  the	  Court’s	  reasoning	  in	  Opinion	  1/91,	  van	  Gerven	  claims	  that	  the	  ‘essential	  
characteristics’	   of	   the	   constitutive	   instruments	   of	   the	   EU	   and	   the	   EEA	   are,	   indeed,	  
equivalent.109	  The	  argumentation	  used	  by	   the	  Court	   to	  establish	   the	  direct	  effect	  of	  EU	  
law	   in	  Van	  Gend	  en	  Loos	   and	   the	  aims	  of	   the	  EEA	  Agreement	   regarding	   the	  position	  of	  
individuals	   in	   its	   legal	   order,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   homogeneity	   claim	   put	   forward	   by	   the	  
Agreement,	  its	  characteristics	  should	  certainly	  support	  the	  recognition	  of	  direct	  effect	  for	  
its	   provisions	   under	   the	   Van	   Gend	   en	   Loos	   conditions.	   Noteworthy	   is	   the	   Court’s	  
statement	  in	  Opinion	  1/91	  according	  to	  which	  the	  EEA	  is	  established	  by	  an	  international	  
agreement	   that	   ‘essentially,	   merely	   creates	   rights	   and	   obligations	   as	   between	   the	  
contracting	   parties	   and	   provides	   for	   no	   transfer	   of	   sovereign	   rights	   to	   the	   inter-­‐
governmental	   institutions	  which	   it	   sets	  up’.110	  As	  discussed	  above,	   the	  preamble	   to	   the	  
EEA	  Agreement	  makes	  it	  explicit	  that	  the	  Agreement	  does	  not	  merely	  create	  rights	  and	  
obligations	  as	  between	  the	  contracting	  parties	  but	  also	  confers	  rights	  on	  individuals	  in	  a	  
similar	   manner	   as	   the	   EU	   Treaties.	   In	   the	   case	   of	   the	   EU,	   the	   sovereign	   rights	   were	  
transferred	   to	   the	   institutions	   of	   the	   Union	   as	   a	   consequence	   of	   the	   Treaties	   directly	  
conferring	  rights	  and	  imposing	  obligations	  on	  individuals.	  The	  question	  of	  setting	  up	  the	  
institutions	   vested	  with	   supranational	   powers	   in	   the	   EEA	   is	   a	   different	   yet	   important	  
matter	  and	  will	  be	  further	  discussed	  below.111	  	  	  
The	   practice	   of	   the	   Court	   of	   Justice	   demonstrates	   clearly	   the	   Court’s	   willingness	   to	  
extend	   the	   interpretation	   of	   EU	   law,	   including	   on	   the	   question	   of	   direct	   effect,	   to	   the	  
                                            
107	  ibid	  973.	  
108	   C	   Baudenbacher,	   'The	   EFTA	   Court	   and	   Court	   of	   Justice	   of	   the	   European	   Union:	   Coming	   in	   Parts	   But	  
Winning	  Together'	  in,	  The	  Court	  of	  Justice	  and	  the	  Construction	  of	  Europe:	  Analyses	  and	  Perspectives	  on	  Sixty	  
Years	  of	  Case-­law	  (T.M.C.	  Asser	  Press	  2013)	  183.	  
109	  W	  van	  Gerven,	  'The	  Genesis	  of	  EEA	  Law	  and	  the	  Principles	  of	  Primacy	  and	  Direct	  Effect'	  (n	  102)	  979.	  
110	  Opinion	  1/91	  EEA	  I	  (n	  2)	  para	  20.	  
111	  Chapters	  6	  and	  7.	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identical	   provisions	   found	   in	   the	   EEA	   Agreement.	   The	   first	   of	   these	   cases	   was	   the	  
decision	  of	  the	  Court	  of	  First	  Instance	  (CFI,	  now	  General	  Court)	  in	  the	  case	  Opel	  Austria	  
where	  the	  CFI	  accorded	  direct	  effect	  in	  the	  EU	  legal	  order	  to	  Article	  10	  EEA	  Agreement	  
drawing	  directly	  on	  the	  case	  law	  setting	  out	  the	  conditions	  for	  direct	  effect	  in	  the	  EU.112	  
Opel	   Austria	   has	   been	   followed	   by	   a	   number	   of	   other	   cases113	   that	   prove	   that	   the	  
recognition	  of	  identical	  interpretation	  as	  well	  as	  the	  direct	  effect	  of	  exported	  acquis	  vis-­à-­
vis	  EU	  law	  has	  not	  been	  problematic	  since	  Opinion	  1/91.	  	  
The	  monopoly	  of	  determining	   the	  effect	  of	   the	  provisions	  of	   the	  EEA	  Agreement	   in	   the	  
national	  legal	  orders	  of	  the	  EEA	  EFTA	  States	  does	  not	  rest	  with	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice	  of	  the	  
EU	  but	  with	  the	  national	  courts	  of	  the	  EEA	  EFTA	  States	  and,	  eventually,	  the	  EFTA	  Court	  
independently	  of	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice.	  In	  the	  Restamark	  case,	  the	  EFTA	  Court	  for	  the	  first	  
time	  established	  that	  a	  provision	  of	  EEA	  law	  fulfils	  the	  conditions	  for	  being	  unconditional	  
and	  sufficiently	  precise	  to	  have	  direct	  effect.114	  The	  EFTA	  Court	  argued	  that	  it	  is	  ‘inherent	  
in	   the	  nature	  of	   [the	  primacy	  provision	  contained	   in	  Protocol	  35	  EEA]	   that	   individuals	  
and	   economic	   operators	   in	   cases	   of	   conflict	   between	   implemented	   EEA	   rules	   and	  
national	  statutory	  provisions	  must	  be	  entitled	  to	  invoke	  and	  to	  claim	  at	  the	  national	  level	  
any	   rights	   that	   could	   be	   derived	   from	   provisions	   of	   the	   EEA	   Agreement,	   as	   being	   or	  
having	  been	  made	  part	  of	   the	   respective	  national	   legal	  order,	   if	   they	  are	  unconditional	  
and	   sufficiently	   precise’.115	   In	   determining	   the	   latter	   two	   criteria,	   the	   EFTA	   Court	  
referred	   to	   the	   Manghera	   decision	   of	   the	   Court	   of	   Justice116	   in	   which	   the	   Court	  
established	   the	   direct	   effect	   of	   37(1)	   EC	   Treaty,	   the	   equivalent	   of	   Article	   16	   EEA	  
Agreement	   which	   was	   the	   subject	   of	   the	   Restamark	   case.117	   With	   its	   decision	   in	  
Restamark,	   EFTA	   Court	   filled	   the	   gap	   in	   the	   EFTA	   pillar	   of	   the	   EEA	   Agreement	   as	  
concerns	  the	  direct	  effect	  of	  the	  provisions	  of	  the	  latter,	  yet	  with	  respect	  to	  rules	  that	  had	  
already	   been	   implemented	   in	   the	   national	   legal	   order,	   hence	   the	   notion	   ‘quasi-­‐direct	  
                                            
112	  Case	  T-­‐115/94	  Opel	  Austria	  v	  Council	  (n	  99)	  paras	  100-­‐102.	  
113	  See,	   for	  example,	  Case	  C-­‐355/96	  Silhouette	   [1998]	  ECR	   I-­‐4799,	  para	  36;	  Case	  C-­‐465/01	  Commission	  v	  
Austria	  [2004]	  ECR	  I-­‐8291;	  Case	  C 85/12	  LBI	  v	  Kepler	  Capital	  Markets	  (Court	  of	  Justice,	  24	  October	  2013).	  
114	  Case	  E-­‐1/94	  Restamark	  [1994-­‐1995]	  EFTA	  Ct	  Rep	  15.	  
115	  ibid	  para	  77.	  
116	  Case	  59/75	  Manghera	  [1976]	  ECR	  91.	  	  
117	  Case	  E-­‐1/94	  Restamark	  (n	  114)	  para	  79.	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effect’.118	   The	   relationship	   between	   non-­‐implemented	   EEA	   law	   and	   national	   law,	  
including	  the	  possible	  direct	  effect	  of	  the	  former,	  is	  subject	  to	  a	  decision	  of	  the	  EEA	  EFTA	  
States	   and	   their	  wish	   to,	   thereby,	   avoid	   a	   violation	  of	  EEA	   law	   should	   such	  a	   situation	  
arise	  without	  escaping	  the	  obligation	  to	  duly	  transpose	  directives	   into	  domestic	   law.119	  
The	  EEA	   is	  generally	   characterised	  by	  a	   cooperative	   relationship	  between	   the	  Court	  of	  
Justice	  and	   the	  EFTA	  Court	   rather	   than	  an	  authoritative	  position	   taken	  by	   the	  Court	  of	  
Justice.	   Officially,	   the	   cooperation	   between	   the	   two	   courts	   is	   facultative,	   yet	   functions	  
well	  in	  practice.120	  	  
The	  other	  multilateral	  agreements	  that	  export	  internal	  market	  acquis	  to	  non-­‐EU	  Member	  
States	  and	  their	  application	  to	  date	  have	  been	  less	  explicit	  as	  to	  the	  possible	  direct	  effect	  
of	   the	  exported	  acquis	  both	   in	   the	  EU	  and	   its	  Member	  States	  and	   in	   the	  domestic	   legal	  
orders	   of	   the	   third	   country	   contracting	   parties.	   The	   preamble	   to	   the	   ECT	   makes	   no	  
reference	  to	  the	  role	  of	  individuals.	  Recital	  7	  of	  the	  preamble	  states	  that	  the	  ‘Parties’,	  i.e.	  
the	  Union	  and	  the	  non-­‐EU	  contracting	  parties	  have	  resolved	  to	   ‘establish	  an	   integrated	  
market	  in	  natural	  gas	  and	  electricity,	  based	  on	  common	  interest	  and	  solidarity’.	   It	  may,	  
nevertheless,	  be	  possible	   to	  extract	   the	  creation	  of	   individual	   rights	   from	  Recital	  12	  of	  
the	   preamble	  which	   expresses	   the	   aim	   of	   furthering	   ‘high	   levels	   of	   gas	   and	   electricity	  
provision	  to	  all	  citizens	  based	  on	  public	  service	  obligations’	  whereas	  the	  overall	  aim	  of	  
the	   agreement	   is	   to	   create	   ‘a	   single	   regulatory	   space’.121	   Article	   94	   ECT	   provides	   for	  
consistent	  interpretation	  of	  the	  terms	  and	  concepts	  of	  the	  Treaty	  with	  the	  interpretation	  
provided	  by	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice,	  yet	  the	  limited	  reference	  to	  ‘terms’	  and	  ‘concepts’	  makes	  
it	   doubtful	   whether	   the	   Treaty	   is	   able	   to	   convey	   a	   similar	   degree	   of	   homogeneity	  
between	  EU	  law	  and	  the	  exported	  acquis	  as	  the	  EEA	  Agreement.	  	  	  
The	  case	  of	  the	  ECAA	  Agreement	  is,	  again,	  slightly	  different	  from	  that	  of	  the	  ECT.	  Recital	  
2	  of	  the	  preamble	  to	  the	  ECAA	  Agreement	  provides	  that	  ‘the	  rules	  concerning	  the	  ECAA	  
are	  to	  apply	  on	  a	  multilateral	  basis	  within	  the	  ECAA’.	  The	  preamble	  does	  not	  make	  any	  
reference	   to	   individuals	   specifically,	   yet	  mentions	   that	   the	   Agreement	   is	   concluded	   in	  
order	  to	  provide	   ‘mutual	  market	  access	  to	  the	  air	   transport	  markets	  of	   the	  Contracting	  
                                            
118	  C	  Baudenbacher,	   'If	  Not	  EEA	  State	  Liability,	  Then	  What:	  Reflections	  Ten	  Years	  after	   the	  EFTA	  Court's	  
Sveinbjornsdottir	  Ruling'	  (2009)	  10	  Chicago	  Journal	  of	  International	  Law	  333,	  358.	  
119	  Case	  E-­‐1/07	  Criminal	  proceedings	  against	  A	  [2007]	  EFTA	  Ct	  Rep	  246,	  para	  41.	  
120	  See	  further	  below	  chapter	  7.	  	  
121	  Recital	  13,	  Preamble	  to	  the	  ECT.	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Parties	  and	  freedom	  of	  establishment,	  with	  equal	  conditions	  of	  competition,	  and	  respect	  
of	   the	   same	   rules’.122	   Insofar	   as	   the	   agreement	   is	   aimed	  at	   regulating	  market	   relations	  
among	  the	  specific	  group	  of	  air	  transport	  companies	  the	  latter	  can	  be	  considered	  as	  the	  
economic	  operators	  who	  could,	  possibly,	  enjoy	  the	  direct	  effect	  of	  the	  provisions	  of	  the	  
ECAA	  Agreement.	  Furthermore,	  Article	  16	  ECAA	  Agreement	  copies,	  in	  essence,	  Article	  6	  
EEA	   Agreement	   as	   concerns	   the	   conform	   interpretation	   of	   identical	   provisions.	   As	   a	  
difference,	  the	  sources	  of	  the	  authoritative	  interpretations	  are	  in	  the	  ECAA	  not	  only	  the	  
Court	  of	  Justice	  but	  also	  the	  European	  Commission.	  
What	   is	   important	   to	  bear	   in	  mind	   is	   that	   the	  object	  and	  purpose	  of	  a	   treaty	  cannot	  be	  
derived	  from	  its	  stated	  objectives	  only.	  The	  nature	  of	  the	  provisions	  of	  each	  agreement,	  
too,	  is	  an	  important	  source	  of	  information	  as	  to	  the	  intention	  of	  the	  contracting	  parties.	  
In	  the	  cases	  of	  the	  ECT	  and	  the	  ECAA	  Agreement,	  the	  intention	  of	  the	  contracting	  parties	  
must,	  therefore,	  also	  be	  deducted	  from	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  provisions	  of	  the	  agreement,	  i.e.	  
the	  acquis	  that	  in	  the	  EU	  legal	  order	  can	  have	  direct	  effect.	  This	  is	  apparent	  from	  the	  fact	  
that	   the	   agreements	   strive	   after	   a	   certain	   level	   of	   homogeneity	   with	   the	   original	   EU	  
acquis.	  In	  conclusion,	  therefore,	  it	  should	  be	  assumed	  that	  the	  provisions	  of	  the	  ECT	  and	  
the	  ECAA	  Agreement,	  too,	  can	  in	  the	  light	  of	  the	  objectives	  of	  the	  agreements	  potentially	  
have	  direct	  effect	  under	  conditions	  comparable	  to	  those	  invoked	  in	  the	  EU	  and	  the	  EEA.	  
The	   fundamental	   difference	   between	   the	   EU	   and	   the	   EEA,	   on	   the	   one	   hand,	   and	   the	  
Energy	  Community	  and	  the	  ECAA,	  on	  the	  other,	  lies	  in	  the	  institutional	  framework	  set	  up	  
by	  the	  agreements,	  especially	  the	  (non-­‐)	  existence	  of	  a	  court	  endowed	  with	  jurisdiction	  
to	  determine	  the	  effect	  of	   the	  rules	   in	  the	  national	   legal	  orders.	   In	  the	  EEA	  there	   is	   the	  
EFTA	   Court	   but	   the	   treaty	   bodies	   of	   the	   Energy	   Community	   and	   the	   ECAA	   are	   not	  
provided	   such	   judicial	   functions.	   In	   the	   non-­‐EU	   contracting	   states,	   therefore,	   the	  
determination	  as	  to	  direct	  effect	  is	  largely	  for	  the	  national	  courts	  to	  make.123	  
                                            
122	  Recital	  1,	  Preamble	  to	  the	  ECAA	  Agreement.	  
123	   Unless	   the	   third	   countries	   have	   agreed	   to	   binding	   preliminary	   rulings	   from	   the	   Court	   of	   Justice:	   see	  
below	  chapter	  7.	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3	  The	  hierarchy	  of	  norms	  and	  rules	  of	  conflict	  between	  internal	  market	  rules	  
and	  national	  legislation	  
3.1	  Public	  international	  law	  
Differently	  from	  the	  effect	  of	  international	  law	  in	  the	  national	  legal	  orders,	  the	  hierarchy	  
of	  norms	  cannot	  be	  determined	  by	  the	  international	  rules	  themselves	  or	  by	  international	  
courts	  but	  falls	  exclusively	  within	  the	  realm	  of	  national	  constitutional	  law.	  For	  example,	  
some	   monist	   countries,	   such	   as	   the	   Netherlands,	   grant	   international	   treaties	   a	   rank	  
higher	   than	   ordinary	   national	   laws,	  whereas	   some,	   such	   as	   the	  USA,	   do	   not.	   In	   dualist	  
countries	   where	   international	   agreements	   are	   incorporated	   into	   the	   national	   legal	  
system	  by	  national	  laws,	  the	  rank	  assumed	  by	  the	  international	  law	  provisions	  is	  usually	  
equal	   to	   the	   act	   giving	   force	   to	   it	   domestically.	   In	   consequence,	   a	   later	   statute	   can	  
override	  an	  earlier	  one	  according	  to	  the	  principle	  of	  lex	  posterior	  derogat	  prior	  unless	  the	  
international	   law	   instrument	   itself	   establishes	   its	   rank.	   The	   fact	   that	   international	   law	  
obligations	   can	   thereby	   be	   infringed	   assumes	   relevance	   primarily	   on	   the	   international	  
plane,	  where	  the	  principle	  of	  pacta	  sunt	  servanda	  will	  be	  violated,	  and	  not	   the	  national	  
plane.	  	  
The	  responsibility	  of	  states	  is	  to	  give	  effect	  to	  the	  obligations	  they	  have	  assumed	  under	  
international	   law.	  They	  are,	   thus,	  bound	  to	  ensure	   that	   the	  provisions	  which	   they	  have	  
incorporated	   in	   their	  national	   legal	   systems	  are	  given	  proper	  effect	  domestically.	  As	   in	  
the	   case	   of	   direct	   effect,	   the	   concrete	  measures	   for	   doing	   so	   are	   to	   be	   determined	   by	  
national	  law.	  If	  a	  state	  fails	  to	  fulfil	  its	  obligations	  under	  international	  law,	  the	  state	  will	  
assume	  international	   legal	  responsibility	   for	  breach	  of	   the	   international	  obligation.	  The	  
failure	   to	  correctly	   implement	   the	  provisions	  of	   international	   law	  by	  duly	  amending	  or	  
repealing	  domestic	  law	  where	  necessary	  is	  under	  Article	  27	  VCLT	  not	  a	  justification	  for	  a	  
breach	  of	  an	  international	  law	  obligation.	  The	  breach	  can	  be	  enforced	  by	  other	  states	  or	  
international	  organisations	  or,	  in	  some	  cases	  such	  as	  the	  ECHR	  and	  investment	  tribunals,	  
also	  by	  individuals.	  If	  another	  party	  incurs	  damage	  as	  a	  result,	  the	  state	  may	  also	  be	  held	  
liable	  for	  damages.124	  	  
                                            
124	  A	  Aust	  (n	  5)	  161.	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The	  actual	  rank	  of	  international	  law	  in	  a	  national	  legal	  order	  assumes	  significance	  only	  in	  
cases	   where	   the	   international	   law	   instrument	   provides	   concrete	   implementation	  
methods.	  If	  the	  parties	  to	  the	  agreement	  are	  only	  bound	  by	  the	  result	  to	  be	  achieved	  and	  
are	  free	  to	  choose	  the	  methods	  as	  to	  how	  to	  achieve	  the	  results,	  there	  is	  little	  difference	  
as	  to	  what	  means	  the	  state	  employs.125	  	  
3.2	  EU	  law	  
In	   the	  European	  Union,	   the	  hierarchical	   relationship	  between	  EU	   law	  and	  national	   law	  
was,	  to	  a	  certain	  extent,	  left	  for	  the	  national	  legal	  orders	  to	  determine.	  In	  Costa	  v	  ENEL,	  
the	  Court	  ruled	  that	  EU	  law	  takes	  precedence	  over	  conflicting	  national	  law.126	  Together	  
with	  direct	  effect,	  primacy	  of	  EU	  law	  is	  a	  key	  principle	  in	  the	  constitutional	  set-­‐up	  of	  the	  
Union,	  even	  suggested	  to	  be	  the	  foundation	  of	  the	  constitutional	  order	  of	  the	  EU.127	  The	  
principle	  appears	  in	  Declaration	  No	  17	  attached	  to	  the	  Treaty	  of	  Lisbon.	  The	  Declaration	  
substantiates	  the	  principle	  of	  primacy	  with	  references	  to	  the	  case	  law	  of	  the	  Court.	  The	  
fact	  that	  the	  Court	  determined	  a	  rule	  for	  conflict	  situations	  and	  established	  precedence	  
rather	   than	   a	   general	   rule	   and	   invalidity	   of	   conflicting	   national	   rules	   means	   that	   the	  
primacy	   of	   EU	   law	   does	   not	   constitute	   an	   absolute	   rule	   of	   hierarchy.128	   The	   EU	   is	  
separate	  from	  the	  Member	  States	  yet	   ‘intimately	  and	  even	  organically	  tied	  to	   it’.129	  The	  
reasoning	  of	  the	  Court,	  once	  again,	  drew	  on	  the	  ‘terms	  and	  the	  spirit	  of	  the	  Treaty’	  and	  
established	   that	   the	   reciprocal	   system	   of	   the	   EU	   cannot	   allow	   national	   measures	   to	  
prevail	  over	  the	  EU	  legal	  system.	  The	  reasoning	  of	  the	  Court	  rests	  on	  the	  need	  to	  attain	  
the	  objectives	  of	  the	  Treaties	  and	  to	  avoid	  discriminatory	  behaviour	  prohibited	  therein.	  	  
The	   primacy	  principle	  was	   established	  with	   reference	   to	  Article	   189	  EEC	  Treaty	   (now	  
Article	  288	  TFEU),	  which	  grants	  direct	  applicability	  to	  regulations.130	  The	  conclusion	  of	  
the	  Court	  is	  easily	  explainable	  in	  the	  light	  of	  the	  general	  logic	  discussed	  above	  according	  
to	  which	  the	  provisions	  that	  determine	  the	  means	  to	  be	  employed	  in	  order	  to	  introduce	  
                                            
125	  TC	  Hartley	  (n	  20)	  206.	  
126	  Case	  6/64	  Costa	  v	  ENEL	  [1964]	  ECR	  585,	  594.	  
127	   B	   de	   Witte,	   'International	   Agreement	   or	   European	   Constitution?'	   in	   JA	   Winter	   and	   others	   (eds),	  
Reforming	  the	  Treaty	  on	  European	  Union:	  The	  Legal	  Debate	  (Kluwer	  Law	  International	  1996)	  3,	  12-­‐13.	  
128	   ‘Primacy	  of	  application’	  compared	  to	  ‘primacy	  of	  validity’,	  see	  FC	  Mayer,	   'Supremacy	  -­‐	  Lost?	  Comment	  
on	  Roman	  Kwiecien'	   in	  P	  Dann	  and	  M	  Rynkowski	  (eds),	  The	  Unity	  of	  the	  European	  Constitution	  (Springer	  
2006)	  87,	  88.	  
129	  Case	  6/64	  Costa	  v	  ENEL	  [1964]	  ECR	  585,	  Opinion	  of	  AG	  Lagrange,	  605.	   	  
130	  Case	  6/64	  Costa	  v	  ENEL	  (n	  126).	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an	   international	   law	   measure	   into	   the	   EU	   legal	   order	   should	   not	   be	   overridden	   by	  
national	   legislation.	   Adopting	   additional	   national	  measures	  would,	   possibly,	   defeat	   the	  
objective	  of	  the	  measure	  which	  includes	  uniform	  application.	  Giving	  effect	  to	  conflicting	  
national	   legislation,	   in	   any	   respect,	   constitutes	   a	   violation	   by	   the	  Member	   State	   of	   the	  
pacta	  sunt	  servanda	  principle	  of	  international	  law.	  Importantly,	  the	  primacy	  rule,	  too,	  is	  
enforced	  by	   the	  Court	  of	   Justice,	   thereby	  distinguishing	   the	  EU	   legal	  order	  and	   judicial	  
structure	  from	  other	  international	  organisations	  established	  to	  the	  date	  of	  the	  founding	  
of	   the	  European	  Communities.	   In	  Simmenthal,	   the	  Court	  extended	   the	  primacy	   formula	  
developed	   in	   Costa	   v	   ENEL	   to	   also	   preclude	   the	   Member	   States	   from	   adopting	   new	  
legislation	  which	  would	  conflict	  with	  EU	  law.131	  	  
The	   principle	   of	   primacy,	   too,	   has	   emerged	   from	   a	   teleological	   interpretation	   of	   the	  
Treaties	   by	   the	   Court.	   The	   teleological	   and	   effectiveness-­‐driven	   approach	   is	  
characteristic	   not	   only	   to	   the	   EU	   but	   to	   international	   organisations	   and	   multilateral	  
cooperation	   schemes	   more	   generally.132	   The	   rationale	   of	   the	   primacy	   principle	   was	  
recalled	   in	   Simmenthal	   as	   ensuring	   the	   effectiveness	   of	   EU	   law	   and	   forming	   the	   very	  
foundations	   of	   the	   Union.133	   In	   Internationale	   Handelsgesellschaft,	   the	   Court	   explained	  
that	   the	   ‘uniformity	   and	   efficacy	   of	   Community	   law’	   demand	   for	   the	   latter	   to	   be	   given	  
precedence	  over	  conflicting	  national	  laws.134	  In	  the	  latter	  case,	  the	  Court	  also	  ruled	  that	  
the	  primacy	  of	  Community	  law	  requires	  that	  the	  validity	  of	  EU	  rules	  be	  only	  determined	  
with	   relation	   to	   Community	   law	   itself	   and	   not	   any	   national	   law,	   including	   even	   the	  
fundamental	   principles	   of	   national	   constitutional	   law	   by	   ‘the	   very	   nature’	   of	   the	  
Treaty.135	  The	  primacy	  of	  EU	  law	  vis-­à-­vis	  provisions	  of	  national	  constitutions	  has	  been	  
established	  in	  a	  number	  of	  cases.136	  The	  most	  significant	  concern	  of	  the	  Member	  States	  –	  
the	  protection	  of	  fundamental	  rights	  by	  their	  constitutions	  –	  is	  to	  a	  large	  part	  resolved	  by	  
Article	  6(3)	  TEU	  which	  provides	  that	  the	  protection	  of	  fundamental	  rights	  is	  guaranteed	  
in	  the	  EU	  legal	  order	  by	  both	  the	  ECHR	  as	  well	  as	  the	  ‘constitutional	  traditions	  common	  
to	  the	  Member	  States’.	  The	  primacy	  of	  EU	  law	  accommodates	  fundamental	  rights	  also	  as	  
                                            
131	  Case	  106/77	  Simmenthal	  [1978]	  ECR	  629,	  para	  17.	  
132	  O	  Spiermann	  (n	  57)	  788.	  
133	  Case	  106/77	  Simmenthal	  (n	  131)	  para	  18.	  
134	  Case	  11/70	  Internationale	  Handelsgesellschaft	  [1970]	  ECR	  1125,	  para	  3.	  
135	  ibid.	  	  
136	  For	  example,	  Case	  C-­‐285/98	  Kreil	  [2000]	  ECR	  I-­‐69;	  Case	  C-­‐462/99	  Connect	  Austria	  v	  Telekom-­Control-­
Kommission	  [2003]	  ECR	  I-­‐05197;	  Case	  C-­‐213/07	  Michaniki	  [2008]	  ECR	  I-­‐9999.	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general	   principles	   of	   EU	   law137	   and	   as	   part	   of	   the	   EU	   acquis	   via	   the	   Charter	   of	  
Fundamental	  Rights.	  The	  Court	  is,	  thus,	  not	  absolute	  in	  disregarding	  national	  protection	  
of	  fundamental	  rights.	  	  
The	   principle	   of	   primacy	   does	   not	   constitute	   complete	   supremacy	   over	   national	   laws.	  
The	  national	  legal	  systems	  are	  protected,	  firstly,	  by	  the	  initial	  adoption	  or	  transposition	  
of	  the	  EU	  Treaties	  into	  their	  legal	  orders,	  by	  which	  they	  have	  accepted	  the	  EU	  legal	  order	  
and	   which	   has	   taken	   place	   pursuant	   to	   the	   national	   constitutions;	   secondly,	   by	   the	  
principle	  of	  conferral	  which	  means	  that	  the	  Union	  does	  not	  have	  more	  powers	  than	  what	  
have	  been	  conferred	  upon	  it	  by	  the	  Member	  States;	  thirdly,	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  EU	  law	  which	  
is	  adopted	  ultra	  vires	   is	   invalid;	  and,	   fourthly,	  by	  the	   fact	   that	   the	  Court	  cannot	  declare	  
national	   law	   invalid.	   Importantly,	   though,	   national	   courts	   although	   they	  may	   be	   faced	  
with	   situations	  where	   the	   validity	   of	   an	   EU	   legal	   act	   is	   in	   question	   cannot	   themselves	  
declare	  those	  acts	  invalid.138	  The	  exclusive	  jurisdiction	  to	  do	  so	  is	  vested	  with	  the	  Court	  
of	  Justice	  under	  Article	  263	  TFEU.139	  
As	  is	  the	  case	  with	  direct	  effect,	  the	  real	  effect	  of	  the	  principle	  of	  primacy	  of	  EU	  law	  is,	  in	  
practice,	  subject	  to	  its	  acceptance	  by	  national	  courts.140	  This	  is	  even	  more	  relevant	  in	  the	  
case	   of	   primacy	   than	   direct	   effect	   because	  while	   the	   latter	   is,	   at	   least	   to	   some	   extent,	  
dependent	  on	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  international	  rules	  itself,	  the	  hierarchy	  of	  sources	  of	  law	  
in	   a	   national	   legal	   order	   is	   determined	   solely	   by	   that	   legal	   order.	   In	   addition,	   the	  
principle	  of	  direct	  effect	  does	  not	  infringe	  national	  legislation	  in	  a	  negative	  way	  because	  
it	  does	  not	  affect	  the	  application	  of	  national	  law.	  Primacy,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  does	  exactly	  
that	  by	  rendering	  conflicting	  national	  law	  inapplicable.	  It	  is	  not	  surprising,	  therefore,	  that	  
the	  primacy	  of	  EU	  law	  in	  relation	  to	  national	  law	  has	  been	  brought	  up	  in	  national	  courts	  
prompting	  the	  latter	  to	  condition	  their	  acceptance	  of	  EU	  law	  in	  the	  light	  of	  the	  national	  
                                            
137	  Case	  11/70	  Internationale	  Handelsgesellschaft	  (n	  134)	  para	  4.	  
138	  Case	  314/85	  Foto-­Frost	  [1987]	  ECR	  4199,	  para	  20.	  
139	   See	   also	   Joined	   Cases	   C-­‐143/88	   and	   C-­‐92/89	  Zuckerfabrik	   Süderdithmarschen	   and	   Zuckerfabrik	   Soest	  
[1991]	  ECR	  I-­‐415,	  para	  17;	  Case	  C-­‐344/04	  IATA	  and	  ELFAA	  [2006]	  ECR	  I-­‐403,	  para	  27.	  
140	  F	  Morgenstern,	  'Judicial	  Practice	  and	  the	  Supremacy	  of	  International	  Law'	  (1950)	  27	  British	  Yearbook	  
of	  International	  Law	  42,	  p	  91.	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constitutions.	  This	   is	   especially	   the	   case	  when	   the	  Court	   challenges	   the	  applicability	  of	  
national	  constitutional	  law.141	  	  
To	  summarise,	  the	  Court	  has	  deemed	  EU	  law	  to	  prevail	  over	  national	  law	  to	  the	  extent	  of	  
rendering	  the	  latter	  inapplicable	  and	  not	  invalid,	  applying	  automatically	  without	  a	  prior	  
ruling	   of	   the	   Court	   or	   a	   national	   constitutional	   court	   and	   constituting	   a	   duty	   of	   every	  
national	  court	  and,	  finally,	  applying	  to	  national	  law	  adopted	  prior	  and	  after	  the	  particular	  
rule	  of	  EU	  law	  and	  to	  all	  levels	  of	  national	  courts.	  
3.3	  Multilateral	  agreements	  exporting	  EU	  internal	  market	  acquis	  
Whether	  the	  EU	  internal	  market	  acquis	  takes	  precedence	  over	  conflicting	  national	  norms	  
in	   the	   states	  parties	   to	   the	  multilateral	   agreements	   exporting	   the	  acquis	   depends,	   first	  
and	   foremost,	   on	   the	   domestic	   legal	   orders	   of	   the	   non-­‐EU	   contracting	   parties	   to	   the	  
agreements.	  This	  is	  so	  primarily	  because	  of	  the	  limits	  of	  the	  jurisdiction	  of	  the	  Court	  of	  
Justice	  as	  regards	  these	  agreements.	  	  
In	   Opinion	   1/91,	   the	   Court	   of	   Justice	   found	   that	   the	   principles	   of	   primacy	   and	   direct	  
effect	  did	  not	  necessarily	  form	  part	  of	  the	  EEA	  legal	  order.	  Contrary	  to	  the	  EU	  where	  the	  
Member	  States	  have	  given	  up	  part	  of	  their	  sovereignty	  and	  the	  Treaties	  bind	  not	  only	  the	  
states	   but	   also	   their	   nationals,	   the	   EEA	  was,	   according	   to	   the	   Court,	   considered	   to	   be	  
founded	  by	  an	  international	  agreement	  that	  only	  affects	  the	  contracting	  parties	  and	  not	  
their	  nationals.142	  As	  demonstrated	  above,	   though,	   this	   is	  not	  exactly	   the	  case	  with	   the	  
EEA.143	  
Protocol	  35	  on	  the	  implementation	  of	  EEA	  rules	  provides	  that	  the	  EEA	  Agreement	  does	  
not	   entail	   a	   transfer	   of	   legislative	   powers	   to	   any	   institutions	   of	   the	   EEA	   yet	   the	  
effectiveness	   of	   EEA	   law	   is	   to	   be	   ensured	   by	   the	   obligation	   of	   contracting	   parties	   to	  
introduce	  in	  their	  national	  legal	  orders	  a	  statutory	  provision	  to	  give	  precedence	  to	  EEA	  
rules	  in	  cases	  of	  conflict.144	  It	  must	  be	  noted	  that	  the	  direct	  effect	  of	  EEA	  law	  is	  only	  fully	  
                                            
141	  For	  example,	  2	  BvR	  197/83	  Solange	  II	  [1986]	  BVerfG	  73,	  339;	  2	  BvR	  2134,	  2159/92	  Maastricht	  [1993]	  
BVerfG,	  89,	  155;	  2	  BvE	  2/08	  et	  al	  Lissabon	  [2009]	  BVerfG	  123,	  267;	  see	  J	  Baquero	  Cruz,	  'The	  Legacy	  of	  the	  
Maastricht-­‐Urteil	  and	  the	  Pluralist	  Movement'	  (2008)	  14	  European	  Law	  Journal	  389.	  
142	  Opinion	  1/91	  EEA	  I	  (n	  2)	  para	  21;	  Case	  26/62	  Van	  Gend	  en	  Loos	  (n	  1).	  
143	  See	  above	  section	  2.3.	  
144	  The	  Sole	  Article	  of	  Protocol	  35.	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realised	   when	   the	   EEA	   rules	   also	   enjoy	   primacy	   in	   the	   EEA.145	   The	   EFTA	   Court	   has,	  
however,	   established	   a	   ‘quasi-­‐primacy’146	   of	   the	   EFTA	   pillar	   of	   the	   EEA	   Agreement	   in	  
Einarsson.147	  Naturally,	  this	  only	  affects	  EU	  provisions	  that	  have	  been	  implemented	  in	  the	  
national	   legal	   orders	   of	   the	   EEA	   EFTA	   contracting	   parties.148	   The	   EFTA	   Court	  made	   a	  
qualification	  of	   the	  provisions	  to	  which	  the	  primacy	  rule	  applies:	   it	   includes	  only	  those	  
provisions	  that	  have	  been	  implemented	  in	  the	  legal	  orders	  of	  the	  EEA	  EFTA	  States,	  and	  
create	   rights	   for	   individuals.149	   Importantly,	   the	   EFTA	   Court	   did	   not,	   in	   the	   case	   of	  
primacy,	  need	  to	  analyse	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  EEA	  as	  was	  the	  case	  with	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice.	  
Instead,	  the	  EFTA	  Court	  could	  base	  its	  argumentation	  on	  Protocol	  35	  and	  its	  own	  prior	  
recognition	  of	  the	  ‘quasi-­‐direct	  effect’	  of	  the	  provisions	  of	  the	  EEA	  Agreement	  that	  have	  
been	  implemented	  by	  the	  EEA	  EFTA	  States.	  	  
The	  ECT	  and	  the	  ECAA	  Agreement	  are	  silent	  on	  the	  question	  of	  primacy.	  The	  non-­‐EU	  and	  
non-­‐EEA	   EFTA	   contracting	   parties	   of	   these	   agreements	   are,	   thereby,	   bound	   by	   the	  
provisions	  of	   the	  agreements	   to	   implement	   the	   latter	   in	  good	   faith.150	  The	  relationship	  
between	  these	  multilateral	  agreements	  and	  the	  respective	  national	  laws	  is	  governed	  by	  
the	  rules	  of	  public	  international	  law	  and,	  eventually,	  national	  constitutional	  law.	  
The	  one	   and	   significant	   limit	   to	   extending	   the	  principle	  of	  primacy	   to	   the	  non-­‐EU	  EEA	  
contracting	  parties	  to	  these	  agreements	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  there	  is	  no	  court	  to	  establish	  the	  
principle	   in	  an	  authoritative	  manner	  except	   for	   the	  Court	  of	   Justice	  with	  respect	   to	   the	  
application	  of	  the	  agreements	  in	  the	  EU	  legal	  order	  and	  the	  domestic	  legal	  orders	  of	  the	  
EU	  Member	  States,	  where	  applicable.151	  International	  law	  that	  is	  binding	  on	  the	  EU	  forms	  
part	   of	   the	   EU	   legal	   order	   without	   any	   implementing	   legislation.152	   International	   law	  
assumes	  a	   rank	  higher	   than	   secondary	  EU	   law	  yet	   lower	   than	   the	  EU	  Treaties	   and	   the	  
general	   principles	   of	   EU	   law.153	   The	   jurisdiction	   of	   the	   Court	   with	   respect	   to	   the	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  V	  Kronenberger,	  'Does	  the	  EFTA	  Court	  Interpret	  the	  EEA	  Agreement	  as	  If	  It	  Were	  the	  EC	  Treaty?	  Some	  
Questions	   Raised	   by	   the	   Restamark	   Judgment'	   (1996)	   45	   International	   and	   Comparative	   Law	  Quarterly	  
198,	  210.	  	  
146	  C	  Baudenbacher,	  'If	  Not	  EEA	  State	  Liability,	  Then	  What’	  (n	  118)	  358.	  	  
147	  Case	  E-­‐1/01	  Einarsson	  [2002]	  EFTA	  Ct	  Rep	  1,	  paras	  51-­‐55.	  
148	  ibid	  para	  52.	  
149	  ibid	  paras	  52-­‐53.	  
150	  Article	  6	  ECT;	  Article	  4	  ECAA	  Agreement.	  
151	  Institutional	  aspects	  are	  discussed	  in	  detail	  below	  in	  chapter	  7.	  
152	  Case	  181/73	  Haegeman	  (n	  85)	  paras	  3-­‐6.	  
153	  Case	  T-­‐201/04	  Microsoft	  Corp.	  v	  Commission	  [2007]	  ECR	  II-­‐3601,	  para	  798.	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application	  of	  the	  ECT	  and	  the	  ECAA	  Agreement	  in	  the	  non-­‐EU	  contracting	  states	  is	  very	  
limited.	  
Another	   issue	  related	   to	   the	  primacy	  of	   the	  exported	  acquis	   concerns	   the	  possibility	  of	  
inserting	  the	  principle	  of	  primacy	  into	  the	  framework	  of	  those	  agreements	  at	  all.	  When	  
establishing	  the	  principle	  of	  primacy	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice	  relied	  on	  the	  nature	  of	  EU	  law	  
that	   demanded	   the	   primacy	   of	   application	   vis-­à-­vis	   national	   law	   as	   well	   as	   the	  
effectiveness	   and	   uniformity	   of	   EU	   law.	   The	   effectiveness	   and	   uniformity	   of	   the	  
multilateral	   agreements	   could,	   possibly,	   also	   justify	   the	   principle	   of	   primacy	   in	   those	  
agreements.	  As	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  EEA,	   it	   is	  not	   impossible	  to	  insert	  the	  primacy	  rule	  in	  
the	  provisions	  of	   the	  actual	  Treaty.	  The	  reason	   for	  why	  no	  such	  provision	  exists	   in	   the	  
ECT	  or	  the	  ECAA	  Agreement	  must	  be	  due	  to	  the	  narrower	  scope	  and	  simpler	  institutional	  
structure	  of	   the	   latter	   two	   that,	   in	   turn,	   reflects	   the	  more	   limited	  degree	  of	   integration	  
envisaged	  by	  them.	  	  
One	  significant	  problem	  that	  may	  arise	  with	  respect	   to	  a	  primacy	  principle	  applying	   to	  
the	  multilateral	  agreements	  is	  its	  potential	  conflict	  with	  the	  constitutional	  law	  provisions	  
of	  the	  non-­‐EU	  treaty	  partners.	  Since	  the	  EU	  Treaties	  do	  not	  apply	  to	  the	  third	  countries,	  
they	   are	   not	   protected	   by	   Article	   6(3)	   TEU,	   which	   means	   that	   their	   constitutional	  
traditions	  fall	  outside	  the	  range	  of	  principles	  which	  affect	  the	  application	  of	  the	  internal	  
market	  acquis	  in	  the	  EU	  legal	  order.154	  The	  protection	  of	  fundamental	  rights	  accorded	  to	  
EU	  legislation	  by	  the	  EU	  Charter	  of	  Fundamental	  Rights	  as	  well	  as	  possibly	  the	  ECHR	  in	  
the	  future,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  could	  be	  considered	  adequate	  even	  by	  the	  third	  states.	  It	  
may	  be	  possible	  to	  ensure	  the	  application	  of	  fundamental	  rights,	  although	  neither	  the	  EU	  
Charter	  nor	  the	  ECHR	  form	  part	  of	  the	  EEA	  Agreement	  itself,	  via	  the	  homogeneity	  clauses	  
of	  Articles	  1	  and	  6	  EEA	  Agreement;	  or	   to	  derive	   from	  the	   fact	   that	   the	  EEA	  Agreement	  
creates	   individual	   rights	   an	   interpretation	   of	   the	   identical	  acquis	   that	   is	   homogeneous	  
with	   the	   interpretation	   provided	   by	   the	   Court	   of	   Justice	   and	   takes	   account	   of	   the	  
protection	  of	  fundamental	  rights.155	  The	  EFTA	  Court	  does	  so	  in	  practice.156	  Furthermore,	  
                                            
154	  H	  Haukeland	  Fredriksen,	   'One	  Market,	  Two	  Courts:	  Legal	  Pluralism	  vs.	  Homogeneity	   in	   the	  European	  
Economic	  Area'	  (2010)	  79	  Nordic	  Journal	  of	  International	  Law	  481,	  491.	  
155	  W	  Kälin,	  'The	  EEA	  Agreement	  and	  the	  European	  Convention	  for	  the	  Protection	  of	  Human	  Rights'	  (1992)	  
3	  European	  Journal	  of	  International	  Law	  341,	  341-­‐342	  and	  347-­‐348.	  
156	   E-­‐U	   Petersmann,	   'Human	   Rights,	   International	   Economic	   Law	   and	   ‘Constitutional	   Justice’'	   (2008)	   19	  
European	  Journal	  of	  International	  law	  769,	  785.	  	  
 
	   176 
in	   the	   Oporto	   Protocol	   which	   guides	   the	   interpretation	   of	   the	   EEA	   Agreement	   it	   was	  
agreed	  that	  insofar	  as	  and	  until	  the	  EEA	  Agreement	  does	  not	  provide	  for	  the	  fulfilment	  of	  
the	   existing	   treaty	   obligations	   of	   the	   contracting	   parties	   including	   those	   providing	   for	  
individual	   rights,	   the	   latter	   agreements	   continue	   to	   be	   applied.157	   This	   concerns	  most	  
directly	  human	  rights	  treaties	  and	  the	  protection	  of	  fundamental	  rights.	  	  
In	  conclusion,	  nothing	  in	  the	  multilateral	  agreements	  precludes	  the	  principle	  of	  primacy	  
from	  being	  applied	  the	  only	  guarantees	  for	  that	  are	  currently	  provided	  by	  Protocol	  35	  of	  
the	  EEA	  Agreement.	  	  
4	  The	  effective	  application	  and	  enforcement	  of	  internal	  market	  rules	  
Under	  the	  effective	  enforcement	  of	  internal	  market	  rules,	  two	  aspects	  will	  be	  considered	  
–	  the	  principles	  of	  state	  responsibility	  and	  consistent	  interpretation.	  Both	  are	  in	  place	  to	  
ensure	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  EU	  law	  and	  are	  determined	  by	  courts.	  This	  section	  does	  not,	  
however,	   address	   questions	   related	   to	   administrative	   bodies	   and	   administrative	  
decisions.	  
4.1	  Consistent	  interpretation	  
4.1.1	  Public	  international	  law	  
One	   further	   possibility	   of	   increasing	   the	   effectiveness	   of	   a	   legal	   system	   is	   through	   the	  
choice	  of	  interpretative	  methods.	  The	  rules	  for	  interpreting	  international	  agreements	  are	  
laid	  down	  in	  Articles	  31-­‐33	  VCLT,	  resulting	  from	  comprehensive	  analysis	  conducted	  by	  
the	   International	   Law	   Commission	   and	   reflecting	   customary	   international	   law.158	   The	  
general	  rules	  of	  provided	  in	  Article	  31(1)	  VCLT	  read	  as	  follows:	  	  
A	   treaty	   shall	   be	   interpreted	   in	   good	   faith	   in	   accordance	   with	   the	   ordinary	  
meaning	  to	  be	  given	  to	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  treaty	  in	  their	  context	  and	  in	  the	  light	  of	  
its	  object	  and	  purpose.	  	  
                                            
157	  Joint	  Declaration	  on	  the	  relation	  between	  the	  EEA	  Agreement	  and	  existing	  agreements,	  annexed	  to	  the	  
EEA	  Agreement	  [1994]	  OJ	  L1/3.	  
158	  Kasikili/Sedudu	  Island	  (Botswana/Namibia),	  Judgment,	  1999	  ICJ	  Reports	  1045,	  1059;	  Territorial	  Dispute	  
(Libyan	  Arab	  Jarnahiriya/Chad),	  Judgment,	  1994	  ICJ	  Reports	  6,	  21;	  Oil	  Platforms	  (Islamic	  Republic	  of	  Iran	  v	  
United	   States	   of	   America),	  Preliminary	   Objection,	   Judgment,	   1996	   ICJ	   Reports	   803,	   812;	  Golder	   v	  United	  
Kingdom	  (1975)	  Series	  A	  No	  18,	  para	  29.	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Furthermore,	  as	  a	  secondary	  means	  of	  recourse,	  should	  the	  result	  of	   the	   interpretation	  
carried	  out	  on	   the	  basis	  of	  Article	  31	  prove	   inadequate	  or	  when	   the	  situation	   requires	  
that	   the	  preliminary	   interpretation	  be	  confirmed	  Article	  32	  VCLT	   lists	   the	   ‘preparatory	  
work	   of	   the	   treaty	   and	   the	   circumstances	   of	   its	   conclusion’	   as	   additional	   means	   of	  
interpretation.	  	  	  	  
Lauterpacht	   has	   divided	   the	   principles	   guiding	   the	   interpretation	   of	   treaties	   into	   two	  
categories	   –	   literal	   interpretation,	   which	   is	   restrictive,	   and	   teleological	   interpretation,	  
which	  promotes	  the	  principle	  of	  effectiveness.159	  The	  former	  means	  of	   interpretation	  is	  
strongly	   connected	   with	   the	   idea	   of	   state	   sovereignty.	   It	   helps	   ensure	   that	   no	  
encroachment	  upon	  state	  sovereignty	  to	  which	  the	  contracting	  parties	  have	  voluntarily	  
consented	   will	   go	   beyond	   a	   literal	   analysis	   of	   what	   was	   established	   at	   the	   stage	   of	  
concluding	   the	   treaty.	   The	   latter,	   teleological	   interpretation	   seeks	   to	   go	   beyond	   the	  
textual	  construction	  of	  the	  treaty	  provisions	  and	  draws	  on	  the	  objective	  and	  purpose	  of	  
the	   treaty,	   which	   may	   or	   may	   not	   be	   explicit	   in	   the	   actual	   wording	   of	   the	   treaty	  
provisions.160	  	  	  
The	   textual	   method	   of	   interpretation	   looks	   strictly	   at	   the	   provisions	   of	   a	   treaty	   and	  
constructs	   the	  meaning	  of	   the	  provisions	  on	   the	  basis	   of	   the	  written	  words.	  When	   the	  
provisions	   of	   a	   treaty	   are	  worded	   in	   a	   clear	  manner	   there	   is	   no	   need	   to	   go	   beyond	   a	  
textual	   interpretation	   for	   reasons	   other	   than	   to	   confirm	   its	   correctness.161	   The	  
teleological	   method	   of	   interpretation	   is	   more	   proactive	   because	   it	   takes	   into	  
consideration	   also	   the	   context	   and	   the	   objectives	   of	   the	   treaty.	   In	   public	   international	  
law,	   it	   is	   difficult	   to	   construct	   a	   hierarchy	  between	   these	  methods	  of	   interpretation	   as	  
both	   include	  consideration	   for	   the	  other.162	   In	   fact,	  as	  can	  be	  seen	  from	  the	  wording	  of	  
Article	  31(1)	  VCLT,	  the	  ordinary	  meaning	  of	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  treaty	  is	  to	  be	  interpreted	  in	  
the	   light	   of	   the	   object	   and	   purpose	   and	   the	   context	   of	   the	   agreement,	   thus	  
                                            
159	   H	   Lauterpacht,	   'Restrictive	   Interpretation	   and	   the	   Principle	   of	   Effectiveness	   in	   the	   Interpretation	   of	  
Treaties'	  (1949)	  26	  British	  Yearbook	  of	  International	  Law	  48.	  
160	  E	  Gordon,	  'The	  World	  Court	  and	  the	  Interpretation	  of	  Constitutive	  Treaties:	  Some	  Observations	  on	  the	  
Development	   of	   an	   International	   Constitutional	   Law'	   (1965)	   59	   American	   Journal	   of	   International	   Law	  
794,	  796.	  
161	  Acquisition	  of	  Polish	  Nationality,	  Advisory	  Opinion,	  1923	  PCIJ	  Series	  B	  No	  7,	  20;	  Aegean	  Sea	  Continental	  
Shelf,	  Judgment,	  1978	  ICJ	  Reports	  3,	  22;	  Territorial	  Dispute	  (Libyan	  Arab	  Jarnahiriya/Chad)	  (n	  158)	  25-­‐26;	  
ILC	  Draft	  Articles	  on	  the	  Law	  of	  Treaties	  with	  commentaries,	  (1966)	  II	  Yearbook	  of	  the	  International	  Law	  
Commission,	  220,	  para	  11.	  	  
162	  DP	  O'Connell,	  International	  Law	  (Stevens	  &	  Sons	  1970)	  254.	  
 
	   178 
accommodating	   both	   methods,163	   yet	   a	   certain	   priority	   is	   given	   to	   textual	  
interpretation.164	  	  
Article	  27(1)	  VLCT	  codifies	  the	  maxim	  ut	  res	  magis	  valeat	  quam	  pereat	  which	  reflects	  the	  
principle	  of	  effectiveness.	  The	  principle	  requires	  that	  whenever	  there	  is	  a	  choice	  between	  
two	  possible	  interpretations	  of	  treaty	  out	  of	  which	  one	  gives	  effect	  to	  the	  provision	  and	  
the	  other	  does	  not,	  a	  solution	  should	  be	  preferred	  which	  gives	  effect	  to	  the	  provision	  due	  
to	   the	   principles	   of	   good	   faith	   and	   the	   object	   and	   purpose	   of	   the	   treaty.165	   The	  
interpretation	   should	   not,	   however,	   lead	   to	   a	   result	   that	   does	   not	   correspond	   to	   the	  
intention	  of	  the	  parties	  as	  expressed	  in	  the	  ‘letter	  and	  spirit’	  of	  the	  treaty,	  or	  amount	  to	  a	  
revision	  of	  the	  treaty.166	  	  
Whether	  one	  uses	  a	  textual	  or	  teleological	  method	  of	  interpretation	  is	  not	  decisive	  as	  to	  
the	  outcome	  in	  terms	  of	   the	  scope	  of	  a	  broad	  or	  narrow	  approach	  to	  the	  application	  of	  
the	   agreement.	   The	   latter	   depends	   on	   both	   the	   legal	   and	   institutional	   context	  
surrounding	  the	  interpretation	  of	  the	  treaty	  by	  national	  courts.167	  Furthermore,	  different	  
courts,	  both	  international	  and	  national,	  employ	  different	  procedures	  and	  seek	  guidance	  
in	  different	  principles	   of	   treaty	   interpretation.168	   Interestingly,	   in	  dualist	   legal	   systems	  
where	   international	   agreements	   are	   transposed	   into	  national	   legal	  orders	  by	  means	  of	  
domestic	   legislation,	   national	   courts	   are	   faced	   with	   a	   need	   to	   combine	   the	   national	  
procedures	  and	  principles	  of	  interpretation	  with	  the	  requirement	  to	  ensure	  compliance	  
                                            
163	   RY	   Jennings,	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  568-­‐569.	  
168	  ibid,	  609-­‐610.	  
 
	   179 
with	   the	   international	   law	   obligations	   of	   the	   state.169	   As	   long	   as	   the	   former	   can	  
accommodate	   the	   latter	   and	   the	   real	   intent	   of	   the	   parties	   is	   not	   obscured	   in	   the	  
interpretation	  process	  no	  problems	  will	  arise	  on	  the	  international	  plane.	  English	  courts,	  
for	  example,	  have	  been	  able	  to	  have	  recourse	  to	  the	   international	   law	  instrument	   itself	  
when	  interpreting	  international	  agreements	  incorporated	  in	  English	  law.170	  	  
The	  cases	   in	  which	  the	  choice	  of	   interpretative	  methods	   is	  between	  those	  that	  have	  an	  
effect	   and	   those	   that	   have	   none	   at	   all	   are	  much	   fewer	   in	   number	   than	   those	   in	  which	  
different	  interpretations	  lead	  to	  a	  different	  level	  of	  effectiveness.171	  Treaties	  establishing	  
international	  organisations	  –	  constitutive	  treaties	  –	  are	  special	  in	  this	  regard	  because	  of	  
the	   evolving	   nature	   of	   the	   legal	   regime	   they	   create	   and	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   contracting	  
parties	  are	  often	  not	  the	  original	  signatories	  whose	  intent	  should	  be	  looked	  for.172	  	  
The	   interpretation	   of	   constitutive	   treaties	   falls	   within	   the	   realm	   of	   ‘international	  
constitutional	  law’.173	  In	  the	  case	  of	  such	  treaties,	  the	  intent	  of	  the	  parties	  is	  usually	  the	  
most	  important	  factor	  for	  the	  development	  of	  the	  legal	  order	  created	  by	  them,	  yet	  it	  fails	  
to	  take	  into	  account	  the	  distinction	  between	  the	  effective	  and	  restrictive	  approaches.174	  
Rogoff,	  however,	  justifies	  the	  search	  for	  the	  intent	  of	  the	  parties	  in	  cases	  of	  uncertainty	  of	  
interpretation	  in	  cases	  of	  comprehensive	  agreements	  the	  subject	  matters	  of	  which	  cover	  
a	  whole	  area	  of	  legal	  relationships.	  When	  finding	  an	  appropriate	  solution,	  the	  ambiguous	  
provision	   should	   be	   construed	   in	   a	   way	   to	   allow	   for	   fulfilling	   the	   purpose	   of	   the	  
agreement	  by,	  firstly,	  seeking	  a	  way	  to	  extend	  the	  application	  of	  the	  agreement	  over	  the	  
specific	   legal	   question	   and,	   secondly,	   to	   consider	   the	   agreement	   as	   an	   authoritative	  
source	  for	  dealing	  with	  the	  issue	  in	  question.175	  
In	  the	  interpretation	  of	  constitutive	  treaties	  special	  attention	  is	  given	  to	  the	  competences	  
attributed	  to	  the	  international	  organisation	  or	  other	  international	  regime;	  this	  leads	  to	  a	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frequent	  use	  of	   teleological	   interpretation	  by	  courts,	  especially	  where	  the	  competences	  
have	   to	   be	   asserted	   by	   implication.176	   This	   observation	   goes	   hand	   in	   hand	   with	   the	  
modern	  regime	  theory	  of	  international	  relations	  that	  focuses	  on	  international	  regimes	  as	  
opposed	   to	   international	   organisations.	   Kratochwil	   and	   Ruggie	   define	   international	  
regimes	   as	   ‘governing	   arrangements	   constructed	   by	   states	   to	   coordinate	   their	  
expectations	  and	  organize	  aspects	  of	   international	  behaviour	   in	  various	   issue-­‐areas’.177	  
International	  regimes	  consist	  of	  principles	  and	  norms,	  specific	  rules,	  and	  procedures	  and	  
programs.178	   Regime	   theory	   influences	   the	   interpretative	   methods	   of	   international	  
agreements	   by	   leading	   the	   interpreters	   towards	   a	   broader	   perspective	   of	  maintaining	  
and	  developing	  the	  regime.179	  This	  approach	  is	  most	  clearly	  reflected	  in	  the	  case	  law	  of	  
the	  Court	  of	  Justice	  of	  the	  EU.	  In	  turn,	  the	  national	  courts	  of	  the	  EU	  Member	  States	  must,	  
when	   interpreting	   EU	   law,	   depart	   from	   the	   national	   canons	   of	   interpreting	   national	  
legislation	   and	   bear	   in	   mind	   the	   broader	   integration	   objectives	   enshrined	   in	   the	   EU	  
Treaties.	  In	  international	  law,	  it	  is	  generally	  unusual	  for	  treaties	  themselves	  to	  create	  an	  
interpreting	   mechanism;	   in	   some	   instances,	   however,	   bodies	   established	   under	   the	  
treaty	  may	  deal	  with	  questions	  of	   interpretation.180	  The	  ECHR,	  the	  EU	  Treaties	  and	  the	  
EEA	  Agreement	  are	  among	  the	  limited	  number	  of	  treaties	  that	  set	  up	  a	  court	  and	  provide	  
it	  with	  the	  express	  mandate	  to	  interpret	  the	  constitutive	  instrument.	  	  
4.1.2	  EU	  law	  
In	   order	   to	   avoid	   fragmentation	   of	   interpretations	   of	   EU	   law	   and	   to	   preserve	   the	  
autonomy	   of	   the	   EU	   legal	   order,	   the	   Treaties	   provide	   a	   stable	   framework	   for	   the	  
interpretation	   of	   the	   Treaties.	   The	   interpretation	   of	   EU	   law	   is	   carried	   out	   by	   EU	  
institutions	  and	  the	  Court	  of	   Justice	  as	  well	  as	  national	  authorities	  and	  national	  courts.	  
Article	  19	  TEU	  places	  on	  the	  Court	   the	  task	  of	  ensuring	  that	   the	   law	  is	  observed	   in	  the	  
interpretation	  and	  application	  of	  the	  EU	  Treaties.	  This	  applies	  to	  primary	  and	  secondary	  
EU	  law	  alike.	  Even	  more	  important	  in	  this	  context	  is	  Article	  267	  TFEU	  that	  provides	  for	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the	   preliminary	   reference	   procedure	   in	   which	   the	   national	   courts	   may,	   and	   highest	  
courts	  must	  when	  unsure	  about	  the	  correct	  interpretation	  of	  EU	  law	  have	  recourse	  to	  the	  
Court	   for	   an	   authoritative	   interpretation.	   Furthermore,	   under	  Article	   267(b)	  TFEU	   the	  
Court	  of	   Justice	   is	   the	  only	   judicial	  body	   that	  may	  rule	  on	   the	  validity	  of	   secondary	  EU	  
law.181	  The	  Court,	  moreover,	  holds	  a	  monopoly	  of	  interpretation	  of	  the	  Treaties	  by	  virtue	  
of	   Article	   344	   TFEU	   which	   precludes	   the	   Member	   States	   from	   submitting	   a	   dispute	  
arising	  from	  the	  Treaties	  to	  a	  dispute	  settlement	  mechanism	  other	  than	  one	  provided	  in	  
the	  Treaties.	  All	  of	   the	  above	  applies	  equally	   to	   international	  agreements	  concluded	  by	  
the	  EU.	  	  	  
It	   appears	   from	   the	   analysis	   above	   that	   the	   Court	   of	   Justice	   frequently	   endorses	   a	  
teleological	   method	   of	   interpretation.182	   One	   of	   the	   specific	   methods	   of	   ensuring	  
effectiveness	  of	  EU	  law,	  but	  also	  coherence	  of	  the	  legal	  order,	  is	  consistent	  interpretation	  
that	   the	   Court	   has	   deemed	   to	   be	   ‘inherent	   in	   the	   system	   of	   the	   Treaty’.183	   Consistent	  
interpretation	   incorporates	   a	   method	   of	   interpreting	   a	   rule	   in	   the	   light	   of	   another,	  
hierarchically	   higher-­‐standing	   rule,	   thus	   avoiding	   a	   conflict	   between	   the	   two	   but	   not	  
calling	   into	   question	   the	   validity	   of	   the	   one	   or	   the	   other.	   In	   EU	   law	   consistent	  
interpretation	  can,	  in	  general	  terms,	  be	  witnessed	  on	  three	  levels:	  national	  law-­‐EU	  law;	  
secondary-­‐primary	  EU	  law;	  and	  EU	  law-­‐public	  international	  law.184	  	  
Directive-­‐conform	  interpretation,	  also	  called	  indirect	  effect,	   is	  the	  most	  prominent	  field	  
of	   application	   of	   consistent	   interpretation	   of	   EU	   law.	   The	   doctrine	   of	   direct	   effect	  
emerged	  in	  the	  Court’	  case	  law	  out	  of	  a	  need	  to	  ensure	  adequate	  protection	  of	  the	  rights	  
of	   individuals	   in	   the	  event	  of	  a	  Member	  State	  not	   fulfilling	   its	  obligation	  to	   transpose	  a	  
directive	  in	  a	  timely	  manner.185	  As	  stated	  by	  the	  Court	  in	  Pfeiffer	  it	  is,	  first	  and	  foremost,	  
the	  task	  of	  the	  national	  courts	  to	  grant	  individuals	  the	  necessary	  legal	  protection	  that	  the	  
latter	   derive	   from	   EU	   law	   and	   to	   ensure	   the	   effectiveness	   of	   EU	   law.186	   Nevertheless,	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unimplemented	  or	  wrongly	  implemented	  directives	  are	  not	  entirely	  without	  effect	  due	  to	  
the	  doctrine	  of	  direct	  effect,	  state	  liability	  for	  breaches	  of	  EU	  law,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  doctrine	  
of	   consistent	   interpretation.187	   Consistent	   interpretation,	   in	   particular,	   assumes	  
relevance	   in	  cases	  where	  a	  directive	   lacks	  direct	  effect,	   i.e.	  when	   the	  Van	  Gend	  en	  Loos	  
criteria	  do	  not	  apply,188	  or	  in	  horizontal	  relations	  between	  individuals.189	  
The	   doctrine	   of	   consistent	   interpretation	   entails	   an	   obligation	   of	   the	   national	   courts	  
when	  applying	  national	   law,	  whether	  or	  not	  adopted	  for	   implementing	  the	  directive,	  to	  
interpret	   national	   law	   ‘in	   the	   light	   of	   the	  wording	   and	   the	   purpose	   of	   the	   directive’	   in	  
order	   to	   achieve	   the	   objectives	   of	   the	   latter.190	   The	   duty	   of	   consistent	   interpretation	  
extends	   to	   all	   national	   legislation,191	   and	   even	   the	   case	   law	   of	   national	   courts.192	  
Originating	  from	  the	  principle	  of	  sincere	  cooperation	  enshrined	  in	  Article	  4(3)	  TEU,	  the	  
principle	   of	   consistent	   interpretation	   obliges	   national	   courts	   to	   construe	   national	  
legislation	  in	  the	  light	  of	  EU	  law	  in	  instances	  where,	  for	  example,	  EU	  law	  does	  not	  have	  
direct	  effect	  due	  to	  a	  failure	  of	  the	  Member	  State	  to	  implement	  a	  directive.	  The	  effet	  utile	  
of	  unimplemented	  directives	  which	  do	  not	  have	  direct	  effect	  needs	  to	  be	  achieved	  by	  ‘all	  
appropriate	  measures,	  whether	  general	  or	  particular’,	  including	  obligations	  resting	  upon	  
the	  courts	  of	  the	  Member	  States.	  Both	  the	  doctrines	  of	  direct	  effect	  and	  that	  of	  consistent	  
interpretation	  concern	  the	  effective	  judicial	  protection	  granted	  to	  individuals,	  which	  can	  
be	  considered	  a	  general	  principle	  of	  EU	  law.193	  The	  duty	  of	  consistent	  interpretation	  also	  
applies	   to	  national	   legislation	   that	  has	  duly	   implemented	  a	  directive	  because	   the	  mere	  
fact	  that	  the	  latter	  has	  been	  transposed	  into	  national	  legislation	  does	  not	  rule	  out	  entirely	  
the	   possibility	   of	   a	   national	   court	   ‘de-­‐implementing’	   the	   directive	   by	   means	   of	  
interpretation.194	   In	   order	   to	   distinguish	   between	   consistent	   interpretation	   for	   the	  
purpose	  of	  providing	  a	  correct	   interpretation	  of	  a	  piece	  of	  national	   legislation	   that	  has	  
                                            
187	  V	  Skouris,	  'Effet	  Utile	  Versus	  Legal	  Certainty:	  The	  Case-­‐law	  of	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice	  on	  the	  Direct	  Effect	  of	  
Directives'	  (2006)	  17	  European	  Business	  Law	  Review	  241,	  247.	  
188	  Case	  14/83	  von	  Colson	  [1984]	  ECR	  1891,	  paras	  27-­‐28.	  
189	  Joined	  Cases	  C-­‐397/01	  to	  C-­‐403/01	  Pfeiffer	  (n	  183)	  para	  119.	  	  
190	  Case	  14/83	  von	  Colson	  (n	  187)	  para	  26.	  
191	  Case	  C-­‐106/89	  Marleasing	  [1990]	  ECR	  I-­‐4135,	  para	  8.	  
192	  Case	  C-­‐456/98	  Centrosteel	  v	  Adipol	  [2000]	  ECR	  I-­‐6007,	  para	  17.	  	  
193	  W	  van	  Gerven,	  'Non-­‐Contractual	  Liability	  of	  Member	  States,	  Community	  Institutions	  and	  Individuals	  for	  
Breaches	  of	  Community	  Law	  with	   a	  View	   to	   a	  Common	  Law	   for	  Europe'	   (1994)	  1	  Maastricht	   Journal	   of	  
European	  and	  Comparative	  Law	  6,	  11-­‐12.	  	  
194	   JDN	  Bates,	   'The	   Impact	   of	  Directives	  on	   Statutory	   Interpretation:	  Using	   the	  Euro-­‐Meaning?'	   (1986)	  7	  
Statute	  Law	  Review	  174,	  185.	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correctly	   implemented	  a	  directive	   and	   consistent	   interpretation	  which,	   in	   a	   temporary	  
fashion,	  seems	  to	  compensate	  faulty	  or	  lacking	  implementation,	  Prechal	  has	  introduced	  
the	  terms	  ‘judicial	  implementation’	  and	  ‘remedial	  interpretation’,	  respectively.195	  
By	   the	   duty	   of	   consistent	   interpretation,	   the	   Court	   imposes	   upon	   national	   courts	   an	  
obligation	  to	  apply	  teleological	  interpretation	  that	  takes	  account	  of	  the	  objectives	  sought	  
by	   the	   directive.	   The	   possibilities	   of	   a	   national	   court	   to	   interpret	   national	   law	   in	  
conformity	  with	  EU	  law	  are	  limited	  by	  the	  national	  legislation.	  Firstly,	  there	  needs	  to	  be	  
national	   law	   in	   place	   and,	   secondly,	   it	   must	   be	   possible	   to	   interpret	   the	   national	  
provision	   in	   a	   directive-­‐conform	  manner.196	   Furthermore,	   the	   national	   legal	   traditions	  
play	  a	  role,	  notably	  in	  the	  form	  of	  the	  methods	  of	   interpretation	  that	  are	  recognised	  by	  
the	   national	   legal	   system197	   and	   within	   the	   limits	   of	   discretion	   provided	   in	   national	  
law.198	  A	  method	  of	   interpretation	  cannot,	  after	  all,	   replace	   legislative	  action.	  As	  a	  next	  
step	   of	   giving	   effect	   to	   a	   directive	   that	   has	   no	   direct	   effect	   and	   for	   the	   effective	  
implementation	   of	   which	   national	   law	   cannot	   be	   interpreted	   in	   a	   consistent	   manner,	  
recourse	  must	  be	  had	  to	  state	  liability.199	  
Further	  limitations	  to	  implementing	  the	  duty	  of	  consistent	  interpretation	  are	  of	  a	  more	  
substantive	   nature.	   They	   arise	   from	   general	   principles	   of	   law	   and	   serve	   to	   protect	  
individuals.	   The	   Court	   uses	   the	   same	   motivation	   to	   deny	   horizontal	   direct	   effect	   of	  
directives.200	  These	  general	  principles	   include,	   for	  example,	  those	  of	   legal	  certainty	  and	  
non-­‐retroactivity.201	  Crucial	  in	  the	  context	  of	  criminal	  law	  by	  virtue	  of	  the	  principle	  nulla	  
poena	  sine	  lege,	  the	  applicability	  of	  these	  principles	  in	  cases	  involving	  administrative	  and	  
civil	   law	   is,	   however,	   less	   clear.	   In	   the	   latter	   instances	   it	   must	   be	   ensured	   that	   an	  
individual	  is	  not	  placed	  in	  a	  situation	  that	  is	  less	  favourable	  as	  a	  result	  giving	  effect	  to	  a	  
directive	  which	  is	  otherwise	  not	  intended	  to	  have	  effects	  on	  individuals.202	  	  	  	  
                                            
195	  S	  Prechal,	  Directives	  in	  EC	  law	  (Oxford	  University	  Press	  2006)	  190-­‐191.	  
196	  T	  Tridimas,	   'Horizontal	  Effect	  of	  Directives:	  A	  Missed	  Opportunity?'	   (1994)	  19	  European	  Law	  Review	  
621,	  624.	  
197	  Joined	  Cases	  C-­‐397/01	  to	  C-­‐403/01	  Pfeiffer	  (n	  183)	  para	  116.	  
198	  Case	  14/83	  von	  Colson	  (n	  187)	  para	  28.	  
199	  Case	  C-­‐91/92	  Faccini	  Dori	  v	  Recreb	  [1994]	  ECR	  I-­‐3325,	  para	  27.	  
200	  Case	  152/84	  Marshall	  [1986]	  ECR	  723,	  para	  48.	  
201	  Case	  80/86	  Kolpinghuis	  Nijmegen	  [1987]	  ECR	  3969,	  para13.	  
202	  G	  Betlem	  (n	  184)	  407.	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In	   addition	   to	   directive-­‐conform	   interpretation,	   the	   EU	   also	   faces	   the	   question	   of	  
accommodating	   international	   law	   within	   its	   legal	   system.	   Pursuant	   to	   Article	   216(2)	  
TFEU,	  international	  agreements	  concluded	  by	  the	  EU	  are	  binding	  upon	  the	  institutions	  of	  
the	  Union	  and	  on	   the	  Member	  States.	  The	  Court	  has	  extended	  a	   formula	  similar	   to	  von	  
Colson	   to	  the	  consistent	  interpretation	  of	  EU	  secondary	  law	  in	  the	  light	  of	   international	  
law.	   In	   Commission	   v	   Germany,	   the	   Court	   drew	   parallels	   between	   the	   consistent	  
interpretation	   of	   EU	   secondary	   law	   in	   relation	   to	   EU	   primary	   law,	   implementing	  
regulations	   in	  relation	  to	  basic	  regulations	  and,	   finally,	  secondary	  EU	  law	  in	  relation	  to	  
international	  agreements	  concluded	  by	  the	  EU.203	  The	  latter	  aspect	  emerges	  from	  the	  fact	  
that	   in	   the	  EU	   legal	   order,	   international	   agreements	   enjoy	  primacy	  over	   secondary	  EU	  
law	  but	  not	  over	  the	  Treaties.204	  	  
Notably,	   in	   the	   case	   law	   referred	   to	   the	   Court	   developed	   the	   duty	   of	   consistent	  
interpretation	   from	   the	   rank	  of	   the	   international	   law	  obligation	  vis-­à-­vis	   secondary	  EU	  
law	  rather	  than	  from	  the	  need	  to	  guarantee	  the	  effet	  utile	  of	  binding	  international	  law	  in	  
the	  EU	  legal	  order.	  The	  Court	  did,	  however,	  adopt	  a	  teleological	  approach.	  For	  example,	  
in	  Walz	   the	  Court	  made	  an	  explicit	   reference	   to	   the	  aim	  of	   the	  Montreal	  Convention	   to	  
unify	   the	   rules	   of	   international	   carriage	   by	   air	   and	   the	   respective	   obligation	   of	   the	  
contracting	  parties	  to	  give	  the	  term	  ‘damage’	  ‘a	  uniform	  and	  autonomous	  interpretation’	  
irrespective	   of	   the	   different	   meanings	   that	   the	   concept	   has	   in	   the	   national	   legal	  
systems.205	  Following	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  correct	  interpretation	  of	  the	  term	  in	  the	  light	  of	  
Article	  31	  VCLT,	  the	  Court	  concluded	  that	  ‘damage’	  should	  be	  given	  the	  meaning	  which	  is	  
not	   laid	   down	   in	   an	   international	   agreement	   but	   which	   instead	   is	   ‘common	   to	   all	   the	  
international	   law	   sub-­‐systems’,	   referring	   to	   Article	   31(2)	   of	   the	   International	   Law	  
Commission	   (ILC)	   Draft	   Articles	   on	   the	   Responsibility	   of	   States	   for	   Internationally	  
Wrongful	  Acts	  (ARSIWA).206	  	  
The	   duty	   of	   consistent	   interpretation	   is	   not	   limited	   to	   international	   agreements	   but	  
applies	   equally	   to	   other	   sources	   of	   international	   law,	   such	   as	   the	   decisions	   of	  
                                            
203	   Case	   C-­‐61/94	  Commission	   v	  Germany	   [1996]	   ECR	   I-­‐3989,	   para	   52;	   Case	   C-­‐311/04	  Algemene	   Scheeps	  
Agentuur	  Dordrecht	  [2006]	  ECR	  I-­‐609,	  para	  25;	  Joined	  Cases	  C-­‐447/05	  and	  C-­‐448/05	  Thomson	  and	  Vestel	  
France	  [2007]	  ECR	  I-­‐2049,	  para	  30.	  
204	  See	  above	  section	  3.2.	  
205	  Case	  C-­‐63/09	  Walz	  v	  Clickair	  SA	  [2010]	  I-­‐4239,	  para	  21.	  
206	  ibid	  para	  27.	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international	  organisations	  or	  treaty	  bodies	  which	  are	  binding	  on	  the	  EU	  either	  directly	  
or	  through	  the	  Member	  States;207	  customary	  international	  law;208	  and	  even	  non-­‐binding	  
recommendations.209	   In	  analogy	  to	   the	  doctrine	  of	  consistent	   interpretation	  of	  national	  
law	   with	   EU	   law,	   the	   latter	   even	   applies,	   and	   assumes	   special	   relevance,	   when	   the	  
international	   law	   rule	   is	   not	   directly	   effective210	   because	   international	   law	   obligations	  
have	  to	  be	  performed	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  principle	  of	  good	  faith.211	  	  
All	   in	   all,	   the	   requirement	   of	   consistent	   interpretation	   accorded	   by	   the	   Court	   to	  
international	  law	  is	  a	  sign	  of	  respect	  of	  the	  Union	  towards	  international	  law	  and	  towards	  
the	   commitments	   it	   has	   assumed	  under	   international	   law.212	  This	   applies	   especially	   to	  
the	  direct	  references	  to	  Article	  31	  VCLT	  that	  binds	  the	  EU	  and	  some	  of	  its	  Member	  States	  
only	  by	  virtue	  of	  the	  customary	  law	  nature	  of	  the	  provision.213	  	  
4.1.3	  Multilateral	  agreements	  exporting	  EU	  internal	  market	  acquis	  
The	   interpretation	  of	   international	  agreements,	   including	   those	   that	   contain	  EU	  acquis,	  
by	  national	  courts	   is	  subject	  to	  the	  choice	  of	   interpretation	  methods	  and	  procedures	  of	  
the	   states	   in	   question.	   Since	   the	   multilateral	   agreements	   exporting	   the	   acquis	   can	   be	  
considered	   to	   be	   ‘regimes’	   under	   the	   regime	   theory	   of	   international	   relations,	   one	   can	  
assume	   that	   the	   states	   parties	   to	   the	   agreements,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   EU,	   would	   be	   more	  
inclined	   to	   adopt	   a	   teleological	   approach	  when	   interpreting	   the	   agreements.	   There	   is,	  
however,	   no	   guarantee	   for	   the	   national	   courts	   to	   do	   so.	   This	   can	   be	  witnessed	   in	   the	  
example	  of	  the	  EU	  and	  the	  practice	  of	  the	  Member	  States	  interpreting	  national	  law	  in	  the	  
light	   of	   EU	   law.	   The	   development	   of	   the	   doctrine	   of	   consistent	   interpretation	  
                                            
207	  Case	  30/88	  Greece	  v	  Commission	  [1989]	  ECR	  3711,	  para	  13;	  Case	  C-­‐192/89	  Sevince	  [1990]	  ECR	  I-­‐3461,	  
para	  14.	  
208	  Case	  C-­‐286/90	  Poulsen	  and	  Diva	  Navigation	  Corp.	  [1992]	  ECR	  I-­‐6019,	  para	  9.	  
209	  Case	  C-­‐188/91	  Deutsche	  Shell	  [1993]	  ECR	  I-­‐363,	  para	  18.	  	  
210	  Case	  C-­‐335/05	  Řízení	  Letového	  Provozu	  ČR	  [2007]	  ECR	  I-­‐4307,	  para	  16.	  	  
211	  Case	  C-­‐308/06	  Intertanko	  [2008]	  ECR	  I-­‐4057,	  para	  52.	  	  
212	   F	   Casolari,	   'Giving	   Indirect	   Effect	   to	   International	   Law	   within	   the	   EU	   Legal	   Order:	   The	   Doctrine	   of	  
Consistent	  Interpretation'	  in	  E	  Cannizzaro,	  P	  Palchetti	  and	  RA	  Wessel	  (eds),	  International	  Law	  as	  Law	  of	  the	  
European	  Union	  (Martinus	  Nijhoff	  Publishers	  2012)	  395,	  405-­‐406.	  
213	  Opinion	  1/91	  EEA	  I	  (n	  2)	  para	  14;	  Case	  C-­‐312/91	  Metalsa	  [1993]	  ECR	  I-­‐3751,	  para	  12;	  Case	  C-­‐416/96	  
Eddline	  El-­Yassini	  [1999]	  ECR	  I-­‐1209,	  para	  47;	  Case	  C-­‐268/99	  Jany	  and	  Others	  [2001]	  ECR	  I-­‐8615,	  para	  35;	  
Case	  C-­‐386/08	  Brita	   [2010]	  ECR	   I-­‐1289,	  paras	  39-­‐42;	  Case	  C-­‐63/09	  Walz	  v	  Clickair	   SA	   (n	  205)	  para	  23;	  
Case	  C-­‐410/11	  Espada	  Sánches	  (Court	  of	  Justice,	  22	  November	  2012),	  paras	  20-­‐21.	  The	  EU	  is	  not	  party	  to	  
the	   1986	   Vienna	   Convention	   on	   the	   Law	   of	   Treaties	   between	   States	   and	   International	   Organizations	   or	  
between	  International	  Organizations.	  
 
	   186 
demonstrates	   that	   the	   Court	   perceived	   it	   necessary	   to	   enhance	   the	   qualitative	   level	   of	  
implementation,	   or	   the	   effectiveness,	   of	   EU	   law	   by	   placing	   on	   the	   Member	   States	   an	  
explicit	   obligation	   to	   adopt	   conforming	   interpretation	   rather	   than	   relying	   on	   the	  
interpretative	  practices	  of	  the	  national	  courts.	  In	  this	  vein,	  it	  is	  perhaps	  unreasonable	  to	  
expect	  a	  level	  of	  market	  integration	  similar	  to	  the	  EU	  to	  be	  achieved	  in	  an	  extended	  EU	  
internal	   market	   without	   the	   multilateral	   agreements	   featuring	   similar	   duties	   and	  
enforcement	  mechanisms	  as	  concerns	  consistent	  interpretation.	  
The	  question	  of	   interpreting	  the	  multilateral	  agreements	  exporting	  the	   internal	  market	  
acquis	  has	   two	  dimensions.	  The	   first	   concerns	   the	  consistent	   interpretation	  of	  national	  
legislation	   in	   the	   light	   of	   the	   multilateral	   agreements,	   and	   the	   second	   the	   uniform	  
interpretation	  and	  application	  of	  the	  agreements	  and	  the	  corresponding	  EU	  law.	  The	  EEA	  
Agreement,	  the	  ECT	  and	  the	  ECAA	  Agreement	  all	  provide	  rules	  on	  interpretation	  for	  the	  
purpose	  of	  preserving	  homogeneous	  interpretation	  of	  the	  agreements.214	  In	  the	  absence	  
of	  guidelines	  to	  the	  contracting	  parties	  as	  regards	  consistent	  interpretation,	  it	  is	  for	  the	  
national	  courts	  to	  decide	  which	  approach	  they	  adopt	  when	  interpreting	  the	  provisions	  of	  
the	  agreements	  in	  the	  national	  legal	  orders.	  	  
In	  the	  EFTA	  pillar	  of	  the	  EEA,	  the	  EFTA	  Court	  has	  adopted	  a	  similar	  effectiveness-­‐driven	  
approach	   to	   interpreting	   EEA	   law	   as	   the	   Court	   of	   Justice.	   In	  Karlsson,	   the	   EFTA	   Court	  
ruled	  that	  although	  EEA	  law	  does	  not	  prescribe	  the	  direct	  effect	  of	  unimplemented	  EEA	  
rules	   before	   national	   courts	   because	   the	   EEA	   lacks	   legislative	   powers	   the	   domestic	  
courts	   of	   EEA	   EFTA	   States	   must,	   nevertheless,	   take	   into	   consideration	   ‘any	   relevant	  
element	  of	  EEA	  law,	  whether	  implemented	  or	  not	  when	  interpreting	  national	  law’.215	  The	  
direct	  effect	  of	  unimplemented	  EEA	  law	  is,	  therefore,	  replaced	  by	  the	  duty	  of	  consistent	  
interpretation.	   This	   duty	   derives	   from	   the	   ‘general	   objective	   of	   the	   EEA	   Agreement	   of	  
establishing	   a	   dynamic	   and	   homogeneous	   market,	   in	   the	   ensuing	   emphasis	   on	   the	  
judicial	   defence	   and	   enforcement	   of	   the	   rights	   of	   individuals,	   as	   well	   as	   in	   the	   public	  
                                            
214	  Recital	  15,	  Preamble	  to	  the	  EEA	  Agreement	  and	  Articles	  6,	  58,	  105,	  106,	  111	  EEA	  Agreement;	  Article	  94	  
ECT;	  Articles	  16,	  18,	  20	  ECAA	  Agreement	  as	  well	  as	  a	  number	  of	   references	   in	   the	  Annexes	   to	   the	  ECAA	  
Agreement.	  
215	  Case	  E-­‐4/01	  Karlsson	  [2002]	  EFTA	  Ct	  Rep	  240,	  para	  28.	  
 
	   187 
international	  law	  principle	  of	  effectiveness’.216	  In	  this	  judgment,	  the	  EFTA	  Court	  followed	  
closely	  the	  case	  law	  of	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice	  on	  consistent	  interpretation.	  	  
In	   Criminal	   proceedings	   against	   A,	   the	   EFTA	   Court	   reiterated	   its	   argumentation	   in	  
Karlsson.	  The	  EFTA	  Court	  took	  a	  result-­‐oriented	  approach	  towards	  the	  interpretation	  of	  
the	   EEA	   rule	   in	   question	   by	   employing	   to	   the	   largest	   extent	   possible	   the	   methods	   of	  
interpretation	   recognised	   by	   national	   law.217	   The	   EFTA	   Court	   has,	   however,	   restricted	  
the	  possibility	  of	  relying	  on	  provisions	  of	  EU	   law	  that	  have	  not	  been	  made	  part	  of	  EEA	  
law.218	   The	   possibility	   of	   considering	   EU	   law	   is	   limited	   to	   considering	   the	   level	   of	  
harmonisation	  reached	  in	  the	  EU	  legal	  order	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  ensuring	  homogeneity	  and	  
uniform	   conditions	   for	   competition	   in	   the	   EEA	   but	   not	   allowing	   for	   individuals	   to	  
‘normally’	  invoke	  provisions	  of	  EU	  law.219	  	  
Neither	   the	  ECT	  nor	   the	  ECAA	  Agreement	  establish	  a	   supranational	   judiciary	  endowed	  
with	   the	   powers	   to	   enforce	   the	   principle	   of	   consistent	   interpretation	   of	   national	   laws	  
with	  EU	  acquis,220	  yet	  it	  must	  be	  borne	  in	  mind	  that	  non-­‐performance	  of	  the	  obligations	  
assumed	   under	   the	   agreements	   will	   entail	   the	   responsibility	   of	   the	   state	   vis-­à-­vis	   the	  
other	  contracting	  parties.	  	  
The	   consistent	   interpretation	   of	   EU	   law	   and	   the	   identical	   acquis	   exported	   by	   the	  
multilateral	  agreements	  is	  best	  exemplified	  by	  the	  Polydor	  doctrine	  and	  the	  subsequent	  
case	  law.	  The	  Polydor	  case	  concerned	  the	  interpretation	  of	  a	  provision	  of	  the	  1972	  EEC-­‐
Portugal	  FTA.	  The	  case	  concerned	  two	  British	  companies	  that	  were	  selling	  in	  the	  United	  
Kingdom	   records	   imported	   from	   a	   Portuguese	   producer.	   The	   records	   did	   not	   comply	  
with	  United	  Kingdom	  copyright	  laws	  and,	  subsequently,	  a	  copyright	  infringement	  action	  
was	  brought	  against	  the	  companies.	  The	  defendants	  relied	  on	  the	  provision	  in	  the	  FTA	  on	  
the	   abolition	   of	   restrictions	   to	   trade	   in	   goods	   that	   have	   been	   lawfully	   placed	   on	   the	  
market	   in	   Portugal	   that	   replicated	   provisions	   of	   the	   EEC	   Treaty.	   The	   Court	   of	   Justice,	  
however,	   refused	   to	   interpret	   the	   provision	   of	   the	   FTA	   in	   a	   manner	   identical	   to	   the	  
corresponding	  provisions	  of	   the	  EEC	  Treaty.	  The	  Polydor	   case,	   thus,	  demonstrated	   that	  
                                            
216	  ibid.	  
217	  Case	  E-­‐1/07	  Criminal	  proceedings	  against	  A	  (n	  119)	  para	  39.	  
218	  Joined	  Cases	  E-­‐5/04,	  E-­‐6/04,	  and	  E-­‐7/04	  Fesil	  and	  Finnfjord	  [2005]	  EFTA	  Ct	  Rep	  117,	  para	  110.	  
219	  ibid.	  
220	  The	  exception	   is	   the	  possibility	  of	   the	  Court	   to	   give	  a	  preliminary	   ruling	  on	   the	   interpretation	  of	   the	  
ECAA	  Agreement.	  See	  further	  below	  chapter	  7	  section	  3.2.4.	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identical	   wording	   of	   provisions	   contained	   in	   the	   EU	   Treaties	   and	   in	   international	  
agreements	  does	  not	  entail	  automatic	  uniformity	  of	  interpretation.	  	  
The	   Court	   maintained	   that	   the	   interpretation	   of	   the	   EEC	   Treaty	   follows	   from	   its	  
objectives	  and	  purpose.221	  The	  provisions	  of	  the	  FTA,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  must	  be	  given	  
an	   interpretation	   in	   the	   light	   of	   its	   own	   specific	   objectives.	  A	   comparison	  between	   the	  
objectives	  of	   the	  EEC	  Treaty	  and	   the	  FTA	  revealed	   the	  narrower	   scope	  of	   the	   latter.222	  
Subsequently,	  a	  mere	  similarity	  between	   the	  provisions	  of	   the	   two	  agreements	  did	  not	  
justify	   an	  extension	  of	   the	   interpretation	  given	   in	   the	   context	  of	   the	  EEC	  Treaty	   to	   the	  
provisions	   of	   the	   FTA.223	   The	   Polydor	   doctrine	   is	   fully	   in	   line	   with	   Article	   31	   VCLT	  
pursuant	  to	  which	  the	  provisions	  of	  an	   international	  agreement	  must	  be	   interpreted	  in	  
the	  light	  of	  objectives	  of	  that	  agreement	  specifically.	  	  	  
The	  Polydor	  doctrine	  has	  had	  a	  crucial	  impact	  on	  all	  attempts	  to	  extend	  the	  actual	  effect	  
of	  EU	  law	  beyond	  the	  Union	  by	  means	  of	  exporting	  internal	  market	  acquis.	   In	  order	  for	  
third	   country	   nationals	   to	   enjoy	   the	   same	   rights	   as	   conferred	   by	   the	   Treaties	   on	   EU	  
citizens,	   the	   international	   agreements	   exporting	   the	   acquis	   must	   contain	   similarly	  
worded	   provisions	   as	   well	   as	   demonstrate	   a	   similarity	   of	   objectives	   as	   concerns	   the	  
internal	   market.	   A	   mere	   free	   trade	   agreement	   does	   not	   entail	   such	   similarity	   of	  
objectives	  nor	  does	  it	  provide	  a	  guarantee	  for	  identical	  interpretation.	  
In	  a	  number	  of	  subsequent	  cases,	  the	  Court	  has	  elaborated	  on	  the	  principle	  that	  evolved	  
in	  Polydor	  with	  the	  aim	  of	  establishing	  whether	  provisions	  identical	  to	  EU	  law	  contained	  
in	  international	  agreements	  should	  be	  given	  the	  same	  interpretation	  as	  the	  acquis	  within	  
the	  Union.	  The	  Court	  has	  done	  so	  by	  assessing	  the	  aims	  pursued	  by	  each	  provision	  of	  the	  
international	  agreement	   in	  question	   in	   its	  particular	  context	  and	  making	  a	  comparison	  
between	   the	   objectives	   and	   context	   of	   the	   agreement	   and	   the	   EU	   Treaties.	   In	   some	  
instances	  the	  Court	  has	  considered	  that	  provisions	  of	  FTAs	  and	  association	  agreements	  
have	  satisfied	  the	  above	  criteria	  and	  have,	  thus,	  been	  interpreted	  in	  a	  manner	  identical	  to	  
the	  provisions	  of	  the	  EU	  Treaties,224	  in	  others	  it	  has	  not.225	  The	  determination	  is	  always	  
                                            
221	  Case	  270/80	  Polydor	  v	  Harlequin	  Records	  (n	  64)	  para	  16	  
222	  ibid	  paras	  16-­‐18.	  
223	  ibid	  paras	  15	  and	  18.	  
224	  For	  example,	  Case	  C-­‐207/91	  Eurim-­Pharm	  [1993]	  ECR	  I-­‐3723	  concerning	  the	  EEC-­‐Austria	  FTA;	  Case	  C-­‐
162/00	  Pokrzeptowicz-­Meyer	   [2002]	  ECR	  I-­‐1049	  concerning	  the	  EC-­‐Poland	  EA;	  Case	  C-­‐438/00	  Deutscher	  
 
	   189 
made	  with	  reference	  to	  a	  particular	  provision	  and	  does	  not	  extend	  to	  any	  international	  
agreement	  in	  its	  entirety.	  
In	  Pabst	  &	  Richarz,	  for	  example,	  the	  Court	  contended	  that	  a	  provision	  of	  the	  EEC-­‐Greece	  
Association	  Agreement,	  which	  was	  similar	  in	  wording	  to	  Article	  95	  of	  the	  EEC	  Treaty	  on	  
the	  prohibition	  of	  fiscal	  barriers	  to	  trade,	  ‘fulfils,	  within	  the	  framework	  of	  the	  Association	  
between	   the	  Community	  and	  Greece	   the	   same	   function	  as	   that	  of	  Article	  95’	  due	   to	   its	  
purpose	  of	  preparing	  the	  entry	  of	  Greece	  into	  the	  EEC.226	  Consequently,	  the	  Court	  ruled	  
that	  the	  ‘objective	  and	  nature’	  of	  the	  EEC-­‐Greece	  Association	  Agreement	  and	  the	  wording	  
of	   the	   specific	   provision	   required	   that	   within	   the	   Community	   spirits	   originating	   from	  
Greece	  must	  be	  treated	  equally	  vis-­à-­vis	  spirits	  originating	  from	  the	  Member	  States.227	  
In	  some	   instances,	   the	   institutional	  context	  of	   the	   international	  agreement,	   too,	  plays	  a	  
role	   in	   establishing	   the	   equivalence	   of	   the	   legal	   contexts	   of	   the	   EU	   Treaties	   and	   the	  
agreement.	  In	  A,	  the	  Court	  claimed	  that	  the	  same	  interpretation	  of	  the	  provisions	  on	  the	  
free	   movement	   of	   capital	   within	   the	   Community	   cannot	   be	   extended	   to	   capital	  
movements	  between	  the	  Community	  and	  third	  countries	  insofar	  as	  the	  mutual	  assistance	  
between	  competent	  authorities	  does	  not	  extend	  to	  the	  third	  countries	  in	  question.228	  The	  
Court	  maintained	  this	  requirement	  even	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  EEA	  Agreement.229	  	  	  
There	   is	   abundant	   case	   law	   of	   the	   Court	   on	   the	   interpretation	   of	   provisions	   of	  
international	   agreements	   including	   those	   that	   replicate	   EU	   acquis.	   The	   Court’s	  
interpretation	   of	   three	   (sets	   of)	   agreements	   –	   the	   EEC-­‐Turkey	   Association	   Agreement,	  
the	   bilateral	   agreements	   concluded	   between	   the	   EU	   and	   Switzerland	   and	   the	   EEA	  
Agreement	  –	  illustrate	  this	  point.	  Each	  of	  these	  agreements	  has	  a	  different	  scope	  and	  aim	  
at	  a	  different	  level	  of	  integration.	  	  
                                            
Handballbund	  [2003]	  ECR	  I-­‐4135	  concerning	  the	  EC-­‐Slovakia	  EA;	  Case	  C-­‐171/01	  Wählergruppe	  Gemeinsam	  
[2003]	  ECR	  I-­‐4301	  concerning	  the	  EEC-­‐Turkey	  Association	  Agreement;	  and	  Case	  C-­‐265/03	  Simutenkov	  (n	  
89)	  concerning	  the	  EC-­‐Russia	  PCA.	  
225	  For	  example,	  Case	  C-­‐312/91	  Metalsa	  (n	  213)	  concerning	  the	  EEC-­‐Austria	  FTA;	  Case	  C-­‐63/99	  Gloszczuk	  
[2001]	  ECR	  I-­‐6369	  concerning	  the	  EC-­‐Poland	  EA;	  Case	  C-­‐235/99	  Kondova	  [2001]	  ECR	  I-­‐6427	  and	  Case	  C-­‐
101/10	  Pavlov	  and	  Famira	  [2011]	  ECR	  I-­‐5951	  concerning	  the	  EC-­‐Bulgaria	  EA;	  and	  Case	  C-­‐257/99	  Barkoci	  
and	  Malik	  [2001]	  ECR	  I-­‐6557	  concerning	  the	  EC-­‐Czech	  EA.	  	  
226	  Case	  17/81	  Pabst	  &	  Richarz	  [1982]	  ECR	  1331,	  para	  26.	  
227	  ibid	  para	  27.	  
228	  Case	  C-­‐101/05	  A	  [2007]	  ECR	  I-­‐11531,	  paras	  60-­‐63.	  
229	   Case	   C-­‐72/09	   Établissements	   Rimbaud	   [2010]	   ECR	   I-­‐10659,	   para	   40;	   Case	   C-­‐48/11	   Veronsaajien	  
oikeudenvalvontayksikkö	   (Court	   of	   Justice,	   19	   July	   2012),	   para	   34.	   In	   the	   former,	   the	   conditions	   for	  
administrative	  assistance	  were	  not	  satisfied,	  in	  the	  latter	  they	  were.	  
 
	   190 
The	   Polydor	   doctrine	   established	   that	   in	   order	   for	   the	   Court	   of	   Justice	   to	   interpret	  
similarly	  worded	  provisions	   in	   international	  agreements	   in	   line	  with	  the	   interpretation	  
of	   EU	   law,	   the	   substantive	   content	   of	   the	   respective	   provisions,	   the	   objective	   of	   the	  
agreement	  and	  the	  institutional	  and	  procedural	  context	  must	  be	  comparable.	  On	  several	  
occasions,	   the	  Court	  has	  ruled	  that	  the	  free	  movement	  of	  Turkish	  workers	   in	  the	  EU	  as	  
provided	   in	   the	   EEC-­‐Turkey	   Agreement	   is	   limited	   and	   does	   not	   comprise	   a	   general	  
freedom	   of	   movement	   that	   applies	   to	   EU	   citizens.230	   Third	   country	   nationals	   may,	   in	  
general,	  enjoy	  the	  same	  freedom	  from	  discrimination	  on	  grounds	  of	  nationality	  provided	  
that	  they	  belong	  to	  the	  privileged	  categories	  of	  long-­‐term	  residents	  or	  family	  members	  or	  
that	  the	  principle	  extends	  to	  them	  by	  virtue	  of	  an	  international	  agreement.231	  	  
Demirkan	   is	  a	  good	  example	  of	  how	  the	  Court	  delimits	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  free	  movement	  
provisions	   in	   the	  EEC-­‐Turkey	  Agreement.232	  Demirkan	   concerned	   a	   standstill	   clause	   in	  
the	   Additional	   Protocol	   to	   the	   EEC-­‐Turkey	   Agreement	   that	   restricted	   the	   contracting	  
parties	  to	  adopt	  new	  barriers	  to	  the	  freedom	  to	  provide	  services	  after	  the	  conclusion	  of	  
the	   agreement.	   The	   standstill	   clause	   became	   binding	   on	   Germany	   in	   1973	   but,	  
nevertheless,	   in	   1980	   Germany	   introduced	   a	   visa	   requirement	   for	   Turkish	   nationals	  
travelling	  to	  Germany.	  In	  Soysal,	  the	  Court	  found	  that	  the	  visa	  requirement	  infringed	  the	  
standstill	  clause	  by	  erecting	  new	  barriers	  to	  the	  freedom	  of	  Turkish	  nationals	  to	  provide	  
services	  in	  the	  EU.233	  Demirkan,	  a	  Turkish	  national,	  applied	  for	  a	  German	  visa	  to	  visit	  a	  
relative	   in	   Germany	   but	   her	   application	   was	   rejected	   by	   the	   German	   authorities.	   The	  
applicant	   challenged	   the	   rejection	   in	   a	   German	   court	   arguing	   that	   because	   the	   visa	  
requirement	   restricted	  her	   freedom	  to	   receive	   services	   in	  Germany	   it	   also	  violated	   the	  
standstill	   clause.	   This	   argument	   was	   rejected	   by	   the	   Court.	   Previously,	   in	   Luisi	   and	  
Carbone	   the	   Court	   had	   interpreted	   the	   ‘freedom	   to	   provide	   services’	   as	   entailing	   a	  
passive	  dimension	  –	  the	  freedom	  of	  movement	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  receiving	  rather	  than	  
                                            
230	  For	  example,	  Case	  C-­‐171/95	  Tetik	  [1997]	  ECR	  1-­‐329,	  para	  29;	  Case	  C-­‐37/98	  Savas	  [2000]	  ECR	  1-­‐2927,	  
para	   59;	   Case	  C-­‐171/01	  Wählergruppe	  Gemeinsam	   (n	   224)	  para	  89;	   Case	  C-­‐325/05	  Derin	   [2007]	  ECR	   I-­‐
6495,	  para	  66.	  	  
231	  See	  S	  Boelaert-­‐Suominen,	  'Non-­‐EU	  Nationals	  and	  Council	  Directive	  2003/109/EC	  on	  the	  Status	  of	  Third-­‐
Country	   Nationals	   who	   are	   Long-­‐term	   Residents:	   Five	   Paces	   Forward	   and	   Possibly	   Three	   Paces	   Back'	  
(2005)	  42	  Common	  Market	  Law	  Review	  1011.	  
232	  Case	  C-­‐221/11	  Demirkan	  (Court	  of	  Justice,	  24	  September	  2013).	  
233	  Case	  C-­‐228/06	  Soysal	  and	  Savatli	  [2009]	  ECR	  I-­‐1031,	  paras	  57-­‐58.	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providing	   services.234	   In	  Demirkan,	   the	   Court	   decided	   not	   to	   extend	   the	   interpretation	  
given	   in	   Luigi	   and	   Carbone	   to	   the	   EEC-­‐Turkey	   Agreement.	   Resorting	   to	   the	   Polydor-­‐
doctrine,	   the	   Court	   found	   that	   the	   ’purely	   economic	   purpose’	   of	   the	   EEC-­‐Turkey	  
Agreement	   fell	   short	   of	   the	   purpose	   of	   the	   EU	  Treaties	   to	   ‘bring	   [...]	   about	   freedom	  of	  
movement	   for	  persons	  of	   a	   general	  nature’.235	  Pursuant	   to	   the	  Court,	   the	  protection	  of	  
passive	  freedom	  to	  provide	  services	  is	  part	  of	  the	  specific	  internal	  market	  objective	  –	  one	  
which	   distinguishes	   the	   EU	   Treaties	   from	   the	   EEC-­‐Turkey	   Agreement.236	   Demirkan	  
clearly	  demonstrates	  that	  it	  is	  not	  a	  given	  that	  a	  fundamental	  freedom	  retains	  the	  same	  
scope	   as	   within	   the	   EU	   when	   exported	   to	   third	   countries	   and	   extended	   to	   non-­‐EU	  
nationals.	  	  
There	   are	   two	  possibilities	   for	   analysing	   the	   application	  of	   the	  Polydor	   doctrine	   to	   the	  
EU-­‐Switzerland	   bilateral	   agreements.	   On	   the	   one	   hand,	   the	   bilateral	   agreements	   are	  
separate	  from	  one	  another	  and	  pursue	  their	  own	  objectives.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  however,	  
each	   bilateral	   agreement	   contributes	   to	   the	   comprehensive	   management	   of	   EU-­‐
Switzerland	   relations	   and	   must,	   thus,	   be	   seen	   in	   the	   overall	   context	   of	   the	   set	   of	  
agreements.237	   In	   Grimme,	   the	   Court	   adopted	   the	   latter,	   comprehensive	   way	   of	  
analysis.238	  The	  Court	  found	  that	  the	  objectives	  of	  the	  EU-­‐Swiss	  bilateral	  agreements	  as	  
regards	   the	   internal	  market	  were	  not	   comparable	   to	   those	  of	   the	  EEA	  Agreement.	  The	  
Court	  noted	  that	  by	  rejecting	  the	  EEA	  Agreement	  and	  refraining	  from	  implementing	  the	  
free	   movement	   of	   services	   and	   establishment	   Switzerland	   did	   not	   ‘join	   the	   internal	  
market	  of	  the	  Community’	  which	  is	  an	  ‘area	  of	  total	  freedom	  of	  movement	  analogous	  to	  
that	  provided	  by	  a	  national	  market’.239	  Therefore,	   the	  provisions	  of	   the	  EU-­‐Switzerland	  
bilateral	  agreements	  cannot	  automatically	  be	  interpreted	  in	  line	  with	  the	  corresponding	  
provisions	  of	  EU	  Treaties	  unless	   the	  agreement	   in	  question	  provides	  so	  explicitly.240	   In	  
Bergström,	   AG	   Mazák	   referred	   to	   Grimme	   to	   conclude	   that	   there	   is	   no	   automatic	  
                                            
234	  Joined	  Cases	  286/82	  and	  26/83	  Luisi	  and	  Carbone	  [1984]	  ECR	  377,	  para	  16.	  
235	  Case	  C-­‐221/11	  Demirkan	  (n	  232)	  paras	  44,	  51	  and	  53.	  
236	  ibid	  para	  56.	  
237	  This	  applies	  in	  particular	  to	  the	  ‘Bilateral	  I’	  set	  of	  seven	  agreements	  which	  are	  bound	  together	  by	  a	  so-­‐
called	   ‘guillotine	   clause’.	   All	   of	   the	   agreements	   entered	   into	   force	   together	   and	   none	   of	   them	   can	   be	  
terminated	  individually,	  see	  above	  chapter	  1	  section	  3.1.	  
238	  Case	  C-­‐351/08	  Grimme	  [2009]	  ECR	  I-­‐10777.	  
239	  ibid	  para	  27.	  
240	   ibid	   para	   29;	   Case	   C-­‐541/08	  Fokus	   Invest	   [2010]	   ECR	  I-­‐1025,	   para	  28;	   Case	   C-­‐70/09	  Hengartner	   and	  
Gasser	  [2010]	  ECR	  I-­‐7233,	  para	  42.	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equivalence	   of	   interpretation	   between	   the	   EU	   internal	   market	   provisions	   and	   the	  
provisions	  of	  the	  EC-­‐Switzerland	  bilateral	  agreements	  but	  that	  the	  latter	  instead	  need	  to	  
be	   interpreted	   in	   the	   light	   of	   the	   objectives	   of	   the	   bilateral	   agreements.241	   Surely,	   this	  
does	  not	  preclude	  the	  possibility	  of	  identical	  interpretation	  provided	  that	  in	  the	  relevant	  
fields	  the	  objectives	  of	  the	  Treaties	  and	  of	  the	  bilateral	  agreements	  are	  comparable.	  
In	   his	   Opinion	   in	  Ettwein,242	   AG	   Jääskinen	   reiterated	   the	   Court’s	   reasoning	   in	  Grimme.	  
The	  AG	  found	  that	  as	  regards	  the	  internal	  market	  and	  the	  four	  freedoms	  the	  aims	  of	  the	  
EEA	  Agreement	  are	  identical	  to	  those	  of	  the	  EU	  Treaties;	  identically	  worded	  provisions	  of	  
the	  EEA	  Agreement	  should,	  therefore,	  be	  given	  the	  same	  interpretation	  as	  the	  underlying	  
EU	   rules.243	   By	   rejecting	   the	   EEA	   Agreement	   in	   1992,	   Switzerland	   also	   discarded	   the	  
‘project	  of	  creating	  an	  integrated	  economic	  whole	  with	  a	  single	  market	  based	  on	  common	  
rules	   between	   its	   members’.244	   Instead,	   the	   EC-­‐Switzerland	   agreement	   on	   the	   free	  
movement	   of	   persons,	   which	   was	   the	   subject	   of	   the	   Opinion,	   merely	   aims	   at	   the	  
strengthening	   of	   relations	   ‘without	   any	   prospect	   of	   extending	   the	   application	   of	   the	  
fundamental	   freedoms	   in	   toto	   to	   the	   Swiss	   Confederation’,	   thus	   excluding	   identical	  
interpretation	   from	   taking	  place	  automatically.245	  The	  Court	   in	  Ettwein	   interpreted	   the	  
relevant	  provisions	  of	  the	  EC-­‐Switzerland	  agreement	  in	  the	  light	  of	  the	  agreement	  itself	  
without	  comparing	  the	  objectives	  of	  the	  agreement	  with	  those	  of	  the	  EU	  Treaties	  or	  the	  
EEA	  Agreement.246	  In	  spite	  of	  the	  lack	  of	  automaticity	  the	  Court	  deemed	  the	  objectives	  in	  
the	   particular	   case	   comparable	   and	   interpreted	   the	   relevant	   provisions	   of	   the	   EC-­‐
Switzerland	  agreement	  in	  light	  of	  the	  previous	  judgments	  its	  had	  given	  in	  the	  context	  of	  
the	  EU.	  
Among	   all	   international	   agreements	   concluded	   by	   the	   EU,	   the	   EEA	   Agreement	   comes	  
closest	  to	  the	  level	  of	  integration	  demonstrated	  by	  the	  EU	  internal	  market.	  Homogeneous	  
interpretation	   of	   EEA	   acquis	   with	   EU	   acquis	   is,	   moreover,	   pursued	   by	   Article	   6	   EEA	  
Agreement	  which	  provides	  that	  provisions	  of	  the	  EEA	  Agreement	  which	  are	  identical	  in	  
substance	  to	  EU	  acquis	  must	  be	  interpreted	  in	  conformity	  with	  the	  pre-­‐1992	  case	  law	  of	  
                                            
241	  Case	  C-­‐257/10	  Bergström	  [2011]	  ECR	  I-­‐13227,	  Opinion	  of	  AG	  Mazák,	  para	  45.	  
242	  Case	  C-­‐425/11	  Katja	  Ettwein	  (Court	  of	  Justice,	  18	  October	  2012),	  Opinion	  of	  AG	  Jääskinen.	  
243	  ibid	  para	  39.	  
244	  ibid	  para	  36.	  
245	  ibid	  paras	  36-­‐37	  and	  65.	  
246	  Case	  C-­‐425/11	  Katja	  Ettwein	  (Court	  of	  Justice,	  18	  October	  2012).	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the	   Court.	   Already	   before	   the	   conclusion	   of	   the	   EEA	   Agreement	   its	   objectives	   were	  
subject	   to	   scrutiny	  by	   the	  Court.	   In	  Opinion	  1/91,	   the	  Court,	   implicitly	   referring	   to	   the	  
Polydor	  doctrine,	  found	  that	  the	  identical	  wording	  of	  the	  provisions	  of	  the	  EC	  Treaty	  and	  
the	  EEA	  Agreement	  does	  not	  necessarily	  lead	  to	  their	  identical	  interpretation	  unless	  the	  
objectives	   of	   both	   treaties	   justify	   such	   analogous	   interpretation.247	   Even	   though	   the	  
internal	  market	  objectives	  of	  the	  EU	  and	  the	  EEA	  are	  roughly	  identical	  the	  Court	  found	  
that	   the	   free	   trade	   and	   competition	   rules	   in	   the	   EEC	   Treaty	   ‘far	   from	   being	   an	   end	   in	  
themselves’	   serve	   the	   purpose	   within	   the	   Community	   of	   ‘making	   concrete	   progress	  
towards	   European	   unity’.248	   Provisions	   ‘identical	   in	   their	   content	   or	   wording’	   by	  
themselves	   do	   not	   guarantee	   homogeneity	   between	   the	   EEC	   Treaty	   and	   the	   EEA	  
Agreement.249	  
The	   conclusions	   that	   the	   Court	   made	   in	   Opinion	   1/91	   regarding	   homogeneity	   were,	  
however,	  not	  fully	  endorsed	  by	  subsequent	  case	  law.	  In	  Opel	  Austria,	  the	  CFI	  rejected	  the	  
Council’s	  argument	  on	   the	  existence	  of	  major	  differences	  between	   the	  EU	  Treaties	  and	  
the	   EEA	   Agreement	   that	   would	   preclude	   an	   identical	   interpretation	   of	   Article	   10	   EEA	  
Agreement	  and	  the	  corresponding	  provision	  in	  the	  EC	  Treaty.250	  The	  CFI	  recognised	  the	  
difference	  between	  the	  aims	  and	  context	  of	  the	  EEA	  Agreement	  and	  Community	  law	  yet	  
did	   no	   perceive	   them	   as	   standing	   in	   the	  way	   of	   a	   homogeneous	   EEA.	   Instead,	   the	   CFI	  
deemed	  the	  integration	  objectives	  of	  the	  EEA	  Agreement	  to	  ‘exceed	  those	  of	  a	  mere	  free-­‐
trade	   agreement’,	   thus	   justifying	   the	   inapplicability	   of	   the	  Polydor	   doctrine.251	   The	  CFI	  
argued	  that	  the	  conclusions	  of	  Opinion	  1/91	  referred	  to	  the	  envisaged	  judicial	  system	  of	  
the	  EEA	  and	   its	   effect	  on	   the	  autonomy	  of	   the	  EU	   legal	  order	   rather	   than	   the	   identical	  
interpretation	   of	   similar	   provisions.252	   The	   EEA	  Agreement	   contains	   certain	   safeguard	  
clauses	   that	  allow	  the	   Joint	  Committee	   to	  refuse	   the	  entry	  of	  post-­‐1992	  acquis	   into	   the	  
EEA	  legal	  order,	  thus	  leading	  to	  derogations	  from	  substantive	  uniformity	  between	  the	  EU	  
and	  the	  EEA	  legal	  order.	  The	  CFI,	  however,	  regarded	  the	  possibility	  of	  derogations	  not	  to	  
                                            
247	  Opinion	  1/91	  EEA	  I	  (n	  2)	  para	  14.	  
248	  ibid	  paras	  15-­‐18.	  
249	  ibid	  para	  22.	  
250	  Case	  T-­‐115/94	  Opel	  Austria	  v	  Council	  (n	  99)	  paras	  105-­‐106.	  
251	  ibid	  paras	  106-­‐107.	  
252	  ibid	  para	  109.	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be	  of	   importance	   for	   the	  purpose	  of	   interpreting	  Article	  10	  EEA	  Agreement.253	  Certain	  
substantive	   derogations	   in	   the	   composition	   of	   the	   acquis	   should	   not	   render	   the	  
objectives	  of	  the	  EEA	  Agreement	  incomparable	  to	  EU	  law.	  	  	  
The	  arguments	  of	  the	  CFI	  in	  Opel	  Austria	  were	  refuted	  by	  AG	  Cosmas	  in	  Andersson.254	  The	  
case	  concerned	  the	  interpretation	  of	  Article	  6	  EEA	  Agreement	  with	  a	  view	  to	  determining	  
whether	   secondary	   EU	   law	   and	   principles	   established	   in	   the	   case	   law	   of	   the	   Court	   of	  
Justice	   –	   in	   this	   case	   the	  Francovich	   doctrine	   –	   can	   be	   applied	   in	   the	   EEA	   legal	   order.	  
Noting	  the	   ‘fundamental	  differences’	  between	  the	  EU	  and	  the	  EEA	  legal	  systems	  the	  AG	  
contended	   that	   the	   contexts	   are	   too	   different	   to	   transfer	   to	   the	   EEA	   the	   fundamental	  
principles	  of	  primacy,	  direct	  effect	  and	  state	  liability.255	  The	  analysis	  of	  AG	  Cosmas	  can	  be	  
considered	  correct	  but	  must	  be	  viewed	  in	  the	  specific	  context	  of	  the	  applicability	  of	  the	  
fundamental	  principles	  of	  the	  EU	  in	  the	  EEA	  Agreement	  that	  pertain	  to	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  
acquis	   outside	   the	   Union	   rather	   than	   the	   identical	   set	   of	   rights	   and	   obligations	  which	  
both	  EU	  and	  EEA	  EFTA	   citizens	   receive	   from	   the	  EU	  Treaties	   and	   the	  EEA	  Agreement,	  
respectively.	  As	  concerns	  the	  comparability	  of	  the	  objectives	  of	  the	  EEA	  Agreement	  and	  
the	  EU	  Treaties	   for	   the	  purpose	  of	   interpreting	  Article	  10	  EEA	  Agreement,	  AG	  Cosmas	  
fully	  endorsed	  the	  conclusions	  of	  the	  CFI	  in	  Opel	  Austria.256	   	  
The	  ‘notorious’	  differences	  in	  character	  between	  the	  EU	  and	  the	  EEA	  Treaties	  once	  noted	  
by	   AG	   Fennelly257	   have	   not	   been	   upheld	   in	   subsequent	   case	   law.	   In	   Ospelt,	   both	   AG	  
Geelhoed	  and	  the	  Court	  agreed	  that	  the	  objective	  of	  ‘the	  fullest	  possible	  realisation	  of	  the	  
free	   movement	   of	   goods,	   persons,	   services	   and	   capital	   within	   the	   whole	   European	  
Economic	   Area’	   adds	   up	   to	   an	   extension	   of	   the	   EU	   internal	   market	   to	   the	   EEA	   EFTA	  
States.258	   Exceptions	   occur	   only	   in	   situations	   where	   not	   all	   relevant	   rules	   that	   are	  
                                            
253	  ibid	  para	  110.	  
254	  Case	  C-­‐321/97	  Andersson	  and	  Wåkerås-­Andersson	  [1999]	  ECR	  I-­‐3551,	  Opinion	  of	  AG	  Cosmas.	  
255	  ibid	  para	  49.	  
256	  ibid	  n	  44.	  
257	  Case	  C-­‐110/95	  Yamanouchi	  [1997]	  ECR	  I-­‐3251,	  Opinion	  of	  AG	  Fennelly,	  para	  30.	  
258	   Case	   C-­‐452/01	   Ospelt	   [2003]	   ECR	   I-­‐9743,	   Opinion	   of	   AG	   Geelhoed,	   para	   69;	   Case	   C-­‐452/01	   Ospelt	  
[2003]	  ECR	   I-­‐9743,	  para	  29.	  The	  Court’s	   ruling	   in	  Ospelt	  has	  been	  confirmed	   in	  a	  number	  of	  subsequent	  
judgments,	   see	   H	   Haukeland	   Fredriksen,	   'Bridging	   the	  Widening	   Gap	   between	   the	   EU	   Treaties	   and	   the	  
Agreement	  on	  the	  European	  Economic	  Area'	  (2012)	  18	  European	  Law	  Journal	  868,	  873-­‐875.	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relevant	  to	  the	  identical	  interpretation	  and	  application	  of	  a	  povisions	  of	  EEA	  law	  and	  the	  
underlying	  EU	  law	  provisions	  have	  been	  made	  part	  of	  the	  EEA	  legal	  order.259	  	  
Several	  authors	  have	  shared	  the	  view	  that	  the	  internal	  market	  has	  been	  ‘extended’	  to	  the	  
EEA	  EFTA	  States.260	  To	  the	  extent	  that	  the	  EU	  Treaties	  and	  the	  EEA	  Agreement	   feature	  
similar	   provisions	   on	   the	   free	   movement	   of	   capital	   as	   well	   as	   similar	   objectives	   and	  
context,	  the	  provision	  itself	  and	  permissible	  restrictions	  must	  ‘as	  far	  as	  possible’	  be	  given	  
identical	   interpretation.261	  Commentators,	  too,	  agree	  that	  the	  Polydor	  doctrine	  does	  not	  
apply	   to	   the	   EEA	   Agreement	   to	   the	   effect	   of	   precluding	   identical	   interpretation	   of	  
provisions	  which	  are	   identical	   in	  substance.262	  On	   the	  one	  hand,	  compared	   to	   the	  EEC-­‐
Portugal	   FTA,	   the	   EEA	   Agreement	   envisages	   much	   deeper	   cooperation.	   On	   the	   other	  
hand,	  Article	  6	  EEA	  Agreement	  precludes	  conflicting	  interpretations,	  at	  least	  with	  regard	  
to	   pre-­‐signature	   case	   law.	  Moreover,	   although	   the	   EEA	   Agreement	   does	   not	   include	   a	  
reference	   to	   the	   peoples	   of	   the	   EU	   and	   the	   EEA	   EFTA	   States	   as	   did	   the	   original	   EEC	  
Treaty,	   the	   preamble	   to	   the	   EEA	   Agreement	   does	   speak	   of	   ‘the	   important	   role	   that	  
individuals	  will	  play	   in	   the	  European	  Economic	  Area	   through	  the	  exercise	  of	   the	  rights	  
conferred	  on	  them	  by	  this	  Agreement	  and	  through	  the	  judicial	  defence	  of	  these	  rights’.263	  
Importantly,	  Recital	  8	  was	  only	  added	  to	  the	  preamble	  to	  the	  draft	  EEA	  Agreement	  after	  
the	  Court	  had	  given	   its	  Opinion	  1/91.264	  Compared	  to	  both	   the	  EEC-­‐Turkey	  Agreement	  
and	   the	   EU-­‐Switzerland	   bilateral	   agreements,	   therefore,	   the	   objectives	   of	   the	   EEA	  
Agreement	  do,	   indeed,	  to	  the	  extent	  of	  the	  internal	  market	  constitute	  a	  pre-­‐determined	  
guarantee	   for	   identical	   interpretation	   of	   identically	   worded	   acquis.	   The	   type	   of	   the	  
                                            
259	  Case	  C-­‐540/07	  Commission	  v	  Italy	  [2009]	  ECR	  I-­‐10983,	  paras	  68-­‐75.	  
260	  C	  Baudenbacher,	  'If	  Not	  EEA	  State	  Liability,	  Then	  What’	  (n	  118)	  333;	  H	  Haukeland	  Fredriksen,	  ‘Bridging	  
the	  Widening	  Gap	  between	  the	  EU	  Treaties	  and	  the	  Agreement	  on	  the	  European	  Economic	  Area'	  (n	  258)	  
883.	  	  
261	  Case	  C-­‐452/01	  Ospelt,	  Opinion	  of	  AG	  Geelhoed	  (n	  258)	  paras	  69-­‐71.	  
262	   S	  Norberg,	   ‘The	  European	  Economic	  Area’	   in	   PJ	  Oliver	   (ed),	   Oliver	   on	   Free	  Movement	   of	   Goods	   in	   the	  
European	  Union	  (Hart	  Publishing	  2010)	  487,	  493;	  C	  Baudenbacher,	  ‘The	  EFTA	  Court	  and	  Court	  of	  Justice	  of	  
the	  European	  Union’	  (n	  108)	  191.	  
263	  Recital	  8,	  Preamble	  to	  the	  EEA	  Agreement.	  
264	  H	  Haukeland	  Fredriksen,	  ‘The	  EFTA	  Court	  15	  Years	  on'	  (2010)	  59	  International	  and	  Comparative	  Law	  
Quarterly	  731,	  750.	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agreement	  plays	  no	  particular	  role	  here	  as	  all	  of	   the	  agreements	  discussed	  above	  have	  
been	  concluded	  as	  association	  agreements.265	  	  	  
Three	  recent	  judgments	  in	  cases	  United	  Kingdom	  v	  Council	  provided	  a	  unique	  occasion	  to	  
compare	  the	  objectives	  of	  the	  EEA	  Agreement,266	  the	  EC-­‐Switzerland	  Agreement	  on	  the	  
Free	   Movement	   of	   Persons,267	   and	   the	   EEC-­‐Turkey	   Agreement.268	   Although	   the	  
judgments	   do	   not	   concern	   the	   interpretation	   of	   identical	   provisions	   they	   illustrate	   the	  
considerations	   of	   the	   objective	   and	   context	   of	   the	   international	   agreements	  which	   can	  
and	   certainly	   will	   be	   taken	   into	   account	   should	   a	   question	   of	   identical	   interpretation	  
arise	  at	  a	   later	  point.	  Each	  of	   the	  cases	  concerned	  an	  annulment	  action	  brought	  by	   the	  
United	  Kingdom	  Government	  against	  a	  Council	  decision	  on	   the	  position	   to	  be	   taken	  on	  
behalf	  of	   the	  EU	   in	  accordance	  with	  Article	  218(9)	  TFEU	  by	  the	  bodies	   that	  amend	  the	  
three	   international	   agreements.	   The	   amendments	   in	   question	   concerned	   the	   adoption	  
into	  the	  EEA	  Agreement,	  the	  EC-­‐Switzerland	  Agreement	  and	  the	  EEC-­‐Turkey	  Agreement	  
of	  Regulation	  No	  883/2004	  on	  the	  coordination	  of	  social	  security	  systems	  that	  replaced	  
Regulation	   No	   1408/71.	   The	   United	   Kingdom	   Government	   claimed	   that	   the	   decisions	  
were	  adopted	  on	  a	  wrong	  legal	  basis.	  Instead	  of	  the	  internal	  market	  legal	  basis	  of	  Article	  
48	  TFEU,	   the	  United	  Kingdom	  argued	  that	   the	  contested	  Council	  decisions	  should	  have	  
been	  adopted	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  Article	  79(2)	  TFEU	  regulating	  EU	  immigration	  policy.	  The	  
United	  Kingdom	  may	  exercise	  an	  opt-­‐out	  from	  the	  latter.	  	  
In	  all	  of	  the	  three	  cases,	  the	  Court	  firmly	  overruled	  the	  United	  Kingdom’s	  arguments	  that	  
the	  amendments	  constituted	  immigration	  policy	  measures.	  The	  first	  judgment	  delivered	  
in	   Case	   C-­‐431/11	   concerned	   the	   EEA	   Agreement.	   The	   Court,	   firstly,	   cited	   its	   earlier	  
judgment	  in	  Ospelt	  on	  the	  objectives	  of	  the	  EEA	  Agreement	  to	  extend	  the	  internal	  market	  
to	   EEA	   EFTA	   States	   and	   found	   that	   the	   contested	   Regulation	   served	   precisely	   the	  
purpose	  of	  providing	  to	  EEA	  citizens	  the	  same	  social	  conditions	  for	  the	  exercise	  of	  their	  
free	   movement	   rights	   as	   those	   enjoyed	   by	   EU	   citizens.269	   In	   the	   case	   of	   the	   EC-­‐
                                            
265	  Among	  the	  bilateral	  agreements	  concluded	  with	  Switzerland,	  agreements	  belonging	  to	   ‘Bilateral	  I’	  are	  
association	  agreements	  but	  not	  those	  of	  the	  ‘Bilateral	  II’	  package.	  The	  Agreement	  on	  the	  Free	  Movement	  of	  
Persons	  is	  part	  of	  ‘Bilateral	  I’.	  See	  above	  chapter	  1	  section	  3.1.	  
266	  Case	  C-­‐431/11	  United	  Kingdom	  v	  Council	  (Court	  of	  Justice,	  26	  September	  2013).	  
267	  Case	  C-­‐656/11	  United	  Kingdom	  v	  Council	  (Court	  of	  Justice,	  27	  February	  2014).	  	  
268	  Case	  C-­‐81/13	  United	  Kingdom	  v	  Council	  (Court	  of	  Justice,	  18	  December	  2014).	  
269	  Case	  C-­‐431/11	  United	  Kingdom	  v	  Council	  (n	  266)	  paras	  50	  and	  58.	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Switzerland	   agreement,	   the	   Court	   did	   not	   use	   the	   language	   of	   extending	   the	   internal	  
market	   to	   Switzerland,	   probably	   due	   to	   the	   Swiss	   refusal	   to	   become	   party	   to	   the	   EEA	  
Agreement.	  Instead,	  the	  Court	  referred	  to	  the	  objective	  of	  the	  agreement	  to	  ‘bring	  about	  
between	  [the	  EC	  and	  Switzerland]	  the	  free	  movement	  of	  persons	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  rules	  
applying	  in	  the	  Community’.270	  	  
Both	   the	   EEA	   and	   the	   EC-­‐Switzerland	   agreements	   already	   contained	   EU	  acquis	   on	   the	  
approximation	  of	  social	  security	  systems	  with	  a	  view	  to	  ensure	  the	  effectiveness	  of	   the	  
free	  movement	  provisions.	  An	  update	  in	  EU	  acquis	  was	  necessary	  to	  incorporate	  changes	  
introduced	  by	   the	   Lisbon	  Treaty.	   In	   order	   to	   ensure	   the	   balance	   of	   rights	   between	  EU	  
citizens	  and	  the	  citizens	  of	  Iceland,	  Liechtenstein,	  Norway	  and	  Switzerland	  and	  ‘with	  the	  
result	   that	   nationals	   of	   the	   EEA	   States	   concerned	   benefit	   from	   the	   free	   movement	   of	  
persons	  under	   the	   same	   social	   conditions	   as	  EU	   citizens’	   required	  a	  due	  update	   in	   the	  
EEA	   and	   EU-­‐Swiss	   acquis	   on	   the	   free	   movement	   of	   persons	   but	   the	   scope	   of	   the	  
amendment	  in	  itself	  was	  not	  significant.271	  	  
The	  same	  does	  not	  hold	   true	   for	   the	  EEC-­‐Turkey	  Agreement.	  The	  objective	  of	   the	  EEC-­‐
Turkey	  Agreement	  is	  narrower	  than	  the	  fullest	  possible	  realisation	  of	  the	  free	  movement	  
of	  persons,	  stating	  merely	  the	  wish	  of	  the	  contracting	  parties	  to	  secure	  between	  them	  the	  
freedom	   of	   movement	   for	   workers	   in	   progressive	   stages,	   one	   of	   the	   stages	   being	   the	  
incorporation	  of	  the	  contested	  Regulation	  into	  the	  Agreement.272	  As	  set	  out	  in	  Demirkan	  
and	   other	   case	   law	   on	   the	   EEC-­‐Turkey	   Agreement,	   there	   is	   no	   general	   freedom	   of	  
movement	  between	  the	  EU	  and	  Turkey	  nor	  have	  the	  contracting	  parties	  completed	  the	  
progressive	  introduction	  of	  the	  free	  movement	  of	  workers	  provided	  in	  Article	  12	  of	  the	  
Agreement.	  In	  the	  judgment,	  the	  Court	  referred	  extensively	  to	  the	  previous	  judgments	  in	  
the	   cases	   concerning	   the	   EEA	   Agreement	   and	   the	   EC-­‐Switzerland	   Agreement.	   The	  
comparison	   of	   the	   three	   agreements	   led	   to	   a	   conclusion	   that	   as	   concerns	   the	   free	  
movement	   of	   persons	   the	   objective	   of	   the	   EEC-­‐Turkey	   Agreement	   was	   neither	  
comparable	   to	   the	   aims	   of	   the	   EEA	   Agreement	   nor	   those	   of	   the	   EC-­‐Switzerland	  
Agreement.273	  	  
                                            
270	  Case	  C-­‐656/11	  United	  Kingdom	  v	  Council	  (n	  267)	  para	  55.	  	  
271	  ibid	  para	  58.	  
272	  Case	  C-­‐81/13	  United	  Kingdom	  v	  Council	  (n	  268)	  paras	  43	  and	  45.	  
273	  ibid	  para	  57.	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The	  Court	  contended	  that	  the	  EEA	  EFTA	  States	  and	  Switzerland	  can	  be	   ‘equated	  with	  a	  
Member	  State	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  the	  application	  of	  those	  regulations’	  whereas	  Turkey	  
cannot.274	  Even	  the	  fact	  that	  Regulation	  No	  1408/71	  had	  been	  incorporated	  into	  the	  EEC-­‐
Turkey	  Agreement	  and	  the	  Additional	  Protocol	  similarly	  as	  to	  the	  EEA	  and	  the	  EC-­‐Swiss	  
agreements,	   it	   did	   not	   have	   the	   same	   effect	   of	   extending	   to	   Turkey	   the	   rules	   on	   the	  
coordination	   of	   social	   security	   systems.275	   As	   a	   result,	   Turkey	  was	   not	   covered	   by	   the	  
extension	  of	  the	  internal	  market	  in	  the	  way	  of	  the	  EEA	  EFTA	  States	  and	  Switzerland.	  In	  
the	  case	  at	  hand	  this	  meant	  that	   the	  Council	  decision	   in	  question	  could	  not	  be	  adopted	  
solely	   on	   the	   internal	   market	   legal	   basis	   of	   Article	   48	   TFEU	   but	   in	   conjunction	   with	  
Article	  217	  TFEU	  which	   is	   the	   legal	  basis	   for	  association	  agreements.276	  The	  additional	  
legal	   basis	   was	   intended	   to	   emphasize	   the	   distinction	   between	   the	   EEC-­‐Turkey	  
Agreement	  and	  the	  EEA	  and	  EC-­‐Switzerland	  agreements	  yet	  is	  somewhat	  puzzling	  as	  all	  
of	  the	  agreements	  are	  association	  agreements.	  The	  Court	  highlighted	  that	  the	  legal	  basis	  
of	  Article	  48	  TFEU	  may	  only	  be	  used	  on	  its	  own	  for	  adopting	  internal	  market	  measures	  
within	  the	  EU	  or	  in	  external	  action	  vis-­à-­vis	  non-­‐EU	  Member	  States	  that	  ‘can	  be	  placed	  on	  
the	  same	  footing’	  as	  EU	  Member	  States.277	  The	  difference	  between	  the	  decisions	  does	  not	  
lie	   within	   actual	   divergences	   in	   the	   application	   of	   Regulation	   883/2004	   in	   the	   third	  
countries	  concerned	  but	  rather	  in	  the	  perceived	  differences	  in	  the	  level	  of	  integration	  of	  
the	  third	  countries	  into	  the	  internal	  market.	  Both	  AG	  Kokott278	  and	  the	  Court279	  made	  it	  
explicit	  that	  the	  idea	  of	  extending	  the	  internal	  market	  to	  non-­‐EU	  Member	  States	  includes	  
not	   only	   the	   extension	   of	   free	   movement	   rights	   within	   the	   EU	   to	   the	   third	   country	  
nationals	  but	  also	  the	  free	  movement	  of	  EU	  nationals	  in	  the	  third	  countries	  in	  question.	  
Nationals	  of	   the	  EEA	  EFTA	  countries,	   furthermore,	  enjoy	   the	   internal	  market	   freedoms	  
even	  vis-­à-­vis	  each	  other.	   In	   this	  case,	   the	   individuals	  of	   Iceland,	  Liechtenstein,	  Norway	  
and	  Switzerland	  have,	   indeed,	  been	  placed	  on	  an	  equal	   footing	  with	  EU	  citizens.	   In	   the	  
case	  of	  Switzerland,	   this	  generalisation	  cannot	  automatically	  be	  carried	  on	   to	  all	  of	   the	  
                                            
274	  ibid.	  	  	  
275	  ibid	  para	  58.	  
276	  ibid	  paras	  59-­‐66.	  
277	  ibid	  para	  59.	  
278	  Case	  C-­‐431/11	  United	  Kingdom	  v	  Council	  (Court	  of	  Justice,	  26	  September	  2013),	  Opinion	  of	  AG	  Kokott,	  
para	  42.	  
279	  Case	  C-­‐431/11	  United	  Kingdom	  v	  Council	  (n	  266)	  para	  55.	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bilateral	   agreements	   because	   the	   EU-­‐Swiss	   cooperation	   lacks	   uniformity	   in	   the	   core	  
elements	  of	  the	  internal	  market	  –	  the	  four	  fundamental	  freedoms.	  	  
In	  Opinion	  1/91,	  the	  Court	  held	  that	  the	  fundamental	  freedoms	  were	  only	  one	  of	  several	  
possible	  means	   to	  achieve	   the	   internal	  market	  and	  economic	  and	  monetary	  union	  and,	  
eventually,	  greater	  European	  unity.280	  A	  reading	  of	  Opinion	  1/91	  in	  combination	  with	  the	  
judgments	  in	  the	  above-­‐mentioned	  cases	  United	  Kingdom	  v	  Council,	  however,	  reveals	  that	  
the	   Court	   is	   not	   likely	   to	   restrict	   the	   application	   of	   EU	   acquis	   in	   countries	   covered	   by	  
agreements	   that	   envisage	   deep	   regulatory	   integration.	   By	   2014,	   the	   Court’s	   careful	  
approach	  towards	  the	  EEA	  Agreement	  has	  been	  replaced	  by	  recognition	  of	  the	  possibility	  
of	   truly	   extending	   the	   internal	   market	   beyond	   the	   EU	   also	   in	   the	   light	   of	   the	   Polydor	  
principle.	   The	   facts	   of	   the	   cases	   above	   did	   not	   require	   the	   Court	   to	   comment	   on	   the	  
interpretation	  of	  EU	  acquis	  in	  the	  respective	  agreements	  yet	  the	  Court’s	  affirmation	  of	  an	  
extended	   internal	  market	  encourages	  one	   to	  assume	   that	   it	   is	  unlikely	   for	   the	  Court	   to	  
impede	  the	  functioning	  of	  the	  expanded	  internal	  market	  by	  refusing	  to	  interpret	  EEA	  or	  
even	   EU-­‐Swiss	   acquis	   which	   is	   identical	   in	   substance	   to	   the	   underlying	   EU	   acquis	  
differently	  from	  the	  latter.	  	  
The	   EFTA	   Court	   is	   very	   accommodating	   towards	   identical	   interpretation	   of	   identical	  
provisions	   of	   EU	   and	  EEA	   law.	  On	   the	   one	  hand,	   this	   friendliness	   can	  be	  derived	   from	  
Article	   6	   EEA	   Agreement	   that	   explicitly	   requires	   that	   the	   provisions	   of	   the	   EEA	  
Agreement	  which	  are	  identical	  to	  those	  of	  the	  EU	  Treaties	  be	  interpreted	  and	  applied	  in	  a	  
manner	  uniform	  with	  the	  pre-­‐signature	  case	  law	  of	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice.	  Article	  3	  of	  the	  
SCA	  provides	  that	  the	  EFTA	  Court	  also	  has	  to	  pay	  due	  account	  to	  later	  case	  law.	  On	  the	  
other	  hand,	  the	  duty	  of	  uniform	  interpretation	  stems	  from	  the	  ‘main	  objective	  of	  the	  EEA	  
Agreement	  [...]	  to	  create	  a	  homogeneous	  EEA’	  as	  provided	  by	  the	  EEA	  Agreement.281	  The	  
reasoning	   of	   the	   EFTA	   Court	   is	   effectiveness-­‐driven,	   thus	   corresponding	   to	   the	  
teleological	   approach	   of	   the	   Court	   of	   Justice.282	   According	   to	   the	   EFTA	   Court,	   the	  
homogeneity	  principle	  sets	  the	  foundation	  for	  a	  presumption	  that	  identical	  provisions	  of	  
                                            
280	  Opinion	  1/91	  EEA	  I	  (n	  2)	  para	  19.	  	  
281	  Joined	  Cases	  E-­‐9/07	  and	  E-­‐10/07	  L’Oréal	  [2008]	  EFTA	  Ct	  Rep	  259,	  para	  27.	  	  
282	  ‘Homogeneous	  interpretation	  and	  application	  of	  common	  rules	  is	  essential	  for	  the	  effective	  functioning	  
of	  the	  internal	  market	  within	  the	  EEA’:	  ibid.	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EU	   and	   the	   EEA	   treaties	   are	   to	   be	   interpreted	   in	   a	   similar	   manner.283	   Diverging	  
interpretations	  are	  justified	  only	  in	  cases	  where	  the	  differences	  in	  the	  scope	  and	  purpose	  
of	  the	  respective	  treaties	  so	  demand.284	  Justification	  cannot,	  however,	  be	  granted	  on	  the	  
basis	  of	  any	  unilateral	  expression	  of	  understanding	  made	  by	   the	  contracting	  parties.285	  
The	  threshold	  for	  the	  EEA	  EFTA	  States	  to	  prove	  the	  compelling	  circumstances	  that	  would	  
justify	   diverging	   interpretation	   of	   EEA	   law	   from	   EU	   law	   is	   very	   high	   rendering	   the	  
homogeneity	  guarantee	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  EFTA	  Court,	  in	  turn,	  very	  strong.286	  Neither	  does	  
the	  EEA	  legal	  order	  accommodate	  endless	  stretching	  in	  substantive	  terms.	  In	  Pedicel,	  the	  
EFTA	  Court	  noted	  that	  dynamic	  interpretation	  of	  the	  EEA	  Agreement	  does	  not	  entail	  an	  
expansion	   of	   the	   scope	   of	   the	   Agreement	   to	   cover	   agricultural	   products	   that	   were	  
originally	  excluded	  from	  its	  application.287	  	  
Importantly,	   the	   EFTA	   Court	   has,	   even	   though	   it	   is	   not	   legally	   bound	   to,	   extended	   the	  
principle	  of	  uniform	  interpretation	  also	  to	  procedural	  rules	  including,	  for	  example,	  rules	  
on	  costs	  which	  are	  recoverable	  from	  the	  party	  ordered	  to	  pay	  the	  costs	  that	  are	  worded	  
identically	   in	   the	   Rules	   of	   Procedure	   of	   the	   EFTA	   Court,	   the	   Court	   of	   Justice	   and	   the	  
General	   Court.288	   As	   the	   reasons	   for	   such	   voluntarily	   homogeneous	   interpretation	   the	  
EFTA	  Court	   stated	   equal	   treatment	   and	   foreseeability	   for	   the	  parties	   appearing	  before	  
the	  courts.289	  
The	  provisions	  of	   the	  ECAA	  Agreement,	   too,	   are	   to	  be	   given	   an	   interpretation	  uniform	  
with	   the	   underlying	   EU	   acquis.	   The	   ECAA	   Agreement	   generally	   fails	   to	   distinguish	  
between	   the	   ECAA-­‐level	   homogeneity	   and	   the	   ECAA-­‐EU	   homogeneity.	   Article	   16(1)	   of	  
the	   ECAA	   Agreement	   provides	   the	   standard	   clause	   of	   conforming	   interpretation	   of	  
identical	  acquis.	   In	  Opinion	  1/00	  on	  the	  compatibility	  of	   the	  ECAA	  Agreement	  with	   the	  
EU	  Treaties,	  the	  Court	  was	  firm	  to	  make	  a	  distinction	  between	  the	  EU	  and	  the	  ECAA	  legal	  
orders	  and	  reassured	  that	   identical	  rules	  are	  to	  be	  given	  autonomous	  interpretation.290	  
                                            
283	  Case	  E-­‐2/06	  EFTA	  Surveillance	  Authority	  v	  Norway	  [2007]	  EFTA	  Ct	  Rep	  164,	  para	  59.	  
284	  Case	  E-­‐3/98	  Rainford-­Towning	  [1998]	  EFTA	  Ct	  Rep	  205,	  para	  21,	  referring	  to	  the	  Maglite	  case	  in	  which	  
such	  different	  circumstances	  did,	  indeed,	  occur:	  Case	  E-­‐2/97	  Maglite	  (n	  100)	  para	  27.	  
285	  Case	  E-­‐2/06	  EFTA	  Surveillance	  Authority	  v	  Norway	  (n	  283)	  para	  59.	  
286	  H	  Haukeland	  Fredriksen,	  'The	  EFTA	  Court	  15	  Years	  on'	  (n	  264)	  743.	  
287	  Case	  E-­‐4/04	  Pedicel	  [2005]	  EFTA	  Ct	  Rep	  1,	  para	  28.	  
288	  Order	  in	  Case	  E-­‐9/04	  European	  Banking	  Federations	  [2007]	  EFTA	  Ct	  Rep	  74,	  para	  16.	  
289	  ibid.	  
290	  ibid	  para	  41.	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Autonomous	   interpretation,	  which	  the	  Court	  refers	   to	   for	   the	  purposes	  of	  safeguarding	  
the	  autonomy	  of	   the	  EU	  legal	  order	  does	  not,	  however,	  exclude	   identical	   interpretation	  
but	  enables	  the	  Court	  to	  take	  due	  account	  of	  differences	  in	  the	  objectives	  and	  context	  of	  
the	  separate	  legal	  orders	  that	  may	  affect	  the	  interpretation	  of	  individual	  provisions,	  just	  
as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  EEA	  Agreement.	  	  
It	  is	  likely	  that	  the	  rules	  which	  the	  Court	  considers	  ‘identical	  as	  to	  substance	  but	  distinct	  
as	   to	   form’291	  will	   receive	   exactly	   the	   same	  kind	   of	   uniform	   interpretation	   as	   EEA	   law	  
provided	   that	   the	   identically	  worded	   provisions	   pursue	   the	   same	   objectives	   in	   the	   EU	  
and	  in	  the	  ECAA	  legal	  orders.	  Article	  94	  ECT	  provides	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  judiciary	  set	  up	  
by	  the	  agreement	  that	  the	  institutions	  of	  the	  Energy	  Community	  must	  ensure	  conforming	  
interpretation	   of	   Energy	   Community	   acquis	   with	   the	   case	   law	   of	   the	   Court	   of	   Justice.	  
There	   is	   not	   case	   law	   of	   the	   Court	   that	   would	   shed	   light	   on	   the	   interpretation	   of	   the	  
objectives	   and	   purpose	   of	   the	   ECT	   vis-­à-­vis	   the	   EU	   Treaties.	   Nevertheless,	   the	   Court’s	  
rulings	  on	  international	  agreements	  that	   ‘extend’	  the	  internal	  market	  to	  third	  countries	  
clearly	  indicates	  that	  in	  general	  terms	  the	  broad	  objectives	  of	  both	  the	  ECAA	  Agreement	  
and	   the	   ECT	   should	   be	   considered	   equivalent	   of	   the	   EU	   Treaties	   for	   the	   purposes	   of	  
granting	  similar	  interpretation	  to	  identical	  acquis.	  
4.2	  Responsibility	  of	  the	  state	  for	  violation	  of	  EU	  acquis	  
4.2.1	  Public	  international	  law	  
In	  public	  international	  law,	  the	  responsibility	  for	  a	  failure	  to	  properly	  fulfil	  international	  
law	   obligations	   is	   vested	  with	   the	   subjects	   of	   international	   law	   –	   states,	   international	  
organisations,	   and	   to	   a	   very	   limited	   degree	   individuals.	   In	   case	   of	   a	   breach	   of	   an	  
international	  agreement,	  the	  rules	  first	  invoked	  will	  be	  those	  provided	  in	  the	  treaty	  itself.	  
Secondly,	   a	   breach	   of	   a	   treaty	   triggers	   responsibility	   under	   the	   international	   law	   of	  
treaties,	   and	   in	   particular	   the	   rule	   of	   pacta	   sunt	   servanda.	   The	   violation	   of	   a	   primary	  
obligation,	   i.e.	  of	   the	  treaty	  provisions,	  entails	   in	  the	  case	  of	  states	  responsibility	  under	  
the	  VCLT.	  Thirdly,	   the	  breach	   can	   entail	   state	   responsibility	   as	   a	   secondary	  obligation,	  
following	   a	   breach	   of	   the	   primary	   obligation.	   Article	   1	   ARSIWA	   provides	   that	   every	  
internationally	   wrongful	   act	   of	   a	   State	   entails	   the	   international	   responsibility	   of	   that	  
                                            
291	  ibid.	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State.	  In	  order	  to	  invoke	  state	  responsibility	  as	  a	  secondary	  obligation,	  there	  needs	  to	  be	  
a	  breach	  of	  a	  primary	  obligation,292	  such	  as	  a	  breach	  of	  a	  treaty.293	  International	  law	  does	  
not	  distinguish	  between	  responsibility	  arising	  from	  a	  breach	  of	  contract	  or	  tort.294	  	  
The	  main	  reaction	  to	  treaty	  breach	  under	  the	  law	  of	  treaties	  is	  non-­‐performance	  in	  the	  
form	  of	  suspension	  or	  termination	  of	  the	  treaty,295	  either	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  treaty	  or	  the	  
general	   law	   of	   treaties	   under	   Articles	   65-­‐68	   and	   Annex	   of	   the	   VCLT.	   Invalidation	   of	  
consent	  to	  be	  bound	  is	  also	  possible	  under	  Articles	  49-­‐52	  VCLT.	  If	  these	  remedies	  have	  
not	  been	  used,	  the	  aggrieved	  party	  may	  invoke	  state	  responsibility	  under	  Articles	  23	  and	  
25	  of	  the	  ARSIWA,296	  while	  the	  procedures	  provided	  in	  the	  VCLT	  and	  the	  ARSIWA	  differ	  
as	  to	  their	  complexity.297	  
The	  possibilities	   for	   individuals	   to	  enforce	   international	   law	  against	   the	  violating	   state	  
are	  extremely	  limited.	  Even	  though	  many	  treaties	  create	  rights	  for	  individuals	  that	  can	  be	  
invoked	  in	  national	  courts,	   individuals	  themselves	  are	  not	  subjects	  of	   international	   law	  
and	  do	  not,	  therefore,	  enjoy	  standing	  in	  the	  International	  Court	  of	  Justice	  (ICJ).298	  In	  the	  
case	   of	   agreements	   that	   are	   concluded	   by	   states	   a	   breach	   of	   an	   international	   law	  
obligation	  can,	  thus,	  only	  be	  invoked	  by	  the	  contracting	  parties.	  The	  situation	  is	  different	  
in	   cases	   where	   the	   international	   law	   instrument	   itself	   creates	   remedies	   that	   can	   be	  
invoked	  by	   individuals,	  such	  as	  access	  to	  dispute	  settlement	  mechanisms	  in	  the	  case	  of	  
the	  ECHR	  and	  bilateral	  investment	  treaties	  that	  have	  established	  an	  arbitral	  tribunal.	  In	  
these	  cases,	  individuals	  can	  rely	  on	  the	  provisions	  of	  international	  law	  directly,	  provided	  
that	  the	  treaty	  has	  become	  part	  of	  the	  national	  legal	  order	  and	  that	  its	  provisions	  confer	  
rights	   on	   the	   individual.	   Regardless,	   the	   possible	   recourse	   to	   international	   courts	   and	  
other	  dispute	  settlement	  mechanisms	  is	  complementary	  to	  the	  legal	  remedies	  provided	  
                                            
292	   ILC	   Draft	   articles	   on	   Responsibility	   of	   States	   for	   Internationally	   Wrongful	   Acts	   with	   commentaries,	  
(2001)	  II	  Yearbook	  of	  the	  International	  Law	  Commission	  Part	  II,	  59.	  	  
293	  For	  discussion,	  see:	   J	  Verhoeven,	   'The	  Law	  of	  Responsibility	  and	  the	  Law	  of	  Treaties'	   in	   J	  Crawford,	  A	  
Pellet	  and	  S	  Olleson	  (eds),	  The	  Law	  of	  International	  Responsibility	  (Oxford	  University	  Press	  2010)	  105,	  107.	  
294	  Rainbow	  Warrior	  Affair	  (New	  Zealand	  v	  France)	  (1990)	  20	  RIAA	  217;	  J	  Verhoeven	  (n	  293)	  106.	  
295	  B	  Simma	  and	  CJ	  Tams,	  'Reacting	  against	  Treaty	  Breaches'	  in	  DB	  Hollis	  (ed),	  The	  Oxford	  Guide	  to	  Treaties	  
(Oxford	  University	  Press	  2012)	  576,	  580.	  
296	  C	  Binder,	  'Does	  the	  Difference	  Make	  a	  Difference?	  A	  Comparison	  between	  the	  Mechanisms	  of	  the	  Law	  of	  
Treaties	  and	  of	  State	  Responsibility	  as	  Means	  to	  Derogate	  from	  Treaty	  Obligations	  in	  Cases	  of	  Subsequent	  
Changes	   of	   Circumstances'	   in	   M	   Szabó	   (ed),	   State	   Responsibility	   and	   the	   Law	   of	   Treaties	   (Eleven	  
International	  Publishing	  2010)	  1,	  17.	  
297	  ibid	  22-­‐23.	  
298	  Articles	  34(1)	  and	  65	  ICJ	  Statute.	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by	  national	  law,	  provided	  that	  the	  rules	  on	  state	  immunity	  so	  permit.299	  Individuals	  can,	  
in	  certain	  circumstances,	  also	  invoke	  international	  law	  in	  national	  disputes	  where	  a	  rule	  
of	   international	   law	  that	   is	  binding	  on	  the	  state	  covers	  an	  aspect	  of	  the	  situation	  of	  the	  
individual.300	   In	   the	   same	  vein,	   should	   individuals	   incur	  damages	   as	   a	   result	   of	   a	   state	  
breaching	   an	   international	   law	   obligation	   they	   can	   claim	   these	   in	   national	   courts	   or,	  
exceptionally,	  before	  the	  ECtHR	  and	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice	  of	  the	  European	  Union.301	  	  
International	   liability302	   for	   injuries	   occurs	   in	   the	   relationship	   between	   subjects	   of	  
international	   law,	   thus	   primarily	   states	   and	   international	   organisations.	   Liability	   for	  
damages	   can	   occur	   either	   as	   a	   result	   of	   injurious	   consequences	   of	   acts	   prohibited	   by	  
international	  law303	  or	  acts	  not	  prohibited	  by	  international	  law.304	  Determining	  whether	  
the	  conduct	  of	  a	  state	  in	  a	  particular	  situation	  is	  unlawful	  or	  not	  rests	  with	  international	  
law	   solely,305	   following	   the	   principle	   of	   ‘cognitive	   indetermination’	   of	   national	   and	  
international	  law.306	  	  
According	  to	  the	  distinction	  made	  in	  international	  law	  between	  both	  state	  responsibility	  
and	   state	   liability,	   and	   primary	   and	   secondary	   obligations,	   the	   obligation	   to	   make	  
                                            
299	  J	  Crawford,	  'The	  System	  of	  International	  Responsibility'	  in	  J	  Crawford,	  A	  Pellet	  and	  S	  Olleson	  (eds),	  The	  
Law	  of	  International	  Responsibility	  (Oxford	  University	  Press	  2010)	  17,	  21.	  
300	  See	  I	  Brownlie,	  Principles	  of	  Public	  International	  Law	  (Oxford	  University	  Press	  2008)	  35.	  
301	  G	  Van	  Harten	  and	  M	  Loughlin	  (n	  24)	  131.	  
302	  The	  distinction	  between	  international	  responsibility	  and	  international	  liability	  is	  relatively	  ambiguous.	  
The	   simplest	   explanation	   offered	   by	   the	   International	   Law	   Commission	   assigns	   to	   the	   category	   of	  
international	  responsibility	  acts	  which	  constitute	  a	  breach	  and	  to	  the	  category	  of	  international	  liability	  acts	  
which	   are	   not	   unlawful	   yet	   produce	   adverse	   consequences	   (see	   (1973)	   II	   Yearbook	  of	   the	   International	  
Law	  Commission,	   169,	   para	  38),	   though	   liability	   is	   also	  used	   to	  denote	   the	  occurrence	  of	   damages.	   	   For	  
more	   uses	   of	   the	   terms	   see	   AE	   Boyle,	   'State	   responsibility	   and	   international	   liability	   for	   injurious	  
consequences	  of	  acts	  not	  prohibited	  by	  international	  law:	  a	  necessary	  distinction?'	  (1990)	  39	  International	  
and	   Comparative	   Law	   Quarterly	   1,	   8-­‐10.	   International	   liability,	   as	   opposed	   to	   responsibility	   may,	   for	  
example,	  be	  considered	  to	  fall	  into	  the	  categories	  of	  either	  ‘objective	  responsibility’	  without	  fault;	  ‘absolute	  
responsibility’	   for	  cases	  where	  damages	  occur;	  or	   ‘causal	   responsibility’	  where	  a	   link	  exists	  between	   the	  
act	  and	  the	  resulting	  damage.	  See	  J-­‐M	  Sorel,	   'The	  Concept	  of	   'Soft	  Responsibility'?'	   in	  J	  Crawford,	  A	  Pellet	  
and	  S	  Olleson	  (eds),	  The	  Law	  of	  International	  Responsibility	  (Oxford	  University	  Press	  2010)	  165,	  166.	  
303	  ILC	  Draft	  Articles	  on	  the	  Responsibility	  of	  States	  for	  Internationally	  Wrongful	  Acts,	  (2001)	  II	  Yearbook	  
of	  the	  International	  Law	  Commission	  Part	  II.	  
304	   International	   Liability	   for	   Injurious	  Consequences	   arising	  out	   of	  Acts	  not	  Prohibited	  by	   International	  
Law,	   sub-­‐divided	   into	   Draft	   Articles	   on	   Prevention	   of	   Transboundary	   Harm	   from	   Hazardous	   Activities,	  
(2001)	  II	  Yearbook	  of	  the	  International	  Law	  Commission	  Part	  II;	  and	  Draft	  principles	  on	  the	  allocation	  of	  
loss	   in	   the	   case	   of	   transboundary	   harm	   arising	   out	   of	   hazardous	   activities,	   (2006)	   II	   Yearbook	   of	   the	  
International	  Law	  Commission	  Part	  II.	  
305	  P-­‐M	  Dupuy,	  'Relations	  between	  the	  International	  Law	  of	  Responsibility	  and	  Responsibility	  in	  Municipal	  
Law'	  in	  J	  Crawford,	  A	  Pellet	  and	  S	  Olleson	  (eds),	  The	  Law	  of	  International	  Responsibility	  (Oxford	  University	  
Press	  2010)	  173,	  181.	  
306	  C	  Santulli,	  Le	  statut	  international	  de	  l'ordre	  juridique	  étatique	  (Editions	  A.	  Pedone	  2001)	  31.	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reparation	   for	   damage	   constitutes	   a	   secondary	   obligation	   in	   the	   former	   category	   and	  
primary	  obligation	  in	  the	  latter.307	  The	  means	  at	  the	  disposition	  of	  an	  injured	  state	  under	  
ARSIWA	   include	   reparation,	   countermeasures,	   cessation	   of	   the	   wrongful	   conduct,	   and	  
assurances	  and	  guarantees	  of	  non-­‐repetition.	  	  
4.2.2	  EU	  law	  
In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  EU	  and	  the	  treaties	  concluded	  by	  the	  EU,	  the	  matter	  of	  responsibility	  
and	  liability	  of	  international	  organisations	  comes	  into	  play.	  The	  EU	  has	  not	  yet	  signed	  the	  
Vienna	   Convention	   on	   the	   Law	   of	   Treaties	   between	   States	   and	   International	  
Organizations	   or	   between	   International	   Organizations	   and	   neither	   has	   the	   Convention	  
entered	   into	   force	   but	   the	   EU	   is,	   nevertheless,	   bound	   by	   those	   provisions	   of	   the	  
Convention	  that	  have	  been	  recognised	  as	  international	  customary	  law.	  The	  responsibility	  
and	   liability	  of	   the	  EU	  as	  an	   international	  organisation	  are,	  moreover,	   regulated	  by	   the	  
ILC	   Draft	   Articles	   on	   the	   Responsibility	   of	   International	   Organizations,308	   which,	   in	  
essence,	  impose	  conditions	  identical	  to	  the	  ARSIWA	  for	  invoking	  the	  responsibility	  of	  an	  
international	   organisation	   for	   its	   internationally	   wrongful	   conduct.	   Account,	   though,	  
must	   in	   the	   case	   of	   the	   EU	   also	   be	   taken	   of	   the	   special	   characteristics	   of	   the	   EU	   as	   a	  
supranational,	   or	   ‘regional	   economic	   integration’	   organisation.309	   Article	   340(2)	   TFEU	  
provides	   that	   in	   the	   case	   of	   non-­‐contractual	   liability,	   the	   Union	   shall	   make	   good	   the	  
damage	   caused	   ‘in	   accordance	  with	   the	   general	   principles	   common	   to	   the	   laws	   of	   the	  
Member	  States’	  regardless	  of	  whether	  the	  damage	  is	  caused	  by	  legislative,	  administrative	  
or	  judicial	  activities	  of	  the	  Union’s	  institutions	  or,310	  in	  the	  opinion	  of	  those	  who	  criticise	  
this	  distinction,	   regardless	  of	  whether	   the	  act	  was	  discretionary	  or	  not.311	  As	   concerns	  
the	   liability	   of	   the	   Member	   States	   for	   infringements	   of	   international	   agreements	  
concluded	   by	   the	   EU,	   including	   mixed	   agreements,	   the	   Court	   found	   in	   Commission	   v	  
Ireland	  that	  Ireland,	  by	  not	  fulfilling	  its	  obligations	  under	  the	  EEA	  Agreement	  in	  an	  area	  
                                            
307	   (1970)	   II	   Yearbook	   of	   the	   International	   Law	   Commission,	   179,	   para	   11;	   (1980)	   II	   Yearbook	   of	   the	  
International	  Law	  Commission	  Part	  I,	  253,	  para	  21.	  See	  AE	  Boyle	  (n	  302)	  10.	  
308	  (2011)	  II	  Yearbook	  of	  the	  International	  Law	  Commission	  Part	  II.	  
309	  For	  the	  specificities	  of	  the	  EU	  as	  a	  subject	  of	  international	  responsibility	  see	  E	  Paasivirta	  and	  PJ	  Kuijper,	  
'Does	   one	   size	   fit	   all?:	   The	   European	   Community	   and	   the	   responsibility	   of	   international	   organizations'	  
(2005)	  36	  Netherlands	  Yearbook	  of	  International	  Law	  169.	  
310	  Case	  C-­‐352/98	  P	  Laboratoires	  pharmaceutiques	  Bergaderm	  and	  Goupil	  [2000]	  ECR	  I-­‐5291,	  para	  46.	  
311	  PP	  Craig,	  'Once	  more	  unto	  the	  breach:	  the	  Community,	  the	  State	  and	  damages	  liability'	  (1997)	  113	  Law	  
Quarterly	  Review	  67,	  72-­‐73.	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that	  falls	  within	  the	  scope	  of	  EU	  law,	  has	  subsequently	  failed	  to	  fulfil	  its	  obligations	  under	  
EU	  law.312	  
The	  EU	  Treaties	  being	  governed	  by	  international	  law,	  the	  Member	  States	  of	  the	  EU,	  too,	  
owe	   to	   each	   other	   obligations	   under	   international	   law.	   Under	   the	   VCLT,	   the	   Member	  
States	  must,	  firstly,	  perform	  the	  obligations	  assumed	  under	  the	  Treaties;	  secondly,	  do	  so	  
in	   good	   faith;	   and,	   thirdly,	   not	   invoke	   national	   law	   as	   a	   justification	   for	   a	   failure	   of	  
performance.313	  
The	  EU	  Treaties	  also	  envisage	  sanctions	  for	  the	  non-­‐performance	  of	  Treaty	  obligations.	  A	  
Member	   State	  may	   bring	   a	   case	   of	   non-­‐performance	   by	   another	  Member	   State	   to	   the	  
Court	  of	  Justice	  under	  Article	  259	  TFEU.	  Before	  recourse	  can	  be	  had	  to	  this	  provision,	  the	  
Member	  State	  must	  first	  have	  brought	  the	  matter	  to	  the	  attention	  of	  the	  Commission.	  If	  
the	   infringement	   is	   established	   by	   the	   Court,	   the	   infringing	   Member	   State	   must	   to	  
remedy	   the	   breach	   by	  means	   of	   a	   financial	   penalty	   under	   Article	   260	   TFEU.	   A	   special	  
provision	  provided	  in	  Article	  7	  TEU	  establishes	  a	  procedure	  for	  dealing	  with	  ‘serious	  and	  
persistent	  breaches’	  by	  a	  Member	  State	  of	  the	  values	  enlisted	  in	  Article	  2	  TEU	  on	  which	  
the	  EU	   is	   founded	  by	  which	   the	   infringing	  Member	   State	  may	   temporarily	   lose	   certain	  
rights	  under	  the	  Treaties,	  including	  voting	  rights	  in	  the	  Council.	  	  
The	  Member	   States	  may	  not	   adopt	   any	   countermeasure	   they	  wish	   against	   a	   breaching	  
Member	   State.	   The	   Court	   has	   clarified	   this	   in	   the	   Hedley	   Lomas	   case.314	   The	   case	  
concerned	  a	  general	  ban	  that	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  had	  placed	  on	  exports	  of	  live	  animals	  
to	  Spain	  –	  itself	  a	  quantitative	  restriction	  on	  trade	  in	  goods	  prohibited	  by	  the	  EU	  Treaties	  
–	  upon	  conviction	  that	  Spain	  had	  failed	  to	  properly	  implement	  an	  EU	  directive.	  The	  Court	  
found	  that	  a	  Member	  State	  may	  not	  adopt	  ‘on	  its	  own	  authority,	  corrective	  or	  protective	  
measures’	  in	  reaction	  to	  a	  breach	  of	  EU	  law	  by	  another	  Member	  State.315	  Recourse	  must	  
instead	  be	  had	  to	  infringement	  proceedings	  under	  Article	  259	  TFEU	  or	  to	  the	  possibility	  
of	  filing	  a	  complaint	  with	  the	  Commission.	  	  
                                            
312	  Case	  C-­‐13/00	  Commission	  v	  Ireland	  [2002]	  ECR	  I-­‐2943.	  
313	  Articles	  26	  and	  27	  VCLT.	  
314	  Case	  C-­‐5/94	  Hedley	  Lomas	  [1996]	  ECR	  I-­‐2553.	  
315	   ibid	  para	  20,	  with	  reference	  to	  Joined	  Cases	  90/63	  and	  91/63	  Commission	  v	  Luxembourg	  and	  Belgium	  
[1964]	  ECR	  625;	  and	  Case	  232/78	  Commission	  v	  France	  [1979]	  ECR	  2729,	  para	  9.	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Significantly	  more	  often	  than	  the	  question	  of	  the	  responsibility	  of	  the	  Member	  States	  for	  
breaches	   of	   EU	   Treaties	   vis-­à-­vis	   one	   another	   does	   one	   encounter	   the	   issue	   of	   the	  
‘domestication’	  of	  responsibility	  –	  the	  responsibility	  of	  the	  Member	  States	  for	  breaches	  of	  
EU	  law	  towards	  individuals.	  In	  such	  instances,	  national	  courts	  are	  faced	  with	  the	  complex	  
task	  of	  adjudicating	  on	  disputes	  that	  involve	  international	  law	  including,	  in	  this	  case,	  EU	  
law.316	  	  
The	  direct	  access	  to	  courts	  that	  individuals	  enjoy	  under	  of	  EU	  law	  to	  defend	  their	  rights	  
against	   a	   breaching	   Member	   State	   makes	   the	   EU	   almost	   unique	   among	   other	  
international	   organisations.	   Additional	   remedies	   are	   in	   the	   hands	   of	   the	   individuals	   in	  
the	   form	  of	  bringing	  complaints	   to	   the	  Commission	   in	  order	   to	  encourage	   the	   latter	   to	  
initiate	   infringement	   proceedings	   against	   the	   Member	   State	   in	   a	   procedure	   of	   non-­‐
compliance	  regulated	  by	  Article	  258	  TFEU.	  Furthermore,	  individuals	  can	  seek	  reparation	  
for	  damages	  that	  have	  incurred	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  breach.	  	  
The	  principle	  of	  state	  liability	  in	  EU	  law	  is	  a	  direct	  consequence	  of	  the	  doctrine	  of	  direct	  
effect	  that	  was	  established	  by	  the	  Court	  to	  ensure	  the	  protection	  of	  individual	  rights	  and	  
the	   effective	   application	   of	   EU	   law.	   In	   the	  meantime,	   the	   doctrine	   of	   direct	   effect	   has	  
assumed	  a	  more	  general	  importance,	  primarily	  with	  respect	  to	  a	  general	  ‘invocability’	  of	  
EU	  law	  in	  proceedings	  other	  than	  those	  strictly	  concerned	  with	  the	  creation	  of	  individual	  
rights.317	  Yet,	  as	  argued	  by	  Eilmansberger,	  the	  invocability	  of	  EU	  law	  on	  its	  own	  is	  limited	  
in	   value	   where	   the	   individual	   rights	   have	   no	   particular	   content,	   including	   ‘offensive	  
remedies’.318	   The	   lack	   of	   the	   latter	   is	   explained	   by	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   initial	   cases	   of	   EU	  
state	   liability	   concerned	   mainly	   the	   ‘negative’	   integration	   rules,	   i.e.	   the	   rules	   of	   the	  
internal	   market	   on	   prohibitions	   on	   restrictions	   of	   free	   movement.319	   When	   ’positive’	  
integration	   gained	   ground	   in	   the	   EU	   in	   the	   form	   of	   increased	   standard-­‐setting	   by	   the	  
                                            
316	  J	  Crawford,	  'The	  System	  of	  International	  Responsibility'	  (n	  299)	  21.	  
317	   CWA	   Timmermans,	   'Directives:	   Their	   Effect	   within	   the	   National	   Legal	   Systems'	   (1979)	   16	   Common	  
Market	  Law	  Review	  533,	  539;	  S	  Prechal,	  Directives	  in	  EC	  law	  (n	  195)	  240-­‐241.	  
318	  T	  Eilmansberger,	  'The	  relationship	  between	  rights	  and	  remedies	  in	  EC	  law:	  In	  search	  of	  the	  missing	  link'	  
(2004)	  41	  Common	  Market	  Law	  Review	  1199,	  1229.	  
319	   S	   Weatherill,	   'Addressing	   Problems	   of	   Imbalanced	   Implementation	   in	   EC	   Law:	   Remedies	   in	   an	  
Institutional	  Perspective'	  in	  C	  Kilpatrick,	  T	  Novitz	  and	  P	  Skidmore	  (eds),	  The	  Future	  of	  Remedies	  in	  Europe	  
(Hart	  Publishing	  2000)	  87,	  89.	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Union	  the	  Court	  recognised	   the	  need,	   in	  addition	   to	  establishing	   the	  direct	  effect	  of	  EU	  
provisions,	  to	  also	  provide	  for	  sufficient	  remedies.320	  
In	  Francovich,	  the	  Court	  established	  state	  liability	  for	  breaches	  of	  EU	  law	  as	  ‘a	  matter	  of	  
principle’,	  much	  like	  the	  ascertainment	  of	  direct	  effect	  and	  primacy.	  The	  Court	  found	  that	  
one	   further	   piece	   missing	   from	   the	   effectiveness	   puzzle	   was	   the	   possibility	   for	  
individuals	  to	  obtain	  redress	  for	  the	  infringement	  of	  their	  rights	  under	  EU	  law.321	  State	  
liability	   is	   a	   means	   of	   redress	   for	   the	   aggrieved	   individuals	   who	   have	   suffered	   a	   loss	  
because	  of	  a	  Member	  State’s	   failure	   to	  correctly	   implement	  EU	   law	  and,	   thereby,	  grant	  
the	  individuals	  the	  possibility	  to	  use	  the	  rights	  that	  have	  been	  conferred	  upon	  them.	  In	  
Francovich,	   the	   Court	   defined	   the	   three	   conditions	   for	   establishing	   state	   liability	   for	   a	  
failure	   to	   properly	   implement	   a	   directive:	   firstly,	   the	   directive	   confers	   individual;	  
secondly,	  these	  rights	  can	  be	  identified	  in	  the	  directive;	  and,	  thirdly,	  there	  is	  a	  causal	  link	  
between	  the	  breach	  of	  EU	  law	  by	  the	  Member	  State	  and	  the	  loss	  and	  damage	  incurred	  by	  
the	   individual.322	   In	  the	  Joined	  Cases	  Brasserie	  du	  Pêcheur	  and	  Factortame,323	   the	  Court	  
extended	  the	  application	  of	  the	  doctrine	  also	  to	  directly	  applicable	  Treaty	  provisions.	  The	  
direct	  effect	  of	  the	  provision	  in	  question	  is,	  however,	  not	  required	  in	  order	  to	  ascertain	  
state	  liability	  of	  a	  Member	  State.324	  	  
State	   liability	   in	   EU	   law	   requires	   extensive	   interface	   between	   the	   EU	   and	   the	   national	  
legal	  systems.	  In	  Rewe325	  and	  Comet,326	  the	  Court	  established	  that	  while	  the	  Treaties	  and	  
secondary	  law	  create	  rights	  for	  the	  individuals,	  the	  legal	  remedies	  in	  the	  event	  of	  breach	  
of	  those	  rights	  must,	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  relevant	  EU	  rules,	  be	  established	  by	  national	  law.	  
The	  Member	  States,	  therefore,	  enjoy	  a	  certain	  procedural	  autonomy327	  to	  set	  up	  a	  system	  
of	   national	   courts	   or	   tribunals	   for	   the	   protection	   of	   the	   rights	   of	   individuals	   in	   cases	  
where	   the	  Member	  State	  or	  any	  other	  actor	  has	   failed	   to	   fulfil	   its	  obligations	  under	  EU	  
                                            
320	  T	  Eilmansberger	  (n	  318)	  1217.	  
321	  Joined	  Cases	  C-­‐6/90	  and	  C-­‐9/90	  Francovich	  and	  Bonifaci	  [1991]	  ECR	  I-­‐5357,	  paras	  33-­‐34.	  	  
322	  ibid,	  para	  40.	  
323	  Joined	  Cases	  C-­‐46/93	  and	  C-­‐48/93	  Brasserie	  du	  Pêcheur	  and	  Factortame	  [1996]	  ECR	  I-­‐1029.	  
324	  S	  Prechal,	  'Does	  Direct	  Effect	  Still	  Matter?'	  (n	  16)	  1067.	  
325	  Case	  33/76	  Rewe	  [1976]	  ECR	  1989,	  para	  5.	  
326	  Case	  45/76	  Comet	  [1976]	  ECR	  2043,	  para	  13.	  
327	  Also	  called	  ‘remedial	  autonomy’,	  see	  C	  Kilpatrick,	  'The	  Future	  of	  Remedies	  in	  Europe'	  in	  C	  Kilpatrick,	  T	  
Novitz	  and	  P	  Skidmore	  (eds),	  The	  Future	  of	  Remedies	  in	  Europe	  (Hart	  Publishing	  2000)	  1,	  4.	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law.	  Due	   to	   the	   requirements	  of	   equivalence328	  and	  effectiveness329	  of	   the	   remedies,330	  
this	   should	   rather	   be	   called	   procedural	   competence.331	   The	   uniform	   application	   of	   EU	  
law,	  however,	  would	  in	  the	  light	  of	  the	  variety	  of	  remedies	  in	  place	  in	  the	  Member	  States	  
necessitate	  that	  the	  Court	  also	  define	  the	  substantive	  conditions	  for	  the	  remedies.332	  
Effectiveness	   is	   the	  principal	  argument	  behind	   the	  principle	  of	   state	   liability,	   and	  state	  
liability	   is	   the	   most	   important	   factor	   ensuring	   the	   effectiveness	   of	   EU	   law.333	   It	   is,	  
moreover,	   an	   important	   element	   in	   substantiating	   the	   principle	   of	   primacy	   of	   EU	   law	  
with	  more	   concrete	   content.334	   An	   extension	   of	   the	   internal	  market	   to	   third	   countries	  
should,	   therefore,	   necessarily	   also	   include	   the	   principle	   of	   state	   liability	   to	   ensure	  
comparable	   effectiveness	   of	   the	   internal	   market	   acquis	   in	   the	   third	   countries’	   legal	  
orders.	  
4.2.3	  Multilateral	  agreements	  exporting	  EU	  internal	  market	  acquis	  
Similarly	  to	  the	  regime	  of	  international	  law	  or	  EU	  law,	  the	  grounds	  for	  state	  liability	  for	  
breaches	  of	  EU	  acquis	  contained	  in	  multilateral	  agreements	  must	  either	  be	  established	  by	  
the	  agreements	  themselves	  or	  remain	  to	  be	  determined	  by	  the	  rules	  of	  international	  and	  
national	  law.	  
The	   responsibility	   of	   EEA	   contracting	   parties	   is	   governed	   by	   Articles	   108-­‐110	   EEA	  
Agreement.	   Similarly	   to	   the	   EU,	   a	   breach	   of	   an	   obligation	   under	   the	   EEA	   Agreement	  
entails	   a	   pecuniary	   penalty.	   As	   concerns	   the	   possibility	   of	   individuals	   to	   invoke	   their	  
rights	   under	   the	   EEA	  Agreement,	   the	   EFTA	  Court	   has	   recognised	   the	   doctrine	   of	   state	  
liability	   in	   the	   EEA	   alongside	   those	   of	   direct	   effect	   and	   primacy.	   In	   the	   EFTA	   Court	  
proceedings	   in	   Sveinbjörnsdottir,	   the	   Commission	   as	   well	   as	   three	   EEA	   EFTA	   States	  
argued	   that	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  principle,	   state	   liability	   cannot	  be	   recognised	   in	   the	  EEA	  on	  
equal	  grounds	  as	   in	   the	  EU	  owing	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   the	  EEA	   legal	  order	   lacks	   ‘important	  
principles	   of	   Community	   law	   such	   as	   transfer	   of	   legislative	   powers,	   direct	   effect	   and	  
                                            
328	  EU	  rights	  must	  be	  granted	  a	  protection	  equivalent	  to	  the	  rights	  established	  under	  national	  law.	  	  
329	  Member	  States	  must	  ensure	  the	  protection	  of	  EU	  rights.	  
330	  See	  Case	  C-­‐312/93	  Peterbroeck	  (n	  51)	  para	  12;	  Joined	  Cases	  C-­‐430/93	  and	  C-­‐431/93	  Van	  Schijndel	  and	  
Van	  Veen	  v	  SPF	  (n	  51)	  para	  17	  and	  case	  law	  cited.	  
331	  W	  van	  Gerven,	  'Of	  Rights,	  Remedies	  and	  Procedures'	  (n	  44)	  502.	  
332	  W	  Van	  Gerven,	   'Bridging	   the	  Unbridgeable:	  Community	  and	  National	  Tort	  Laws	  after	  Francovich	  and	  
Brasserie'	  (1996)	  45	  International	  and	  Comparative	  Law	  Quarterly	  507,	  515.	  
333	  T	  Tridimas,	  The	  General	  Principles	  of	  EU	  Law	  (Oxford	  University	  Press	  2006)	  498.	  
334	  ibid	  500.	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primacy	  of	  Community	  legislation’.335	  The	  EFTA	  Court,	  however,	  introduced	  the	  principle	  
of	   state	   liability	   into	   the	   EEA	   legal	   order	   through	   the	   back	   door.	   Drawing	   upon	   the	  
example	   of	   Francovich,	   the	   EFTA	   Court	   found	   that	   the	   homogeneity	   objective	   and	   the	  
establishment	   of	   individual	   rights	   by	   the	   EEA	   Agreement	   justify	   a	   similar	   doctrine	   of	  
state	   liability	   for	   injuries	  suffered	  by	   individuals	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  a	  Member	  State’s	  
breach	  of	  EEA	  rules	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  EU.336	  Moreover,	  the	  EFTA	  Court	  held	  that	  the	  
principle	   of	   state	   liability	   constituted	   nothing	   less	   than	   an	   ‘integral	   part	   of	   the	   EEA	  
Agreement	   as	   such’337	   and	   was	   justified	   under	   the	   obligation	   of	   the	   EEA	   contracting	  
parties	  under	  Article	  3	  EEA	  Agreement	   to	   take	  all	   appropriate	  measures	   to	  ensure	   the	  
fulfilment	   of	   their	   obligations	   under	   the	   Agreement,	   including	   remedies	   for	   loss	   or	  
damages	   incurred	   as	   the	   result	   of	   a	   failure	   to	   implement	   a	   directive.338	   Some	  
commentators	  believe	  that	  in	  the	  EEA	  the	  principle	  of	  state	  liability	  even	  takes	  over	  the	  
position	  of	  both	  the	  principle	  of	  primacy	  and	  of	  direct	  effect.339	  	  
The	  EFTA	  Court	  has	  defined	  the	   three	  conditions	   for	  state	   liability	   that	  are	   identical	   to	  
the	  conditions	  developed	  by	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice:	  firstly,	  the	  infringed	  provision	  must	  be	  
intended	   to	   confer	   rights	   on	   individuals;	   secondly,	   the	   breach	   must	   be	   sufficiently	  
serious;	  and,	  thirdly,	  a	  direct	  causal	  link	  must	  exist	  between	  the	  breach	  of	  the	  obligation	  
vested	  with	   the	   State	   and	   the	   damage	   sustained	   by	   the	   injured	   party.340	   The	   Court	   of	  
Justice	   later	   confirmed	   the	   existence	   of	   the	   principle	   of	   state	   liability	   in	   the	   EEA	   in	  
Rechberger,	   referring	   to	   the	   objective	   of	   uniform	   interpretation	   and	   application	   of	   the	  
EEA	  Agreement	  and	  EU	  law.341	  	  
A	  critical	  approach	  to	  the	  EFTA	  Court’s	  ruling	  on	  state	  liability	  is	  provided	  by	  Magnússon	  
and	  Hannesson	  who	  argue	  that	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  sovereign	  rights	  transfer	  from	  the	  EEA	  
EFTA	  States	   to	   the	  EEA	  results	   in	  a	   similar	  absence	  of	  direct	  effect	  and	  primacy	   in	   the	  
EEA.342	  The	  authors	  claim	  that	  the	  ‘new	  legal	  order	  of	  international	  law’	  of	  the	  EU	  follows	  
                                            
335	  Case	  E-­‐9/97	  Sveinbjörnsdóttir	  (n	  98)	  para	  44.	  	  
336	  ibid	  para	  60.	  	  
337	  ibid	  para	  63.	  
338	  ibid	  para	  61.	  See	  also	  Case	  E-­‐7/97	  EFTA	  Surveillance	  Authority	  v	  Norway	  [1998]	  EFTA	  Ct	  Rep	  62,	  para	  
16.	  	  
339	  C	  Baudenbacher,	  'If	  Not	  EEA	  State	  Liability,	  Then	  What’	  (n	  118)	  357-­‐358.	  
340	  Case	  E-­‐9/97	  Sveinbjörnsdóttir	  (n	  98)	  para	  66.	  
341	  Case	  C-­‐140/97	  Rechberger	  [1999]	  ECR	  I-­‐3499,	  para	  39.	  
342	  S	  Magnússon	  and	  ÓÍ	  Hannesson	  (n	  104)	  170.	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from	   the	   limitation	   of	   sovereignty	   and	   the	   recognition	   in	   the	   EU	   legal	   order	   of	   the	  
principles	  of	  direct	  effect	  and	  primacy	  –	  elements	   that	   in	   their	  opinion	  are	  missing	   the	  
EEA	   legal	   order.343	   It	   must	   be	   recalled,	   however,	   that	   the	   Court’s	   doctrines	   of	   direct	  
effect,	   primacy	   and,	   consequentially,	   state	   liability	   are	   founded	  on	   the	   fact	   that	   the	  EU	  
Treaties	  create	  rights	  for	  individuals	  which	  must	  be	  protected	  by	  the	  Member	  States	  for	  
the	   sake	   of	   effective	   and	   uniform	   implementation	   of	   EU	   law.	   Insofar	   as	   the	   founding	  
fathers	  of	  the	  EEA	  intended	  the	  EEA	  to	  extend	  the	  EU	  internal	  market	  to	  the	  EEA	  EFTA	  
States,	   it	   follows	   that	   in	   the	   EEA,	   too,	   necessarily	   entails	   the	   conferral	   of	   rights	   to	  
individuals	  and	  that,	  in	  result,	  the	  development	  of	  principles	  such	  as	  the	  EU	  foundational	  
principles	   is	   inevitable	   to	  maintain	   true	  uniformity	   between	   identical	  acquis	   in	   the	  EU	  
and	  in	  the	  EEA	  EFTA	  States.	  The	  absence	  of	  the	  foundational	  principles	  could	  be	  the	  case	  
if	   there	  were	   no	   supranational	   institutions	   at	   all	   to	   establish	   the	   principles	   and	   if	   the	  
principle	   of	   state	   liability,	   for	   example,	  were	   left	   exclusively	   for	   the	   national	   courts	   to	  
determine.	   In	  such	  a	  situation	  the	  solution	  would	  undoubtedly	  have	  been	  found	  on	  the	  
basis	  of	  public	  international	  law	  and,	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  rules	  in	  the	  latter	  as	  concerns	  the	  
possibility	  of	  individuals	  to	  invoke	  international	  law,	  in	  reference	  to	  the	  national	  rules	  of	  
tort	  law.	  Insofar	  as	  the	  EFTA	  Court	  and	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice	  have,	  in	  fact,	  recognised	  the	  
principles	   of	   direct	   effect	   and	   primacy	   in	   EEA	   and	   EU	   law,	   respectively,	   there	   is	   little	  
reason	  to	  claim	  the	  opposite.	  Beyond	  the	  questions	  of	  the	  role	  granted	  to	  the	  EFTA	  Court	  
by	  the	  EEA	  Agreement	  and	  the	  status	  of	  the	  EFTA	  Court’s	  judgments	  in	  the	  legal	  orders	  of	  
the	   EEA	   EFTA	   States,	   the	   issue	   of	   the	   EEA	   Member	   States’	   courts’	   acceptance	   and	  
implementation	  of	   the	   foundational	  principles	   is	  a	  separate	  matter	  and	   falls	  within	   the	  
realm	   of	   enforcement	   rather	   than	   the	   recognition	   of	   the	   principle.	  When	   applying	   the	  
principle	  of	  state	  liability,	  the	  national	  courts	  of	  the	  EEA	  EFTA	  States	  have	  relied	  both	  on	  
the	   rulings	   of	   the	   EFTA	   Court	   as	   well	   as	   on	   national	   provisions	   of	   non-­‐contractual	  
liability	  of	  the	  state.344	  	  
In	  Karlsson,	   the	   EFTA	   Court	   extended	   the	   principle	   of	   state	   liability	   to	   all	   breaches	   of	  
primary	   and	   secondary	   EEA	   law.345	   As	   concerns	   parallels	   between	   the	   foundational	  
principles	  in	  the	  EU	  and	  the	  EEA,	  the	  EFTA	  Court	  added	  that	  contrary	  to	  the	  connection	  
                                            
343	  ibid,	  n	  16.	  
344	  For	  examples	  see	  C	  Baudenbacher,	  'If	  Not	  EEA	  State	  Liability,	  Then	  What’	  (n	  118)	  347-­‐354.	  
345	  Case	  E-­‐4/01	  Karlsson	  (n	  215)	  para	  32.	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between	   the	  principles	  of	  direct	  effect	  and	  state	   liability	   in	  EU	   law	  no	  such	  connection	  
necessarily	  exists	  in	  the	  EEA	  legal	  order.346	  The	  EFTA	  Court	  claimed	  that	  the	  principle	  of	  
state	   liability	  exists	   in	  the	  EEA	  legal	  order	  regardless	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  direct	  effect	  has	  a	  
smaller	  scope	  in	  the	  EEA	  than	  in	  the	  EU.347	  When	  it	  comes	  to	  ensuring	  the	  effectiveness	  
of	  EEA	  law,	  the	  principle	  of	  state	  liability,	  therefore,	  also	  fulfils	  the	  tasks	  of	  primacy	  and	  
direct	  effect	  that	  are	  not	  given	  full	  application	  in	  the	  EEA	  legal	  order.348	  	  
In	  the	  Energy	  Community	  and	  the	  ECAA,	  the	  responsibility	  of	  the	  contracting	  parties	  for	  
breaches	   of	   the	   agreements	   is	   regulated	   by	   the	   rules	   of	   international	   law	   as	   well	   as	  
national	  tort	  laws.	  Procedural	  rules	  for	  non-­‐performance	  are	  provided	  by	  Articles	  90-­‐93	  
ECT	  and	  Article	  20	  ECAA	  Agreement.349	  	  
5	  Conclusion	  
One	   of	   the	   most	   important	   cornerstones	   of	   the	   EU	   legal	   order	   is	   the	   principle	   of	  
effectiveness.350	  The	  principle	  is	  a	  guarantor	  of	  unity	  and	  coherence	  of	  the	  EU	  legal	  order	  
insofar	  as	  it	  emerges	  from	  the	  principle	  of	  sincere	  cooperation	  enshrined	  in	  Article	  4(3)	  
TEU.351	  Since	  the	  subjects	  of	  the	  rights	  and	  obligations	  arising	  from	  the	  EU	  Treaties	  are	  
not	   only	   the	   Member	   States	   but	   also	   their	   nationals	   the	   principle	   of	   effectiveness	   is,	  
respectively,	   transformed	   into	  a	  question	  of	  equal	  rights	  and	  obligations	  of	   individuals.	  
The	  Member	  States	  must	  grant	  the	  individuals	  access	  to	  the	  rights	  that	  they	  derive	  from	  
the	   Treaties	   by	   virtue	   of	   the	   duty	   to	   take	   all	   appropriate	   measures	   to	   ensure	   the	  
fulfilment	   of	   the	   obligations	   under	   EU	   Treaties,	   facilitate	   the	   achievement	   of	   the	  
objectives	  of	  the	  Union	  and	  refrain	  from	  jeopardising	  their	  attainment.	  
The	   effectiveness	   of	   EU	   law	   is	   to	   be	   secured	   by	   a	   set	   of	   principles	   of	   a	   constitutional	  
nature	  –	  direct	  effect,	  primacy,	   consistent	   interpretation	  and	  state	   liability.	  All	  of	   these	  
                                            
346	  ibid	  para	  27.	  
347	  ibid	  para	  29.	  	  
348	  C	  Baudenbacher,	  'If	  Not	  EEA	  State	  Liability,	  Then	  What’	  (n	  118)	  358.	  
349	  Discussed	  in	  detail	  below	  in	  chapter	  7.	  
350	   Joined	   Cases	   C-­‐46/93	   and	   C-­‐48/93	   Brasserie	   du	   Pêcheur	   and	   Factortame	   (n	   323)	   para	   95.	   See	   also	  
Joined	  Cases	  281/85,	  283/85,	  284/85,	  285/85	  and	  287/85	  Germany	  and	  others	  v	  Commission	  [1987]	  ECR	  
3203,	   Opinion	   of	   AG	   Mancini,	   paras	   16	   and	   18;	   Case	   301/87	   France	   v	   Commission	   [1990]	   ECR	   I-­‐307,	  
Opinion	  of	  AG	  Jacobs,	  para	  39.	  
351	   Case	   33/76	   Rewe	   (n	   325)	   para	   5;	   Case	   C-­‐213/89	   Factortame	   (n	   60)	   paras	   19-­‐21;	   Case	   C-­‐312/93	  
Peterbroeck	  (n	  51)	  para	  12.	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are	   functional	   in	   nature	   as	   they	   serve	   to	   regulate	   the	   relationship	   between	   the	   legal	  
orders	   of	   the	   EU	   and	   of	   the	   Member	   States.	   Consequently,	   their	   application	   depends	  
greatly	   on	   the	   cooperative	   spirit	   of	   the	  Member	   States	   and	   is,	   thus,	   vulnerable	   to	   the	  
attitudes	  of	  national	  legislatures,	  administrations	  and	  judiciaries.	  
Effectiveness	  is	  a	  principle	  that	  also	  applies	  to	  public	  international	  law.	  In	  the	  light	  of	  the	  
growing	  trend	  of	  international	  regimes	  effectiveness	  is	  gaining	  ever	  more	  relevance	  just	  
as	   the	   teleological	   interpretation	   of	   the	   rules	   of	   international	   law	   and	   organisations.	  
Teleological,	   effect-­‐giving	   interpretation	   is	   frequently	  employed	  by	   the	  Court	  of	   Justice	  
and	   was	   of	   key	   importance	   in	   the	   creation	   of	   the	   foundational	   principles	   in	   EU	   law.	  
Extending	   substantive	   parts	   the	   EU	   legal	   order	   such	   as	   the	   internal	   market	   acquis	   to	  
third	  countries	  amounts,	  in	  essence,	  to	  the	  act	  of	  creating	  new	  international	  regimes	  or	  
expanding	  existing	  ones,	  which,	  too,	  strive	  towards	  effectiveness.	  	  
The	  Court’s	  initial	  ‘objective	  and	  context’-­‐based	  construal	  of	  the	  transfer	  of	  constitutional	  
principles	   to	   the	   EEA	   legal	   order	   in	   Opinion	   1/91	   was	   soon	   replaced	   by	   a	   more	  
accommodating	  approach	   towards	   the	  principle	  of	  direct	  effect.	  Operating	   in	   the	  EFTA	  
pillar	  of	  the	  EEA,	  the	  EFTA	  Court	  has	  been	  far	  more	  result-­‐oriented	  in	  terms	  of	  creating	  a	  
‘homogeneous	  legal	  order’	  on	  both	  substantive	  and	  procedural	  levels.	  The	  practice	  of	  the	  
EFTA	   Court	   reflects	   a	   sincere	   devotion	   to	   an	   effectiveness-­‐based	   interpretation	   of	   the	  
EEA	  Agreement	  in	  the	  light	  of	  the	  EU	  Treaties	  and	  the	  foundational	  principles	  developed	  
by	   the	   Court	   of	   Justice.	   Although	   detailed	   case	   law	   and	   empirical	   data	   may	   show	  
differences	  in	  the	  application	  of	  the	  acquis	  in	  the	  EU	  and	  the	  EFTA	  pillars	  of	  the	  EEA	  this	  
has	  little	  relevance.	  The	  possibilities	  of	  uniform	  interpretation	  of	  identical	  acquis	   in	  the	  
EU	   and	   the	  EEA	   legal	   orders	   are	  not	   dangerously	   hampered	  by	   the	   fact	   that	   the	  EFTA	  
states	  are	  not	  directly	  bound	  by	  the	  constitutional	  doctrines	  developed	  by	  the	  Court	  of	  
Justice.	  	  	  	  
The	  ‘European	  substantive	  supremacy’,352	  however,	  relies	  on	  the	  interpretation	  adopted	  
by	  the	  national	  courts	  and	  the	  remedies	  provided	  by	  the	  national	   legal	  systems.	  On	  the	  
one	  hand,	  the	  expansion	  of	  the	  EU	  internal	  market	  is	  strengthened	  and	  sustained	  by	  the	  
                                            
352	   JS	   Delicostopoulos,	   'Towards	   European	   Procedural	   Primacy	   in	   National	   Legal	   Systems'	   (2003)	   9	  
European	  Law	  Journal	  599,	  609.	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autonomous	   adoption	   of	   EU	   acquis	   by	   non-­‐member	   states.353	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   the	  
unity	   in	   the	  extended	  market	   is	   jeopardised,	   just	  as	   in	   the	  EU,	  by	  national	   legislatures,	  
administrations	   and	   judiciaries.	   These	   actors	   both	   uphold	   and	   challenge	   the	   effective	  
application	  of	  EU	  rules	  through	  possible	   inconsistent	   implementation	  of	   the	  acquis	  and	  
deficient	  procedural	  homogeneity.	  
In	   the	   EU,	   the	   Court	   of	   Justice	   enjoys	   the	   position	   of	   an	   authoritative	   interpreter	   and	  
engine	   for	   the	   development	   of	   legal	   doctrines.	   It	   holds	   this	   position	   despite	   the	  
occasionally	   critical	   approaches	   of	   the	   Member	   States	   and,	   especially,	   the	   national	  
constitutional	  courts.	  The	  EFTA	  Court	  serves	  essentially	  the	  same	  purpose	  in	  the	  EEA	  as	  
the	   Court	   of	   Justice	   in	   the	   EU.	  When	   it	   comes	   to	   the	   other	  multilateral	   arrangements,	  
such	  as	  the	  Energy	  Community	  and	  the	  ECAA,	  it	  becomes	  apparent	  that	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  
a	   strong	   judicial	  body	   comparable	   to	   either	   the	  Court	  of	   Justice	  of	   the	  EU	  or	   the	  EFTA	  
Court,	  the	  burden	  of	  ensuring	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  regime	  outside	  the	  EU	  and	  the	  EEA	  
falls	  primarily	  on	  the	  national	  courts.	  The	  questions	  of	  the	  applicability	  of	  international	  
law	  in	  municipal	  law,	  the	  rank	  provided	  to	  the	  acquis	  in	  the	  national	  legal	  order	  and	  the	  
legal	  remedies	  available	  to	  individuals	  for	  enforcing	  their	  rights	  under	  EU	  acquis	  are	  to	  
be	   determined	   by	   national	   constitutional	   systems.	   Likewise	   are	   the	   recognition	   of	   the	  
direct	   effect	   of	   a	   provision	   of	   EU	   origin,	   unless	   the	   legal	   instrument	   itself	   specifies	   its	  
effect,	   and	   the	   methods	   for	   interpreting	   treaties	   to	   be	   determined	   by	   the	   national	  
judiciaries	  and	  national	  law.	  While	  there	  is	  nothing	  in	  international	  law	  to	  prevent	  a	  state	  
from	  independently	  adopting	  an	  accommodating	  approach	  to	  EU	  acquis	  as	  international	  
law,	  the	   institutional	  guarantees	  that	  ensure	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  Court	  of	   Justice	   in	  the	  
EU	  are	  considerably	  weaker	  in	  the	  multilateral	  agreements.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  effectiveness	  
of	  the	  expanded	  internal	  market	  and	  the	  protection	  of	  the	  individual	  rights	  embedded	  in	  
the	  exported	  acquis	  depend	  to	  a	  significantly	  larger	  degree	  on	  the	  third	  countries’	   legal	  
orders	   and	   practices	   than	  what	   is	   the	   case	  within	   the	   EU.	   The	   following	   chapters	  will	  
explore	  the	  institutional	  and	  procedural	  frameworks	  of	  the	  multilateral	  agreements	  and	  
evaluate	  their	  effectiveness	  as	  compared	  to	  the	  corresponding	  frameworks	  set	  up	  in	  the	  
EU.	  The	   following	  chapter,	  however,	   is	  dedicate	   specifically	   to	   the	  barriers	   that	   the	  EU	  
                                            
353	  S	  Kux	  and	  U	  Sverdrup,	  'Fuzzy	  borders	  and	  adaptive	  outsiders:	  Norway,	  Switzerland	  and	  the	  EU'	  (2000)	  
22	  Journal	  of	  European	  integration	  237,	  253.	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legal	   order	   itself	   erects	   due	   to	   the	   necessity	   to	   uphold	   its	   own	   autonomy	   to	   the	  
possibility	  of	  effectively	  extending	  the	  internal	  market	  to	  third	  countries.	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PART	  II	   EXPANDING	  THE	  INTERNAL	  MARKET:	  
INSTITUTIONAL	  IMPLICATIONS	  	  
Chapter	  5	   Autonomy	  of	  the	  EU	  legal	  order	  
1	  Introduction	  
Achieving	   and	   preserving	   homogeneity	   in	   the	   expanded	   internal	   market	  
inevitably	  calls	   for	  an	  appropriate	   institutional	  and	  procedural	   framework.	   It	   is	  
necessary	  that	  mechanisms	  exist	  for	  creating	  and	  maintaining	  an	  identical	  body	  
of	   rules	   across	   the	   territory	   of	   the	   expanded	   market	   space,	   as	   well	   as	   for	  
implementing	   and	   interpreting	   the	   rules	   in	   a	   uniform	   manner.	   The	   claim	   of	  
homogeneity	   in	   the	   project	   of	   extending	   the	   EU	   internal	   market	   to	   non-­‐EU	  
Member	  States	  pertains	  merely	  to	  the	  substantive	  dimension	  of	  the	  outcome	  of	  
the	   rules	   transfer.	   The	   aim	   of	   homogeneity	   itself	   does	   not	   prescribe	   any	  
particular	   institutional	  design	  by	  which	   the	  desired	   level	  of	  uniformity	   is	   to	  be	  
reached	  and	  maintained.	  The	  appropriate	  institutional	  and	  procedural	  structures	  
are,	  therefore,	  to	  be	  determined	  by	  the	  contracting	  parties.	  	  
The	  parties	  to	  the	  relevant	  international	  agreements	  are,	  however,	  restricted	  by	  
certain	   imperative	   features	   of	   the	   EU	   legal	   order	   pronounced	   by	   the	   Court	   of	  
Justice.	   These	   restrictions	   include,	   for	   example,	   the	   need	   to	   comply	   with	   the	  
Treaties	  in	  the	  most	  general	  sense	  and	  with	  the	  limits	  to	  the	  competence	  of	  the	  
EU	  and	  the	  different	  institutions	  via	  using	  the	  correct	  legal	  basis	  more	  narrowly.	  
The	  most	   relevant	   of	   these	   limitations	   in	   the	   present	   context	   is,	   however,	   the	  
need	   to	  preserve	   the	  autonomy	  of	   the	  EU	   legal	  order.	  This	   chapter	  will,	   firstly,	  
scrutinise	   the	   concept	  of	   autonomy	  of	   the	  EU	   legal	  order	   in	  general	   and	   in	   the	  
particular	   case	   of	   expanding	   the	   internal	   market	   to	   third	   countries	   by	  
multilateral	   agreements.	   Secondly,	   the	   chapter	  will	   examine	   the	   application	   of	  
the	   concept	   by	   the	   Court	   and,	   thirdly,	   provide	   a	   general	   evaluation	   of	   the	  
relevance	  of	  the	  autonomy	  principle	  on	  the	  possibility	  of	  expanding	  the	  internal	  
market	  without	  enlarging	  the	  Union.	  	  
 
	   216 
2	  Autonomy	  of	  the	  EU	  legal	  order:	  the	  concept	  
The	  autonomy	  of	  a	  legal	  order	  is	  not	  EU-­‐specific	  but	  has	  developed	  in	  reference	  
to	  national	  legal	  systems	  and	  international	  law.	  The	  following	  analysis	  highlights,	  
firstly,	  the	  general	  concept	  of	  autonomy	  and	  its	  application	  in	  the	  EU	  vis-­à-­vis	  the	  
legal	   orders	   of	   the	  Member	   States.	   The	   second	   subsection	   examines	   the	   scope,	  
effects	   and	   rationale	   of	   the	   concept	   of	   autonomy	   in	   the	   EU	   legal	   order	   with	  
respect	  to	  international	  law.	  	  	  
2.1	  Autonomy	  in	  relation	  national	  legal	  orders	  
The	  concept	  of	  an	  autonomous	  legal	  order	  refers,	   first	  and	  foremost,	   to	   its	  self-­‐
referential	   character.	   An	   autonomous	   legal	   order	   is	   able	   to	   create,	   validate,	  
apply,	   and	   interpret	   legal	   rules	  on	   the	  basis	  of	   the	   tools	   found	  within	   the	   legal	  
order	  itself	  without	  constant	  validation	  by	  another	  legal	  order.1	  	  
There	  is	  more	  than	  one	  interpretation	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  autonomy.	  According	  to	  
Schilling’s	   classification,	   autonomy	   can	   refer	   either	   to	   the	   absolute,	   original	  
constituent	   power	   (‘original	   autonomy’);	   independent	   power	   that	   is,	   however,	  
accorded	  by	  another,	  original	  constituent	  power	  (‘derivative	  autonomy’);	  or	  the	  
power	  to	   interpret	  the	  highest	  rules	   in	  a	   legal	  order	  (‘interpretive	  autonomy’).2	  
The	  latter,	  according	  to	  Schilling,	  belongs	  to	  the	  concept	  of	  original	  autonomy	  but	  
not	  necessarily	  to	  the	  legal	  orders	  that	  enjoy	  derivative	  autonomy.	  
In	  his	  analysis	  of	   the	  possible	   foundations	  of	   the	  claim	   for	  autonomy	  of	   the	  EU	  
legal	   order,	   Schilling	   claims	   that	   the	   EU	   does	   not	   constitute	   an	   exercise	   of	  
original	   constituent	   power	   nor	   has	   it	   gained	   the	   constituent	   power	   from	   the	  
European	  peoples	  following	  the	  conclusion	  of	  the	  founding	  Treaties.	  Neither	  can	  
the	   claim	   of	   autonomy	   in	   the	   EU	   be	   based	   on	   natural	   law	   foundations.	   As	  
international	  treaties,	  though,	  the	  EU	  Treaties	  possess	   ‘derivative	  autonomy’	  by	  
virtue	   of	   the	   Member	   States.3	   When	   it	   comes	   to	   the	   existence	   and	   degree	   of	  
interpretive	  autonomy	  in	  the	  EU	  legal	  order,	  the	  practice	  of	  autointepretation	  of	  
EU	   law	   by	   the	   Member	   States’	   national	   courts	   indicates	   that	   the	   interpretive	  
                                            
1	  R	  Barents,	  The	  Autonomy	  of	  Community	  Law	  (Kluwer	  Law	  International	  2004)	  172.	  
2	  T	  Schilling,	  'The	  Autonomy	  of	  the	  Community	  Legal	  Order:	  An	  Analysis	  of	  Possible	  Foundations'	  
(1996)	  37	  Harvard	  International	  Law	  Journal	  389,	  389-­‐390.	  	  
3	  ibid	  404.	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autonomy	  of	   the	  EU	   is	   not	   absolute.4	   Given	   that	   national	   courts,	   especially	   the	  
highest	   courts	   may	   decide	   to	   contest	   the	   Court’s	   interpretation	   of	   the	  
compatibility	  of	  a	  national	  rule	  with	  EU	  law,	  the	  Court	  lacks	  an	  authoritative	  final	  
word	   in	  questions	   regarding	   the	   relationship	  between	   the	  EU	  and	   the	  national	  
legal	  orders.	  	  	  
Weiler	  and	  Haltern	   forcefully	  contested	  Schilling’s	  argumentation,	  especially	  as	  
concerns	  the	  effect	  of	  Member	  States’	  autointerpretation	  of	  EU	   law	  on	  the	  EU’s	  
interpretive	  autonomy.5	  The	  authors	  argued	  that	  regardless	  of	  the	  practice	  of	  the	  
Member	   State	   judiciaries’	   to	   delimit	   the	   competences	   between	   the	   EU	   and	   the	  
Member	  States	  in	  the	  light	  of	  the	  national	  constitutions	  the	  Member	  States	  do	  not	  
possess	  the	  right	  of	  ‘auto-­‐decision’	  over	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  Treaties.6	  Weiler	  and	  
Haltern	  further	  claimed	  that	  the	  Court	  is,	  indeed	  the	  ‘ultimate	  umpire’	  in	  the	  EU	  
legal	   system.	  This	  position	  of	   the	  Court	   is	   enshrined	   in	   the	  Treaty	  articles	   that	  
require	   Member	   State	   compliance	   with	   the	   Court’s	   judgments	   under	   Article	  
260(1)	  TFEU;	  the	   jurisdiction	  of	   the	  Court	  to	  review	  the	  validity	  and	  legality	  of	  
EU	   measures	   under	   Article	   263	   TFEU,	   among	   others	   on	   grounds	   of	   a	   lack	   of	  
competence;	   and	   the	   obligation	   of	   the	   Member	   State’s	   courts	   and	   tribunals	  
against	  whose	   decisions	   there	   is	   no	   judicial	   remedy	   under	   national	   law	   under	  
Article	  267	  TFEU	  to	  bring	  before	   the	  Court	  any	  matter	  on	  the	   interpretation	  of	  
the	  Treaties	  or	  the	  validity	  or	  interpretation	  of	  an	  EU	  legal	  act	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  
obtaining	  a	  preliminary	  ruling.	  	  
As	  regards	  the	  question	  of	  Kompetenz-­Kompetenz	  –	  the	  power	  to	  determine	  the	  
limits	   of	   one’s	   own	   competences	   –	  Weiler	   and	   Haltern	   distinguished	   between	  
two	  applications	  of	  the	  notion.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  the	  term	  refers	  to	  the	  legislative	  
Kompetenz-­Kompetenz	  to	  delimit	  the	  competences,	  whereas,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  it	  
concerns	   the	   judicial	   Kompetenz-­Kompetenz	   to	   adjudicate	   on	   the	   limits	   of	   EU	  
competences.7	   In	   relation	   to	   legislative	   Kompetenz-­Kompetenz,	   according	   to	  
MacCormick	  the	   limited	  political	  and	  normative	  power	  of	  the	  EU	  renders	   it	  not	  
even	  ‘remotely	  to	  resemble	  in	  itself	  a	  sovereign	  state	  or	  sovereign	  federation	  of	  
                                            
4	  ibid	  405-­‐407.	  In	  the	  same	  vein,	  see	  R	  Barents	  (n	  1)	  178.	  
5	   JHH	   Weiler	   and	   UR	   Haltern,	   'The	   Autonomy	   of	   the	   Community	   Legal	   Order—Through	   the	  
Looking	  Glass'	  (1996)	  37	  Harvard	  International	  Law	  Journal	  411.	  
6	  ibid	  424-­‐425.	  
7	  ibid	  436-­‐437.	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states’.8	   Indeed,	   with	   respect	   to	   legislative	   Kompetenz-­Kompetenz,	   the	   EU	   is	  
restricted	   by	   the	   principle	   of	   conferral	   provided	   in	  Articles	   5	   TEU.	  Article	   267	  
TFEU	   allocates	   judicial	   Kompetenz-­Kompetenz	   to	   the	   Court	   to	   provide	  
authoritative	   interpretations	   of	   EU	   law	   and	   rule	   on	   its	   validity.	   Finally,	   the	  
question	  comes	  down	  to	  who	  may	  rule	  on	  the	   limits	  of	  conferred	  powers	  –	  the	  
institutions	   of	   the	   EU	   or	   the	   Member	   States,	   and	   whether	   the	   power	   is,	   thus,	  
vested	  with	  the	  Court	  or	  the	  constitutional	  courts	  of	  the	  Member	  States.9	  Weiler	  
and	  Haltern	   conclude	   that	   the	  ultimate	  authority	   in	   this	   regard	   is	   exercised	  by	  
the	  Court	  of	  Justice.10	  
The	  notion	  of	  autonomy	  originates	  from	  the	  idea	  of	  sovereignty.	  The	  allocation	  of	  
competences	  –	  and	  thereby	  powers	  –	  between	  the	  EU	  and	  the	  Member	  States	  is	  
ultimately	  a	  question	  of	  dividing	  sovereign	  powers.11	  The	  founding	  treaties	  of	  the	  
EU	  are	  concluded	  under	  public	  international	  law	  and	  in	  accordance	  with	  national	  
constitutional	   requirements	   as	   regards	   their	   negotiation,	   signature,	   conclusion	  
and	   application.	   By	   virtue	   of	   the	   international	   agreements,	   the	  Member	   States	  
have	  set	  up	  a	  number	  of	  institutions	  tasked	  with	  decision-­‐making,	  administrative	  
and	   judicial	   duties.	   Although	   based	   on	   an	   original	   recognition	   by	   the	  Member	  
States,	   the	   institutions	   of	   the	   EU	   enjoy	   the	   powers	   conferred	   on	   them	   to	   the	  
extent	   specified	  by	   the	  Treaties.	  Once	   established,	   the	   institutional	   framework,	  
thus,	  operates	  independently	  of	  the	  Member	  States.	  This	  is	  without	  prejudice	  to	  
the	   fact	   that	   the	   Member	   States	   can	   amend	   or	   even	   repeal	   the	   Treaties	   and	  
thereby	   modify	   or	   end	   the	   existence	   of	   the	   Union;	   or	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   Union	  
                                            
8	  N	  MacCormick,	  'Beyond	  the	  Sovereign	  State'	  (1993)	  56	  The	  Modern	  Law	  Review	  1,	  16.	  
9	   I	   Govaere,	   'Beware	   of	   the	   Trojan	   Horse:	   Dispute	   Settlement	   in	   (Mixed)	   Agreements	   and	   the	  
Autonomy	  of	  the	  EU	  Legal	  Order'	  in	  C	  Hillion	  and	  P	  Koutrakos	  (eds),	  Mixed	  Agreements	  Revisited	  
(Hart	  Publishing	  2010)	  187,	  188-­‐189.	  
10	  As	  concerns	  EU	  law	  or	  the	  Court’s	  rulings	  adopted	  ultra	  vires,	  in	  violation	  of	  fundamental	  rights	  
and	   infringing	   national	   constitutional	   identity,	   the	   German	   Constitutional	   Court	   and	   the	   Czech	  
Constitutional	   Court	   beg	   to	   differ.	   See	   M	   Payandeh,	   'Constitutional	   review	   of	   EU	   law	   after	  
Honeywell:	  Contextualizing	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  German	  Constitutional	  Court	  and	  the	  EU	  
Court	   of	   Justice'	   (2011)	   48	   Common	   Market	   Law	   Review	   9;	   J	   Komárek,	   'Czech	   Constitutional	  
Court	  Playing	  with	  Matches:	  the	  Czech	  Constitutional	  Court	  Declares	  a	  Judgment	  of	  the	  Court	  of	  
Justice	   of	   the	   EU	  Ultra	   Vires;	   Judgment	   of	   31	   January	   2012,	   Pl.	   ÚS	   5/12,	   Slovak	   Pensions	   XVII'	  
(2012)	  8	  European	  Constitutional	  Law	  Review	  323.	  	  	  
11	  P	  Pescatore,	  The	  Law	  of	  Integration	  (Sijthoff	  1974)	  30.	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answers	   to	   the	  Member	  States	   for	   the	  manner	   in	  which	   it	  executes	   the	  powers	  
delegated	  to	  it.12	  
A	  number	  of	   judgments	  of	  the	  Court	  as	  well	  as	  national	  courts	  confirm	  that	  the	  
Member	  States	  have	  transferred	  part	  of	  their	  sovereignty	  to	  the	  EU.	  This,	  in	  turn,	  
is	  a	  crucial	  element	  in	  making	  the	  determination	  that	  the	  EU	  legal	  order	  really	  is	  
one	  of	  autonomous	  character,13	  recognised	  both	  by	  the	  supranational	  legal	  order	  
itself	  and	  the	  national	  legal	  orders	  from	  which	  the	  EU	  derives	  its	  autonomy.	  	  
The	  German	  Constitutional	  Court	  stated	  as	  early	  as	  in	  1967	  that	  ‘[t]he	  organs	  of	  
the	  EEC	  exercise	   sovereign	   rights	   that	   the	  Member	  States	  have	   relinquished	   to	  
them	   in	   favour	   of	   the	   Community	   they	   have	   founded’	   and	   that	   this	   has	   taken	  
place	  by	  virtue	  of	  a	   ‘transferral’	  of	   sovereign	  rights	   from	  the	  Member	  States	   to	  
the	  EEC.14	  Furthermore,	   the	  Constitutional	  Court	  affirmed	   the	  autonomy	  of	   the	  
EU	  and	  the	  Member	  States’	  legal	  orders	  from	  one	  another	  as	  well	  as	  the	  status	  of	  
the	  EEC	  Treaty	  as	  an	  ‘autonomous	  source	  of	  law’	  separate	  from	  national	  law.15	  In	  
reference	  to	  the	  latter	  claim	  the	  Constitutional	  Court	  followed	  the	  judgments	  of	  
the	  Court	  of	   Justice	   in	  Van	  Gend	  en	  Loos	  and	  Costa	  v	  ENEL.	  While	   in	  the	  former	  
the	   Court	   of	   Justice	   proclaimed	   that	   ‘the	   Community	   constitutes	   a	   new	   legal	  
order	  of	   international	   law	  for	  the	  benefit	  of	  which	  the	  states	  have	   limited	  their	  
sovereign	  rights,	  albeit	  within	  limited	  fields’,16	  the	  Court	  was	  considerably	  more	  
assertive	  in	  the	  latter	  decision.	  In	  Costa	  v	  ENEL,	  the	  Court	  stated	  in	  response	  to	  a	  
submission	   by	   the	   Italian	   Government	   as	   to	   the	   ‘absolute	   inadmissibility’	   of	   a	  
request	   for	   preliminary	   ruling	   insofar	   as	   a	   national	   court	   is	   obliged	   to	   apply	  
national	  law.17	  The	  Court	  asserted	  that	  the	  EU	  legal	  system	  is	  independent	  of	  the	  
national	  legal	  systems	  and	  that	  the	  latter	  cannot	  by	  its	  own	  rules	  alter	  the	  system	  
of	  legal	  protection	  provided	  by	  the	  Treaties	  such	  as,	  in	  the	  case	  at	  hand,	  the	  right	  
and	   in	   some	   instances	   obligation	   of	   national	   courts	   to	   make	   requests	   for	  
                                            
12	  D	  Sarooshi,	   'The	  Essentially	  Contested	  Nature	  of	  the	  Concept	  of	  Sovereignty:	   Implications	  for	  
the	   Exercise	   by	   International	   Organizations	   of	   Delegated	   Powers	   of	   Government'	   (2003)	   25	  
Michigan	  Journal	  of	  International	  Law	  1107,	  1133-­‐1134.	  
13	  FC	  Mayer,	  'Van	  Gend	  en	  Loos:	  The	  Foundation	  of	  a	  Community	  of	  Law'	  in	  M	  Poiares	  Maduro	  and	  
L	  Azoulai	  (eds),	  The	  Past	  and	  Future	  of	  EU	  Law	  (Hart	  Publishing	  2010)	  16,	  5.	  
14	  1	  BvR	  248/63,	  216/67	  EWG-­Verordnungen	  [1967]	  BVerfGE	  22,	  293,	  para	  15.	  
15	  ibid.	  
16	  Case	  26/62	  Van	  Gend	  en	  Loos	  [1963]	  ECR	  1.	  Regarding	  the	  careful	  language	  used	  by	  the	  Court,	  
see	  FC	  Mayer	  (n	  13)	  21.	  
17	  Case	  6/64	  Costa	  v	  ENEL	  [1964]	  ECR	  1141.	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preliminary	  reference	  when	  faced	  with	  a	  question	  about	  the	  interpretation	  of	  EU	  
law.	  	  
The	  autonomy	  of	  the	  EU	  legal	  order	  is	  grounded	  on	  the	  special	  nature	  of	  the	  EU	  
Treaties	  as	  compared	  to	  other	  agreements	  concluded	  under	  public	  international	  
law.	  The	  Member	  States	  have	  an	  obligation	  under	  international	  law	  to	  apply	  the	  
Treaties,	   including	   respect	   for	   the	   legal	   mechanism	   for	   settling	   disputes	  
established	  therein.	  For	  the	  EU	  Member	  States,	  this	  duty	  entails	  a	  partial	  loss	  of	  
sovereignty	  insofar	  as	  the	  Union	  has	  been	  set	  up	  for	  ‘unlimited	  duration,	  having	  
its	   own	   institutions,	   its	   own	  personality,	   its	   own	   legal	   capacity	   and	   capacity	  of	  
representation	   on	   the	   international	   plane	   and,	   more	   particularly,	   real	   powers	  
stemming	  from	  a	  limitation	  of	  sovereignty	  or	  a	  transfer	  of	  powers	  from	  the	  States	  
to	   the	   Community’.18	   The	   Court	   found	   that	   it	   would	   be	   incompatible	   with	   the	  
terms	  and	  spirit	  of	  the	  Treaty	  as	  well	  as	  the	  obligation	  of	  the	  Member	  States	  to	  
give	  effect	  to	  the	  Treaties	  in	  their	  national	  legal	  orders	  were	  the	  Member	  States	  
to	   overrule	   the	   authority	   of	   the	   EU	   legal	   system	  by	   giving	   precedence	   to	   their	  
own	  unilateral	  acts,19	  and,	  thereby,	  exercise	  autodecision.	  Barents	  has	  explained	  
this	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  EU	  legal	  order	  not	  existing	  completely	  independently	  of	  the	  
Member	  States’	   legal	  orders	  yet	  being	  independent	  of	   ‘unilateral	  influence	  from	  
national	   law’.20	   The	   authority	   of	   the	   EU	   is,	   after	   all,	   based	   on	   reciprocal	  
acceptance	  by	  all	  Member	  States	  of	  the	  permanent	  limitation	  of	  their	  sovereign	  
rights’.21	   Consequently,	   the	   Court	   concluded	   that	   a	   Member	   State	   cannot	  
unilaterally	   restrict	   recourse	   of	   the	   courts	   operating	   in	   its	   jurisdiction	   to	   the	  
preliminary	   reference	  procedure	  which	   they	   can	   access	  under	  Article	   177	  EEC	  
Treaty	  (now	  Article	  267	  TFEU).	  	  
The	  rationale	  behind	  the	  claim	  for	  autonomy	  of	  the	  EU	  legal	  order	  is	  the	  desire	  to	  
uphold	   the	   unity	   of	   the	   legal	   order	   and,	   consequently,	   to	   ensure	   its	   proper	  
functioning.22	   Unity	   is	   closely	   related	   to	   primacy.	   Were	   one	   legal	   order	   to	  
penetrate	  the	  interpretation	  or	  application	  of	  the	  rules	  of	  another	  legal	  order,	  the	  
latter	  could	  not	  justify	  its	  independent	  existence	  nor	  could	  the	  objectives	  of	  the	  
Union	  be	  reached	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  corresponding	  conferral	  of	  powers	  by	  the	  
                                            
18	  ibid	  (emphasis	  added).	  
19	  ibid.	  
20	  R	  Barents	  (n	  1)	  239.	  
21	  Case	  6/64	  Costa	  v	  ENEL	  (n	  17).	  
22	  R	  Barents	  (n	  1)	  171-­‐172.	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Member	   States	   to	   the	   Union.	   The	   latter	   inevitably	   leads	   to	   the	   creation	   of	   a	  
supranational	   legal	  order	  characterised	  by	   the	  notion	  of	  autonomy	  and	  serving	  
the	  common	  aims	  of	  the	  Member	  States23	  –	  the	  ‘intrinsic	  unity’	  of	  the	  EU.24	  	  
The	  concept	  of	  autonomy	  entails	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  EU	  Treaties	  determining	  the	  
legal	   remedies	   available	   under	   EU	   law	   also	   the	   content	   of	   the	   rights	   and	  
obligations	   arising	   from	   the	   Treaties.	   In	   Internationale	   Handelsgesellschaft,	   the	  
Court	  found	  that	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  ensuring	  the	  uniformity	  and	  efficacy	  of	  EU	  law,	  
the	  validity	  of	  the	  measures	  adopted	  by	  EU	  institutions	  may	  only	  be	  judged	  in	  the	  
light	  of	  EU	  law	  itself	  and	  not	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  national	   laws	  and	  legal	  concepts.25	  
Moreover,	   the	   Court	   confirmed	   that	   recourse	   to	   a	   national	   interpretation	   is	  
impossible	  due	  to	  the	  Treaties	  being	  an	  ‘independent	  source	  of	  law’	  and	  thereby	  
autonomous	   from	  the	  national	   legal	  orders.	  As	  such	  the	  validity	  of	   the	  Treaties	  
cannot	   be	   questioned	   by	   national	   courts	   without	   questioning	   the	   very	  
foundations	  of	  the	  EU	  legal	  order	  as	  a	  whole,	  not	  even	  on	  grounds	  of	  an	  alleged	  
violation	   of	   fundamental	   rights	   as	   recognised	   by	   the	   national	   constitutions	   or	  
national	   constitutional	   principles.26	   A	   review	   of	   the	   compatibility	   of	   an	   EU	  
measure	   with	   fundamental	   rights	   must,	   therefore,	   be	   based	   on	   the	   analogous	  
guarantees	   found	   in	   the	  EU	   legal	   order	   as	   fundamental	   rights	   form	  part	   of	   the	  
general	   principles	   of	   EU	   law	   in	   addition	   to	   being	   integrated	   into	   the	   EU	   legal	  
system	  by	  virtue	  of	  the	  EU	  Charter	  of	  Fundamental	  Rights.	  This	  approach	  allows	  
the	  protection	  of	  fundamental	  rights	  to	  be	  considered	  in	  the	  broader	  framework	  
of	  the	  structure	  and	  objectives	  of	  the	  EU,27	  and,	  thus,	  reach	  the	  common	  aims	  of	  
the	  EU	  and	   its	  Member	  States	  rather	   than	  the	  particular	  demands	  of	   individual	  
Member	   States.	   The	   latter	   situation	  would	   jeopardise	   the	   unity	   of	   the	   internal	  
market	   and	   cohesion	   in	   the	  EU	  as	   a	  whole.28	  Neither	  do	  provisions	  of	  national	  
law	   constitute	   a	   valid	   excuse	   for	   a	   failure	   to	   properly	   apply	   international	   law	  
under	  Article	  27	  VCLT.	  	  	  
Even	  earlier	  had	  the	  Court	  overruled	  the	  attempts	  of	  Member	  State	  governments	  
to	  challenge	  the	  refusal	  of	  EU	   institutions	   to	   take	  account	  of	  national	   laws	  and,	  
                                            
23	  P	  Pescatore,	  'The	  Law	  of	  Integration'	  (n	  11)	  50-­‐51.	  
24	  R	  Barents	  (n	  1)	  252-­‐253.	  	  
25	  Case	  11/70	  Internationale	  Handelsgesellschaft	  [1970]	  ECR	  1125,	  para	  3.	  
26	  ibid.	  
27	  ibid	  para	  4.	  
28	  Case	  44/79	  Hauer	  [1979]	  ECR	  3727,	  para	  14.	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thus,	   the	  autonomy	  of	   those	   institutions.29	  The	  autonomy	  of	   the	  EU	   legal	  order	  
has	  mutual	  application	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  neither	  does	  the	  EU	  possess	  the	  power	  
to	   annul	   national	   rules	   that	   conflict	  with	   the	   obligations	   of	   the	  Member	   States	  
under	  EU	  law.30	  	  
The	  self-­‐referential	   character	  of	   the	  EU	   legal	  order	   is	   inextricably	   linked	   to	   the	  
EU’s	   institutional	   framework	   that	   upholds	   the	   independence	   of	   the	   legal	   order	  
from	  external	  claims	  of	  authority	  and	  ensures	  that	  the	  rules	  of	  the	  legal	  order	  are	  
interpreted	   and	   applied	   consistently	   with	   the	   principles	   inherent	   to	   the	   legal	  
order.31	  This	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  the	  EU	  institutions	  are	  the	  only	  ones	  endowed	  
with	  the	  task	  of	  giving	  effect	  to	  EU	  law.	  National	  institutions	  and	  judiciaries	  form	  
part	   of	   the	   general	   institutional	   framework	   of	   the	   EU	   whereas	   the	   ultimate	  
authority	   to	   give	   binding	   interpretations	   of	   EU	   law	   and	   to	   declare	   the	   latter	  
invalid	   rests	   pursuant	   to	   Article	   267	   TFEU	   with	   the	   Court	   of	   Justice.32	   The	  
autonomy	  of	   the	  EU	   legal	  order	   inevitably	   requires	   that	   the	  Court	  of	   Justice	  be	  
the	  ultimate	  umpire	  of	  EU	  law.	  	  
2.2	  Autonomy	  in	  relation	  to	  international	  law	  
The	  second	  aspect	  of	  the	  autonomy	  of	  the	  EU	  legal	  order	  is	  its	  application	  vis-­à-­
vis	  international	  law.	  The	  EU	  is	  active	  on	  the	  international	  stage,	  interacting	  with	  
other	   states	   and	   international	   organisations	   as	   well	   as	   fostering	   international	  
cooperation	  to	  develop	  common	  responses	  to	  global	  challenges.	  The	  EU	  is,	  thus,	  
not	  isolated	  from	  other	  international	  actors,	  processes,	  and	  decision-­‐making	  and	  
dispute	   settlement	  mechanisms.	  However,	   the	   fact	   that	   the	  EU,	   too,	   derives	   its	  
competence	  from	  an	  international	  legal	  instrument	  and	  is,	  thus,	  both	  a	  creature	  
of	  and	  an	  actor	  in	  international	  law	  may	  give	  rise	  to	  complex	  issues	  concerning	  
the	  relationship	  between	  EU	  law	  and	  international	  law.	  
From	  the	  external	  perspective,	  the	  autonomy	  of	  the	  EU	  legal	  order	  is	  as	  a	  means	  
of	  controlling	  the	  normative	  influence	  of	  legal	  norms	  and	  principles	  that	  emanate	  
                                            
29	  Case	  1/58	   Stork	  v	  High	  Authority	   [1959]	  ECR	  17,	  26;	   Joined	  Cases	  7/56	  and	  3-­‐7/57	  Alegra	  v	  
Common	  Assembly	   [1957-­‐1958]	  ECR	  39,	   57;	   Case	   30/59	  Gezamenlijke	   Steenkolenmijnen	   [1961]	  
ECR	  1,	  22.	  
30	  Case	  6/60	  Humblet	  [1960]	  ECR	  559,	  568.	  
31	  R	  Barents	  (n	  1)	  262-­‐263.	  	  
32	  Case	  314/85	  Foto-­Frost	  [1987]	  ECR	  4199,	  para	  17;	  G	  Bebr,	  'The	  Relation	  of	  the	  European	  Coal	  
and	  Steel	  Community	  Law	  to	  the	  Law	  of	  the	  Member	  States:	  A	  Peculiar	  Legal	  Symbiosis'	  (1958)	  
58	  Columbia	  Law	  Review	  767,	  769-­‐770.	   	  
 
	   223 
from	  outside	  the	  EU.33	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  the	  EU	  legal	  order	  exists	  outside	  the	  
international	  community.	  Rather,	  the	  autonomy	  of	  the	  legal	  order	  precludes	  the	  
authoritative	  influence	  of	  international	  norms	  that	  have	  not	  become	  part	  of	  the	  
EU	  legal	  order,	  thus	  rendering	  the	  EU	  independent	  to	  determine	  the	  applicability	  
and	  the	  legal	  effect	  of	  international	  law	  on	  its	  territory.	  The	  Court	  has	  generally	  
had	  an	  accommodating	  approach	  towards	  the	  influences	  of	  international	  law	  on	  
EU	  law.	  The	  Court	  does	  not	  preclude	  an	  interpretation	  of	  EU	  law	  in	  the	   light	  of	  
the	   general	   principles	   of	   international	   law	   or	   customary	   international	   law,	   the	  
provisions	   of	   international	   agreements	   to	  which	   the	   EU	   is	   a	   party	   itself	   or	   by	  
proxy	   of	   the	   Member	   States,	   or	   the	   decisions	   of	   international	   courts	   and	  
tribunals	  the	  jurisdiction	  of	  which	  is	  binding	  on	  the	  Union.	  	  	  
The	  CFI	  ruled	   in	  Kadi	   that	   the	  Member	  States’	  obligations	  under	   the	  Charter	  of	  
the	  United	  Nations	  (UN),	  including	  the	  resolutions	  of	  the	  Security	  Council,	  enjoy	  
primacy	   over	   all	   domestic	   and	   international	   law	   obligations	   including	   the	   EU	  
Treaties	  by	  virtue	  of	  international	  customary	  law	  and	  Articles	  5,	  27	  and	  30	  VCLT	  
as	   well	   as	   under	   Article	   103	   UN	   Charter	   and	   the	   case	   law	   of	   the	   ICJ.34	  
Furthermore,	  since	  the	  Member	  States’	  obligations	  under	  the	  UN	  Charter	  predate	  
the	   conclusion	  of	   the	  EU	  Treaties,	   the	  Member	   States	  must	   give	  precedence	   to	  
the	   application	   of	   the	   Charter.35	   Consequently,	   in	   cases	   of	   conflict	   arising	  
between	  the	  obligations	  of	  the	  Member	  States	  under	  the	  UN	  Charter	  and	  the	  EU	  
Treaties,	   respectively,	   the	   former	   must	   prevail	   over	   the	   latter	   and	   conflicting	  
measures	  of	  EU	  law	  be	  left	  unapplied.36	  Since	  the	  EU	  itself	  is	  not	  a	  member	  of	  the	  
UN,	  the	  obligations	  of	  the	  UN	  Charter	  do	  not	  bind	  the	  EU	  directly.	  
In	  the	  appeal	  to	  Kadi	  brought	  before	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice,37	  the	  Court	  ruled	  that	  in	  
its	   legislative	   action,	   including	  when	   implementing	   UN	   anti-­‐terrorist	   sanctions	  
on	   the	   EU	   territory,	   the	   EU	   is	   bound	   by	   the	   requirements	   of	   international	  
fundamental	   rights	   protection.	   In	   addition	   to	   the	   EU’s	   own	   Charter	   of	  
Fundamental	  Rights,	  Article	  6	  TEU	  and	  the	  case	  law	  of	  the	  Court	  as	  part	  of	  the	  EU	  
                                            
33	  R	  Barents	  (n	  1)	  261.	  	  
34	  Case	  T-­‐315/01	  Kadi	  [2005]	  ECR	  II-­‐3649,	  paras	  181-­‐184;	  Case	  T-­‐306/01	  Yusuf	  and	  Al	  Barakaat	  
[2005]	  ECR	  II-­‐3533,	  paras	  231-­‐234.	  	  
35	  Case	  T-­‐315/01	  Kadi	  (n	  34)	  paras	  185-­‐188;	  Case	  T-­‐306/01	  Yusuf	  and	  Al	  Barakaat	  (n	  34)	  paras	  
235-­‐238.	  	  	  
36	  Case	  T-­‐315/01	  Kadi	  (n	  34)	  paras	  189-­‐190;	  Case	  T-­‐306/01	  Yusuf	  and	  Al	  Barakaat	  (n	  34)	  paras	  
239-­‐240.	  
37	  Joined	  Cases	  C-­‐402/05	  P	  and	  C-­‐415/05	  P	  Kadi	  and	  Al	  Barakaat	  [2008]	  ECR	  I-­‐6351.	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legal	  order,	  the	  general	  principles	  of	  law	  inspired	  by	  the	  constitutional	  traditions	  
common	   to	   the	  Member	   States,	   the	   code	  of	   fundamental	   rights	   of	   the	  Union	   is	  
influenced	  by	  the	  international	  human	  rights	  instruments	  that	  bind	  the	  Member	  
States	   or	   on	   which	   the	   latter	   have	   ‘collaborated’.38	   In	   the	   light	   of	   these	  
considerations,	   and	   the	   fact	   that	   the	  EU	   legal	   order	   is	   an	   autonomous	  one,	   the	  
Court	   concluded	   that	   international	   obligations	   cannot	   prevail	   over	   the	  
constitutional	  principles	  of	  EU	  Treaties	  including	  respect	  for	  fundamental	  rights	  
which	   is	   a	   precondition	   for	   the	   lawfulness	   of	   EU	   measures.39	   Neither	   can	  
measures	  adopted	  by	   the	  Member	  States	   for	   the	  purpose	  of	  maintaining	  peace	  
and	   international	   security	   or	   international	   agreements	   concluded	   before	  
accession	   to	   the	   EU	   be	   given	   precedence	   under	   Articles	   347	   and	   351	   TFEU,	  
respectively,	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  the	  protection	  of	  fundamental	  rights	  by	  the	  EU.40	  
The	  Court	  does	  not,	  however,	  review	  the	  lawfulness	  of	  the	  international	  measure	  
itself.41	  	  	  
The	   Union	   courts	   most	   frequently	   deal	   with	   the	   interaction	   between	   EU	   and	  
international	  law	  in	  cases	  concerning	  the	  interpretation	  of	  EU	  or	  national	  rules	  in	  
the	   light	  of	   international	   law,	   including	  EU	   law	  of	   international	   law	  origin.	  The	  
latter	  includes	  international	  agreements	  concluded	  by	  the	  EU	  or	  by	  the	  Member	  
States	  in	  instances	  where	  the	  EU	  as	  an	  international	  organisation	  cannot	  accede	  
to	  an	  international	  instrument	  in	  its	  field	  of	  competence	  because	  of	  restrictions	  
imposed	  by	  the	  international	  agreement.	  In	  Cipra	  and	  Kvasnicka,	  for	  example,	  the	  
Court	   examined	   its	   own	   jurisdiction	   to	   interpret	   the	   European	   Agreement	  
concerning	   the	   Work	   of	   Crews	   of	   Vehicles	   engaged	   in	   International	   Road	  
Transport	  (the	  AETR	  Agreement).	  The	  Agreement	  was	  concluded	  only	  by	  the	  EU	  
Member	   States	   and	   not	   the	   EEC.	   The	   agreement	   covers	   an	   area	   of	   shared	  
competences	  between	  the	  EU	  and	  the	  Member	  States.	  During	  the	  time	  when	  the	  
initial	  negotiations	  took	  place	  the	  EEC	  had	  not	  yet	  legislated	  in	  the	  field.42	  Since	  
the	   EU	   adopted	   Regulation	   No	   543/69	   on	   the	   harmonisation	   of	   certain	   social	  
legislation	   relating	   to	   road	   transport	   the	   subject	   matter	   of	   the	   Agreement	   fell	  
                                            
38	  Case	  4/73	  Nold	  [1974]	  ECR	  491,	  para	  13.	  
39	  Joined	  Cases	  C-­‐402/05	  P	  and	  C-­‐415/05	  P	  Kadi	  and	  Al	  Barakaat	  (n	  37)	  paras	  282	  and	  285;	  Case	  
5/88	  Wachauf	  [1989]	  ECR	  2609,	  para	  19.	  
40	  Joined	  Cases	  C-­‐402/05	  P	  and	  C-­‐415/05	  P	  Kadi	  and	  Al	  Barakaat	  (n	  37)	  paras	  302-­‐304.	  
41	  ibid	  para	  286.	  
42	  Case	  22/70	  AETR	  [1971]	  ECR	  263,	  paras	  82-­‐83.	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within	   the	   scope	  of	   exclusive	  EU	   competence.43	   In	   order	  not	   to	  undermine	   the	  
ongoing	  negotiations	  it	  was	  decided	  by	  the	  Commission	  and	  the	  Council	  that	  the	  
Member	   States	   could	   conclude	   the	   agreement.44	   In	   so	   doing,	   however,	   the	  
Member	   States	   acted	   ‘in	   the	   interest	   and	   on	   behalf	   of	   the	   [Union]’45	   and	   the	  
provisions	   of	   the	   AETR	   Agreement,	   subsequently,	   form	   part	   of	   EU	   law.46	   As	   a	  
consequence,	   the	  Court	  of	   Justice	  has	   jurisdiction	   to	   interpret	   the	  agreement,47	  
even	  though	  the	  Union	  is	  not	  formally	  a	  party	  to	  the	  agreement.	  
Close	   cooperation	   between	   the	   Member	   States	   and	   the	   EU	   is	   required	   in	   the	  
stages	   of	   negotiation,	   conclusion	   as	  well	   as	   the	   fulfilment	   of	   the	   commitments	  
entered	   into	   on	   the	   international	   plane,48	   including	   both	   AETR-­‐type	   situations	  
and	   mixed	   agreements.	   The	   duty	   of	   cooperation	   serves	   the	   purpose	   of	  
maintaining	  unity	  in	  the	  international	  representation	  of	  the	  EU.49	  In	  fact,	  it	  is	  ‘the	  
inherent	   nature	   of	   the	   system’50	   of	   the	   EU	   to	   strive	   for	   unity	   in	   operation	   and	  
representation	   through	   the	   cooperation	   between	   Union	   institutions	   and	   the	  
Member	  States,	  including	  their	  judiciaries.	  
As	   regards	   mixed	   agreements,	   the	   Court	   has	   generally	   held	   that	   it	   has	  
jurisdiction	   to	   rule	  on	   their	  validity	  and	   interpretation	  at	   least	   regarding	   those	  
parts	  of	   the	  agreement	   that	   fall	  within	   the	  scope	  of	  Union	  competence	  because	  
agreements	   concluded	   by	   the	  Union	   are	   acts	   of	   EU	   institutions.51	   The	  Member	  
States,	  in	  turn,	  have	  under	  Article	  216(2)	  TFEU	  a	  duty	  vis-­à-­vis	  the	  EU	  to	  ensure	  
the	   proper	   fulfilment	   of	   the	   obligations	   arising	   from	   international	   agreements	  
concluded	   by	   the	  Union.52	   The	   question	   of	   the	   Court’s	   jurisdiction	   to	   interpret	  
those	   provisions	   of	   mixed	   agreements	   that	   deal	   with	   issues	   falling	   within	   a	  
sphere	  of	  shared	  competences	  in	  which	  the	  EU	  has	  not	  yet	  legislated	  first	  arose	  
in	   the	   context	   of	   the	   Agreement	   on	   Trade-­‐Related	   Aspects	   of	   Intellectual	  
                                            
43	  ibid	  paras	  30-­‐31.	  
44	  ibid	  paras	  86-­‐87.	  
45	  ibid	  para	  90;	  Case	  C-­‐439/01	  Cipra	  and	  Kvasnicka	  [2003]	  ECR	  I-­‐745,	  para	  23.	  
46	  Case	  C-­‐439/01	  Cipra	  and	  Kvasnicka	  (n	  45)	  para	  24.	  
47	  ibid.	  
48	  Opinion	  1/94	  WTO	  [1994]	  ECR	  I-­‐5267,	  paras	  108.	  
49	  ibid.	  
50	  Case	  C-­‐53/96	  Hermès	  v	  FHT	  [1998]	  ECR	  I-­‐3603,	  Opinion	  of	  AG	  Tesauro,	  para	  21.	  
51	   See,	   for	   example,	   Case	   181/73	  Haegeman	   [1973]	   ECR	   449,	   paras	   4-­‐6;	   Case	   12/86	   Demirel	  
[1987]	  ECR	  3719,	  para	  7.	  
52	  Case	  104/81	  Kupferberg	  [1982]	  ECR	  3641,	  para	  2.	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Property	  Rights	   (TRIPs).	   In	   the	  cases	  Hèrmes53	  and	  Dior54	   the	  Court	   found	   that	  
the	   jurisdiction	   to	   interpret	   the	  provisions	  of	   the	  TRIPs	  Agreement,	  which	  was	  
concluded	  jointly	  by	  the	  EU	  and	  the	  Member	  States,	  requires	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  
unity	  a	  uniform	  interpretation	  by	  both	  the	  judiciaries	  of	  the	  Member	  States	  and	  
of	   the	   EU.55	   In	   order	   to	   ensure	   this	   uniformity,	   the	   Court	   in	  Dior	   extended	   its	  
jurisdiction	   to	   interpret	  Article	  50	  of	  TRIPs	  regarding	   intellectual	  property	   law	  
beyond	  issues	  of	  trade	  mark	  regulation	  which	  fell	  within	  the	  scope	  of	  Community	  
competence.56	   The	   Court	   thereby	   overstepped	   the	   competence	   boundaries	  
between	  the	  EU	  and	  the	  Member	  States	  in	  a	  mixed	  agreement	  without,	  however,	  
clarifying	   the	   exact	   link	   between	   jurisdiction	   and	   competences.57	   Finally,	   in	  
Merck	  Genéricos,	  the	  Court	  established	  that	  while	  the	  Member	  States’	  courts	  have	  
the	   jurisdiction	   to	   interpret	   those	   provisions	   of	   mixed	   agreements	   that	   fall	  
within	   their	   sphere	   of	   competence,	   the	   assessment	   on	   the	   exact	   division	   of	  
competences	  must	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  ensuring	  uniformity	  on	  EU	  lever	  be	  made	  
by	   the	   Court	   of	   Justice.58	   This	   includes	   the	   question	   of	   determining	  whether	   a	  
provision	  of	   a	  mixed	  agreement	  has	  direct	   effect	   –	   in	  areas	   that	   fall	  within	   the	  
Member	   States’	   sphere	   of	   competence	   the	   determination	   is	   for	   the	   national	  
courts	  to	  make.59	  	  
Other	  situations	  in	  which	  the	  interaction	  between	  international	  law	  and	  EU	  law	  
can	  give	   rise	   to	   conflicts	   concern	   the	   interpretation	  of	  EU	   law	  by	   international	  
actors.	  An	  example	  is	  provided	  by	  the	  MOX	  Plant	  case,60	  which	  concerned	  a	  non-­‐
EU	  judiciary	  –	  an	  international	  arbitral	  tribunal	  –	  being	  asked	  by	  an	  EU	  Member	  
State	  to	  rule	  on	  the	  application	  and	  interpretation	  of	  EU	  law.	  	  
The	  case	  concerned	  infringement	  proceedings	  initiated	  against	  Ireland.	  The	  Irish	  
government	   had	   submitted	   a	   case	   against	   the	   United	   Kingdom	   to	   an	   arbitral	  
tribunal	  established	  under	  the	  1992	  Convention	  for	  the	  Protection	  of	  the	  Marine	  
Environment	   of	   the	   North-­‐East	   Atlantic	   which	   the	   EU,	   too,	   has	   concluded.	   In	  
                                            
53	  Case	  C-­‐53/96	  Hermès	  v	  FHT	  [1998]	  ECR	  I-­‐3603.	  
54	  Joined	  Cases	  C-­‐300/98	  and	  C-­‐392/98	  Dior	  [2000]	  ECR	  I-­‐11307.	  	  
55	  ibid	  paras	  37-­‐38;	  Case	  C-­‐53/96	  Hermès	  v	  FHT	  (n	  53)	  para	  32.	  
56	  Joined	  Cases	  C-­‐300/98	  and	  C-­‐392/98	  Dior	  (n	  54)	  para	  39.	  
57	  Case	  C-­‐240/09	  Lesoochranárske	  zoskupenie	  VLK	  [	  2011]	  ECR	  I-­‐1255,	  Opinion	  of	  AG	  Sharpston,	  
para	  50.	  
58	  Case	  C-­‐431/05	  Merck	  Genéricos	  [2007]	  ECR	  I 7001,	  paras	  33-­‐38.	  
59	  Joined	  Cases	  C-­‐300/98	  and	  C-­‐392/98	  Dior	  (n	  54)	  para	  48;	  ibid	  para	  34;	  	  
60	  Case	  C-­‐459/03	  Commission	  v	  Ireland	  (MOX	  Plant)	  [2006]	  ECR	  I-­‐4635.	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addition,	   Ireland	   submitted	   a	   request	   for	   provisional	   measures	   to	   the	  
International	   Tribunal	   for	   the	   Law	   of	   the	   Sea	   (ITLOS).	   The	   arbitral	   tribunal,	  
recognising	  that	  it	  would	  have	  to	  rule	  on	  matters	  of	  EU	  law	  including	  the	  division	  
of	   competences	   between	   the	   Union	   and	   the	   Member	   States	   and	   the	   exclusive	  
jurisdiction	  of	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice	  decided	  to	  suspend	  the	  proceedings	  and	  await	  
the	  Court’s	  decision	  as	  to	  the	  exclusive	  jurisdiction	  of	  the	  Court	  to	  adjudicate	  on	  
the	  matter.61	  	  
The	   Court	   considered	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   Tribunal	   was	   to	   interpret	   EU	   law	  
constituted	  a	   threat	   to	   the	  autonomy	  of	   the	  EU	   legal	  order.	  The	   legal	  rules	   that	  
were	  the	  subject	  of	  Ireland’s	  submission	  fell	  within	  the	  scope	  of	  EU	  competence	  
and	  only	   the	  Court,	   therefore,	   enjoyed	   jurisdiction	   to	   rule	  on	   the	  matter.62	  The	  
Court	  pointed	  out	  that	  the	  division	  of	  competences	  in	  the	  EU	  legal	  order	  between	  
the	  EU	  and	  the	  Member	  States	  cannot	  be	  altered	  by	  an	  international	  agreement	  
as	  that	  would	  adversely	  affect	  the	  autonomy	  of	  the	  EU	  legal	  order.63	  The	  Court’s	  
judgment	   is	   based	   on	   Article	   344	   TFEU	   pursuant	   to	   which	   Member	   States	  
undertake	  not	  to	  submit	  a	  dispute	  concerning	  the	  interpretation	  or	  application	  of	  
the	   Treaties	   to	   any	   method	   of	   settlement	   other	   than	   those	   provided	   in	   the	  
Treaties.64	   This	   rule	   is	   closely	   connected	   to	   the	   duty	   of	   sincere	   cooperation	  
between	   the	   Member	   States	   under	   Article	   4(3)	   TEU.65	   In	   the	   case	   at	   hand,	  
though,	  a	  solution	  to	  the	  question	  of	  conflicting	  jurisdictions	  was	  provided	  in	  the	  
United	  Nations	  Convention	  on	   the	  Law	  of	   the	  Sea	  (UNCLOS)	   itself.	  Both	   the	  EU	  
and	   its	   Member	   States	   are	   parties	   to	   the	   UNCLOS.	   Pursuant	   to	   Article	   282	  
UNCLOS,	  if	  the	  parties	  to	  the	  Convention	  have	  agreed	  to	  submit	  disputes	  arising	  
between	  them	  to	  a	  procedure	  that	  results	   in	  a	  binding	  decision,	  that	  procedure	  
shall	  take	  precedence	  over	  the	  dispute	  settlement	  mechanisms	  provided	  by	  the	  
UNCLOS.	  The	  Convention,	  therefore,	  pays	  full	  respect	  to	  the	  autonomy	  of	  the	  EU	  
legal	  order	  in	  terms	  of	  not	  exercising	  jurisdiction	  over	  EU	  law	  which,	  in	  the	  case	  
at	  hand,	  concerned	  both	  the	  provisions	  of	  an	  international	  agreement	  concluded	  
by	  the	  EU	  and	  the	  Member	  States	  as	  well	  as	  EU	  directives.	  Given	  that	  the	  matter	  
under	  dispute	  fell	  within	  the	  competence	  of	  the	  EU	  by	  virtue	  of	  Ireland	  relying	  in	  
                                            
61	  ibid	  paras	  42-­‐46.	  
62	  ibid	  paras	  120-­‐121.	  
63	  ibid	  para	  123.	  	  
64	  ibid	  para	  123.	  
65	  ibid	  para	  169.	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its	   argumentation	   before	   the	   tribunal	   on	   EU	   directives66	   and	   the	   Convention	  
being	   a	   mixed	   agreement	   and	   the	   EU	   enjoying	   exclusive	   competence	   in	   the	  
relevant	  areas,	   the	  Court	  deemed	  the	  case	  to	  be	  decided	  on	  the	  basis	  of	   the	  EU	  
Treaties,	   including	   the	   Court’s	   exclusive	   jurisdiction.67	   Ireland	   was,	  
subsequently,	  held	  to	  have	  breached	  its	  obligations	  under	  EU	  law.68	  
The	   case	   law	   discussed	   above	   illustrates	   well	   the	   perception	   of	   the	   EU	   as	   an	  
autonomous	   legal	  order	  –	   ‘municipal’	   in	   the	  words	  of	  AG	  Poiares	  Maduro,69	  yet	  
not	  as	  one	  completely	  separate	  of	  the	  international	  legal	  regime.	  Whilst	  respect	  
for	  international	  law	  is	  deeply	  rooted	  in	  the	  EU	  legal	  order	  the	  Court	  is	  keen	  to	  
protect	  the	  autonomy	  of	  the	  legal	  order,	  and	  alongside	  that,	  its	  own	  jurisdiction	  
in	   interpreting	   and	   adjudicating	   on	   EU	   law	   including,	   especially,	   the	   parts	   of	  
mixed	   agreements	   that	   fall	   within	   the	   scope	   of	   EU	   competence.	   The	   following	  
section	  will	  consider	   the	  specific	   limitations	   imposed	  by	  the	  autonomy	  concept	  
on	  the	  practice	  of	  exporting	  EU	  internal	  market	  acquis	  to	  third	  countries	  and,	  in	  
particular,	  the	  objective	  of	  extending	  the	  internal	  market	  beyond	  the	  borders	  of	  
the	  EU	  while	  achieving	  and	  maintaining	  the	  homogeneity	  of	  the	  market.	  	  
3	  The	  implications	  of	  autonomy	  for	  expanding	  the	  internal	  market	  
Whereas,	  generally,	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  EU	  law	  is	  maintained	  by	  the	  various	  legal	  
principles,70	  the	  safeguards	  of	  the	  autonomy	  of	  the	  EU	  legal	  order	  lie,	  primarily,	  
in	   institutional	   arrangements	   and	   the	   legal	   rules	   that	   ensure	   its	   proper	  
functioning.71	  By	  upholding	  the	  authority	  to	  determine	  its	  institutional	  structure,	  
the	   EU	   is	   able	   to	   preserve	   its	   ‘independence	   of	   action’	   or,	   in	   other	   words,	  
‘autonomy’.72	  In	  a	  sequence	  of	  cases,	  the	  Court	  has	  identified	  and	  deemed	  either	  
compatible	  or	  incompatible	  with	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  EU	  as	  an	  autonomous	  legal	  order	  
a	  number	  of	  institutional	  arrangements,	  especially	  as	  regards	  the	  judiciary.	  Many	  
of	  the	  cases	  are	  opinions	  provided	  by	  the	  Court	  pursuant	  to	  the	  procedure	  under	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  ibid	  paras	  119-­‐121.	  
67	  ibid	  paras	  126-­‐127.	  
68	  ibid	  para	  182.	  
69	  Joined	  Cases	  C-­‐402/05	  P	  and	  C-­‐415/05	  P	  Kadi	  and	  Al	  Barakaat	  [2008]	  ECR	  I-­‐6351,	  Opinion	  of	  
AG	  Poiares	  Maduro,	  para	  21.	  
70	  Considered	  above	  in	  chapter	  4.	  
71	  See	  Opinion	  2/13	  ECHR	  II	  (Court	  of	  Justice,	  18	  December	  2014),	  para	  158.	  
72	  Opinion	  1/76	  European	  laying-­up	  fund	  for	  inland	  waterway	  vessels	  [1977]	  ECR	  741,	  para	  12.	  In	  
the	  original	  French	  text	  the	  ‘independence	  of	  action’	  is	  referred	  to	  as	  ‘l’autonomie	  d’action’.	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Article	   218(11)	   TFEU	   according	   to	   which	   a	   Member	   State,	   the	   European	  
Parliament,	  the	  Council	  or	  the	  Commission	  may	  request	  the	  Court	  for	  an	  opinion	  
as	  to	  the	  compatibility	  with	  the	  Treaties	  of	  an	  envisaged	  agreement.	  	  
The	   conditions	   for	   deeming	   the	   institutional	   framework	   established	   by	   an	  
international	  agreement	  compatible	  with	  the	  EU	  legal	  order	  can	  be	  divided	  into	  
two	  distinct	  groups	  and	  have	  been	  summarised	  by	  the	  Court	  in	  Opinion	  1/00.73	  
The	   first	   requirement	  of	  preserving	   the	  autonomy	  of	   the	  EU	   legal	  order	   is	   that	  
the	   essential	   character	   of	   the	   powers	   and	   the	   institutions	   of	   the	   EU	   remain	  
unaffected	   so	   as	   not	   to	   necessitate	   an	   amendment	   of	   the	   Treaties.	   The	   second	  
requirement	   is	   that	   the	  EU	   and	   its	   institutions	  maintain	   their	   independence	   in	  
interpreting	  EU	  law	  in	  the	  exercise	  of	  their	  internal	  powers	  and	  not	  be	  bound	  by	  
an	   interpretation	   given	   to	   identical	   acquis	   in	   the	   context	   of	   an	   international	  
agreement	  rather	  than	  the	  EU	  Treaties.	  	  
Maintaining	  the	  essential	  character	  of	  the	  EU’s	  powers	  and	  institutions	  concerns	  
a	  number	  of	  different	  issues:	  firstly,	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  Member	  States	  
in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  EU	  including	  the	  ‘mutual	  trust’	  between	  them;	  secondly,	  the	  
idea	   that	   the	  objectives	   of	   the	  EU	  must	  be	  obtained	  by	   ‘common	  action’	   of	   the	  
Member	   States;	   and,	   thirdly,	   the	   understanding	   according	   to	   which	   the	   EU	  
institutions	  may	   not	   transfer	   to	   ‘non-­‐EU	   organisms’	   powers	   of	   the	   Union.	   The	  
fourth	   category	   of	   essential	   elements	   in	   safeguarding	   autonomy	   relates	   to	   the	  
nature	  of	  the	  powers	  of	  the	  EU	  and	  of	  its	  institutions	  as	  conceived	  in	  the	  Treaties:	  
on	   the	   other	   hand,	   the	   powers	   of	   the	   Commission	   may	   be	   extended	   to	   third	  
countries	  provided	  that	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  powers	  remains	  intact;	  on	  the	  others,	  
EU	   representatives	   cannot	   be	   replaced	   by	   those	   of	   the	   Member	   States	   in	   the	  
organs	  of	  international	  organisations;	  and,	  moreover,	  the	  ‘nature	  of	  the	  function	  
of	   the	  Court’	   requires	   that	   its	   judgments	  be	  binding.	  The	   fifth	   and	   sixth	   aspect	  
concern	  the	  role	  of	  national	  courts	  as	  ‘ordinary’	  courts	  in	  the	  ‘complete	  system	  of	  
legal	   remedies	   and	   procedures’	   and	   remedies	   to	   individuals	   following	   an	  
infringement	  of	  EU	  law	  by	  a	  Member	  State,	  respectively.	  
Safeguarding	  the	  independence	  of	  the	  EU’s	  institutions	  when	  interpreting	  EU	  law	  
includes	  the	   following	  elements.	  The	   first	  concerns	  the	  exclusive	   jurisdiction	  of	  
the	   EU	   judiciary	   to	   interpret	   and	   apply	   EU	   law	   including	   the	   obligation	   of	   the	  
                                            
73	  Opinion	  1/00	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  ECR	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Member	   States	   under	   Article	   344	   TFEU	   not	   to	   submit	   disputes	   relating	   to	   the	  
interpretation	  or	  application	  of	  EU	  law	  to	  other	  methods	  of	  adjudication	  than	  the	  
one	   provided	   in	   the	   Treaties.	   The	   second	   issue	   relates	   to	   the	   exclusive	  
jurisdiction	  of	   the	  Court	   of	   Justice	   to	   delimit	   the	   competences	  between	   the	  EU	  
and	   its	   Member	   States	   and	   to	   declare	   invalid	   an	   act	   of	   EU	   institutions	   under	  
Article	  276	  TFEU.	  The	  third	  aspect	  requires	  that	  the	  judges	  of	  the	  Court	  maintain	  
‘open	  minds’	   and	   ‘complete	   independence’	   when	   interpreting	   EU	   law,	   and	   the	  
fourth	  pertains	  to	  the	  idea	  that	  if	  not	  the	  Court	  then	  no	  international	  court	  may	  
conduct	  a	   judicial	  review	  of	  CFSP	  acts.	  The	  following	  analysis	  examines	  each	  of	  
the	  elements	  outlined	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  case	  law	  of	  the	  Court.	  
3.1	  Opinion	  1/76	  European	  laying-­‐up	  fund	  
The	   very	   first	   case	   to	   deal	   with	   the	   question	   of	   international	   agreements	  
threatening	  to	  distort	  the	  institutional	  system	  of	  the	  EU	  was	  Opinion	  1/76	  on	  the	  
Draft	   Agreement	   establishing	   a	   European	   laying-­‐up	   fund	   for	   inland	   waterway	  
vessels.74	   The	   draft	   agreement	   under	   scrutiny	   sought	   to	   establish	   an	  
international	   organisation	   to	   regulate	   inland	  waterway	  navigation	  on	   the	   river	  
Rhine.	   While	   the	   Court	   endorsed,	   generally,	   the	   establishment	   of	   such	   an	  
international	   organisation,	   it	   contested	   certain	   solutions	   proposed	   for	   the	  
institutional	   design	   of	   the	   organisation.	   The	   draft	   agreement	   intended	   to	  
privilege	   the	   participation	   in	   the	   organs	   of	   the	   organisation	   of	   some	   Member	  
States	   over	   other.	   This,	   according	   to	   the	   Court,	   was	   to	   ‘alter	   in	   a	   manner	  
inconsistent	  with	  the	  Treaty	  the	  relationships	  between	  Member	  States	  within	  the	  
context	   of	   the	   Community’.75	   More	   precisely,	   pursuant	   to	   Recital	   2	   of	   the	  
preamble	  to	  the	  EEC	  Treaty,	  the	  objectives	  of	  the	  Community	  must	  be	  obtained	  
by	   ‘common	   action’.	   ‘Common	   action’	   requires	   the	   participation	   of	   all	  Member	  
States	  without	  even	  a	  voluntary	  exclusion	  of	  one	  or	  more	  Member	  States,	  as	  well	  
as	   that	   in	  decision-­‐making	  procedures	   of	   an	   international	   agreement	   the	   same	  
participation	   rules	   of	   individual	   Member	   States	   apply	   as	   determined	   by	   the	  
Treaties	   in	   the	   respective	   policy	   field.76	   Together	   these	   factors	   constitute,	  
according	   to	   the	   Court,	   ‘a	   surrender	   of	   the	   independence	   of	   action	   of	   the	  
Community	   in	   its	   external	   relations’	   as	   well	   as	   an	   alteration	   in	   the	   ‘internal	  
                                            
74	  Opinion	  1/76	  European	  laying-­up	  fund	  for	  inland	  waterway	  vessels	  (n	  72).	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  ibid	  para	  10.	  
76	  ibid	  para	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constitution	  of	  the	  Community’	  by	  virtue	  of	  a	  change	  in	  the	  essential	  elements	  of	  
the	  Community	  structure	  concerning	  the	  powers	  of	  the	  institutions	  as	  well	  as	  the	  
relationship	  between	  the	  Member	  States.77	  In	  turn,	  these	  factors	  conflict	  with	  the	  
principles	  of	  unity	  and	  solidarity	  in	  the	  Community.	  Today,	  common	  action	  has,	  
in	  the	  light	  of	  the	  increased	  use	  of	  flexibility,	  especially	  opt-­‐out,	  become	  accepted	  
as	  compatible	  with	  both	  the	  unity	  and,	  subsequently,	  even	  autonomy	  of	   the	  EU	  
legal	  order.	  The	  absence	  of	  one	  or	  more	  Member	  States	  in	  any	  other	  policies	  or	  
decision-­‐making	   procedures	   that	   are	   not	   subject	   to	   opt-­‐outs	   would	   hardly	   be	  
considered	  compatible	  with	  the	  Treaties	  even	  today.	  
Regarding	  decision-­‐making	  procedures,	  the	  Court	  considered	  incompatible	  with	  
the	   EEC	   Treaty	   provisions	   of	   the	   draft	   agreement	   that	   replaced	   the	   EEC	  
institutions	   with	   the	   Member	   States	   in	   the	   treaty	   organisations	   dealing	   with	  
matters	  that	  fell	  within	  the	  competences	  of	  the	  EEC	  and	  restricted,	  thereby,	  the	  
powers	   of	   the	   Commission.78	   In	   the	   same	   Opinion,	   regarding	   decision-­‐making	  
procedures,	  the	  Court	  had	  to	  analyse	  the	  compatibility	  with	  the	  EEC	  Treaty	  of	  a	  
provision	  of	  the	  draft	  agreement	  by	  which	  direct	  applicability	  would	  be	  granted	  
to	   all	   decisions	   of	   the	   organs	   of	   the	   fund	   in	   the	   territories	   of	   the	   contracting	  
parties,	   including	   the	   Community.	   Here,	   a	   peculiar	   question	   of	   Kompetenz-­
Kompetenz	   arose.	   The	   question	   referred	   to	   the	   authority	   of	   EU	   institutions	   to	  
transfer	  to	   ‘non-­‐Community	  organisms’	   the	  powers	  of	   the	  Community	  and	  thus	  
subject	   the	   Member	   States	   to	   the	   direct	   applicability	   of	   rules	   created	   by	   this	  
international	  body	  outside	  the	  decision-­‐making	  framework	  of	  the	  EEC	  Treaty.79	  
Indeed,	  a	  logical	  conclusion	  would	  be	  that	  a	  transfer	  of	  such	  powers	  to	  another	  
international	   organisation	  would	   render	   the	   Community	   legal	   order	   subject	   to	  
the	  authority	  of	  another	  legal	  order	  and	  thus	  deprive	  it	  of	  its	  autonomous	  nature.	  
The	   situation	   is	   different	  when	   the	   international	   agreement	   itself	   specifies	   the	  
possible	   direct	   effect	   of	   its	   provisions.80	   The	   Court,	   however,	   refrained	   from	  
answering	   the	   question	   because	   according	   to	   the	   provisions	   of	   the	   draft	  
agreement	  the	  powers	  to	  be	  transferred	  were	  of	  executive	  nature	  only	  and	  thus	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not	   liable	   to	   bind	   the	   contracting	   parties,	   including	   the	   Community,	   to	   supra-­‐
supranational	  rules.81	  
As	   concerns	   the	   judicial	   system	   envisaged	   by	   the	   draft	   agreement	   in	   Opinion	  
1/76,	  the	  Court	  considered	  that	  the	  inclusion	  in	  a	  legal	  system	  of	  a	  non-­‐member	  
state	  would	  preclude	  an	  effective	   legal	  protection	  of	   the	  rights	  of	   individuals.82	  
The	  participation	  of	  the	  judges	  of	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice	  in	  the	  fund	  tribunal	  would,	  
according	   to	   the	   Court,	   prejudice	   their	   impartiality	   in	   deciding	   cases	   brought	  
before	   the	  Court	   after	   the	   same	   legal	  question	  has	  already	  been	   considered	  by	  
the	   fund	   tribunal	   in	   the	   presence	   of	   the	   same	   judges	   and	   vice	   versa.	  Whereas	  
homogeneity	   would	   be	   preserved,	   the	   uniformity	   of	   interpretation	   was	   not	  
considered	  by	  the	  Court	  to	  outweigh	  the	  value	  of	  a	  development	  of	  EU	  law	  in	  a	  
manner	   completely	   independent	   of	   external	   influences	   beyond	   those	   that	   are	  
considered	   compatible	   with	   the	   Treaties	   by	   the	   Court.83	   The	   only	   acceptable	  
solution	   from	   the	   perspective	   of	   the	   autonomy	   of	   the	   EU	   legal	   order	   would,	  
therefore,	  be	  for	  the	  judges	  of	  the	  Court	  not	  to	  participate	  in	  judicial	  institutions	  
established	   by	   EU	   international	   agreements	   at	   least	   in	   situations	   where	   the	  
envisaged	  court	  or	  tribunal	  could	  potentially	  be	  faced	  with	  a	  task	  to	  interpret	  or	  
apply	  EU	  law.	  
The	   Court	   did,	   however,	   recognise	   the	   value	   of	   the	   draft	   agreement	   as	   an	  
example	  for	  future	  agreements	  concluded	  by	  the	  EU	  and/or	  the	  Member	  States	  
and	   third	   countries	   and	   rejected	   the	   proposed	   institutional	   structure	  with	   the	  
additional	  purpose	  of	  avoiding	  a	  progressive	  and	   irreversible	  weakening	  of	   the	  
Union	   action.	   All	   future	   agreements,	   therefore,	   must	   conform	   to	   the	  
requirements	  pronounced	  by	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice	  in	  order	  to	  receive	  a	  green	  light	  
in	  the	  preliminary	  opinion	  procedure.	  	  	  
3.2	  Opinion	  1/91	  EEA	  I	  
Some	  of	  the	  issues	  that	  arose	  in	  Opinion	  1/76	  recurred	  in	  the	  landmark	  Opinion	  
1/91	  concerning	  the	  compatibility	  with	  the	  Treaties	  of	  the	  EEA	  Agreement.84	  In	  
the	   Opinion,	   the	   Court	   confined	   its	   analysis	   of	   the	   compatibility	   of	   the	   draft	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agreement	   with	   the	   autonomy	   of	   the	   EU	   legal	   order	   to	   the	   proposed	   judicial	  
architecture	  only.	  What	  is	  remarkable	  in	  this	  opinion	  are	  the	  explicit	  references	  
that	   the	   Court	   made	   to	   the	   notion	   of	   autonomy	   of	   the	   EU	   legal	   order	   in	   the	  
context	   of	   international	   agreements	   exporting	   EU	   acquis	   –	   a	   terminological	  
affirmation	  which	  the	  Court	  has	  continued	  to	  use	  in	  subsequent	  case	  law.	  	  
The	  judicial	  autonomy	  of	  the	  EU	  legal	  order,	  as	  elaborated	  in	  Opinion	  1/91,	  rests	  
on	  two	  main	  premises	  –	  Articles	  19(1)	  TEU	  and	  344	  TFEU	  asserting	  the	  exclusive	  
jurisdiction	   of	   the	   EU	   judiciary	   to	   ensure	   that	   in	   the	   interpretation	   and	  
application	  of	  the	  Treaties	  the	  law	  is	  observed,	  and	  the	  obligation	  of	  the	  Member	  
States	  not	  to	  submit	  EU	  law	  disputes	  to	  external	  fora,	  respectively.	  The	  envisaged	  
EEA	  Court	  would	  have	  been	  conferred	  jurisdiction	  to	  hear	  disputes	  between	  the	  
contracting	  parties.	  Subsequently,	  the	  EEA	  Court	  would	  have	  had	  to	  interpret	  the	  
term	   ‘Contracting	   Party’	   in	   the	   context	   of	   the	   EEA	   Agreement	   and	   thereby	  
determine	  who	  –	   the	  EU,	   the	  Member	  States	  or	   the	  EU	  and	   the	  Member	  States	  
together	   –	   were	   contracting	   parties	   in	   a	   particular	   matter	   brought	   before	   the	  
EEA	   Court.	   The	   tasks	   of	   the	   EEA	   Court	   would,	   therefore,	   have	   entailed	   a	  
delimitation	   of	   competences	   between	   the	   EU	   and	   its	   Member	   States	   that	  
constitutes	  interpretation	  of	  the	  Treaties	  by	  a	  judicial	  body	  other	  than	  the	  Court	  
of	  Justice.85	  The	  Court	  maintained,	  however,	  that	  the	  creation	  of	  an	  international	  
court	   the	  decisions	  of	  which	  are	  binding	  on	  EU	   institutions	   including	  the	  Court	  
itself	   is	   not	  per	   se	   contrary	   to	   the	   Treaties.86	   Yet	   the	   Court	  made	   a	   distinction	  
with	  respect	  to	  ‘an	  essential	  part	  of	  the	  rules	  –	  including	  the	  rules	  of	  secondary	  
legislation	  –	  which	  govern	  economic	  and	  trading	  relations	  within	  the	  Community	  
and	   which	   constitute,	   for	   the	   most	   part,	   fundamental	   provisions	   of	   the	  
Community	  legal	  order’.87	  A	  homogeneous	  interpretation	  of	  the	  exported	  acquis	  
that	   is	   identical	   to	   EU	   provisions	  would,	   according	   to	   the	   Court,	   add	   up	   to	   an	  
interpretation	  of	  EU	  law	  itself.	  In	  the	  absence	  of	  an	  obligation	  of	  the	  EEA	  Court	  to	  
provide	  an	  interpretation	  of	  EEA	  law	  identical	  with	  the	  interpretations	  provided	  
by	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice	  after	  the	  signature	  of	  the	  EEA	  Agreement,	  the	  mechanism	  
for	   maintaining	   homogeneity	   would	   have	   threatened	   the	   independence	   of	   the	  
Court	   to	  determine	   the	  meaning	  and	  application	  of	  EU	  rules	  and	  thus	   the	   ‘very	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foundations’	  of	  the	  EU	  and	  the	  autonomy	  of	  the	  EU	  legal	  order.88	  It	  is	  interesting	  
to	  note	  that	  the	  Court	  did	  not	  consider	  in	  this	  respect	  its	  own	  freedom	  to	  deviate	  
from	   the	   homogeneity	   objective	   in	   favour	   of	   preserving	   autonomy	   in	   case	   a	  
conflict	  between	  an	  interpretation	  given	  by	  the	  EEA	  Court	  or	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice	  
should	  arise.	  With	  this	  Opinion,	  the	  Court	  endeavoured	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  draft	  
EEA	  Agreement	  comply	  fully	  with	  the	  requirements	  of	  the	  Treaties	  to	  the	  effect	  
that	  safeguarding	  the	  autonomy	  of	  the	  EU	  legal	  order	  would	  not	  propel	  the	  Court	  
to	   breach	   its	   own	   obligations	   under	   the	   EEA	   Agreement	   to	   maintain	  
homogeneity	  within	  the	  EEA.	  	  
In	   terms	   of	   the	   composition	   of	   the	   EEA	   Court,	   as	   in	   Opinion	   1/76,	   the	   Court	  
considered	   it	   in	  Opinion	  1/91	   incompatible	  with	   the	  concept	  of	  autonomy	   that	  
judges	  of	   the	  Court	  of	   Justice	   sit	  on	   the	  EEA	  Court.89	  The	  Court	  was	  concerned	  
that	   its	   own	   judges	   would	   need	   to	   juggle	   between	   different	   methods	   of	  
interpretation	   when	   applying	   and	   interpreting	   identical	   rules	   in	   two	   different	  
treaty	   contexts	   that	   also	   feature	   different	   objectives	   as	   regards	   the	   depth	   of	  
integration.90	  According	  to	  the	  Court,	  this	  task	  would	  challenge	  the	  ‘open	  minds’	  
and	   ‘complete	   independence’	   of	   the	   judges	  when	   interpreting	  EU	   law	  and	   thus	  
jeopardise	  the	  idea	  of	  autonomy	  as	  independence	  from	  legal	  sources	  external	  to	  
the	   EU.91	   While	   the	   Court	   has	   generally	   not	   been	   averse	   towards	   drawing	  
inspiration	   from	   public	   international	   law	   or	   national	   legal	   systems	   for	   the	  
purpose	  of	  interpreting	  EU	  law	  the	  problematic	  aspect	  here	  was	  the	  perception	  
of	  the	  Court	  that	  the	  judges	  would,	  in	  a	  situation	  of	  multiple	  loyalties,	  not	  be	  fully	  
independent	  to	  interpret	  EU	  law	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  objectives	  and	  context	  of	  the	  
EU	  Treaties	  only.	  
Finally,	  the	  Court	  considered	  in	  Opinion	  1/91	  the	  compatibility	  with	  the	  Treaties	  
of	  the	  system	  of	  preliminary	  rulings	  under	  the	  draft	  EEA	  Agreement.	  According	  
to	   the	   draft	   Protocol	   34,	   the	   courts	   of	   the	   EEA	   EFTA	   States	   would	   have	   been	  
conferred	   a	   right	   to	   make	   references	   for	   a	   preliminary	   ruling	   to	   the	   Court	   of	  
Justice.	   In	   the	   meantime,	   each	   of	   the	   contracting	   parties	   could	   determine	   the	  
extent	   to	   which	   the	   protocol	   applies	   to	   the	   courts	   and	   tribunals	   under	   its	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jurisdiction,	   whether	   there	   is	   an	   obligation	   for	   the	   highest	   courts	   to	   make	   a	  
referral	  and	  whether	  the	  Court’s	  rulings	  have	  binding	  effect	  or	  not.92	  According	  
to	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice,	  it	  is	  not	  contrary	  to	  the	  Treaties	  to	  confer	  on	  the	  Court	  the	  
task	   to	   provide	   preliminary	   rulings	   to	   third	   country	   courts	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   an	  
international	  agreement	  or	  to	  leave	  it	  for	  the	  third	  countries	  to	  decide	  whether	  
or	   not	   to	   allow	   their	   courts	   tribunals	   to	   make	   use	   of	   the	   preliminary	   ruling	  
procedure.	  It	  is,	  however,	  incompatible	  with	  the	  Treaty	  structure	  if	  in	  instances	  
where	   the	   Court	   has	   given	   a	   preliminary	   ruling	   the	   binding	   force	   of	   the	  
preliminary	   ruling	   is	   not	   guaranteed.93	   According	   to	   the	   Court,	   the	   lack	   of	  
binding	  force	  of	  its	  preliminary	  rulings	  would	  defeat	   ‘the	  nature	  of	  the	  function	  
of	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice	  […]	  namely	  that	  of	  a	  court	  whose	  judgments	  are	  binding’.94	  
It	   is	   remarkable	   that	   the	   Court	   considered	   only	   the	   binding	   effect	   of	   the	  
preliminary	   rulings	  an	   issue	  and	  not	   the	   lack	  of	  a	  general	  obligation	  of	  highest	  
courts	  to	  request	  a	  preliminary	  ruling	  as	  if	  the	  latter	  did	  not	  belong	  to	  the	  ‘nature	  
of	  the	  function	  of	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice’.	  The	  first	  concerns	  the	  function	  of	  the	  Court	  
as	  not	  being	  an	  advisory	  body	  and	  the	  other	  the	  function	  of	  the	  procedure	  that	  
might	  not	  guarantee	  unity	   if	  requests	   for	  preliminary	  rulings	  are	  optional.	  As	  a	  
clarification,	   the	   Court	   noted	   that	   all	   preliminary	   rulings,	   even	   those	   given	   in	  
response	   to	   possible	   requests	   by	   the	   EEA	   EFTA	   countries,	   are	   binding	   on	   the	  
Member	  States	  yet	  confusion	  could	  arise	  among	  Member	  State	  courts	  as	   to	   the	  
general	  effect	  of	  preliminary	  rulings	  when	  applying	  preliminary	  rulings	  that	  are	  
not	   binding	   on	   the	   courts	   of	   the	   EEA	   EFTA	   States	  who	   are	   the	   possible	   direct	  
addressees	  of	  the	  rulings.95	  
3.3	  Opinion	  1/92	  EEA	  II	  
Having	  struck	  down	  the	  first	  version	  of	  the	  EEA	  Agreement,	  the	  Court	  was	  given	  
a	   possibility	   to	   assess	   the	   lawfulness	   of	   the	   second	   version	   of	   the	   draft	  
agreement	  in	  Opinion	  1/92.96	  Firstly,	  the	  second	  version	  of	  the	  EEA	  Agreement	  
no	  longer	  envisaged	  the	  creation	  of	  an	  EEA	  Court	  but	  an	  EFTA	  Court	  that	  would	  
only	   adjudicate	   on	   disputes	   between	   the	   EEA	   EFTA	   States	   and	   on	  which	   only	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judges	  from	  the	  EEA	  EFTA	  countries	  would	  sit.	  The	  concerns	  raised	  by	  the	  Court	  
in	  the	  previous	  Opinion	  1/91	  were,	  thus,	  met.	  Secondly,	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice	  may	  
be	   involved	   in	   the	   dispute	   settlement	   procedure	   by	   giving	   a	   ruling	   on	   the	  
interpretation	  of	  rules	   identical	   to	   those	  of	   the	  Treaties.	  Thirdly,	   the	  EEA	  EFTA	  
States	  were	  given	  an	  opportunity	   to	  decide	  on	  whether	   they	  wished	   to	   receive	  
binding	   preliminary	   rulings	   from	   the	   Court	   of	   Justice	   on	   the	   interpretation	   of	  
provisions	  of	  the	  EEA	  Agreement.	  And	  finally,	  there	  was	  no	  longer	  a	  requirement	  
for	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice	  to	  take	  account	  of	  decisions	  of	  other	  courts.97	  	  
Instead	  of	   a	   common	  EEA	  Court,	   the	  updated	  EEA	  Agreement	  provides	   for	   the	  
creation	  of	  a	  political	  body	  –	  the	  Joint	  Committee	  –	  to	  track	  the	  development	  of	  
the	  case	  law	  of	  the	  Court.	  The	  Court	  deemed	  this	  solution	  to	  be	  compatible	  with	  
the	   Treaties	   insofar	   as	   it	   does	   not	   alter	   the	   binding	   force	   of	   the	   rulings	   of	   the	  
Court	  within	  the	  EU.98	  It	  is	  slightly	  peculiar	  that	  the	  Court	  dismissed	  the	  previous	  
solution	   that	  did	  not	  alter	   the	  effect	  of	   the	  Court’s	   rulings	  within	   the	  EU	  either	  
simply	   because	   of	   a	   potential	   confusion	   among	   national	   courts.	   This	   can	   be	  
considered	  a	  small	  overreaction	  on	  the	  Court’s	  behalf.	  Since	  the	  decisions	  of	  the	  
EEA	   Joint	   Committee	  were	   declared	   not	   to	   affect	   the	   case	   law	   of	   the	   Court	   of	  
Justice,	   the	  Court	  considered	   the	  autonomy	  of	   the	  EU	   legal	  order	   to	   thereby	  be	  
preserved.99	  
As	  concerns	  the	  Joint	  Committee,	  the	  Court	  established	  that	  the	  only	  autonomy-­‐
conform	   solution	   would	   be	   to	   give	   binding	   force	   to	   the	   dispute	   settlement	  
procedure	   envisaged	   in	   Article	   105	   EEA	   Agreement.100	   In	   addition,	   the	   Joint	  
Committee	  could	  not	   in	   the	  course	  of	   the	  dispute	  settlement	  procedures	  under	  
either	  Article	  105	  or	  111	  EEA	  Agreement	  issue	  a	  decision	  that	  would	  render	  the	  
case	   law	   of	   the	   Court	   of	   Justice	   inapplicable	   on	   the	   territory	   of	   the	   non-­‐EFTA	  
contracting	   parties.101	   The	   hands	   of	   the	   Joint	   Committee	   are,	   therefore,	   tied	   to	  
taking	  decisions	  that	  conform	  to	  the	  case	  law	  of	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice.	  	  
The	  Court	  further	  affirmed	  that	  it	  was	  in	  keeping	  with	  the	  Treaties	  to	  confer	  on	  
the	   Court	   of	   Justice	   additional	   powers	   only	   pursuant	   to	   the	   Treaty	   revision	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procedures	  unless	  the	  new	  powers	  do	  not	  alter	  the	  ‘nature	  of	  the	  function	  of	  the	  
Court’	   such	   as	   that	   the	   decisions	   of	   the	   Court	   are	   always	   binding.102	   The	   new	  
preliminary	   ruling	   procedure	   envisaged	   by	   the	   updated	   EEA	   Agreement,	  
however,	   only	   concerns	   dispute	   settlement	   procedure	   of	   Article	   111(3)	   EEA	  
Agreement	   which	   accords	   binding	   force	   to	   the	   interpretation	   provided	   by	   the	  
Court	  and	  does	  not,	  therefore,	  affect	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  function	  of	  the	  Court	  in	  an	  
adverse	   manner.103	   The	   contracting	   parties	   also	   have	   a	   possibility	   to	   request	  
binding	   preliminary	   references	   from	   the	   Court	   of	   Justice.104	   The	   arbitration	  
procedure,	  on	   the	  other	  hand,	   cannot	  be	  used	   in	  cases	  on	   the	   interpretation	  of	  
the	   identical	   acquis	   which	   means	   that	   EU	   law	   will	   not	   be	   given	   authoritative	  
interpretation	  by	  non-­‐EU	  judicial	  mechanisms,	   thus	  upholding	  the	  autonomy	  of	  
the	  EU	  legal	  order.105	  The	  Commission	  and	  the	  Member	  States’	  and	  the	  EEA	  EFTA	  
States’	   governments	   succeeded	   in	   walking	   a	   tightrope	   between	   arriving	   at	   a	  
homogeneity	  mechanism	  while	  maintaining	  a	  close	  relationship	  between	  the	  EU	  
and	  EEA	   institutions	  without	   compromising	   the	  autonomy	  of	   the	  EU.	  From	   the	  
perspective	  of	  the	  EU,	  the	  balance	  is	  about	  a	  ‘comfortable	  duality’	  whereby	  third	  
countries	  are	  given	  the	  opportunity	  to	  participate	  in	  a	  common	  project	  without,	  
however,	   deciding	   on	   its	   ‘nature,	   scope,	   development	   or	   authoritative	  
interpretation’.106	  
In	  addition	  to	  the	  judicial	  mechanisms,	  the	  autonomy	  of	  the	  EU	  legal	  order	  also	  
requires	  the	  preservation	  of	  other	  institutional	  arrangements	  established	  by	  the	  
Treaties	  to	  the	  extent	  of	  maintaining	  the	  ‘nature	  of	  the	  powers	  of	  the	  Community	  
and	   of	   its	   institutions	   as	   conceived	   in	   the	   [Treaties]’.107	   The	   sharing	   of	  
surveillance	   tasks	   in	   the	   field	  of	   competition	  between	   the	  Commission	  and	   the	  
EFTA	   Surveillance	   Authority	   is,	   according	   to	   the	   Court,	   compatible	   with	   the	  
Treaties.108	  All	  in	  all,	  the	  Court	  deemed	  the	  new	  version	  of	  the	  EEA	  Agreement	  to	  
conform	   to	   the	   requirements	   of	   the	   Treaties,	   especially	   as	   concerns	   the	  
guarantees	  for	  preserving	  the	  autonomy	  of	  the	  EU	  legal	  order.	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3.4	  Opinion	  1/00	  ECAA	  
In	   the	   subsequent	   Opinion	   1/00	   on	   the	   Draft	   ECAA	   Agreement,	   the	   Court	  
consolidated	   its	   previous	   case	   law	   and	   summarised	   the	  main	   requirements	   on	  
international	  agreements	  as	  concerns	  compatibility	  with	  the	  autonomy	  claim.	  In	  
the	   forefront	   of	   a	   test	   for	   compatibility	   stands	   the	   essential	   character	   of	   the	  
powers	  of	  the	  Community	  and	  its	  institutions	  and	  the	  canons	  of	  interpretation	  of	  
EU	  law.109	  An	  alteration	  of	  the	  foundations	  of	  the	  EU	  would	  inevitably	  require	  an	  
amendment	   of	   the	   Treaties	   and	   international	   agreements	   cannot	   be	   used	   to	  
circumvent	   the	   regular	   Treaty	   amendment	   procedures	   provided	   in	   Article	   48	  
TEU.110	  This	  was	  also	   the	  reason	   for	   the	  Court	   in	  Opinion	  2/94	  to	  consider	   the	  
planned	  accession	  by	  the	  Community	  to	  the	  ECHR	  incompatible	  with	  Community	  
law	   on	   institutional	   as	   well	   as	   substantive	   grounds	   concerning	   the	   lack	   of	  
competence	  of	   the	  EU	  under	   the	  now	  Article	  352	  TFEU.111	  With	   respect	   to	   the	  
ECAA	  Agreement,	  the	  Court	  considered	  that	  for	  the	  institutional	  solutions	  of	  the	  
ECAA	   to	   be	   compatible	   with	   the	   Treaties	   there	   must	   either	   be	   a	   clearer	  
separation	  between	  the	  EU	  and	  non-­‐EU	  pillars	  of	  contracting	  parties	  or	  that	  all	  
contracting	   parties	   must	   be	   placed	   together	   in	   one	   single	   organisation	   with	  
distinct	  organs	   that	   functions	  parallel	   to	   those	  of	   the	  EU,	  such	  as	   in	   the	  case	  of	  
the	  EFTA.112	  	  
Because	  there	  is	  no	  separate	  international	  organisation	  comparable	  to	  the	  EFTA	  
in	   the	   field	   of	   air	   transport,	   the	   ECAA	   Agreement	   provides	   for	   a	   ‘single	   pillar’	  
structure	  instead	  of	  the	  ‘twin	  pillar’	  solution	  opted	  for	  in	  the	  EEA	  Agreement.113	  
The	  ECAA	  does	  not	  feature	  a	  surveillance	  body	  other	  than	  the	  Commission	  nor	  a	  
separate	  court.	  Instead,	  a	  political	  organ	  –	  the	  ECAA	  Joint	  Committee	  –	  is	  tasked	  
with	  dispute	  settlement	  and	  the	  contracting	  parties	  have	  a	  possibility	  to	  request	  
preliminary	  rulings	  from	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice.	  The	  extension	  of	  the	  powers	  of	  the	  
Commission	  and	  the	  creation	  of	  new	  institutional	  links	  with	  third	  countries	  was,	  
however,	  deemed	  by	  the	  Court	  to	  be	  compatible	  with	  the	  Treaties	  insofar	  as	  the	  
nature	   of	   the	   powers	   remains	   intact	   and	   the	   question	   mainly	   concerns	   the	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geographic	  expansion	  of	   the	  power.	  The	  draft	  ECAA	  Agreement	  thereby	  passed	  
the	  test	  of	  compatibility	  with	  the	  Treaties.	  
A	  great	  advantage	  in	  terms	  of	  autonomy-­‐conform	  treaty	  design	  is	  the	  conclusion	  
of	   an	   agreement	   in	   a	   field	   of	   EU	   exclusive	   competence,	   such	   as	   the	   Energy	  
Community	   Treaty.	   Where	   only	   the	   EU	   is	   party	   to	   the	   agreement	   there	   is	  
automatically	   no	   need	   for	   the	   treaty	   organs	   to	   interpret	   the	   term	   ‘Contracting	  
Party’	  to	  the	  effect	  of	  ruling	  on	  the	  division	  of	  competences	  between	  the	  EU	  and	  
its	  Member	  States	  in	  a	  given	  matter.114	  Furthermore,	  only	  in	  the	  event	  of	  mixed	  
agreements	  or	  agreements	  to	  which	  the	  EU	  is	  not	  a	  party	  yet	  the	  subject	  matter	  
of	  which	  falls	  within	  EU	  competence	  there	  is	  a	  danger	  of	  a	  possible	  violation	  by	  
the	  Member	  States	  of	  Article	  344	  TFEU.115	  The	  conclusion	  of	  the	  ECT,	  therefore,	  
never	  necessitated	  an	  opinion	  of	  the	  Court	  under	  Article	  218(11)	  TFEU.	  
It	   is	   interesting	   to	   note	   that	   in	   all	   of	   its	   opinions	   on	   agreements	   exporting	   the	  
acquis	   the	   general	   tone	   of	   the	   Court	   has	   been	   rather	   protective	   towards	   the	  
autonomy	  of	  the	  EU	  legal	  order.	  The	  Court	  seems	  to	  almost	  have	  been	  taking	  it	  
for	   granted	   that	   a	   solution	  ensuring	  homogeneity	  would	  nearly	  always	   conflict	  
with	  the	  Treaties.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  Court	  is	  undoubtedly	  willing	  to	  sacrifice	  
the	  homogeneity	  objective	  for	  the	  need	  to	  preserve	  the	  autonomy	  of	  the	  EU	  legal	  
order.	   In	   spite	   of	   forming	   a	   part	   of	   the	   EU	   legal	   order	   as	   a	   provision	   of	   an	  
international	   agreement,	   the	   homogeneity	   objectives	   featured	   in,	   for	   example,	  
the	   EEA	   and	   the	   ECAA	   Agreements	   do	   not	   belong	   to	   the	   core	   mechanisms	  
preserving	   an	   effective	   functioning	  of	   the	  Treaties.	   The	  Court	   is,	   therefore,	   not	  
bound	  to	  pursue	  a	  political	  agenda	  of	  expanding	  a	  homogeneous	  internal	  market	  
beyond	  the	  EU	  but	  rather	  assesses	  the	  mechanisms	  put	  in	  place	  for	  that	  aim	  from	  
a	  strict	  prism	  of	  maintaining	  the	  autonomy	  of	  the	  EU	  legal	  order.116	  
A	  common	  feature	  of	  all	  of	   the	  cases	  discussed	  above	   in	  this	  section,	  as	  well	  as	  
the	   MOX	   Plant	   case	   in	   the	   previous	   section,	   is	   that	   they	   deal	   with	   the	  
interpretation	  by	  a	  non-­‐EU	  judiciary	  of	  either	  EU	   law	  or	   legal	  rules	  that	  mirror	  
EU	  acquis.	  The	  Court	  has	  previously	  affirmed	  that	  it	  is	  not	  as	  such	  contrary	  to	  the	  
concept	   of	   the	   autonomy	  of	   the	   EU	   legal	   order	   to	   accept	   the	   jurisdiction	   of	   an	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  example,	  ibid	  para	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international	   court	   or	   tribunal	   for	   the	   purpose	   of	   interpreting	   rules	   of	  
international	   law.	   A	   threat	   to	   autonomy	   occurs,	   however,	   in	   cases	   where	   an	  
external	   judiciary	   is	   tasked	   with	   the	   interpretation	   of	   EU	   law	   and,	   thereby,	  
potentially	   affects	   the	   position	   of	   the	   Court	   of	   Justice	   in	   the	   EU	   constitutional	  
architecture.	  While	   the	   latter	   can	   be	   accepted	   as	   a	   reasonable	   conclusion,	   it	   is	  
nevertheless	   remarkable	   that	   the	   Court	   stroke	   down	   the	   EEA	   Court	   for	   the	  
reason	  that	  the	  participation	  of	  the	  judges	  of	  the	  Court	  would	  prevent	  them	  from	  
remaining	   impartial	   when	   deciding	   on	   cases	   concerning	   identically	   worded	  
provisions	  in	  either	  the	  EU	  Treaties	  or	  the	  EEA	  Agreement.	  The	  question	  of	  open	  
minds	  is	  puzzling	  considering	  that	  the	  Court	  does	  interpret	  both	  the	  provisions	  
of	   the	   EU	   Treaties	   and	   the	   EEA	   Agreement	   and	   does,	   thereby,	   differentiate,	  
where	   appropriate,	   between	   the	   different	   objectives	   of	   the	   agreements.	   The	  
mere	   fact	   that	   the	   judges	   of	   the	   Court	   of	   Justice	   actually	   deal	   with	   the	  
interpretation	   of	   identical	   internal	   market	   acquis	   in	   two	   (or	   more)	   different	  
contexts	  does	  not	  jeopardise	  the	  autonomy	  of	  the	  EU	  legal	  order.	  The	  fact	  of	  the	  
‘double-­‐hatting’	  of	  the	  judges,	  however,	  does	  by	  virtue	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  judges	  
may	  encounter	  difficulties	  when	  switching	  identities	  between	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice	  
and	  the	  EEA	  Court,	  respectively.	  
A	  situation	  slightly	  different	  from	  those	  discussed	  above	  involving	  the	  autonomy	  
of	   the	  EU	  occurred	   in	  Reynolds	  v	  Commission	   in	  which	  the	  Court	  had	  to	  rule	  on	  
the	  compatibility	  with	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  autonomy	  of	  the	  EU	  legal	  order	  of	  a	  civil	  
action	   that	   the	   Commission	   had	   brought	   before	   a	   US	   court	   against	   certain	  
American	  tobacco	  manufacturers.117	  The	  applicants	  submitted	  that	  if	  a	  US	  court	  
were	  to	  determine	  the	  Commission’s	  competence	  to	  commence	  proceedings	  in	  a	  
non-­‐Member	  State	  for	  recovery	  of	  allegedly	  unpaid	  customs	  duties	  and	  VAT	  this	  
would	   violate	   the	   autonomy	   of	   the	   EU	   legal	   order	   and	   breach	   Article	   344	  
TFEU.118	   The	   Court	   swiftly	   overruled	   these	   arguments	   and	   stated	   that	   a	   third	  
country	   court’s	   decision	   as	   to	   the	   power	   of	   the	   Commission	   to	   bring	   before	   it	  
legal	  proceedings	  does	  not	  bind	  the	  EU	  institutions	  to	  a	  particular	  interpretation	  
of	  EU	  law	  in	  exercising	  their	  internal	  powers	  and,	  subsequently,	  does	  not	  affect	  
the	  autonomy	  of	  the	  EU	  legal	  order.119	  The	  Court	  can,	  thus,	  be	  deemed	  to	  develop	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the	  criteria	  for	  assessing	  the	  maintenance	  of	  the	  autonomy	  of	  the	  EU	  legal	  order	  
in	  a	  clear	  and	  systematic	  manner.	  
3.5	  Opinion	  1/09	  Patents	  Court	  
The	  systematic	  approach	  of	   the	  Court	  was	  also	   reflected	   in	   the	  next	  opinion	  of	  
the	   Court	   on	   the	   compatibility	   of	   draft	   international	   agreements	   with	   the	  
Treaties.	   In	   Opinion	   1/09,120	   the	   Court	   was	   requested	   to	   assess	   whether	   the	  
envisaged	  agreement	  setting	  up	  a	  European	  and	  Community	  Patents	  Court	  was	  
in	  conformity	  with	  the	  Treaties	  and,	  in	  particular,	  the	  autonomy	  of	  the	  EU	  legal	  
order.	  The	  Court	  recalled	  that	  it	  is	  in	  general	  compatible	  with	  EU	  law	  to	  create	  an	  
international	   court	   for	   the	   purpose	   of	   interpreting	   the	   provisions	   of	   an	  
international	  agreement.	  It	  is	  in	  fact,	  part	  of	  the	  autonomy	  of	  the	  EU	  legal	  order	  
to	   be	   able	   to	   voluntarily	   submit	   itself	   to	   the	   jurisdiction	   of	   an	   external	  
judiciary.121	   The	   possibility	   to	   set	   up	   such	   a	   court	   is,	   nevertheless,	   conditional	  
upon	   the	   determination	   of	   whether	   or	   not	   the	   judicial	   mechanism	   so	   created	  
violates	  the	  essential	  characteristics	  of	  the	  judicial	  power	  of	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice.	  
The	  envisaged	  Patents	  Court	  was	  supposed	  not	  only	  to	  interpret	  an	  international	  
agreement	   but	   also	   future	   EU	   patent	   legislation	   and	   acquis	   in	   the	   fields	   of	  
intellectual	   property,	   internal	   market	   and	   competition	   policy.	   In	   addition,	   the	  
Patents	  Court	  would	  have	  been	  able	  to	  interpret	  the	  provisions	  of	  EU	  law	  in	  the	  
light	  of	  fundamental	  rights,	  general	  principles	  of	  EU	  law,	  and	  even	  determine	  the	  
validity	  of	  an	  EU	  measure.122	  	  	  	  
The	  Patents	  Court	  was	  not	  designed	  to	  resolve	  disputes	  between	  individuals	   in	  
the	  field	  of	  EU	  patent	  law.	  It	  was	  not	  intended	  to	  replace	  the	  jurisdiction	  of	  the	  
Court	  of	  Justice	  but	  rather	  to	  take	  on	  the	  respective	  tasks	  of	  the	  national	  courts	  
and,	  thus,	  unify	  patent	  litigation	  across	  the	  EU.	  The	  fact	  that	  the	  national	  courts	  
would,	   thereby,	   be	  deprived	  of	   their	   power	   to	   apply	   and	   interpret	  EU	   law	  and	  
request	  preliminary	  rulings	  from	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice	  in	  the	  fields	  covered	  by	  the	  
agreement,	  a	  task	  taken	  over	  by	  the	  Patents	  Court,	  would,	  according	  to	  the	  Court,	  
deprive	   the	   former	   of	   their	   tasks	   as	   ‘ordinary’	   courts	   and,	   thereby,	   affect	   the	  
foundations	   of	   the	   EU	   legal	   system	   and	   render	   the	   envisaged	   Patents	   Court	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system	  incompatible	  with	  the	  Treaties.123	  The	  ‘very	  nature	  of	  EU	  law’	  would	  be	  
jeopardised	   by	   an	   alteration	   of	   the	   complete	   system	   of	   legal	   remedies	   and	  
procedures	   for	   reviewing	   the	   validity	   of	   EU	   measures	   that	   includes	   both	   the	  
Member	   States’	   courts	   and	   the	   EU	   judiciary	   without	   a	   due	   revision	   of	   the	  
Treaties.124	  The	  autonomy	  of	  the	  EU	  legal	  order	  does,	  therefore,	  reach	  beyond	  EU	  
law	   and	   EU	   institutions	   to	   include	   also	   the	   functions	   of	   the	   Member	   States’	  
institutions	  in	  the	  general	  institutional	  framework	  of	  the	  EU.	  	  
A	   further	   shortcoming	  of	   the	  Patents	  Court	   system	  was	   the	   fact	   that	   in	   the	  EU	  
legal	   system	   individual	   rights	   are	   protected	   by	   the	   obligation	   of	   the	   Member	  
States	  to	  remedy	  damages	  incurred	  by	  individuals	  as	  a	  result	  of	  an	  infringement	  
of	   EU	   law	   by	   the	   Member	   States	   including,	   under	   specific	   circumstances,	   the	  
national	   judiciaries.	   Since	   the	   Patents	   Court	   could	   not	   be	   subjected	   to	  
infringement	  proceedings	  under	  Articles	  258-­‐260	  TFEU	  nor	  could	   its	  decisions	  
give	  ground	  to	  financial	  liability	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  Member	  States,	  the	  nature	  of	  EU	  
law	   was,	   thus,	   considered	   to	   be	   altered	   to	   the	   extent	   incompatible	   with	   the	  
provisions	   of	   the	   Treaties.125	   All	   in	   all,	   the	   Court	   did	   not	   accept	   the	   proposed	  
institutional	  format	  of	  the	  draft	  Patents	  Court	  agreement.	  	  
The	   Benelux	   Court	   under	   scrutiny	   in	   Parfums	   Christian	   Dior126	   was,	   however,	  
deemed	  by	  the	  Court	  to	  be	  compatible	  with	  the	  Treaties	  because	  of	   its	  position	  
within	  the	  judicial	  system	  of	  the	  EU	  and,	  therefore,	  subject	  to	  the	  judicial	  review	  
mechanisms	  of	  the	  Treaties.127	  Proceedings	  before	  the	  Benelux	  Court	  form	  part	  
of	   the	   proceedings	   before	   national	   courts	   and	   do	   not,	   therefore,	   deprive	   the	  
national	  courts	  of	  their	  powers	  to	  interact	  with	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice	  by	  virtue	  of	  
the	  preliminary	  ruling	  procedure.	  Also	  the	  Benelux	  Court	  itself	  is	  to	  be	  regarded	  
as	  part	  of	   the	  national	   judicial	  systems	  to	   the	  extent	   that	   it	  serves	   to	  provide	  a	  
common	  interpretation	  to	  a	  set	  of	  rules	  common	  to	  the	  Benelux	  countries.128	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3.6	  Opinion	  2/13	  ECHR	  II	  
The	  most	  recent	  and,	  undoubtedly,	  most	  widely	  contested	  opinion	  of	   the	  Court	  
concerns	  Opinion	  2/13	  on	  the	  EU’s	  accession	  to	  the	  ECHR.129	  Following	  the	  first	  
failed	   attempt	   in	   1994	   to	   design	   an	   agreement	   of	   the	   EU’s	   accession	   to	   the	  
ECHR,130	   the	   new	  draft	   agreement	  was	   drawn	  up	   in	   hope	   that	   the	   substantive	  
shortcomings	  impeding	  the	  conclusion	  of	  the	  first	  agreement	  had	  been	  remedied	  
by	   Article	   6(2)	   TEU	   and	   that	   the	   new	   draft	   agreement	   would,	   therefore,	   be	  
accepted	  by	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice.	  Both	  Article	  6(2)	  and	  Protocol	  No	  8	  TEU	  as	  well	  
as	   the	   Declaration	   on	   Article	  6(2)	   annexed	   to	   the	   TEU	   stipulate	   that	   the	   EU’s	  
accession	   to	   the	   ECHR	   must	   preserve	   the	   specific	   characteristics	   of	   the	   EU	   –	  
pertaining	   both	   to	   its	   ‘constitutional	   structure’	   and	   the	   ‘institutional	  
framework’131	  –	  and	  may	  not	  affect	  the	  Union’s	  competences,	  the	  powers	  of	  the	  
institutions,	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  Member	  States	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  ECHR,	  
nor	   infringe	   Article	  344	   TFEU.	   Unexpectedly	   to	   many	   observers132	   the	   Court,	  
however,	   refuted	   the	   compatibility	   of	   the	   draft	   accession	   agreement	   with	   the	  
Treaties	   on	   a	   number	   of	   different	   reasons	   pertaining	   to,	   for	   example,	   the	  
preservation	  of	  the	  specific	  characteristics	  and	  autonomy	  of	  the	  EU	  legal	  order.	  
The	  Court	  first	  contended	  that	  Article	  53	  ECHR	  that	  allows	  the	  Member	  States	  to	  
lay	   down	   higher	   standards	   of	   fundamental	   rights	   protection	   requires	  
coordination	  with	  Article	  53	  of	   the	  EU	  Charter	   in	  order	   for	   the	  Member	  States	  
not	  to	  introduce	  standards	  higher	  than	  necessary	  under	  the	  Charter	  and	  for	  the	  
primacy,	   unity	   and	   effectiveness	   of	   EU	   law	   to	   be	   maintained.133	   Secondly,	   the	  
Court	  found	  that	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  principle	  of	   ‘mutual	  trust’,	  the	  Member	  
States	   especially	   in	   the	   field	   of	   the	   AFSJ	   may	   not,	   other	   than	   in	   exceptional	  
circumstances,	   consider	   other	   Member	   States	   to	   breach	   EU	   law	   including	  
fundamental	   rights	   and	   not,	   therefore,	   control	   the	   other	   Member	   States’	  
performance	   in	   that	   regard.134	  The	   fact	   that	   the	  envisaged	  agreement	  provided	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for	  a	  possibility	  for	  the	  Member	  States	  to	  check	  on	  each	  other’s	  performance	  in	  
protecting	   fundamental	   rights	  was	   considered	  by	   the	  Court	   to	  undermine	  both	  
the	   ‘underlying	   balance	   of	   the	   EU’	   as	   well	   as	   the	   autonomy	   of	   the	   EU	   legal	  
order.135	  As	  a	  third	  aspect,	   the	  Court	  pointed	  out	  the	  possibility	  of	   the	  Member	  
States	  under	  Protocol	  16	  of	  the	  ECHR	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  ECtHR	  requests	  for	  advisory	  
opinions	   on	   the	   interpretation	   and	   application	   of	   the	   Convention.	   At	   the	   same	  
time,	   upon	   EU’s	   accession	   to	   the	   ECHR	   the	   Convention	   would	   become	   an	  
inherent	  part	   of	   EU	   law	  and	   its	   interpretation,	   therefore,	  would	   fall	  within	   the	  
jurisdiction	   of	   the	   Court.	   Insofar	   as	   the	   draft	   agreement	   did	   not	   regulate	   the	  
relationship	   between	   the	   EU’s	   preliminary	   ruling	   procedure	   and	   the	   advisory	  
opinion	   procedure	   under	   Protocol	   16	   ECHR	   the	   latter	  would,	   according	   to	   the	  
Court,	   jeopardise	   the	   autonomy	   and	   the	   effectiveness	   of	   the	   EU’s	   preliminary	  
ruling	  procedure	  under	  Article	  267	  TFEU.136	  
Fourthly,	  the	  Court	  found	  that	  the	  exclusive	  jurisdiction	  of	  the	  Court	  provided	  by	  
Article	  344	  TFEU	  was	  not	  protected	  by	   the	  draft	   agreement	  because	   the	   latter	  
does	  not	  give	  explicit	  precedence	   to	   the	  EU	  dispute	   settlement	  procedure	  over	  
the	  corresponding	  procedure	  under	  the	  ECHR	  in	  disputes	  concerning	  EU	  law.137	  
This	   is	  different	   from	  the	  situation	   in	  MOX	  Plant	  where	  the	  convention	  at	   issue	  
there	   provided	   a	   clear	   rule	   on	   the	   priority	   of	   the	   EU	   dispute	   settlement	  
procedures	  over	  those	  provided	  for	  by	  the	  convention.138	  The	  essence	  of	  Article	  
344	  TFEU	   is	   that	   it	   ‘precludes	  any	  prior	  or	  subsequent	  external	  control’139	  and	  
even	  a	  mere	  possibility	  to	  refer	  a	  case	  to	  a	  non-­‐EU	  judiciary.140	  
Fifthly,	   the	   Court	   scrutinised	   the	   co-­‐respondent	   mechanism	   under	   the	   draft	  
accession	   agreement	   and	   found	   that	   it	   infringed	   EU	   law	   in	   several	   ways.	  
Pursuant	  to	  the	  draft	  agreement	  the	  ECHR	  would	  have	  the	  possibility	  to	  decide	  
on	   the	   ‘plausibility’	   of	   the	   request	   from	  either	   the	  Member	  States	  or	   the	  EU	   to	  
become	   a	   co-­‐respondent	   in	   a	   case	   before	   the	   ECtHR	   and,	   thereby,	   enable	   the	  
latter	   court	   to	   rule	   on	   matters	   concerning	   EU	   law	   such	   as	   the	   division	   of	  
                                            
135	  ibid	  para	  194.	  
136	  ibid	  paras	  197-­‐199.	  
137	  ibid	  paras	  205-­‐208.	  	  
138	  ibid	  para	  205.	  
139	  ibid	  para	  210.	  
140	  ibid	  para	  212.	  
 
	   245 
competences	  between	  the	  EU	  and	  the	  Member	  States.141	  The	  ECtHR	  would	  also	  
be	   able	   to	   decide	   on	  whether	   the	   co-­‐respondents	   are	   jointly	   responsible	   for	   a	  
violation	  or	  not	  including	  an	  assessment	  of	  the	  allocation	  of	  powers	  between	  the	  
EU	   and	   its	   Member	   States	   and	   the	   ensuing	   allocation	   of	   responsibility.142	   The	  
latter	  assessment	  falls	  within	  the	  sole	  jurisdiction	  of	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice.143	  
Sixthly,	   the	   draft	   accession	   agreement	   provided	   for	   a	   procedure	   for	   the	   prior	  
involvement	  of	  the	  EU.	  The	  Court	  considered	  the	  procedure	  to,	  indeed,	  preserve	  
the	  competences	  of	  the	  EU	  and	  the	  powers	  of	  its	  institutions	  including	  the	  Court	  
of	   Justice.144	  This	   concerns	   the	  determination	   about	  whether	   a	   case	  before	   the	  
ECHR	  has	  already	  been	  decided	  by	  the	  ‘competent	  EU	  institution	  whose	  decision	  
should	  bind	  the	  ECtHR’.145	  The	  safeguards	  provided	  by	  the	  draft	  agreement	  were	  
not,	  however,	  regarded	  as	  sufficient	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  ECtHR	  would	  never	  assess	  
the	  case	  law	  of	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice	  and	  were,	  thus,	  deemed	  insufficient	  from	  the	  
perspective	   of	   preserving	   the	   special	   characteristics	   of	   the	   EU	   legal	   order.146	  
Furthermore,	   the	   Court	   found	   that	   it	   should	   be	   able	   to	   not	   only	   assess	   the	  
validity	   of	   the	   provisions	   that	   concern	   the	   rights	   contained	   in	   the	   ECHR	   in	   EU	  
secondary	   law	   and	   interpret	   primary	   law	  but	   also	   interpret	   EU	   secondary	   law	  
that	  was	  not	  provided	  for	  by	  the	  draft	  accession	  agreement.147	  The	  impossibility	  
to	   interpret	   EU	   secondary	   law	   would,	   in	   turn,	   defeat	   the	   Court’s	   exclusive	  
jurisdiction	  to	  give	  definitive	  interpretations	  of	  EU	  law.148	  
Finally,	   the	  Court	  considered	   it	  problematic	   that	   the	  draft	  accession	  agreement	  
would	  give	  the	  ECtHR	  the	  possibility	  to	  review	  the	  legality	  of	  certain	  CFSP	  acts	  in	  
the	   light	   of	   the	   fundamental	   rights	   protected	   by	   the	   ECHR.	   Article	   275	   TFEU	  
limits	  the	  Court’s	  jurisdiction	  in	  the	  area	  of	  CFSP	  to	  monitoring	  compliance	  with	  
Article	   40	   TEU	   that	   delimits	   CFSP	   and	   other	   EU	   policies,	   and	   reviewing	   the	  
legality	  of	  Council	  decisions	  that	  impose	  restrictive	  measures	  against	  natural	  or	  
legal	  persons	  pursuant	  to	  Article	  263	  TFEU.	  The	  Court,	  therefore,	  cannot	  exercise	  
a	   similar	   fundamental	   rights	   review	   over	   at	   least	   some	   of	   the	   acts	   of	   CFSP	   as	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would	   be	   granted	   to	   the	   ECtHR.149	   The	   Court	   deemed	   this,	   with	   reference	   to	  
Opinion	  1/09,	   to	   conflict	  with	   the	   idea	   that	   the	   jurisdiction	  of	   the	  Court	   in	   the	  
field	  of	  EU	  law	  may	  not	  be	  transferred	  on	  an	  exclusive	  basis	  to	  an	  international	  
court	   that	   does	   not	   belong	   to	   the	   EU’s	   institutional	   and	   judicial	   framework.150	  
Even	   if	  all	  of	   the	  previous	  arguments	  of	   the	  Court	  can	  be	   found	   justified	   in	   the	  
light	  of	  previous	  case	  law	  the	  final	  statement	  definitely	  makes	  one	  question	  the	  
Court’s	   selfish	  attitude	   towards	   its	  own	   role	   in	   the	   international	   community	  of	  
courts.151	   From	   the	   perspective	   of	   the	   CFSP	   belonging	   into	   the	   same	   EU	   legal	  
order	   as	   other	  policies	   and	   the	  ECtHR	  becoming	   an	  EU	   constitutional	   court	   by	  
gaining	   jurisdiction	   over	   CFSP	   matters,	   however,	   the	   Court’s	   approach	   may	  
receive	  more	  sympathisers.152	  
All	  of	  the	  institutional	  aspects	  of	  the	  autonomy	  of	  the	  EU	  legal	  order	  considered	  
above	  have	  been	  accorded	  very	  strong	  protection	  on	  behalf	  of	   the	  Court	   in	   the	  
name	  of	  the	  essential	  characteristics	  of	  the	  Union.	  These	  features	  of	  the	  EU	  legal	  
order	  can,	  indeed,	  be	  regarded	  as	  parts	  of	  the	  fundamental	  acquis153	  of	  the	  Union	  
the	  protection	  of	  which	  is	  paramount	  –	  the	  ‘untouchable	  hard	  core’154	  of	  the	  EU’s	  
relations	  with	  other	  international	  actors.	  
Finally,	   although	   the	   majority	   of	   the	   examples	   above	   concern	   the	   judicial	  
architecture	  of	  the	  EU,	  the	  autonomy	  of	  the	  EU	  legal	  order	  is	  not	  restricted	  to	  the	  
safeguarding	   of	   the	   system	   of	   courts	   and	   remedies	   but	   also	   the	   EU’s	   decision-­‐
making	  procedures.	  The	   latter	  aspect	  of	   the	  EU’s	  autonomy	   is	  best	  exemplified	  
by	  a	  speech	  given	  by	  De	  Clercq,	  European	  Commissioner	  for	  External	  Relations	  
and	  Trade	  at	   the	  EC-­‐EFTA	  Ministerial	  Meeting	   in	   Interlaken	   in	  1987.	  De	  Clercq	  
outlined	   the	   three	   principles	   of	   the	   EC-­‐EFTA	   cooperation	   including,	   first	   and	  
foremost,	   that	   ‘Community	   integration	   comes	   first	   and	   the	   Community’s	  
decision-­‐making	   autonomy	   must	   be	   preserved’	   for	   the	   sake	   of	   being	   able	   to	  
finalise	   the	   internal	  market	   in	   the	  planned	   timeframe	  and	  not	  wishing	   to	   incur	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further	  delays	  arising	  from	  the	   inclusion	  of	  non-­‐member	  states	   in	  the	  decision-­‐
making	  processes.155	  The	  third	  principle	  concerned	  the	  balance	  between	  benefits	  
and	  obligations	  that	  would	  not	  allow	  the	  EFTA	  States	  to	  participate	   fully	   in	  the	  
activities	  of	  the	  EC	  without	  joining	  the	  Community	  because	  they	  would	  not	  share	  
the	   same	   ‘Community	   discipline	   and	   solidarity’	   as	   the	   Member	   States	   do.156	  
These	   three	  principles	  have	  greatly	   influenced	   the	  decision-­‐making	   framework	  
in	   the	   multilateral	   agreements	   exporting	   the	   acquis	   and	   the	   possibilities	   of	  
arriving	  at	  and	  maintaining	  homogeneity	  in	  the	  extended	  internal	  market.157	  	  	  
4	  Conclusion	  
In	  the	  context	  of	  flexibility	  in	  EU	  integration,	  the	  multiplicity	  of	  the	  types	  of	  the	  
membership	  of	  the	  Union	  can	  be	  justified	  as	  a	  means	  to	  safeguard	  the	  ‘integrity	  
and	   autonomy’	   of	   the	   EU	   legal	   order.158	   Flexible	   integration	   does,	   nonetheless,	  
require	   that	   the	   unconventional	   form	   of	  membership	   is	   identified	   as	   such	   and	  
that	   the	   multiplication	   of	   membership	   patterns	   do	   not	   to	   have	   a	   detrimental	  
effect	  on	  the	   ‘core’	  of	  the	  EU	  legal	  order.	  When	  it	  comes	  to	  interaction	  between	  
the	   EU	   and	   third	   countries	   or	   international	   organisations,	   the	   integrity	   and	  
autonomy	   claim	   is	   ever	   so	   strong.	   The	   case	   law	   of	   the	   Court	   convincingly	  
demonstrates	  that	  safeguarding	  the	  autonomy	  of	  the	  EU	  legal	  order	  is	  one	  of	  the	  
key	  tasks	  of	  its	  judiciary.	  
The	   objective	   of	   the	   principle	   of	   autonomy	   is	   to	   maintain	   the	   independent	  
operation	   of	   EU	   law	   and	   institutions.	   Autonomy	   serves	   the	   broad	   purpose	   of	  
uniform	  application	  of	  EU	  law	  across	  the	  territory	  of	  the	  Union	  in	  order	  to	  enable	  
the	   Union	   to	   achieve	   the	   objectives	   laid	   out	   in	   the	   Treaties.	   Meanwhile,	   the	  
autonomy	   of	   the	   EU	   legal	   order	   faces	   dangers	   on	   both	   Member	   State	   and	  
international	   levels.	   The	   Court	   is	   particularly	   assertive	   in	   reviewing	   the	  
compatibility	  with	  the	  autonomy	  of	  the	  EU	  legal	  order	  of	  those	  agreements	  that	  
seek	  to	  export	  EU	  acquis	   to	  third	  countries	  and	  set	  up	  institutional	  frameworks	  
for	  maintaining	  homogeneity	  in	  the	  internal	  market	  thus	  extended.	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   W	   De	   Clercq,	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   held	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   ministerial	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  See	  below	  chapters	  6	  and	  7,	  especially	  chapter	  6	  section	  3.2.1.	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   M	   Cremona,	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   "Dynamic	   and	   Homogeneous"	   EEA:	   Byzantine	   Structures	   and	   Variable	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Although	   the	   Court	   is	   more	   prone	   to	   safeguard	   the	   autonomy	   of	   the	   EU	   legal	  
order	  than	  to	  further	  the	  homogeneity	  objective	  of	  the	  international	  agreements	  
it	  does	  not	  render	  the	  extension	  of	  the	  EU	  internal	  market	  beyond	  the	  borders	  of	  
the	   Union	   a	   mission	   impossible.	   By	   and	   large,	   the	   problems	   of	   conflicts	   with	  
autonomy	  can	  be	  avoided	  if	  in	  the	  institutional	  structures	  of	  the	  agreements	  the	  
EU	  and	   the	  non-­‐EU	  pillar	   are	  very	   clearly	   separated,	   such	  as	   in	   the	   case	  of	   the	  
ECT	  or,	  on	  the	  contrary,	  where	  one	  single	  organisation	  is	  created	  for	  all	  parties	  
with	  distinct	  organs	  that	  function	  in	  parallel	  to	  those	  of	  the	  EU,	  such	  as	  the	  EEA.	  
Finally,	   the	   Court	   has	   repeatedly	   established	   in	   its	   case	   law	   on	   autonomy	   that	  
certain	  institutional	  designs	  are	  incompatible	  with	  the	  current	  provisions	  of	  the	  
Treaties	   and	   that	   the	   Treaty	   amendment	   provisions	   cannot	   be	   replaced	   by	  
concluding	  an	  international	  agreement.	  Virtually	  any	  institutional	  framework	  set	  
up	  by	  an	  international	  agreement	  exporting	  the	  acquis	  would	  become	  compatible	  
with	   the	   Treaties	   and,	   subsequently,	   the	   requirement	   of	   autonomy	   of	   the	   EU	  
legal	  order	  if	  the	  Treaties	  were	  amended	  accordingly.	  This	  solution	  is,	  however,	  
rather	  unlikely	  to	  be	  made	  use	  of	  in	  the	  fear	  of	  thereby	  opening	  Pandora’s	  box.159	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  Lock,	  'Walking	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  order'	  (2011)	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  Common	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Chapter	  6	   Institutional	  framework:	  defining	  the	  core	  
1	  Introduction	  
The	   project	   of	   expanding	   the	   EU	   internal	   market	   beyond	   the	   borders	   of	   the	  
Union	   cannot	   do	   without	   a	   solid	   institutional	   and	   procedural	   framework	   to	  
ensure	  that	  the	  same	  fundamental	  characteristics	  of	  the	  internal	  market	  and	  the	  
necessary	   degree	   of	   unity	   of	   the	  market	   as	   in	   the	   EU	   are	   incorporated	   in	   the	  
‘extension’	  of	  the	  market.	  As	  discussed	  above	  in	  chapter	  3,	  a	  homogeneous	  EEA,	  
Energy	   Community	   or	   ECAA	   require,	   ideally,	   that	   the	   same	   core	   body	   of	   rules	  
and	   procedures	   be	   given	   the	   same	   effect	   across	   the	   entire	   territory	   of	   the	  
respective	   legal	   orders	   at	   any	   point	   of	   time.	   It	   thus	  means	   that	   in	   order	   to	   be	  
considered	   homogeneous,	   the	   acquis	   must	   correspond	   to	   three	   requirements:	  
unity	  of	  substance,	  time	  and	  territory.	  These	  aspects	  must	  be	  present	  at	  all	  stages	  
–	   the	   adoption,	   implementation,	   application	   and	   enforcement	   of	   the	   acquis.	  
Furthermore,	   homogeneity	   in	   the	   external	   dimension	  demands	   that	   there	   be	   a	  
sufficient	   institutional	   link	   between	   the	   EU	   legal	   order	   and	   the	   legal	   orders	  
created	  by	  the	  multilateral	  agreements.	  
Homogeneity	   does	   not	   require	   absolute	   uniformity,	   either	   within	   the	   EEA,	  
Energy	   Community	   of	   the	   ECAA	   or	   between	   the	   above	   and	   the	   EU,	   yet	   a	  
homogeneous	   expanded	   internal	   market	   must	   necessarily	   include	   the	   core	  
elements	  defined	  above	   in	  chapter	  2.	  These	  core	  elements	  comprise	  provisions	  
on	   fundamental	   freedoms,	   competition	   policy	   and	   the	   relevant	   horizontal	  
provisions	  that	  affect	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  former	  two.	  
This	  chapter	  focuses	  on	  two	  key	  aspects	  of	  the	  institutional	  frameworks	  that	  are	  
set	  up	  to	  guarantee	  homogeneity	  in	  the	  extended	  internal	  market	  –	  the	  exporting	  
of	   the	   acquis	   and	   the	   defining	   of	   its	   key	   elements	   necessary	   for	   achieving	  
homogeneity.	   The	   first	   part	   of	   the	   chapter	   deals	   with	   legal	   mechanisms	   that	  
enable	   the	   acquis	   adopted	   in	   the	   EU	   to	   be	   exported	   to	   the	   EEA,	   the	   Energy	  
Community	   and	   the	   ECAA	   legal	   orders,	   scrutinising	   both	   institutional	   and	  
procedural	  arrangements.	  The	  second	  part	  of	  the	  chapter	  focuses	  on	  the	  possible	  
effects	  of	  third	  country	  participation	  in	  the	  stages	  of	  determining	  the	  substantive	  
content	  of	  the	  core	  acquis	  on	  homogeneity	  in	  the	  expanded	  internal	  market	  and	  
the	   possibilities	   of	   various	   non-­‐EU	   actors	   in	   influencing	   the	   EU	   acquis.	   The	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current	   and	   the	   following	   chapter	   deal	   primarily	   with	   the	   institutions	   and	  
procedures	  of	  the	  EU	  and	  the	  EEA,	  the	  Energy	  Community	  and	  the	  ECAA	  and	  do	  
not	  explore	  in	  detail	  the	  role	  of	  the	  institutions	  of	  the	  EU	  Member	  States	  or	  those	  
of	  the	  non-­‐EU	  contracting	  parties	  to	  the	  agreements	  under	  scrutiny	  as	  these	  fall	  
beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  thesis.	  	  
2	  Exporting	  internal	  market	  acquis	  to	  third	  countries	  
In	  order	  to	  ensure	  homogeneity	  and	  a	  true	  extension	  of	  the	  internal	  market,	  the	  
core	  of	  the	  internal	  market	  acquis	  	  -­‐	  either	  comprehensive	  or	  characteristic	  of	  the	  
particular	   sector	   in	   question,	   such	   as	   energy	  or	   aviation	   –	  must	   be	   transposed	  
into	   the	   legal	   orders	   of	   third	   states	   in	   a	   timely	   and	   precise	   manner.	   Suitable	  
institutional	  and	  procedural	  mechanisms	  need	  to	  be	  in	  place,	  set	  up	  both	  by	  the	  
international	  instruments	  and	  by	  the	  third	  countries’	  national	  legal	  orders.	  Since	  
the	   questions	   of	   primacy	   and	   direct	   effect	   were,	   however,	   already	   discussed	  
above	   in	   chapter	   3,	   this	   chapter	   will	   only	   cover	   the	   rules	   in	   the	   international	  
agreements.	  	  
Uniformity	   at	   the	   stage	   of	   adoption	   means,	   firstly,	   that	   the	   same	   set	   of	   rules	  
comes	   into	   in	   force.	   Secondly,	   at	   the	   time	   new	   legislation	   or	   amendments	   to	  
existing	   legislation	   in	   the	   sphere	   of	   the	   internal	   market	   or	   a	   sector	   thereof	   is	  
adopted	  in	  the	  EU,	  the	  same	  acquis	  must	  also	  enter	  into	  force	  vis-­à-­vis	  the	  third	  
countries.	   This	   is	   important	   both	   as	   regards	   the	   content	   of	   the	   legal	   rules	   –	  
within	   the	   limits	   of	  what	   can	   be	   classified	   as	   ‘permissible	   differentiation’	   –	   as	  
well	   as	   the	   temporal	   dimension.	   Thirdly,	   homogeneity	   demands	   that	   the	   same	  
set	   of	   rules	   apply	   at	   the	   same	   point	   of	   time	   across	   the	   entire	   territory	   of	   the	  
expanded	   internal	   market,	   thus	   excluding	   the	   possibility	   of	   adopting	   new	  
legislation	  at	  different	  times	  and,	  thereby,	  proceeding	  at	  different	  speeds.1	  
Within	   the	   EU,	   general	   rules	   on	   the	   entry	   into	   force	   of	   new	   legislation	   apply	  
equally	   to	   all	   Member	   States	   notwithstanding	   negotiated	   exceptions	   that	   are	  
usually	  limited	  in	  number	  and	  scope.	  The	  entry	  into	  force	  following	  the	  adoption	  
of	   new	   EU	   legislation	   is	   automatic	   across	   the	   entire	   Union.	   EU	   legislation	  
becomes	   binding	   on	   the	   Member	   States	   –	   to	   the	   extent	   that	   the	   measures	  
                                            
1	  See	  above	  chapter	  3	  section	  3.1.	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adopted	  enjoy	  general	  application	  and	  have	  legally	  binding	  force	  –	  to	  all	  Member	  
States	  at	   the	  moment	  of	   adoption	  or	  at	   a	   later	  date	  as	  may	  be	   specified	  by	   the	  
instrument.	   Should	   the	   particular	   instrument	   have	   direct	   effect	   it	   will	   also	   be	  
enforceable	  by	  individuals.	  	  
In	  the	  case	  of	  exporting	  the	  acquis	  outside	  the	  Union	  the	  automaticity	  no	  longer	  
applies.	  The	  international	  agreements	  serve	  as	  a	   filter	  between	  the	  EU	  Treaties	  
and	  the	  constitutional	  orders	  of	  non-­‐EU	  Member	  States.	  As	  is	  the	  case	  with	  all	  of	  
the	   multilateral	   agreements	   under	   scrutiny,	   uniformity	   of	   the	   acquis	   is	  
guaranteed	  only	  for	  the	  moment	  of	  their	  conclusion.	  The	  updating	  of	  the	  acquis	  
which	   forms	   part	   of	   the	   international	   agreement,	   either	   being	   inserted	   in	   the	  
main	   text	   of	   the	   agreement	   or	   in	   an	   annex	   attached	   to	   it,	   amounts	   to	   an	  
amendment	   of	   the	   international	   agreement.	   The	   amendment	   must	   take	   place	  
according	   to	   the	   rules	   of	   international	   treaty	   law	   and	   the	   provisions	   of	   the	  
agreement	   itself.	   For	   the	   purpose	   of	   inserting	   new	  acquis	   into	   the	  multilateral	  
agreements	  to	  reflect	  legislative	  changes	  in	  the	  EU	  simplified	  treaty	  amendment	  
procedures	  are	  often	  used.	  In	  the	  cases	  of	  the	  EEA	  and	  the	  ECAA,	  the	  updating	  of	  
the	   acquis	   takes	   place	   in	   accordance	  with	   a	   simplified	   procedure	  whereas	   the	  
ECT	  prescribes	  no	  special	  procedure.	  Instead,	  the	  general	  rules	  on	  revision	  and	  
accession	  outlined	  in	  Article	  100	  ECT	  apply.	  	  
2.1	  European	  Economic	  Area	  
Overall,	  the	  EEA	  Agreement	  introduces	  three	  categories	  of	  methods	  for	  achieving	  
the	   homogeneity	   necessary	   for	   the	   establishment	   and	   functioning	   of	   the	   EEA	  
common	  market	  –	  legislative,	  administrative	  and	  judicial.2	  This	  chapter	  concerns	  
the	   first,	   legislative	  means,	  while	   the	   next	   chapter	   analyses	   the	   administrative	  
and	  judicial	  means	  for	  maintaining	  homogeneity	  within	  the	  EEA	  and	  between	  the	  
EEA	   and	   the	   EU.	   Among	   the	   multilateral	   agreements	   under	   scrutiny,	   the	   EEA	  
Agreement	   represents	   the	  most	   elaborate	   system	   for	   updating	   the	  acquis.	   The	  
EEA	  is	  made	  up	  of	  two	  distinct	  pillars,	  the	  first	  –	  the	  EU	  pillar	  –	  comprising	  the	  
EU	  and	   its	  Member	  States	   and	   the	   institutions	  of	   the	  EU,	   and	   the	   second	  –	   the	  
EFTA	  pillar	  –	  made	  up	  of	  the	  EEA	  EFTA	  States	  and	  the	  institutions	  of	  the	  EFTA,	  
                                            
2	  A	  Lazowski,	  'Box	  of	  chocolates	  integration:	  the	  European	  Economic	  Area	  and	  the	  Swiss	  models	  
revisited'	   in	   S	   Blockmans	   and	   S	   Prechal	   (eds),	   Reconciling	   the	   Deepening	   and	  Widening	   of	   the	  
European	  Union	  (T.M.C.	  Asser	  Press	  2007)	  87.	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respectively.	   In	   between	   the	   institutions	   of	   the	   two	   pillars	   are	   the	   EEA	  
institutions,	   in	   which	   both	   the	   EU	   and	   the	   EFTA	   pillars	   are	   represented.3	   The	  
EEA’s	   sophisticated	   institutional	   framework	   allows	   for	   a	   ‘quasi-­‐automatic’	  
procedure	   for	   amending	   the	   annexes	   to	   the	   EEA	   Agreement	   that	   contain	   the	  
relevant	  acquis,4	  something	  which	  is	  indispensable	  considering	  the	  vast	  scope	  of	  
the	  agreement.	  	  	  
2.1.1	  Institutions	  
The	  parallel	  structure	  of	  the	  EEA	  comprises	  four	  joint	  institutions	  in	  which	  both	  
the	  EU	  and	  the	  EFTA	  side	  of	  the	  EEA	  Agreement	  are	  represented.	  These	  include	  
the	   EEA	   Council,	   the	   EEA	   Joint	   Committee,	   the	   EEA	   Joint	   Parliamentary	  
Committee,	  and	  the	  EEA	  Consultative	  Committee.	  In	  addition,	  the	  institutions	  of	  
the	  EFTA	  pillar	  comprise	   the	  EFTA	  Standing	  Committee,	   the	  EFTA	  Surveillance	  
Authority	  and	  the	  EFTA	  Court.	  The	  EFTA	  Standing	  Committee	  is	  a	  forum	  in	  which	  
the	  EEA	  EFTA	  States	  meet	  and	  adopt	  common	  positions	   to	  be	  presented	   in	   the	  
EEA	  Joint	  Committee.	  The	  roles	  of	  the	  EFTA	  Surveillance	  Authority	  and	  the	  EFTA	  
Court	   in	   the	   process	   of	   implementing	   the	   EEA	   Agreement	   and	   the	   acquis	   are	  
discussed	  in	  detail	  in	  the	  following	  chapter.	  	  	  
The	   EEA	   Council	   is	   the	   main	   political	   body	   of	   the	   EEA.	   It	   consists	   of	  
representatives	   of	   the	   contracting	   parties,	   including	   the	   Council	   of	   the	   EU,	   the	  
Commission	   and	   the	   EEA	   EFTA	   States	   Iceland,	   Liechtenstein	   and	   Norway.	  
Similarly	  to	  the	  European	  Council,	  the	  task	  of	  the	  EEA	  Council	  is	  to	  give	  political	  
impetus	   to	   the	   EEA	   and	   lay	   down	   general	   guidelines	   for	   the	   EEA	   Joint	  
Committee.5	   It	   also	   deals	  with	   difficult	   questions	   that	   the	   Joint	   Committee	   has	  
failed	  to	  reach	  a	  decision	  on,	  or	  questions	  which	  demand	  swift	  action.6	  The	  EEA	  
Council	   adopts	  decisions	   ‘by	  agreement	  between	   the	   [Union],	  on	   the	  one	  hand,	  
and	   the	   EFTA	   States,	   on	   the	   other’.7	   This	   requirement	   of	   consensus	   places	   the	  
two	  pillars	  of	  the	  EEA	  on	  the	  opposing	  sides	  of	  the	  meeting	  table	  yet	  compels	  the	  
parties	   to	   close	   cooperation	   in	   order	   to	   reach	   the	   necessary	   consensus.	  
                                            
3	   For	   an	   illustrative	   organigram	   see	   ‘Joint	   Committee’	   (EEA	   website)	  
<http://www.efta.int/eea/eea-­‐institutions>	  accessed	  24	  June	  2015.	  
4	  S	  Lavenex,	  D	  Lehmkuhl	  and	  N	  Wichmann,	  'Modes	  of	  external	  governance:	  a	  cross-­‐national	  and	  
cross-­‐sectoral	  comparison'	  (2009)	  16	  Journal	  of	  European	  Public	  Policy	  813,	  818.	  
5	  Article	  89(1)	  EEA	  Agreement.	  	  
6	  Article	  89(2)	  EEA	  Agreement.	  
7	  Article	  90(2)	  EEA	  Agreement.	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Consensual	  decision-­‐making	  characterises	  the	  EEA	  as	  a	  whole.	  Furthermore,	  not	  
only	  do	  the	  EU	  and	  its	  Member	  States	  as	  represented	  by	  the	  Commission	  and	  the	  
Council	  have	  to	  agree	  on	  one	  message	  and	  communicate	  this	  with	  one	  voice	  but	  
the	   same	   also	   applies	   to	   the	   EEA	   EFTA	   States.	   The	   EEA	   Council	   is	   led	   by	   a	  
President,	  alternating	   twice	  a	  year	  between	  a	  member	  of	   the	  Council	  of	   the	  EU	  
and	  a	  representative	  of	  an	  EEA	  EFTA	  State,8	  with	  the	  aim	  of	  ensuring	  a	  balance	  in	  
the	  EEA	  between	  the	  EU	  and	  the	  EFTA	  pillars.	  The	  Council	  meets	  twice	  a	  year	  or	  
whenever	   circumstances	   so	   require,9	   in	   addition	   to	   continuous	   dialogue	   on	  
foreign	  policy	  matters,10	  resembling,	  again,	  the	  European	  Council.	  
The	  institution	  involved	  in	  the	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  management	  of	  the	  EEA	  and	  deciding	  
on	   the	   amendments	   to	   the	   EEA	   Agreement	   is	   the	   EEA	   Joint	   Committee,11	   the	  
equivalent	  of	  the	  Council	  of	  the	  EU	  in	  the	  EEA.	  The	  division	  between	  the	  EU	  and	  
the	  EFTA	  pillars	  in	  the	  EEA	  Council	  is	  carried	  on	  to	  the	  Joint	  Committee,	  which,	  
too,	  adopts	  decisions	  by	  agreement	  between	  the	  one	  and	  the	  other	  block.12	  In	  the	  
Joint	   Committee,	   the	   EU	   is	   represented	   by	   the	   Commission	   and	   the	   EFTA	  
Surveillance	   Authority	   participates	   as	   an	   observer.	   The	   Presidency	   of	   the	   EEA	  
Joint	  Committee,	  too,	  alternates	  twice	  a	  year	  between	  the	  Union,	  represented	  by	  
the	   Commission,	   and	   a	   representative	   of	   one	   of	   the	   EFTA	   States.13	   The	   Joint	  
Committee	   meets,	   in	   principle,	   at	   least	   once	   a	   month,	   but	   may	   be	   convened	  
extraordinarily	  at	   the	   initiative	  of	   the	  President	  or	  at	   the	   request	  of	  one	  of	   the	  
contracting	  parties.	  	  
The	   EEA	   Joint	   Parliamentary	   Committee	   is	   an	   advisory	   body	   and	   a	   venue	   for	  
parliamentary	   cooperation	   between	   the	   European	   Parliament	   and	   the	  
parliaments	   of	   the	   EEA	   EFTA	   States.	   It	   is	   composed	   of	   an	   equal	   number	   of	  
parliamentarians	   from	   the	   European	   Parliament	   and	   from	   the	   national	  
parliaments	  of	  the	  EEA	  EFTA	  States,14	  thus	  treating	  the	  two	  pillars	  of	  the	  EEA	  as	  
equal.	  The	  task	  of	  the	  Parliamentary	  Committee	  is	  to	  raise	  awareness	  about	  the	  
areas	   covered	   by	   the	   EEA	   Agreement	   through	   dialogue	   and	   debate	   without,	  
                                            
8	  Article	  91(2)	  EEA	  Agreement.	  
9	  ibid.	  
10	   See	   ‘EEA	   Council’	   (EEA	   Website)	   <http://www.efta.int/eea/eea-­‐institutions/eea-­‐council>	  
accessed	  24	  June	  2015.	  
11	  Article	  92	  EEA	  Agreement.	  
12	  Article	  93(2)	  EEA	  Agreement.	  
13	  Article	  94(1)	  EEA	  Agreement.	  
14	  Article	  95(1)	  EEA	  Agreement.	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however,	   any	   formal	   role	   in	   the	   EEA	   decision-­‐making	   procedures.15	   The	  
Committee’s	  powers	  are	   limited	   to	   the	  adoption	  of	  resolutions,	  scrutinising	   the	  
annual	   report	   of	   the	   Joint	   Committee,	   and	   hearing	   the	   President	   of	   the	   EEA	  
Council.16	  
The	  fourth	  EEA	  joint	  body	  is	  the	  EEA	  Consultative	  Committee	  which	  provides	  a	  
venue	  for	  cooperation	  between	  the	  social	  partners	  of	  the	  EU	  and	  the	  EFTA	  States.	  
The	   cooperation	   serves	   to	   ‘enhance	   the	   awareness	   of	   the	   economic	   and	   social	  
aspects	   of	   the	   growing	   interdependence	   of	   the	   economies	   of	   the	   Contracting	  
Parties	  and	  of	   their	   interests	  within	  the	  context	  of	   the	  EEA’.17	  The	  Consultative	  
Committee	  is	  composed	  of	  an	  equal	  number	  of	  members	  of	  the	  EU	  Economic	  and	  
Social	   Committee	   and	   its	   EFTA	   equivalent,	   the	   EFTA	   Consultative	   Committee.	  
The	  Consultative	  Committee	  may	  adopt	  reports	  and	  non-­‐binding	  resolutions	   to	  
put	   forward	   its	   views	   and	   to,	   thereby,	   enable	   the	   EEA	   social	   partners	   to	  
participate	  in	  the	  EEA	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  role	  in	  the	  decision-­‐making	  procedures.	  	  
2.1.2	  Procedures	  for	  ensuring	  homogeneity	  
Newly	  adopted,	  amended	  or	  repealed	  EU	  acquis	  becomes	  part	  of	  or	   is	  excluded	  
from	   the	   EEA	   Agreement	   only	   upon	   due	   amendment	   of	   the	   latter.	   The	  
amendment	   procedure	   involves	   the	   institutions	   of	   both	   the	   EEA	   and	   the	   EEA	  
EFTA	   States.	   The	   former	   conduct	   the	   amendment	   of	   the	   annexes	   or	   protocols	  
whereas	  the	  latter	  implement	  the	  acquis	  in	  the	  national	  legal	  orders.	  
After	  the	  Council	  of	  the	  EU	  has	  adopted	  a	  legal	  act,	  the	  EEA	  EFTA	  States’	  experts	  
first	   review	   the	  new	  piece	  of	   legislation.	   In	   fact,	   the	   first	  evaluation	  of	   the	  EEA	  
relevance	  of	  a	  piece	  of	  EU	  acquis	  is	  made	  already	  by	  the	  EU	  declaring	  the	  legal	  act	  
either	  EEA	  relevant	  or	  not.18	  The	  purpose	  of	  the	  scrutiny	  of	  the	  EEA	  EFTA	  States’	  
experts	  is	  to	  consider	  the	  EEA	  relevance	  of	  the	  legal	  act	  on	  their	  own	  behalf	  and	  
to	   give	   an	   opinion	   as	   to	   whether	   an	   amendment	   of	   the	   annexes	   of	   the	   EEA	  
                                            
15	  Article	  95(3)	  EEA	  Agreement.	  
16	  Article	  95(4)	  EEA	  Agreement.	  
17	  Article	  96(1)	  EEA	  Agreement.	  	  
18	   See,	   for	   example,	   Directive	   2013/36/EU	   of	   the	   European	   Parliament	   and	   of	   the	   Council	   of	  
26	  June	   2013	   on	   access	   to	   the	   activity	   of	   credit	   institutions	   and	   the	   prudential	   supervision	   of	  
credit	   institutions	   and	   investment	   firms	   [2013]	  OJ	  L176/338,	  which	  provides	   that	   the	   text	  has	  
EEA	  relevance.	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Agreement	   is	  required.19	  Occasionally,	  adaptations	  have	  to	  be	  made	  to	  EU	  legal	  
acts	  before	  they	  are	   incorporated	  in	  the	  EEA	  including	  the	  removal	  of	  non-­‐EEA	  
relevant	   parts	   of	   the	   legal	   acts.20	   This	   procedure	   is	   coordinated	   by	   the	   EFTA	  
Secretariat.	  The	  EFTA	  Secretariat	  also	  drafts	  a	  decision	  of	   the	   Joint	  Committee,	  
which	   is	   following	  approval	  by	  the	  EFTA	  States	  and	  the	  subcommittees	  dealing	  
with	   the	   matter	   in	   question	   passed	   on	   to	   the	   Commission	   via	   the	   European	  
External	  Action	  Service	  (EEAS).	  After	  endorsement	  by	  the	  Commission,	  the	  draft	  
Joint	  Committee	  decision	  is	  forwarded	  to	  either	  the	  Commission	  or	  the	  Council,	  
depending	  on	  whether	  the	  revisions	  foreseen	  in	  the	  draft	  decision	  are	  minor	  or	  
substantive.	  The	  aim	  of	   the	  procedure	   is	   to	  ensure	   the	  simultaneous	  entry	   into	  
force	  of	  new	  or	  amended	  legislation	  in	  the	  entire	  EEA	  and,	  by	  that,	   to	  maintain	  
homogeneity	  and	  legal	  certainty.21	  A	  certain	  delay	   is	  nevertheless	  embedded	  in	  
the	   procedure	   as	   the	   Joint	   Committee	   incorporates	   into	   the	   EEA	   Agreement	  
acquis	   that	   has	   already	   been	   adopted	   in	   the	   EU,	   including	   acts	   that	   enter	   into	  
force	  immediately	  or	  with	  minor	  delay	  vis-­à-­vis	  the	  EU	  Member	  States.22	  	  
Since	  no	  voting	   takes	  place	   in	   the	   Joint	  Committee	  great	  emphasis	   is	  placed	  on	  
finding	   consensus.23	   Consensus	   in	   the	   Joint	   Committee	   is	   the	   aim	   pursued	  
throughout	  the	  equally	  elaborate	  ‘decision-­‐shaping’	  procedure	  in	  which	  the	  EEA	  
EFTA	   States	   participate.24	   Should	   the	   contracting	   parties,	   regardless	   of	   the	  
efforts	   made	   at	   previous	   stages	   be	   unable	   to	   reach	   an	   agreement	   on	  
incorporating	   an	   amendment	   of	   EU	   acquis	   into	   the	   EEA	   Agreement,	   the	   Joint	  
Committee	  will	   continue	  working	   towards	  a	   commonly	  acceptable	   solution.	  An	  
eventual,	  albeit	  imperfect,	  solution	  is	  to	  recognise	  an	  equivalence	  of	  legislation	  in	  
the	  EU	  and	  the	  EFTA	  pillars	  of	  the	  EEA.25	  Article	  102(4)	  serves	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  
Joint	  Committee	  deals	  with	  every	  matter	  relevant	  to	  the	  good	  functioning	  of	  the	  
EEA	  Agreement.	  A	  decision	  on	  taking	  notice	  on	  the	  equivalence	  of	  legislation	  will	  
                                            
19	  Not	  always,	  though,	  is	  acquis	  that	  has	  been	  declared	  EEA	  relevant	  actually	  relevant	  to	  the	  EEA	  
Agreement	   and	   vice	   versa:	   H	   Haukeland	   Fredriksen	   and	   CNK	   Franklin,	   'Of	   Pragmatism	   and	  
Principles:	  The	  EEA	  Agreement	  20	  Years	  On'	  (2015)	  52	  Common	  Market	  Law	  Review	  629,	  652-­‐
653.	  
20	  Norwegian	  Government,	   ‘Parliament	  White	  Paper	  –	  The	  EEA	  Agreement	  and	  Norway’s	  other	  
agreements	  with	  the	  EU’	  No	  5	  (2012-­‐2013),	  12	  and	  16.	  	  
21	  Article	  102(1)	  EEA	  Agreement.	  
22	  H	  Haukeland	  Fredriksen	  and	  CNK	  Franklin	  (n	  19)	  657.	  
23	  Article	  102(3)	  EEA	  Agreement.	  
24	  The	  influence	  of	  the	  EEA	  EFTA	  States	  in	  the	  procedure	  of	  developing	  new	  EEA	  relevant	  acquis	  
in	  the	  EU	  is	  discussed	  in	  detail	  below	  in	  section	  3.	  	  
25	  Article	  102(4)	  EEA	  Agreement.	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have	   to	   be	  made	   at	   least	   six	  months	   after	   the	  matter	   has	   been	   referred	   to	   the	  
Joint	   Committee	   or,	   at	   the	   latest,	   on	   the	   day	   of	   the	   entry	   into	   force	   of	   the	  
corresponding	  EU	  legislation.	  	  
In	  the	  event,	  though,	  that	  the	  EEA	  Joint	  Committee	  fails	  to	  reach	  agreement	  by	  a	  
prescribed	  deadline	  of	  six	  months	  or	  at	  least	  by	  the	  time	  the	  EU	  legislation	  enters	  
into	   force,	   the	   relevant	   part	   of	   an	   annex	   to	   the	   EEA	   Agreement	   is	   suspended	  
unless	   the	   Joint	   Committee	   decides	   differently.26	   The	   Joint	   Committee	   will	  
continue	  work	  on	  the	  matter	  until	  the	  parties	  agree	  to	  a	  solution.	  The	  time	  span	  
between	  the	  adoption	  of	  an	  EEA	  relevant	  EU	  act	  and	  the	  possible	  suspension	  of	  a	  
part	  of	  an	  annex	  attached	  to	  the	  EEA	  Agreement	  will	  be	  one	  year	  in	  total.27	  The	  
practical	   effect	   of	   a	   suspension	   will	   be	   discussed	   in	   and,	   thus,	   decided	   by	   the	  
Joint	   Committee.28	   The	   suspension	   does	   not,	   however,	   affect	   the	   rights	   and	  
obligations	   that	   individuals	   and	  undertakings	  have	   already	   acquired	  under	   the	  
EEA	  Agreement.29	  To	  this	  date,	  no	  suspensions	  have	  yet	  taken	  place.	  
Suspension	  will	  affect	  an	  entire	  part	  of	  an	  annex	  to	  the	  EEA	  Agreement.30	  An	  opt-­‐
out	  by	  one	  EEA	  EFTA	  State	  from	  updating	  the	  EEA	  Agreement,	  therefore,	  affects	  
all.	   The	   aim	   of	   the	   suspension	   mechanism	   is	   to	   avoid	   a	   patchwork	   situation	  
whereby	  different	  acquis	  applies	   in	  different	  parts	  of	   the	  EEA	  and	  the	   idea	  of	  a	  
homogeneous	  EEA	  legal	  order	  defeated.	  Nevertheless,	  homogeneity	  vis-­à-­vis	  the	  
EU	  pillar	  of	  the	  EEA	  will	  in	  the	  instance	  of	  a	  suspension	  certainly	  be	  interrupted.	  
Joint	   Committee	   decisions	   are	   binding	   on	   the	   EEA	   contracting	   parties	   under	  
public	   international	   law	   and	   thus	   subject	   to	   the	   national	   constitutional	  
provisions.	  The	  parties	  to	  the	  EEA	  Agreement	  are	  under	  an	  obligation	  to	  ensure	  
that	   the	  decisions	   of	   the	   Joint	   Committee	   are	   duly	   applied	   and	   implemented.31	  
Failure	  of	  one	  contracting	  party	   to	  do	   so	  will	   incur	   international	   responsibility	  
towards	   the	   others.	   Subject	   to	   the	   applicable	   constitutional	   provisions,	  
amendments	   to	   the	   EEA	   Agreement,	   its	   annexes	   or	   protocols	   may	   have	   to	   be	  
approved	  separately	  by	  the	  legislatures	  of	  one	  or	  more	  of	  the	  contracting	  parties.	  
                                            
26	  Article	  102(5)	  EEA	  Agreement.	  
27	  The	  sum	  of	  the	  two	  six-­‐month	  periods	  provided	  in	  Article	  102(4)	  and	  (5)	  EEA	  Agreement.	  
28	  Article	  102(5)	  EEA	  Agreement.	  
29	   See,	   for	   example,	   J	  Pelkmans	  and	  P	  Böhler,	   'The	  EEA	  Review	  and	  Liechtenstein's	   Integration	  
Strategy'	  (2013)	  Centre	  for	  European	  Policy	  Studies,	  53.	  
30	   C	   Reymond,	   'Institutions,	   Decision-­‐Making	   Procedure	   and	   Settlement	   of	   Disputes	   in	   the	  
European	  Economic	  Area'	  (1993)	  30	  Common	  Market	  Law	  Review	  449,	  466.	  
31	  Article	  104	  EEA	  Agreement.	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Seeking	  parliamentary	  approval	  may	  possibly	  result	   in	  delays	   in	   the	  procedure	  
and	  pose	  a	  threat	  to	  the	  temporal	  aspect	  of	  homogeneity	  in	  the	  EEA	  legal	  order.	  	  
Contracting	   parties	   must	   notify	   others	   of	   the	   date	   they	   have	   fulfilled	   their	  
national	   constitutional	   requirements	   to	   give	   effect	   to	   Joint	   Committee	  
decisions.32	  Should	  one	  of	  the	  contracting	  parties	  fail	  to	  do	  so	  within	  six	  months’	  
time,	   the	   Joint	   Committee	   decision	   will	   be	   applied	   provisionally	   until	   the	  
notification	  is	  provided.33	  During	  that	  time	  there	  is,	  thus,	  a	  lag	  between	  the	  time	  
the	  acquis	  becomes	  applicable	  in	  the	  EU	  and	  the	  time	  it	  enters	  into	  force	  with	  vis-­
à-­vis	   one	   or	   more	   of	   the	   EEA	   EFTA	   contracting	   parties.	   The	   provisional	  
application	  of	  a	  piece	  of	  the	  acquis	  that	  has	  not	  received	  parliamentary	  approval	  
in	  one	  of	  the	  EEA	  EFTA	  States	  may	  be	  refused	  provisional	  application	  by	  another	  
contracting	   party.	   Such	   refusal	   will,	   as	   well	   as	   a	   notification	   by	   a	   contracting	  
party	  that	  the	  amendment	  has	  not	  been	  ratified	  by	  their	  parliament,	  result	  in	  the	  
suspension	  of	   the	  relevant	  part	  of	   the	  annex	  to	  the	  Agreement.	  The	  suspension	  
will	  take	  place	  within	  a	  month	  of	  those	  circumstances	  arising	  but	  not	  before	  the	  
corresponding	  EU	  legal	  act	  has	  entered	  into	  force.34	  	  
From	  the	  perspective	  of	  achieving	  homogeneity,	  one	  of	  the	  key	  provisions	  in	  the	  
EEA	   Agreement	   is	   Article	   97.	   It	   provides	   that	   subsequent	   amendments	   to	   the	  
domestic	   legislation	   of	   the	   Contracting	   Parties	   are	   only	   compatible	   with	   the	  
Agreement	   if	   they	  comply	  with	  the	  principle	  of	  non-­‐discrimination	  and	   if	  other	  
EEA	  members	  are	  duly	  informed	  of	  the	  amendments.	  Following	  a	  notification	  in	  
this	  regard,	  the	  domestic	  legislative	  amendment	  is	  either	  given	  green	  light	  by	  the	  
EEA	  Joint	  Committee	  by	  being	  deemed	  not	  to	  affect	  the	  good	  functioning	  of	  the	  
EEA	  Agreement	  and,	   thus,	  declared	  not	  EEA	  relevant,	  or	  deemed	  to	  necessitate	  
an	  amendment	  of	  the	  annexes	  or	  protocols	  to	  the	  EEA	  Agreement	  in	  accordance	  
with	  Article	  98.	  The	  good	   functioning	  of	   the	  EEA	  Agreement,	   therefore,	   should	  
lead	  to	  legal	  homogeneity	  both	  within	  the	  EU	  and	  between	  the	  EU	  and	  the	  EEA.	  
Since	  the	  EEA	  Agreement	  is	  a	  mixed	  agreement,	  similarly	  to	  the	  EEA	  EFTA	  States	  
and	  the	  EU	  Member	  States	  represented	  by	  the	  Council	  of	  the	  EU,	  the	  Union,	  too,	  
has	  to	  decide	  on	   its	  own	  position	  to	  be	  put	   forward	  at	  an	  EEA	  Joint	  Committee	  
                                            
32	  Article	  103(1)	  EEA	  Agreement.	  
33	  Article	  103(2)	  EEA	  Agreement.	  
34	  ibid.	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meeting	   as	   well	   as	   on	   a	   possible	   amendment	   of	   the	   EEA	   Agreement	   or	   its	  
annexes	   or	   protocols.	   Regulation	   No	   2894/94	   establishes	   procedures	   to	   be	  
followed	   by	   the	   EU	  when	   implementing	   the	   EEA	  Agreement.35	   Article	   1	   of	   the	  
said	   Regulation	   provides	   that	   at	   the	   stage	   where	   the	   Commission	   submits	   a	  
legislative	   proposal	   to	   the	   Council	   for	   adoption	   it	   must	   indicate	   whether	   it	  
considers	   the	   act	   to	   fall	   within	   the	   ambit	   of	   the	   EEA	   Agreement.	   Should	   a	  
Member	  State	  object	   to	   the	  EEA	  relevance	  of	   the	  act	  proposed,	   the	  Council	  will	  
decide	  on	  the	  question	  with	  a	  vote	  that	  requires	  the	  same	  voting	  majority	  as	  the	  
adoption	   of	   the	   corresponding	   EU	   legal	   act.	   In	   the	   Joint	   Committee	   meetings	  
where	  the	  extension	  of	  an	  EU	  legal	  act	  to	  the	  EEA	  is	  decided	  the	  position	  of	  the	  
EU	   is	   adopted	   by	   the	   Commission.36	   All	   other	   EU	   positions	   in	   the	   EEA	   Joint	  
Committee	  must	  be	  endorsed	  by	  the	  Council	  on	  a	  proposal	  from	  the	  Commission.	  
EU	   positions	   in	   the	   EEA	   Council	   require	   unanimous	   adoption	   in	   the	   Council	  
unless	   the	  EEA	  Council	  deals	  with	  an	  EU	   legal	  act.	   In	   the	   latter	   case	   the	  voting	  
majority	  is	  determined	  by	  the	  legal	  basis	  of	  the	  legal	  act	  in	  question.37	  Analogous	  
rules	   apply	   to	   the	   European	   Parliament	   who	   will,	   in	   parallel	   to	   adopting	  
positions	  on	  EU	  legislation	  also	  adopt	  positions	  on	  the	   ‘EEA	  relevance’	  of	   those	  
acts.38	  	  
In	   conclusion,	   the	   institutional	   and	  procedural	   framework	  of	   the	  EEA	  supports	  
the	  objective	  of	  dynamic	  homogeneity	  to	  almost	  the	  greatest	  extent	  possible	  for	  
an	   international	  agreement	   that	   lacks	   supranational	   character.	  The	  substantive	  
dimension	  of	  homogeneity	  is	  safeguarded	  by	  the	  constant	  monitoring	  of	  the	  ‘EEA	  
relevance’	   of	   EU	   acquis	   by	   both	   the	   EU	   and	   the	   EEA	   EFTA	   parties	   to	   the	   EEA	  
Agreement,	   and	   the	   subsequent	   action	   taken	   by	   the	   EEA	   Joint	   Committee	   to	  
update	  the	  annexes	  to	  the	  Agreement	  accordingly.	  The	  two	  distinct	  pillars	  of	  the	  
EEA	   –	   those	   of	   the	   EU	   and	   the	   EFTA	   –	   influence	   the	   territorial	   dimension	   of	  
homogeneity	  insofar	  as	  the	  entire	  part	  of	  the	  Agreement	  is	  suspended	  when	  the	  
Joint	  Committee	  fails	  to	  update	  the	  annexes	  to	  reflect	  developments	  in	  the	  acquis	  
or	  when	  one	  or	  more	  of	  the	  EEA	  EFTA	  States’	  legislatures	  does	  so.	  At	  that	  point	  
                                            
35	   Council	   Regulation	   (EC)	   No	   2894/94	   of	   28	   November	   1994	   concerning	   arrangements	   for	  
implementing	   the	   Agreement	   on	   the	   European	   Economic	   Area	   [1994]	   OJ	   L305/6	   (Regulation	  
(EC)	  No	  2894/94).	  
36	  Council	  Regulation	  (EC)	  No	  2894/94,	  Article	  1(2).	  	  
37	  Council	  Regulation	  (EC)	  No	  2894/94,	  Article	  2.	  	  
38	  Council	  Regulation	  (EC)	  No	  2894/94,	  Article	  3.	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of	   time,	   the	   entire	   EFTA	   pillar	   becomes	   detached	   from	   the	   EU	   pillar.	  
Homogeneity	  within	   the	   EEA	   as	   a	  whole	  will	   as	   a	   result	   become	   distorted	   but	  
since	   no	   EFTA	   states	   are	   allowed	   to	   surpass	   others	   in	   keeping	   up	   with	   the	  
internal	  market	   legislative	   changes,	   unless	   on	   a	   voluntary	   basis	   and	  without	   a	  
corresponding	   rights	   vis-­à-­vis	   the	   EU	   pillar,	   this	   places	   extra	   pressure	   on	   the	  
defaulting	  party.	  In	  practice,	  however,	  although	  the	  EEA	  Agreement	  allows	  for	  a	  
time	  lag	  of	  a	  maximum	  of	  twelve	  months	  between	  the	  amendment	  of	  the	  acquis	  
and	   the	   updating	   of	   the	   EEA	  Agreement	   or	   a	   suspension	   of	   a	   part	   thereof,	   the	  
incorporation	  of	  EEA	  relevant	  acquis	  into	  the	  EEA	  Agreement	  has	  taken	  up	  to	  six	  
years.39	  	  
The	  time	  gap	  is,	  however,	  inevitable	  owing	  to	  the	  quasi-­‐automatic	  system	  of	  the	  
EEA	   and	   the	   need	   to	   wait	   for	   parliamentary	   approval	   in	   order	   for	   the	  
amendments	   of	   the	   EEA	  Agreement	   to	   enter	   into	   force	   vis-­à-­vis	   the	   EEA	   EFTA	  
countries.	  The	  current	  backlog	  of	  legal	  acts	  awaiting	  incorporation	  into	  the	  EEA	  
Agreement40	   and	   implementation	   in	   the	  EEA	  EFTA	  States41	   is	  not	   insignificant.	  
One	   of	   the	   reasons	   for	   the	   former	   is	   the	   increasingly	   cross-­‐border	   legislative	  
activity	   of	   the	  EU	   that	  makes	   it	   difficult	   to	  determine	   the	  EEA	   relevance	  of	   EU	  
legal	   acts,	   including	  whether	   a	   piece	   of	  acquis	   affects	   the	   internal	  market.42	   In	  
practice,	   the	   homogeneity	   aim	   is,	   therefore,	   more	   vulnerable	   than	   what	   the	  
regulatory	  framework	  sets	  it	  out	  to	  be.	  The	  impossibility	  of	  always	  arriving	  at	  a	  
homogeneous	  result	  is,	  moreover,	  recognised	  by	  the	  EFTA	  Court.43	  	  
                                            
39	  See	  for	  examples	  H	  Haukeland	  Fredriksen	  and	  CNK	  Franklin	  (n	  19)	  657-­‐658.	  
40	  Over	  600	  legislative	  acts	   in	  2014,	  see	  J	  Breidlid	  and	  M	  Vahl,	   '20	  years	  on:	  Current	  and	  future	  
challenges	  for	  the	  EEA'	  (2015)	  EFTA	  Bulletin	  (forthcoming),	  10.	  	  
41	   For	   example,	   as	   of	   May	   2014,	   Iceland	   had	   a	   transposition	   deficit	   of	   3.1%	   (34	   directives),	  
Liechtenstein	  0.9%	  (8	  directives),	  and	  Norway	  1.9%	  (21	  directives):	  Commission,	  ‘Single	  Market	  
Scoreboard	   –	   Iceland	   2013-­‐2014’	   April	   2015	   <http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/	  
scoreboard/_docs/2015/04/member-­‐states/2015-­‐04-­‐iceland_en.pdf>	   accessed	   24	   June	   2015;	  
Commission,	   ‘Single	   Market	   Scoreboard	   –	   Liechtenstein,	   2013-­‐2014’	   April	   2015	  
<http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/scoreboard/_docs/2015/04/member-­‐states/2015-­‐
04liechtenstein_en.pdf>	   accessed	   24	   June	   2015;	   Commission,	   ‘Single	   Market	   Scoreboard	   –	  
Norway,	   2013-­‐2014’	   April	   2015	   <http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/scoreboard/_docs/	  
2015/04/member-­‐states/2015-­‐04-­‐norway_en.pdf>	   accessed	   24	   June	   2015.	   In	   Iceland	   and	  
Norway	   regulations,	   too,	   must	   be	   incorporated	   in	   their	   respective	   legal	   orders.	   In	   November	  
2014,	  Iceland	  had	  34	  overdue	  regulations	  and	  Norway	  20:	  EFTA	  Surveillance	  Authority,	  ‘Internal	  
Market	   Scoreboard	   –	   EEA	   EFTA	   States	   of	   the	   European	   Economic	   Area’	   No	   35	   April	   2015	  
<http://www.eftasurv.int/	  
media/scoreboard/Internal_Market_Scoreboard_No_35_April_2015.pdf>	  accessed	  24	  June	  2015.	  
42	  Norwegian	  Government,	  ‘Parliament	  White	  Paper’	  (n	  20)	  15.	  
43	  Case	  E-­‐3/97	  Opel	  Norge	  [1998]	  EFTA	  Ct	  Rep	  1,	  para	  30.	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2.2	  Energy	  Community	  
The	  institutional	  mechanisms	  for	  achieving	  and	  maintaining	  homogeneity	  in	  the	  
Energy	  Community	   are	   significantly	  weaker	   than	   those	   of	   the	  EAA	  Agreement.	  
The	  institutional	  structure	  of	  the	  Energy	  Community	  is	  much	  more	  sophisticated	  
than	  that	  of	  the	  ECAA	  but	  the	  sophistication	  does	  not	  necessarily	  translate	   into	  
the	   effectiveness	   of	   the	   structures	   in	   safeguarding	   homogeneity	   in	   the	   Energy	  
Community	  legal	  order.	  
2.2.1	  Institutions	  
The	  Energy	  Community	  comprises	   five	   institutions:	   the	  Ministerial	  Council,	   the	  
Permanent	  High	   Level	   Group	   (PHLG),	   the	   Regulatory	   Board,	   two	   Fora	   and	   the	  
Secretariat.	   The	   Ministerial	   Council	   provides	   general	   policy	   guidelines	   to	   the	  
Energy	  Community	  and	  ensures,	  thereby,	  the	  attainment	  of	  the	  objectives	  of	  the	  
Treaty.	  It	  adopts	  Measures	  and	  Procedural	  Acts,	  and	  may	  also	  delegate	  legislative	  
tasks	   to	   other	   institutions.44	   The	   Ministerial	   Council	   is	   made	   up	   of	   one	  
representative	  from	  each	  contracting	  party	  except	  for	  the	  EU	  that	  is	  represented	  
by	   two	   persons.45	   Each	   contracting	   party	   holds	   the	   Presidency	   of	   the	   Energy	  
Community	  in	  turn	  for	  a	  term	  of	  six	  months.	  Importantly,	  since	  the	  ECT	  is	  not	  a	  
mixed	  agreement	  its	  institutions	  do	  not	  feature	  two	  blocks	  that	  would	  separate	  
the	  EU	  from	  the	  non-­‐EU	  contracting	  parties	  such	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  EEA.	  	  
The	  Ministerial	  Council	  meets	  at	  least	  twice	  a	  year	  and	  its	  meetings	  are	  prepared	  
by	  the	  Secretariat.46	  One	  of	  the	  tasks	  of	  the	  Ministerial	  Council	  is	  to	  compose	  an	  
annual	   report	   which	   is	   forwarded	   to	   the	   European	   Parliament	   and	   to	   the	  
Parliaments	  of	   the	  Adhering	  Parties	  and	  of	   the	  Participants.47	  Adhering	  Parties	  
are	   the	   non-­‐EU	   contracting	   parties	   to	   the	   ECT	   with	   the	   exception	   of	   Kosovo	  
(UNMIK).	  Participants	  are	   those	  EU	  Member	  States	  who	  wish	   to	  be	   involved	   in	  
the	   activities	   of	   the	   Energy	   Community	   despite	   not	   being	   able	   to	   become	  
contracting	   parties	   themselves.	   They	   are	   represented	   and	   participate	   in	   the	  
discussions	   at	   the	   Energy	   Community’s	   institutions.48	   Not	   being	   contracting	  
                                            
44	  Article	  47	  ECT.	  
45	  Article	  48	  ECT.	  
46	  Article	  50	  ECT.	  
47	  Article	  52	  ECT.	  
48	  Article	  95	  ECT.	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parties	  they	  do	  not	  take	  part	  in	  the	  voting	  but	  enjoy	  a	  higher	  position	  than	  third	  
country	  observes	  who	  cannot	  participate	  in	  discussions.49	  	  
The	   PHLG	   prepares	   the	   work	   of	   the	   Ministerial	   Council	   and	   reports	   to	   it	   on	  
progress	  made	  toward	  achievement	  of	  the	  objectives	  of	  the	  Treaty.50	  The	  PHLG	  
may	   take	   Measures	   upon	   due	   delegation	   from	   the	   Ministerial	   Council.	   It	   also	  
discusses	  the	  development	  of	   the	  acquis	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  reports	  submitted	  on	  a	  
regular	   basis	   by	   the	   European	   Commission.	   The	   PHLG	   consists	   of	   the	  
representatives	  of	  each	  contracting	  party	  and	  two	  representatives	  of	  the	  EU.51	  As	  
with	  the	  Ministerial	  Council,	  the	  Secretariat	  prepares	  the	  meetings	  of	  the	  PHLG.52	  
The	   Regulatory	   Board	   of	   the	   Energy	   Community	   possesses	   the	   necessary	  
technical	  expertise	  for	  its	  proper	  functioning.	  The	  Board	  advises	  the	  Ministerial	  
Council	   and	   the	   PHLG	   on	   the	   details	   of	   the	   statutory,	   technical	   and	   regulatory	  
rules	   and	   issues	   recommendations	   on	   cross-­‐border	   disputes	   involving	   two	   or	  
more	   regulators	   upon	   request	   by	   any	   of	   them.53	   The	   Regulatory	   Board	   is	  
composed	  of	  representatives	  of	  each	  contracting	  party’s	  energy	  regulators.	  The	  
EU	   is	   represented	   by	   the	   Commission,	   assisted	   by	   one	   regulator	   of	   each	  
Participant,	   and	   one	   representative	   of	   the	   European	   Regulators	   Group	   for	  
Electricity	  and	  Gas	  (ERGEG).54	  	  
The	  two	  Fora	  on	  electricity	  and	  gas,	  respectively,	  represent	  stakeholder	  groups.	  
The	   Fora	   are	   composed	   of	   representatives	   of	   all	   interested	   stakeholders	  
including	   industry,	   regulators,	   industry	   representative	   groups,	   and	   consumers	  
and	  play	  an	  advisory	  role	  in	  the	  Energy	  Community.55	  The	  Fora	  are	  chaired	  by	  a	  
representative	   of	   the	   EU	   and	   adopt	   their	   conclusions	   by	   consensus.56	   The	  
conclusions	  are	  then	  forwarded	  to	  the	  PHLG.57	  	  
Finally,	   the	   Secretariat	   of	   the	   Energy	   Community	   provides	   administrative	  
assistance	  to	  all	  of	  the	  other	  institutions	  and	  reviews	  the	  proper	  implementation	  
                                            
49	  Article	  96(2)	  ECT.	  
50	  Article	  53	  ECT.	  	  
51	  Article	  54	  ECT.	  	  
52	  Article	  56	  ECT.	  
53	  Article	  58	  ECT.	  
54	  Article	  59	  ECT.	  
55	  Article	  63	  ECT.	  
56	  Articles	  64	  and	  65	  ECT.	  
57	  Article	  65	  ECT.	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of	   the	   ECT	   by	   the	   contracting	   parties.58	   The	   Secretariat	   is	   impartial,	   thus	   also	  
independent	  of	  the	  EU,	  and	  acts	  only	  in	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  Energy	  Community.59	  
2.2.2	  Procedures	  for	  ensuring	  homogeneity	  
The	   decision-­‐making	   procedures	   for	   adopting	   Energy	   Community	   Measures	  
differ	  according	  to	  whether	  they	  are	  adopted	  under	  Title	  II	  ECT	  on	  the	  extension	  
of	  the	  acquis	  communautaire,	  under	  Title	  III	  on	  the	  Mechanism	  for	  operation	  of	  
Network	   Energy	  Markets,	   or	   under	   Title	   IV	   on	   the	   creation	   of	   a	   Single	   Energy	  
Market.	  The	  Measures,	  which	  are	  either	  decisions	  or	   recommendations,	   can	  be	  
adopted	  by	  the	  Ministerial	  Council	  or,	  upon	  a	  delegation	  from	  the	  latter,	  another	  
institution	  of	  the	  Energy	  Community.60	  	  
What	   is	  of	  relevance	   for	  the	  purposes	  of	   the	  current	  study	   is	   the	  procedure	   for	  
updating	   the	   relevant	  acquis	   in	   the	   Energy	   Community	   to	  mirror	   as	   closely	   as	  
possible	  the	  EU’s	  energy	  acquis.	  The	  EU	  Commission	  holds	  a	  central	  position	  in	  
the	  Energy	  Community.	  The	  Commission	  coordinates	  all	  activities	  of	  the	  Energy	  
Community61	   as	   well	   as	  makes	   proposals	   for	   the	   adoption	   of	   Measures.62	   The	  
role	   of	   the	   Commission	   creating	   a	   strong	   link	   between	   the	   EU	   and	   the	   Energy	  
Community	  certainly	  contributes	  to	  the	  task	  of	  maintaining	  homogeneity	  in	  the	  
latter.	  Measures	   can	  be	   adopted	  either	  by	   the	  Ministerial	  Council,	   the	  PHLG	  or	  
the	  Regulatory	  Board.	  Each	  ECT	  contracting	  party	  has	  one	  vote	  and	  a	  Measure	  is	  
adopted	  by	  a	  majority	  of	  votes	  cast,63	  yet	  for	  a	  decision	  to	  be	  taken	  at	  least	  two	  
thirds	  of	   the	   contracting	  parties	  need	   to	  be	  present.64	  Measures	  under	  Title	   III	  
are	  adopted	  by	   the	  Ministerial	  Council,	   the	  PHLG	  or	   the	  Regulatory	  Board	  on	  a	  
proposal	   from	   a	   contracting	   party	   or	   the	   Secretariat,65	   the	   necessary	   voting	  
majority	  being	  two-­‐thirds	  of	  the	  votes	  cast	  including	  a	  positive	  vote	  by	  the	  EU.66	  
The	  EU,	   thereby,	  enjoys	  veto	  right.	  Measures	  under	  Title	   IV	  are	  adopted	  by	  the	  
                                            
58	  Article	  67	  ECT.	  
59	  Article	  70	  ECT.	  
60	  Article	  76	  ECT.	  	  
61	  Article	  4	  ECT.	  
62	  Article	  79	  ECT.	  
63	  Articles	  80-­‐81	  ECT.	  
64	  Article	  78	  ECT.	  
65	  Article	  82	  ECT.	  
66	  Article	  83	  ECT.	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Ministerial	   Council,	   the	   PHLG	   or	   the	   Regulatory	   Board	   on	   a	   proposal	   from	   a	  
contracting	  party,67	  and	  unanimity	  is	  required	  to	  adopt	  the	  Measure.68	  	  
As	   in	   the	  cases	  of	   the	  EEA	  and	  the	  ECAA,	   the	  measures	  adopted	  under	  the	  ECT	  
are	  binding	  on	  the	  contracting	  parties.	  Each	  party	  must	  meet	  their	  constitutional	  
requirements	  to	  implement	  Decisions	  addressed	  to	  them	  in	  their	  domestic	  legal	  
systems.69	  A	   failure	  of	   a	   contracting	  party	   to	   implement	   the	  ECT	  or	   a	  measure	  
may	  be	  brought	  to	  the	  attention	  of	  the	  Ministerial	  Council	  by	  a	  reasoned	  request	  
of	  any	  party,	   the	  Secretariat	  of	   the	  Regulatory	  Board.	  Private	  bodies	  may	   issue	  
complains	  to	  the	  Secretariat.70	  The	  consequence,	  after	  the	  Ministerial	  Council	  has	  
determined	  a	  breach	  of	  obligations	  by	  a	  party	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  procedure	  
of	   Article	   91	   ECT,	   is	   a	   suspension	   of	   certain	   rights	   that	   the	   breaching	   party	  
derives	  from	  the	  Treaty,	  including	  voting	  rights	  and	  exclusion	  from	  meetings	  or	  
mechanisms	  under	  the	  Treaty.	  	  
Should	  the	  contracting	  parties	  wish	  to	  implement	  other	  parts	  of	  the	  EU	  acquis	  on	  
Network	   Energy,	   the	   treaty	   revision	   procedure	   under	   Article	   100	   ECT	   applies	  
thus	  requiring	  a	  unanimous	  vote	  of	  all	  contracting	  parties.	  	  
Article	   25	   ECT	   states	   that	   the	   Energy	   Community	   ‘may	   take	   Measures’	   to	  
implement	  amendments	  to	  the	  acquis	  communautaire	  to	  reflect	  the	  evolution	  of	  
EU	   acquis.	   The	   limited	   degree	   of	   automatism	   provided	   by	   this	   provision	   is	   a	  
potential	   threat	   to	   homogeneity	   in	   the	   Energy	   Community.	   Yet	   its	   importance	  
depends	   on	   how	   to	   interpret	   the	   phrase	   ‘may	   take’.	   The	   ECT	   provides	   two	  
alternatives:	  issues	  that	  the	  Energy	  Community	  ‘shall’	  tackle	  and	  issues	  that	  the	  
Energy	  Community	   ‘may’	   address.	  The	   latter	  notably	  apply	   to	  harmonisation,71	  
renewable	  energy	  sources	  and	  energy	  efficiency.72	  	  
The	   EU	   energy	   acquis	   that	   forms	   part	   of	   the	   ECT	   is,	   moreover,	   given	   some	  
flexibility	  with	  regard	  to	  its	  application	  to	  the	  non-­‐EU	  contracting	  parties	  of	  the	  
ECT.	   The	   acquis	   provided	   in	   Title	   II	   of	   the	   Treaty	   is	   ‘adapted	   to	   both	   the	  
institutional	   framework	   of	   this	   Treaty	   and	   the	   specific	   situation	   of	   each	   of	   the	  
                                            
67	  Article	  84	  ECT.	  
68	  Article	  85	  ECT.	  
69	  Article	  89	  ECT.	  
70	  Article	  90	  ECT.	  
71	  Article	  34	  ECT.	  
72	  Article	  35	  ECT.	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Contracting	  Parties,	  with	   a	   view	   to	   ensuring	  high	   levels	   of	   investment	   security	  
and	   optimal	   investments’.73	   The	   adaptation	   is	   conducted	   by	   the	   Energy	  
Community	  that	  adopts	  the	  necessary	  Measures	  to	  adjust	  the	  acquis	  according	  to	  
the	   institutional	   framework	   of	   the	   Energy	   Community	   Treaty	   as	   well	   as	   the	  
‘specific	  situation	  of	  each	  of	   the	  Contracting	  Parties’.74	  Neither	   the	  EEA	  nor	   the	  
ECAA	   agreements	   envisage	   such	   a	   possibility	   of	   differentiation	   apart	   from	  
separately	  negotiated	  exceptions.	  	  
One	  further	  point	  deserving	  attention	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  Energy	  Community	  is	  
the	  difference	  in	  the	  binding	  force	  of	  identical	  acquis	  in	  the	  EU	  and	  in	  the	  Energy	  
Community.	  Article	  14	  ECT	  provides	  that	  the	  contracting	  parties	  agree	  to	  make	  
efforts	  towards	  the	  implementation	  of	  Council	  Directive	  96/61/EC	  on	  integrated	  
pollution	   prevention	   and	   control.	   The	   Directive	   was	   replaced	   in	   2008	   by	  
Directive	   2008/1/EC.	   The	   fact	   that	   the	   Directive	   in	   question	   enjoys	   no	   such	  
binding	   force	  within	   the	   Energy	   Community	   as	   it	   does	  within	   the	   EU	   and,	   for	  
example,	  the	  EEA	  is	  alarming	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  achieving	  and	  maintaining	  
homogeneity	  in	  the	  Energy	  Community.	  This	  holds	  true	  on	  the	  condition	  that	  the	  
said	  Directive	  does,	  indeed,	  form	  part	  of	  the	  objectively	  defined	  ‘core’	  acquis	  the	  
absence	   of	   which	   would	   defeat	   homogeneity	   in	   the	   Energy	   Community	   and	  
between	   the	   latter	  and	   the	  EU.	   It	   is	  not	   the	  purpose	  of	   this	   study	   to	  determine	  
exhaustively	  whether	  an	  act	  of	  flanking	  policy	  does	  or	  does	  not	  form	  part	  of	  the	  
core	   commitments	  within	   the	   internal	  market	   project,	   either	   as	   a	  whole	   or	   as	  
represented	   by	   a	   specific	   sector.	   Rather,	   an	   attempt	   is	   made	   to	   outline	   the	  
criteria	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   which	   it	   is	   possible	   to	   assert	   which	   elements	   possibly	  
belong	  to	  the	  ‘core’	  commitments	  within	  the	  internal	  market	  and	  are,	  therefore,	  
indispensable	   for	   achieving	   and	   maintaining	   homogeneity	   in	   the	   expanded	  
market.	  
The	   ECT	   makes	   no	   distinction	   between	   Measures	   adopted	   for	   the	   purpose	   of	  
updating	  the	  acquis	  and	  other	  measures.	  Subsequently,	  no	  special	  procedure	  has	  
been	   established	   to	   tackle	   specifically	   the	   failure	   of	   an	   Energy	   Community	  
institution	  or	  a	  contracting	  party	  to	  implement	  changes	  in	  the	  relevant	  EU	  acquis	  
in	  the	  ECT.	  The	  inability	  of	  an	  Energy	  Community	  institution	  to	  adopt	  a	  decision	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to	   update	   the	   acquis	   contained	   in	   the	   Treaty	   has	   no	   consequences	   on	   the	  
functioning	   of	   the	   Treaty.	   Although	   the	   situation	   in	   which	   a	   contracting	   party	  
does	   not	   comply	   with	   the	   Treaty	   is	   considered	   a	   breach	   thereof,	   the	   ECT	  
envisages	  no	  special	  guarantees	  to	  safeguard	  the	  homogeneity	  of	  its	  legal	  order	  
or	  between	  EU	  acquis	  and	  Energy	  Community	  acquis	  beyond	  the	  suspension	  of	  
rights	  deriving	  from	  the	  ECT	  in	  the	  case	  of	  a	  serious	  and	  persistent	  breach.	  Not	  
reaching	  a	  homogeneous	  result	  can,	  however,	  hardly	  be	  regarded	  a	  breach	  in	  the	  
context	  of	   the	  Energy	  Community.	   In	  sum,	  similarly	   to	   the	  ECAA,	  which	  will	  be	  
discussed	   in	   the	   following	   section,	   there	   are	   institutional	   and	   procedural	  
possibilities	   for	   updating	   the	   ECT	   to	   mirror	   developments	   in	   EU	   acquis	   yet	  
similarly	  to	  the	  EEA	  and	  the	  ECAA	  agreements	  there	  are	  no	  absolute	  guarantees	  
to	   the	   effect	   of	   maintaining	   homogeneity.	   The	   homogeneity	   of	   the	   Energy	  
Community	   as	  well	   as	   the	  ECAA	  depends	  on	   the	  willingness	  of	   the	   contracting	  
parties	   to	   duly	   update	   the	   agreements	   and	   to,	   thereafter,	   implement	   the	  
amendments	  to	  the	  agreements	  in	  their	  domestic	  legal	  orders.	  
2.3	  European	  Common	  Aviation	  Area	  
Despite	  following	  the	  model	  of	  the	  EEA,	  the	  sectoral	  ECAA	  Agreement	  has	  a	  much	  
simpler	  institutional	  structure	  than	  the	  comprehensive	  EEA	  Agreement	  or	  even	  
the	  equally	  sectoral	  ECT.	  The	  simplicity	  of	  structure	  applies	   to	   the	   institutional	  
framework	  as	  well	  as	  the	  decision-­‐making	  procedures	  of	  the	  ECAA.	  
2.3.1	  Institutions	  
The	   ECAA	   Agreement	   set	   up	   only	   one	   institution,	   the	   ECAA	   Joint	   Committee,	  
which	   is	   responsible	   for	   the	   administration	   and	   proper	   implementation	   of	   the	  
Agreement.75	   The	   Joint	   Committee	   is	   composed	   of	   representatives	   of	   the	  
contracting	   parties	   including	   both	   the	   EU	   and	   its	   Member	   States	   and	   non-­‐EU	  
Member	   States.	   Differently	   from	   its	   EEA	   counterpart,	   however,	   the	   ECAA	   Joint	  
Committee	  does	  not	  strive	  for	  consensus.	  Decisions	  are	  adopted	  by	  a	  unanimous	  
vote	  unless	  the	  Joint	  Committee	  itself	  lays	  down	  majority	  voting	  rules	  for	  certain	  
specific	  issues.76	  The	  ECAA	  Joint	  Committee	  is	  presided	  over	  in	  turn	  by	  an	  ECAA	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Partner77	   or	   the	   EU	   and	   its	   Member	   States	   and	   just	   as	   in	   the	   EEA,	   this	  
arrangement	  mirrors	  two	  blocks	  –	  one	  formed	  by	  the	  EU	  and	  its	  Member	  States,	  
and	  the	  other	  consisting	  of	  the	  non-­‐EU	  ECAA	  contracting	  parties.78	  Owing	  to	  the	  
more	  limited	  scope	  of	  the	  ECAA	  Agreement	  as	  compared	  to	  the	  EEA	  Agreement,	  
the	  ECAA	  Joint	  Committee	  gathers	  less	  frequently.	  Its	  meetings	  are	  held	  at	  least	  
once	  a	  year	  ‘to	  review	  the	  general	  functioning	  of	  the	  Agreement’	  as	  well	  as	  under	  
special	  circumstances	  or	  by	  request	  of	  a	  contracting	  party.79	  	  
2.3.2	  Procedures	  for	  ensuring	  homogeneity	  
Similarly	   to	   the	   EEA	   Agreement,	   the	   ECAA	   Agreement	   does	   not	   restrain	   the	  
contracting	   parties	   from	   unilaterally	   adopting	   new	   or	   amending	   existing	  
legislation	  in	  the	  field	  of	  air	  transport	  or	  other	  associated	  areas	  covered	  by	  the	  
ECAA	  Agreement.	  The	  newly	  adopted	  or	  amended	  legislation	  may	  not,	  however,	  
conflict	  with	  the	  provisions	  of	  the	  Agreement	  as	  that	  would	  result	  in	  its	  breach.80	  
The	   contracting	  party	  who	  amends	   their	  ECAA	   relevant	   legislation	  must	  notify	  
the	  others	  via	  the	  Joint	  Committee	  within	  a	  month	  of	  when	  the	  legislative	  change	  
took	   place.81	   The	   legislative	   changes	   include	   those	   of	   EU	   acquis.	   Should	   a	  
contracting	   party	   so	   demand,	   the	   Joint	   Committee	   will	   discuss	   the	   amended	  
acquis	   within	   a	   time	   frame	   of	   two	  months.82	   The	   Joint	   Committee	   may	   either	  
adopt	  a	  decision	  to	  revise	  Annex	   I	   to	   the	  ECAA	  Agreement	  and	   incorporate	   the	  
amendment	  of	  the	  acquis	  into	  the	  ECAA	  Agreement,	  approve	  the	  amendment	  as	  
being	   in	   accordance	  with	   the	  Agreement,	   or	   ‘decide	   on	   any	   other	  measures	   to	  
safeguard	  the	  proper	  functioning	  of	  the	  agreement’	  without	  specifying	  the	  exact	  
measures.83	  	  
ECAA	  Joint	  Committee	  decisions	  do	  not	  differ	  from	  the	  decisions	  of	  the	  EEA	  Joint	  
Committee	   as	   regards	   their	   effect.	   Both	   are	   binding	   on	   the	   contracting	   parties	  
under	  international	  law	  and	  must,	  therefore,	  be	  implemented	  in	  accordance	  with	  
                                            
77	  ECAA	  Partners	  include	  ECAA	  contracting	  parties	  with	  the	  exception	  of	  the	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  and	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  Member	  
States:	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  2	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  Article	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  18(7)	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national	   constitutional	   requirements.84	   The	   Joint	   Committee	  must	   be	   informed	  
accordingly.	  	  
The	   significantly	   simpler	   decision-­‐making	   procedure	   envisaged	   by	   the	   ECAA	  
Agreement	   as	   compared	   to	   that	   of	   the	   EEA	   reflects	   the	   more	   limited	  
opportunities	   to	   safeguard	   homogeneity	   in	   the	   ECAA	   legal	   order.	   Whilst	   the	  
ECAA	   Agreement	   can	   be	   updated	   by	   following	   a	   simplified	   treaty	   amendment	  
procedure,	  there	  are	  no	  safeguards	  in	  place	  against	  a	  failure	  to	  reach	  agreement	  
in	   the	   Joint	   Committee	   or	   non-­‐ratification	   of	   a	   decision	   of	   the	   latter	   by	   a	  
contracting	   party.	   The	   ECAA	   Agreement	   does	   not	   provide	   for	   a	   possibility	   to	  
suspend	  parts	  of	   it	   following	  the	  inability	  to	  maintain	  homogeneity.	  As	  a	  result,	  
the	   ECAA	   legal	   order	   is	   much	   more	   likely	   than	   the	   EEA	   to	   lose	   its	   intended	  
homogeneous	  character	  vis-­à-­vis	  the	  aviation	  sector	  of	  the	  EU	  internal	  market.	  	  	  
3	  Defining	  the	  core	  of	  the	  internal	  market	  
The	  previous	   analysis	   dealt	  with	   the	  mechanisms	   for	   ensuring	  homogeneity	   in	  
the	   expanded	   internal	   market	   through	   the	   formal	   procedures	   of	   updating	   the	  
multilateral	  agreements	  in	  order	  to	  incorporate	  amendments	  of	  EU	  acquis	  in	  the	  
fields	   relevant	   to	   the	   respective	   agreements.	   One	   important	   aspect	   of	  
maintaining	   homogeneity	   is	   making	   sure	   that	   the	   contracting	   parties	   to	   the	  
agreements	  exporting	  the	  acquis	  incorporate	  all	  relevant	  acquis	  in	  a	  dynamic	  and	  
speedy	   fashion.	   In	  order	   to	  avoid	  unnecessary	  delays	   in	   the	   stages	  of	  updating	  
the	  agreements	  as	  well	  as	  making	  the	  acquis	  part	  of	  the	  legal	  orders	  of	  the	  non-­‐
EU	  contracting	  parties	  it	  is	  necessary	  that	  sufficient	  information	  and	  consultation	  
possibilities	  are	  provided	  to	  the	  non-­‐EU	  contracting	  parties	  before	  the	  acquis	   is	  
adopted	  on	  the	  EU	  level.	  	  	  	  
The	   focus	   of	   this	   section	   is	   on	   the	   influence	   that	   various	   EU	   and	   non-­‐EU	  
institutions	  and	  other	  actors	  have	  on	  determining	   the	   content	  of	   the	  acquis.	   In	  
other	  words,	   the	   following	   analysis	  will	   consider	  who	   participates	   in	   the	   EU’s	  
decision-­‐making	   procedures	   and	   which	   effect	   the	   participation	   of	   third	   state	  
actors	  in	  the	  defining	  of	  the	  acquis	  may	  have	  on	  the	  homogeneity	  of	  the	  internal	  
market	  expanded	  to	  non-­‐EU	  Member	  States.	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There	  are	  three	  main	  phases	  in	  the	  EU’s	  policy-­‐making.	  These	  phases	  include	  the	  
pre-­‐proposal	   stage	  of	  agenda	  setting,	   the	  decision-­‐making	  stage,	  and	   the	  policy	  
implementation	  stage.85	  Although	  the	  latter	  two	  receive	  the	  most	  attention	  in	  the	  
context	  of	  exporting	  EU	  acquis	  to	  third	  countries	  and	  the	  essential	  characteristics	  
of	   an	   optimal	   institutional	   framework	   for	   achieving	   and	   maintaining	  
homogeneity,	  this	  section	  considers	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  first,	  exploratory	  stage	  
of	  decision-­‐shaping	  on	  the	  homogeneity	  of	  the	  expanded	  internal	  market.	  	  
It	  is	  in	  the	  legislative	  preparatory	  stage	  that	  the	  acquis,	  including	  the	  ‘core’	  acquis	  
which	   provides	   a	   benchmark	   for	   evaluating	   the	   level	   of	   homogeneity	   in	   the	  
expanded	  internal	  market	  is	  defined.	  The	  legislators	  of	  the	  EU	  must	  at	  that	  stage	  
adopt	  a	  decision	  on	  the	  content	  of	   the	   legislative	  text.86	  The	  pre-­‐proposal	  stage	  
does	  not	  only	  serve	  the	  purpose	  of	  elaborating	  the	  content	  of	  a	  legislative	  act	  but	  
also	  provides	  a	  venue	  for	  including	  a	  variety	  of	  actors	  and	  thereby	  ensuring	  that	  
the	  proposed	  act	  will	  receive	  the	  necessary	  support	  at	  the	  decision-­‐making	  stage.	  
The	   decision-­‐makers	   notably	   include	   the	   EU	   legislator,	   the	   decision-­‐making	  
bodies	  of	  the	  international	  agreements	  exporting	  the	  acquis	  and	  third	  countries’	  
national	   parliaments.	   The	   pre-­‐proposal	   stage	   also	   serves	   to	   guarantee	   the	  
effective	  implementation	  of	  the	  acquis	  by	  the	  EU	  Member	  States	  as	  well	  as	  by	  the	  
third	  countries.87	  Thus	   insofar	  as	   the	  preparatory	  stage	  can	  and	  does	   influence	  
the	  outcome	  of	  adopting	  and	  implementing	  the	  acquis	  in	  the	  EU	  and	  beyond	  it	  is	  
indispensable	   to	   consider	   it	   in	   the	   context	   of	   achieving	   and	   maintaining	  
homogeneity	  in	  the	  EEA,	  the	  Energy	  Community	  and	  the	  ECAA.	  	  
The	  following	  analysis	  looks,	  first,	  at	  the	  general	  legislative	  procedure	  in	  the	  EU	  
before	   providing	   a	   more	   specific	   account	   of	   the	   new,	   participatory	   modes	   of	  
governance	   using	   the	   examples	   of	   law	   making	   in	   the	   fields	   of	   EU	   social	   and	  
environmental	  policies.	  The	  second	  part	  of	  the	  examination	  considers	  the	  limits	  
of	   the	  participation	  of	  non-­‐EU	  Member	  States	   in	   the	  decision-­‐shaping	  stages	  of	  
EU	  decision-­‐making.	  	  	  
                                            
85	  T	  Christiansen	  and	  T	  Larsson,	   'Introduction:	  The	  Role	  of	  Committees	   in	  the	  policy-­‐process	  of	  
the	  European	  Union'	  in	  T	  Christiansen	  and	  T	  Larsson	  (eds),	  The	  Role	  of	  Committees	  in	  the	  Policy-­
Process	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  (Edward	  Elgar	  Publishing	  2007)	  1,	  3.	  
86	  ibid	  4.	  
87	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  5.	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3.1	  EU	  actors	  defining	  the	  core	  of	  the	  internal	  market	  
The	   substance	   of	   EU	   internal	   market	   acquis	   is	   defined	   in	   the	   legislative	  
procedure.	   Post-­‐Lisbon	   Treaty,	   Article	   289	   TFEU	   provides	   for	   two	   types	   of	  
legislative	   procedures	   –	   the	   ordinary	   and	   the	   special	   legislative	   procedures.	  
Internal	   market	   legislation	   based	   on	   Article	   114	   TFEU	   is	   usually	   adopted	  
following	  the	  ordinary	  legislative	  procedure,	  save	  fiscal	  provisions	  and	  rules	  on	  
the	  free	  movement	  of	  persons	  and	  labour	  law.88	  	  
In	   the	   ordinary	   legislative	   procedure,	   defined	   in	   Article	   294	   TFEU,	   the	   main	  
actors	  preparing	  and	  adopting	  a	  legislative	  act	  are	  the	  European	  Commission,	  the	  
Council	  and	  the	  European	  Parliament.	  The	  Commission	  submits	  a	  proposal	  to	  the	  
European	  Parliament	  and	   the	  Council	  who	  will	   then	  deliberate	  and	  approve	  or	  
reject	   the	   proposal.	   The	   Commission	   gives	   an	   opinion	   on	   the	   proposed	  
amendments.	   In	   order	   to	   bypass	   a	   negative	   opinion	   of	   the	   Commission	   the	  
Council	  may	  adopt	  the	  act	  by	  unanimous	  vote.	  	  
On	  certain	  conditions,	  legislative	  act	  may	  also	  delegate	  the	  power	  to	  adopt	  non-­‐
legislative	  acts	  to	  the	  Commission	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  supplementing	  or	  amending	  
non-­‐essential	  elements	  of	   the	   legislative	  act.89	  The	  Commission	  may	  also	  adopt	  
measures	   to	   implement	   legislative	   acts	   in	   accordance	   with	   Article	   291	   where	  
uniformity	   in	   the	   implementation	   of	   legislative	   acts	   is	   deemed	   necessary.	   This	  
implementation	  is	  carried	  out	  in	  the	  so-­‐called	  comitology	  committees.	  	  
Legislative	   initiative	   in	   the	   EU	   does	   not	   rest	   solely	   with	   the	   Commission.	  
Pursuant	   to	   Article	   289(4)	   TFEU,	   in	   special	   cases	   defined	   by	   the	   Treaties	  
legislative	   initiative	   may	   also	   be	   taken	   by	   a	   group	   of	   Member	   States	   or	   the	  
European	  Parliament,	  or	  on	  a	  recommendation	  from	  the	  European	  Central	  Bank,	  
or	  at	  the	  request	  of	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice	  or	  the	  European	  Investment	  Bank.	  	  
A	   further	   group	   of	   institutions	   only	   recently	   included	   in	   the	   EU	   legislative	  
process	  are	  national	  parliaments.	  Their	  role	  has	  been	  laid	  out	  in	  Article	  12	  TEU	  
and	   Protocols	   1	   and	   2	   attached	   to	   the	   Treaties.	   In	   the	   context	   of	   the	   internal	  
market,	   national	   parliaments	   are	   kept	   informed	   about	   the	   EU’s	   legislative	  
activity	   including	  draft	   legislation	   and	   they	   are	   guarding	   the	   application	  of	   the	  
                                            
88	  Article	  114(2)	  TFEU.	  
89	  Article	  290(1),(2)	  TFEU.	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principle	  of	  subsidiarity	  by	  the	  EU.	  The	  legislators	  of	  the	  Member	  States	  are	  thus	  
involved	   in	   the	   EU’s	   legislative	   procedures	   beyond	   the	   ratification	   of	   the	   EU	  
Treaties	   and	   amendments	   thereto.	   In	   addition	   to	   their	   individual	   roles	   in	  
reviewing	   draft	   EU	   legislation	   there	   is	   a	   framework	   in	   place	   for	   cooperation	  
between	  national	  parliaments	  and	  the	  EU	  Parliament.	  
Member	   States’	   parliaments	   do	   not	   participate	   in	   the	   EU’s	   decision-­‐making	  
directly	  but	  may,	  individually	  or	  in	  cooperation	  with	  other	  national	  parliaments,	  
issue	   reasoned	   opinions	   to	   the	   European	   Parliament,	   the	   Council	   and	   the	  
Commission	   if	   they	   consider	   a	   draft	   legislative	   act	   not	   to	   comply	   with	   the	  
principle	  of	  subsidiarity.	  These	  opinions	  will	  be	  forwarded	  to	  the	  initiator	  of	  the	  
draft	   legislative	   act,	   if	   not	   the	   Commission.	   In	   cases	   that	   are	   not	   urgent,	   the	  
national	   parliaments	   have	   eight	   weeks	   to	   express	   their	   opinion	   on	   the	   draft	  
legislation.90	   The	   institutions	   that	   receive	   the	   reasoned	   opinion	   ‘shall	   take	  
account’	   thereof	   unless	   at	   least	   one-­‐third	   of	   national	   parliaments	   submit	   a	  
reasoned	   opinion.	   In	   the	   latter	   case	   there	   is	   an	   obligation	   to	   review	   the	   draft	  
legal	  act.91	  The	  institution	  or	  the	  group	  of	  Member	  States	  who	  have	  initiated	  the	  
legislative	  proposal	  in	  question	  may,	  however,	  maintain,	  amend	  or	  withdraw	  the	  
draft	   and	   are	   not,	   therefore,	   legally	   bound	   by	   the	   opinion	   of	   the	   national	  
parliaments	   beyond	   the	   need	   to	   state	   reasons	   for	   their	   decision.92	   This	   is	  why	  
this	  parliamentary	  review	  procedure	  is	  also	  called	  the	  ‘yellow	  card’	  procedure.93	  
Should	  one-­‐half	  of	  the	  national	  parliaments	  vote	  ‘no’	  and	  the	  Commission	  decide	  
to	  maintain	  the	  draft	  legislative	  act	  a	  reasoned	  opinion	  must	  be	  forwarded	  to	  the	  
Council	   and	   the	   Parliament	   and	   the	   latter	  may,	  with	   specific	   voting	  majorities,	  
stop	  the	  legislative	  proposal	  under	  the	  so-­‐called	  ‘orange	  card’	  procedure.94	  
Importantly,	  local	  conditions	  are	  taken	  into	  account	  in	  the	  process	  of	  preparing	  
legislative	   proposals.	   To	   this	   end,	   the	   Commission	   holds	   consultations	   with	   a	  
wide	   range	   of	   interested	   parties	   making	   it	   possible	   for	   the	   former	   to	   gain	   an	  
                                            
90	  Article	  4,	  Protocol	  (No	  1)	  on	  the	  Role	  of	  National	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  [2012]	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91	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   of	   Subsidiarity	   and	  
Proportionality	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  Subsidiarity	  and	  Proportionality).	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  Article	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(2013)	  50	  Common	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  Law	  Review	  115,	  118.	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  ibid	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insight	  into	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  proposed	  legislation	  should	  be	  adopted	  at	  the	  EU	  
level	   or	   whether	   national	   level	   would	   be	   more	   appropriate.95	   No	   such	  
consultations	  take	  place	  in	  third	  countries	  except	  for	  the	  EEA	  EFTA	  States	  but	  in	  
the	  case	  of	  the	  latter	  subsidiarity	  is	  hardly	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  consultations.	  	  	  	  
The	   range	   of	   policy	   and	   decision-­‐makers	   in	   the	   EU	   is	   not	   restricted	   to	   the	  
institutions	  mentioned	  above.	  One	  of	   the	  defining	   features	  of	  EU	  governance	   is	  
participation.	   In	   an	   attempt	   to	   increase	   democracy,	   transparency	   and	  
effectiveness	   of	   the	   EU’s	   policy-­‐making	   a	   number	   of	   actors,	   including	  
stakeholders	   as	   well	   as	   other	   interested	   parties,	   participate	   in	   the	   stages	   of	  
policy	   initiative,	  development,	  and	   implementation.	  These	  actors	  represent	  and	  
reflect	   the	   political,	   social,	   economic,	   and	   regional	   realities	   across	   the	   EU	   and	  
immerse	  those	  elements	  into	  internal	  market	  legislation,	  thus	  giving	  a	  face	  to	  the	  
internal	  market.	  
The	   more	   institutionalised	   forms	   of	   participation	   in	   the	   EU’s	   legislative	  
procedure	   are	   represented	   by	   the	   Economic	   and	   Social	   Committee	   and	   the	  
Committee	  of	  the	  Regions.96	  The	  Economic	  and	  Social	  Committee	  is	  composed	  of	  
the	  representatives	  of	  the	  civil	  society	  –	  social	  partners	  and	  other	  interest	  groups	  
from	   the	   Member	   States.	   The	   Committee	   of	   the	   Regions	   comprises	  
representatives	  of	  regional	  and	  local	  bodies	  of	  the	  Member	  States.	  Both	  play	  an	  
advisory	  role	  vis-­à-­vis	  the	  European	  Parliament,	  the	  Council	  and	  the	  Commission.	  
Although	  the	  Committees	  are	  made	  up	  of	  representatives	  of	  the	  Member	  States	  
the	  latter	  must	  be	  completely	  independent	  in	  their	  activities	  and	  act	  only	  in	  the	  
general	  interest	  of	  the	  EU.	  
The	  Economic	  and	  Social	  Committee	  must	  be	  consulted	  by	  the	  decision-­‐making	  
institutions	  where	  the	  Treaties	  so	  provide	  including	  both	  under	  Articles	  114	  and	  
115	   TFEU.	   In	   all	   other	   cases	   the	   EU	   institutions	   are	   free	   to	   consult	   the	  
Committee.	   The	   Economic	   and	   Social	   Committee	  may	   also	   submit	   opinions	   on	  
issues	   that	   it	   itself	   considers	   necessary	   to	   address.97	   The	   same	   applies	   to	   the	  
                                            
95	  Article	  2,	  Protocol	  on	  Subsidiarity	  and	  Proportionality.	  
96	  Article	  300	  TFEU.	  
97	  Article	  304	  TFEU.	  
 
	   272 
Committee	  of	  the	  Regions,	  except	  for	  compulsory	  consultation	  in	  the	  procedures	  
for	  adopting	  legislation	  on	  the	  internal	  market	  legal	  bases.98	  
In	   addition	   to	   these	   formalised	   channels	   of	   consultation,	   in	   the	   process	   of	  
developing	   a	   proposal	   for	   future	   EU	   legislation	   the	   Commission	   also	   launches	  
public	  consultations.	  The	  Commission	  calls	  for	  input	  from	  interested	  individuals	  
as	   well	   as	   industry	   and	   civil	   society	   stakeholders.	   There	   are	   no	   national	  
limitations	   to	  participation	  which	  means	   that	   foreign	  persons	  and	  entities,	   too,	  
may	  submit	  to	  the	  Commission	  their	  opinions,	  observations	  and	  suggestions.	  	  
Another	  platform	  set	  up	  for	  citizens	  to	  participate	  in	  EU	  policy-­‐making	  is	  through	  
the	   European	   Citizens’	   Initiative.	   Introduced	   by	   the	   Treaty	   of	   Lisbon,	   Articles	  
11(4)	   TEU	   and	   24(1)	   TFEU	   provide	   that	   at	   least	   one	  million	   citizens	  who	   are	  
nationals	  of	  a	  ‘significant	  number’	  of	  Member	  States	  may	  submit	  an	  initiative	  to	  
the	  European	  Commission	  for	  the	  latter	  to	  initiate,	  within	  its	  powers,	  a	  legislative	  
procedure	   for	   the	   adoption	   of	   a	   legal	   act	  which	   the	   group	   of	   citizens	   consider	  
essential	   for	   the	   purpose	   of	   implementing	   the	   Treaties.	   The	   Citizens’	   Initiative	  
falls	   within	   the	   broader	   scheme	   outlined	   in	   Article	   11(1)	   TEU	   of	   bringing	   EU	  
institutions	  closer	  to	  the	  people	  by	  giving	  an	  opportunity	  to	  the	  latter	  to	  express	  
their	   views	   on	   EU	   policies	   and	   actions.	   The	   specific	   rules	   for	   the	   Citizens’	  
initiative	  are	  laid	  out	  in	  Regulation	  No	  211/2011.99	  The	  Regulation	  provides	  that	  
the	  group	  of	  individuals	  who	  submit	  an	  invitation	  to	  the	  Commission	  to	  propose	  
a	  piece	  of	   legislation	  must	   comprise	  nationals	  of	  at	   least	   seven	  Member	  States.	  
Each	   of	   the	   Member	   States	   has	   to	   provide	   a	   certain	   minimum	   number	   of	  
signatories.	  Differently	   from	   the	  public	   consultations	   in	  which	  non-­‐EU	  citizens,	  
too,	   can	   express	   their	   views,	   the	   European	   Citizens’	   Initiative,	   as	   the	   name	  
indicates,	   is	   reserved	  exclusively	   to	  EU	   citizens.	  Therefore,	  while	   third	   country	  
nationals	   who	   are	   not	   residents	   in	   the	   EU	   have	   a	   theoretical	   possibility	   to	  
influence	  the	  outcome	  of	  EU	  legislation	  they	  cannot	  take	  legislative	  initiative	  to	  
influence	  the	  course	  of	  internal	  market	  legislation	  in	  a	  broader	  sense.	  
Yet	  another	   form	  of	   citizen	  participation	   in	  EU	   law	  making	   is	   the	  possibility	   to	  
submit	   petitions	   to	   the	   European	   Parliament	   under	   Article	   227	   TFEU.	   This	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  Article	  307	  TFEU.	  
99	  Regulation	  (EU)	  No	  211/2011	  of	  the	  European	  Parliament	  and	  of	  the	  Council	  of	  16	  February	  
2011	  on	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  [2011]	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opportunity	   is	   available	   to	   all	   EU	   citizens	   as	   well	   as	   to	   the	   members	   of	  
associations,	   companies	   and	   organizations	   whose	   headquarters	   are	   located	   in	  
any	  of	  the	  Member	  States.	  A	  petition	  to	  the	  European	  Parliament	  must	  concern	  
an	   issue	   that	   falls	   within	   the	   scope	   of	   activities	   of	   the	   EU	   and	   concerns	   the	  
petitioner	  directly.	  Petitions	  that	  are	  declared	  admissible	  are	  then	  discussed	  by	  
the	  relevant	  parliamentary	  committee.100	  The	  committee	  may	  decide	  to	  prepare	  
an	  own-­‐initiative	  report	  or	  a	  short	  motion	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  petition	  and	  submit	  
it	   for	   a	  motion.101	   Third	   country	   nationals	   are	   generally	   not	   eligible	   to	   submit	  
petitions	  to	  the	  Parliament.	  Rule	  215(13)	  of	  the	  European	  Parliament’s	  Rules	  of	  
Procedure	  does,	  however,	  enable	  petitions	  submitted	  by	  non-­‐nationals	  and	  non-­‐
residents	   to	   be	   filed	   albeit	   separately	   from	   the	   petitions	   submitted	   by	   EU	  
nationals	  or	  residents,	  and	  allow	  for	  the	  committee	  responsible	   for	  petitions	  to	  
familiarise	   themselves	   with	   the	   content	   of	   those	   petitions	   that	   they	   wish	   to	  
consider.	  	  
A	   further	  group	  of	  persons	  participating	   in	   the	  process	  of	  preparing	   legislation	  
are	  seconded	  national	  experts	  (SNEs).	  Working	  on	  temporary	  secondment	  from	  
their	   home	   countries,	   SNEs	   contribute	   to	   an	   exchange	   of	   experience	   and	  
expertise	  between	  the	  EU	  and	  its	  Member	  States	  and	  beyond.	  Importantly,	  SNEs	  
are	  not	   limited	   to	  EU	  citizens	  but	   include	  experts	   seconded	   from	  the	  EFTA,	  EU	  
candidate	   countries	  with	  whom	   an	   agreement	   on	   personnel	  matters	   has	   been	  
concluded,	   and	   public	   intergovernmental	   organisations	   (IGOs).102	   Although	  
SNEs’	   possibilities	   to	   act	   independently	   in	   the	   Commission	   are	   limited103	   and	  
they	   are,	   during	   their	   period	   in	   the	   Commission	   bound	   to	   be	   loyal	   to	   the	  
Commission	  and	  not	  to	  anyone	  outside	  the	  Commission,104	  the	  SNEs	  are	  able	  to	  
make	   Commission	   staff	   aware	   of	   national	   circumstances	   that	   may	   affect	   the	  
contents	  of	  a	  proposed	  legislative	  act.105	  	  	  	  
                                            
100	  Rule	  216(1),	  Rules	  of	  Procedure	  of	  the	  European	  Parliament,	  8th	  Parliamentary	  Term	  –	  April	  
2015.	  
101	  Rule	  216(2),	  Rules	  of	  Procedure	  of	  the	  European	  Parliament.	  
102	   Commission	   Decision	   of	   12	   November	   2008	   laying	   down	   rules	   on	   the	   secondment	   to	   the	  
Commission	  of	  national	  experts	  and	  national	  experts	  in	  professional	  training,	  C	  (2008)	  6866	  final	  
(SNE	  Decision),	  Article	  1(1)	  and	  (3).	  
103	  SNE	  Decision,	  Article	  6.	  	  
104	  SNE	  Decision,	  Article	  7(1)(a).	  
105	  SNEs	  should	  not,	  however,	  be	  regarded	  as	  national	  ‘Trojan	  Horses’,	  see	  J	  Trondal,	  Z	  Murdoch	  
and	  B	  Geys,	  'On	  Trojan	  Horses	  and	  revolving	  doors:	  Assessing	  the	  autonomy	  of	  national	  officials	  
in	  the	  European	  Commission'	  (2015)	  54	  European	  Journal	  of	  Political	  Research	  249,	  250.	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In	   addition	   to	   individuals	   and	   entities	   seeking	   for	   possibilities	   to	   influence	   EU	  
policies,	   the	   Commission	   itself,	   too,	   seeks	   external	   expertise.	   The	   external	  
experts	   include	   formal	   expert	   groups	   set	  up	  by	  a	  Commission	  decision	  or	  by	  a	  
Commission	   department;	   single	   consultations	   in	   the	   form	   of	   meetings,	  
conferences,	   etc.;	   comitology	   committees,	   independent	   experts	   in	   the	   fields	   of	  
research	   and	   technological	   development;	   social	   dialogue	   committees;	   and	   joint	  
entities	   that	  monitor	   the	   implementation	   of	   international	   agreements.106	   All	   of	  
these	  external	  expert	  configurations	  fulfil	  a	  consultative	  function.	  	  They	  provide	  
unbinding	  expertise	  to	  the	  Commission,	  whereas	  the	  latter	  remains	  independent	  
as	  regards	  the	  content	  of	   its	   legislative	  proposals.107	  Neither	   is	  the	  Commission	  
bound	  to	  resort	  to	  one	  group	  of	  external	  experts	  only.	  Commission’s	  own	  expert	  
groups	  consist	  either	  of	  individuals	  acting	  in	  their	  own	  capacity	  or	  representing	  
a	  stakeholder	  group,	  organisation	  or	  Member	  States’	  national	  authorities.108	  	  
Advisory	  groups	  that	  participate	  in	  the	  stages	  of	  preparing	  and	  implementing	  EU	  
legislation	  include	  ‘expert	  committees’	  that	  are	  made	  up	  of	  national	  officials	  and	  
experts,	   and	   consultative	   committees,	   also	   called	   expert	   groups,	   composed	   of	  
stakeholder	  representatives.109	  Yet	  participation	  in	  expert	  groups	  is	  not	  open	  to	  
anyone.	  The	  participation	  of	  non-­‐governmental	  organisation	  (NGOs)	  and	  interest	  
groups	  is	   limited	  to	   ‘Europe-­‐wide	  organisations’.110	  In	  Directorate	  General	  (DG)	  
Enterprise,	   for	   example,	   expert	   groups	  may	  be	   composed	  of	   representatives	  of	  
the	   Member	   States,	   industry,	   NGOs,	   the	   non-­‐EU	   EEA	   countries,	   candidate	  
countries	   and	   notified	   bodies.	   The	   domination	   of	   corporate	   interest,	   however,	  
has	  been	  subject	  to	  controversy.	  NGOs	  and	  the	  European	  Ombudsman	  have	  been	  
                                            
106	   Commission,	   ‘Framework	   for	   Commission	   Expert	   Groups:	   Horizontal	   Rules	   and	   Public	  
Register’	  (Communication)	  C	  (2010)	  7649	  final	  (Framework	  for	  Commission	  Expert	  Groups),	  5-­‐6.	  
107	  ibid	  3.	  	  
108	  	  ‘Horizontal	  Rules	  for	  Commission	  Expert	  Groups’	  annexed	  to	  the	  Framework	  for	  Commission	  
Expert	  Groups	  (n	  106)	  Rule	  8.	  	  
109	   N	   Nugent,	  The	   European	   Commission	   (Palgrave	  Macmillan	   2001)	   244-­‐245;	   T	   Larsson	   and	   J	  
Murk,	  'The	  Commission's	  relations	  with	  expert	  advisory	  groups'	  in	  T	  Christiansen	  and	  T	  Larsson	  
(eds),	   The	   Role	   of	   Committees	   in	   the	   Policy-­Process	   of	   the	   European	   Union	   (Edward	   Elgar	  
Publishing	   2007)	   64,	   67.	   The	   complete	   list	   of	   expert	   groups	   is	   available	   at	   the	   Register	   of	  
Commission	   Expert	   Groups	   and	   Other	   Similar	   Entities	  
<http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regexpert/index.cfm?do=news.mod_groups>	   accessed	   24	  
June	  2015.	  
110	  T	  Larsson	  and	  J	  Murk	  (n	  109)	  77.	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drawing	  special	  attention	  to	  the	  overtly	  large	  influence	  on	  EU’s	  legislation	  that	  is	  
exerted	  by	  big	  corporations.111	  	  
3.1.1	  EU	  social	  governance	  
Participatory	  governance	  modes	  in	  the	  EU	  have	  become	  most	  institutionalised	  in	  
the	  area	  of	  social	  policy.	  The	  novel	  and	  experimental	  approach	  to	  law	  making	  in	  
social	  policy	  owes	  much	  to	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  variety	  of	  social,	   labour,	   legal	  and	  
industrial	   relations	   cultures	  across	   the	  EU.112	  On	   the	  one	  hand,	   the	  diversity	   is	  
reflected	   in	   the	   choice	   of	   legislative	   acts:	   in	   the	   field	   of	   social	   policy	   soft	   law	  
measures	   are	   often	   preferred	   to	   hard	   law,	   minimum	   standards	   and	   partial	  
harmonisation	   to	   total	   harmonisation,	   and	   directives	   to	   regulations.113	   On	   the	  
other	  hand,	  the	  making	  of	  social	  policy	  is	  characterised	  by	  the	  inclusion	  of	  social	  
partners.	   Both	   of	   these	   aspects	   reflect	   the	   rise	   of	   new	   governance	  methods	   to	  
complement	  the	  classic	  Community	  method	  of	  governance.	  
The	  classic	  Community	  method,	  partly	   incorporated	   in	   the	   ‘ordinary	   legislative	  
procedure’,114	   comprises	   the	   European	   Commission	   solely	   responsible	   for	  
legislative	   proposals,	   the	   Council	   and	   the	   European	   Parliament	   adopting	  
legislation,	  the	  Commission	  and	  the	  Member	  States	  in	  charge	  of	  implementing	  EU	  
policies	   and	   the	  Court	   of	   Justice	   guaranteeing	   respect	   for	   the	   rule	   of	   law.115	   In	  
response	   to	   an	   image	   of	   the	   EU	   as	   complex	   and	   intrusive,	   the	   Commission	  
proposed	   changing	   EU	   governance	   to	   make	   it	   more	   open,	   allow	   for	   more	  
involvement,	  flexibility	  and	  coherence,	  create	  better	  policies	  and	  regulation	  and	  
contribute	   to	   global	   governance.116	   In	   their	   reaction	   to	   the	   White	   Paper	   on	  
Governance,	  the	  European	  Parliament,	  however,	  issued	  a	  Resolution	  stating	  that	  
the	   Community	   approach	   is	   not	   to	   be	   replaced	   completely.117	   The	   Parliament	  
found	   that	   consulting	   stakeholders	   for	   the	  purpose	  of	   improving	   the	  quality	  of	  
                                            
111	   ALTER-­‐EU,	   ‘A	   Year	   of	   Broken	   Promises’	   November	   2013	   <http://www.alter-­‐
eu.org/sites/default/files/documents/Broken_Promises_web.pdf>	   accessed	   24	   June	   2015;	  
‘Ombudsman	   to	   investigate	   EU	   expert	   groups’	   EUobserver	   (14	   May	   2014)	  
<http://euobserver.com/news/124137>	  accessed	  24	  June	  2015.	  
112	  C	  Barnard,	  EU	  Employment	  Law	  (Oxford	  University	  Press	  2013)	  47.	  
113	  ibid	  61	  and	  63.	  
114	  Article	  294	  TFEU.	  
115	  Commission,	  ‘European	  Governance	  –	  A	  White	  Paper’	  (Communication)	  COM	  (2001)	  428	  final	  
(European	  Governance	  White	  Paper),	  8.	  	  
116	  ibid.	  	  
117	  European	  Parliament,	   ‘Resolution	  on	  the	  Commission	  White	  Paper	  on	  European	  governance	  
COM(2001)	  428’	  A5-­‐0399/2001,	  29	  November	  2001.	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draft	  legislation	  ‘can	  only	  ever	  supplement	  and	  can	  never	  replace	  the	  procedures	  
and	   decisions	   of	   legislative	   bodies	   which	   possess	   democratic	   legitimacy’,	  
including	   the	   Council	   and	   the	   Parliament,	   as	   co-­‐legislators,	   and	   opinions	  
provided	   by	   other	   actors	   specified	   in	   the	   Treaties,	   such	   as	   the	   Economic	   and	  
Social	   Committee	   and	   the	   Committee	   of	   the	   Regions.118	   The	   European	  
Parliament,	   furthermore,	   defended	   the	   role	   of	   the	   Economic	   and	   Social	  
Committee	  over	  expert	  groups.119	  
As	   opposed	   to	   the	   classic	   Community	   method,	   new	   governance	   is	   generally	  
characterised	  by	  the	  following	  elements:	  participation	  and	  power-­‐sharing,	  multi-­‐
level	   integration,	   diversity	   and	   decentralisation,	   deliberation,	   flexibility	   and	  
revisability,	   and	   experimentation	   and	   knowledge	   creation.120	   Of	   greater	  
relevance	  with	  respect	   to	  decision-­‐making	  procedures	   is	   the	   first	  of	   the	  above-­‐
mentioned	  –	  participation	  and	  power	  sharing.	  This	  refers	  to	  the	  engagement	  of	  
civil	   society	   and	   stakeholders,	   as	  well	   as	   the	   involvement	  of	  different	   layers	  of	  
decision-­‐making.	   New	   governance	   pertains	   both	   to	   the	   adoption	   and	  
implementation	   stages,	   often	   blurring	   the	   boundary	   between	   the	   two.121	  With	  
regard	   to	   the	   former,	   it	   addresses	   the	   range	   of	   actors	   involved,	   as	  well	   as	   the	  
instruments	  adopted;	  as	   concerns	   the	   latter,	  new	  governance	  departs	   from	   the	  
idea	   of	   uniformity	   through	   harmonisation	   by	   allowing	   the	   Member	   States	   to	  
determine	  the	   legislative	  outcome	  by	  consultation	  and	  coordination	  of	  national	  
policies.122	  	  
The	  distinction	  between	  the	  stages	  of	  policy-­‐making	  and	  implementation	  as	  well	  
as	  the	  importance	  in	  some	  situations	  accorded	  to	  the	  procedure	  rather	  than	  the	  
uniformity	   of	   outcome	   is	   reflected	   in	   the	   case	   law	   of	   the	   Court	   of	   Justice.	   In	  
Standley	  and	  Metson,	   in	  particular,	   the	  Court	  admitted	  that	  Member	  States	  may	  
apply	  a	  directive	  in	  different	  ways	  without	  this	  conflicting	  with	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  
directive	   if	   the	   latter	   creates	   instruments	   rather	   than	   harmonised	   rules	   and	  
envisages	  wide	  discretion	  for	  the	  Member	  States.123	  
                                            
118	  ibid	  Recital	  11(c).	  
119	  ibid	  Recital	  11(d).	  
120	   J	   Scott	   and	   DM	   Trubek,	   'Mind	   the	   Gap:	   Law	   and	   New	   Approaches	   to	   Governance	   in	   the	  
European	  Union'	  (2002)	  8	  European	  Law	  Journal	  1,	  5-­‐6.	  
121	  ibid	  8.	  
122	  ibid	  6.	  
123	  Case	  C-­‐293/97	  Standley	  and	  Metson	  [1999]	  ECR	  I-­‐2603,	  para	  39.	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One	   example	   of	   new	   governance	   in	   social	   policy	   is	   the	   Open	   Method	   of	   Co-­‐
ordination	   (OMC),	   which	   first	   emerged	   in	   the	   framework	   of	   the	   European	  
Employment	   Strategy	   in	   the	   1990s.	   Being	   an	   important	   normative	   system,	   the	  
OMC	   is	   an	   intergovernmental	   method	   used	   in	   areas	   of	   Member	   State	  
competence.	   The	   OMC	   envisages	   that	   the	   Member	   States	   jointly	   identify	   non-­‐
binding	  objectives	  and	  guidelines,	  measuring	  instruments	  and	  benchmarking	  in	  
a	  given	  field.	  The	  idea	  behind	  introducing	  the	  OMC	  was	  to	  create	  a	  de-­‐centralised	  
decision-­‐making	  process	  in	  which	  the	  Member	  States	  play	  the	  main	  role.124	   	  EU	  
institutions	  are	  involved	  in	  the	  first	  and	  the	  third	  stage,	  the	  Council	  adopting	  the	  
objectives	  and	  the	  Commission	  monitoring	  the	  benchmarking	  procedures.	  Since	  
the	  1990s,	  the	  OMC	  has	  been	  employed	  in	  a	  number	  of	  areas	  of	  social	  policy.	  Its	  
use	   is	   encouraged	   both	   by	   the	   challenges	   of	   a	   common	  market	   and	  monetary	  
policy	  and	  the	  interdependence	  between	  the	  Member	  States.125	  Owing	  to	  the	  fact	  
that	   the	   OMC	   produces	   no	   hard	   law	   instruments	   it	   is	   questionable	  whether	   it	  
does,	  indeed,	  form	  part	  of	  the	  acquis.	  It	  does	  certainly	  not	  belong	  to	  the	  acquis	  in	  
the	  meaning	  that	  is	  relevant	  for	  the	  exporting	  of	  the	  acquis	  to	  third	  countries,	  yet	  
it	  is	  relevant	  for	  the	  coordination	  of	  social	  policies	  among	  the	  EU	  Member	  States.	  
Innovative	  governance	  does	  not,	  however,	  only	  appear	  in	  the	  realm	  of	  soft	   law.	  
Maastricht	  Treaty	   introduced	  a	  new	  procedure	   for	   law	  making	  –	   the	  European	  
Social	  Dialogue.	  The	  social	  dialogue	  originates	  from	  the	  Protocol	  on	  Social	  Policy	  
and	  its	  Agreement	  attached	  to	  the	  Maastricht	  EC	  Treaty.	  The	  Amsterdam	  Treaty	  
integrated	  the	  Social	  Protocol	  and	  the	  Agreement	  into	  the	  EC	  Treaty.	  	  
The	  idea	  behind	  the	  social	  dialogue	  originates	  from	  the	  principle	  of	  subsidiarity	  
and	  the	  assumption	  that	  the	  social	  partners	  are	  ‘as	  a	  rule	  closer	  to	  the	  reality	  and	  
to	   social	   problems’.126	   The	   major	   differences	   between	   the	   Member	   States	   in	  
terms	   of	   the	   density	   of	   unionisation,	   however,	   may	   well	   undermine	   this	  
supposition.127	   The	   European	   Social	   Dialogue	   includes	   discussions,	  
                                            
124	   S	   Smismans,	   'EU	   Employment	   Policy:	   Decentralisation	   or	   Centralisation	   through	   the	   Open	  
Method	  of	  Coordination?'	  (2004)	  EUI	  Working	  Paper	  LAW	  2004/1,	  4.	  
125	  DM	  Trubek	  and	  LG	  Trubek,	  'Hard	  and	  Soft	  Law	  in	  the	  Construction	  of	  Social	  Europe:	  the	  Role	  
of	  the	  Open	  Method	  of	  Co-­‐ordination'	  (2005)	  11	  European	  Law	  Journal	  343,	  345	  and	  348.	  
126	  Council	  Resolution	  94/C	  368/03	  of	  6	  December	  1994	  on	  certain	  aspects	  for	  a	  European	  Union	  
social	  policy:	  a	  contribution	  to	  economic	  and	  social	  convergence	  in	  the	  Union	  [1994]	  OJ	  C368/6.	  	  	  
127	   OECD,	   ‘Trade	   Union	   density’	   <http://www.oecd-­‐ilibrary.org/employment/data/trade-­‐
unions/trade-­‐union-­‐density_data-­‐00371-­‐en?isPartOf=/content/datacollection/lfs-­‐tu-­‐data-­‐en>	  
accessed	  24	  June	  2015.	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consultations,	   negotiations	   and	   joint	   actions	   between	   the	   management	   and	  
labour	   sides	   of	   industry.	   Comprising	   both	   legislative	   and	   collective	   action,	   it	  
introduces	   into	   EU	   law	   making	   collective	   agreements	   between	   the	   Social	  
Partners	   that	   are	   of	   cross-­‐industry	   as	   well	   as	   sectoral	   scope.	   In	   essence,	   the	  
legislative	   procedure	   that	   involves	   the	   participation	   of	   social	   partners	   is	   a	  
European	  level	  collective	  agreement.	  	  
Using	  collective	  bargaining	  when	   implementing	  EU	   law	   instead	  of	   legislation	   is	  
by	  no	  means	  without	  complications.	  Under	  Article	  153(3)	  TFEU,	  a	  Member	  State	  
may	   entrust	   management	   and	   labour,	   at	   their	   joint	   request,	   with	   the	  
implementation	  of	  a	  directive	  or	  a	  Council	  decision	  adopted	  in	  accordance	  with	  
Article	   155	   TFEU.	   The	  Member	   State	  must	   ensure	   that	   by	   the	   implementation	  
deadline	   the	   management	   and	   labour	   have,	   indeed,	   adopted	   a	   collective	  
agreement	  that	  effectively	  implements	  the	  legislative	  act	  in	  question.	  On	  the	  EU	  
level,	   it	   is	   the	   Member	   State	   who	   remains	   responsible	   for	   the	   proper	  
implementation	  of	  the	  directive	  or	  decision	  even	  if	  the	  social	  partners	  have	  been	  
given	   the	   possibility	   to	   reach	   a	   collective	   agreement	   on	   the	   matter.128	   The	  
legislation	   must	   be	   enforced	   with	   regard	   to	   all	   workers	   and	   not	   only	   those	  
covered	   by	   the	   collective	   agreement	   if	   question.	   The	   Court	   has	   found	   that	   a	  
Member	   State	   cannot	   avoid	   legislating	   to	   complement	   existing	   collective	  
agreements	   where	   collective	   bargaining	   does	   not	   cover	   all	   workers,	   where	   a	  
sector	  is	  not	  entirely	  covered	  by	  a	  collective	  agreement	  or	  where	  the	  agreement	  
does	  not	  fully	  implement	  the	  EU	  measure.129	  	  
The	  social	  dialogue	  rests	  on	  the	  process	  of	  negotiations	  between	  the	  labour	  and	  
management	   –	   the	   social	   partners.	   Social	   dialogue	   does	   not	   replace	   social	  
legislation;	  rather	  together	  they	  form	  the	  two	  pillars	  of	  the	  ‘Social	  Dimension’.130	  
Social	  dialogue	  is	  encouraged	  on	  the	  EU	  level.	  The	  EU	  is	  required	  to	  promote	  the	  
role	  of	  social	  partners	  as	  well	  as	  to	  facilitate	  cooperation	  between	  them.131	  In	  the	  
meantime,	   the	  Union	  must	   also	   respect	   national	   diversity	   in	   the	   field	   of	   social	  
                                            
128	  Article	  153(3)	  TFEU.	  	  
129	   Case	   143/83	  Commission	   v	  Denmark	   [1985]	   ECR	   427,	   para	   8;	   Case	   C-­‐187/98	  Commission	   v	  
Greece	  [1999]	  ECR	  I-­‐7713,	  para	  47.	  
130	   M	   Rhodes,	   'A	   Regulatory	   Conundrum:	   Industrial	   Relations	   and	   the	   Social	   Dimension'	   in	   S	  
Leibfried	  and	  P	  Pierson	  (eds),	  European	  social	  policy:	  between	  fragmentation	  and	  integration	  (The	  
Brookings	  Institution	  1995)	  78.	  
131	  Article	  152	  TFEU.	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policy	  and	  the	  autonomy	  of	  the	  social	  partners.132	  Where	  the	  social	  partners	  are	  
involved	  in	  the	  social	  dialogue,	  therefore,	  the	  institutions	  cannot	  subject	  them	  to	  
any	  EU	  policy	  agenda.	  	  
Specific	   tasks	   are	   placed	   on	   the	   Commission	   in	   this	   regard.	   The	   Commission	  
must	  promote	   the	   consultation	  of	   the	   social	  partners	  on	  EU	   level	   and	   facilitate	  
their	   dialogue	   by	   supporting	   both	   parties.133	   This	   means	   taking	   any	   relevant	  
measures.	   To	   this	   end,	   the	   Commission	   organises	   meetings,	   supports	   joint	  
studies	  or	  working	  groups	  and	  provides	  technical	  assistance.134	  Article	  156	  TFEU	  
provides	  that	  the	  Commission	  will	  encourage	  cooperation	  between	  the	  Member	  
States.	   The	   Commission	   provides	   coordinating	   assistance,	   conducts	   studies,	  
delivers	  opinions	  after	  consulting	  the	  Economic	  and	  Social	  Committee,	  and	  sets	  
up	   consultations.	   The	   particular	   aim	   of	   such	   assistance	   is	   to	   encourage	   the	  
sharing	  of	  best	  practices,	  benchmarking	  and	  other	   forms	  of	  new	  governance	   in	  
the	  field	  of	  social	  policy.	  	  	  	  
During	  the	  legislative	  procedure,	  the	  Commission	  first	  consults	  management	  and	  
labour	  before	  submitting	  legislative	  proposals	  on	  the	  general	  direction	  of	  future	  
EU	  action.135	  As	  the	  next	  step,	  should	  the	  Commission	  wish	  to	  pursue	  legislation,	  
it	  must	  also	  consult	  the	  social	  partners	  on	  the	  content	  of	  the	  draft	  proposal,	  the	  
latter	  having	  the	  opportunity	  to	  provide	  either	  opinions	  or	  recommendations.136	  
During	  both	  stages	  of	   consultation,	   the	  social	  partners	  may	  decide	   to	   leave	   the	  
legislative	   pillar	   and	   continue	  with	   collective	   bargaining	   in	   the	   social	   dialogue	  
pillar,137	   called	   ‘bargaining	   in	   the	   shadow	  of	   law’.138	  The	  duration	  of	   the	   social	  
dialogue	   procedure	   is	   at	   the	   most	   nine	   months,	   unless	   the	   Commission,	   the	  
management	   and	   the	   labour	   jointly	   decide	   to	   extend	   the	   length	   of	   the	   social	  
dialogue	  phase.139	  	  
                                            
132	  ibid.	  
133	  Article	  154(1)	  TFEU.	  
134	  Commission,	   ‘The	  application	  of	  the	  Agreement	  on	  social	  policy’	  (Communication)	  COM	  (93)	  
600	  final,	  para	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135	  Article	  154(2)	  TFEU.	  
136	  Article	  154(3)	  TFEU.	  
137	  Article	  154(4)	  TFEU.	  
138	  B	  Bercusson,	  European	  Labour	  Law	  (Cambridge	  University	  Press	  2009)	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  Article	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The	   social	   dialogue	   between	   the	   management	   and	   labour	   may	   result	   in	   an	  
agreement,	   but	   only	   if	   the	   parties	   so	   wish.140	   The	   resulting	   Europe-­‐level	  
collective	  agreements	  may	  be	  implemented	  by	  the	  Member	  States	  in	  accordance	  
with	   their	   national	   procedures.141	   In	  matters	   falling	  within	   the	   scope	   of	   Union	  
competence	  and	  outlined	  in	  Article	  153	  TFEU,	  should	  both	  sides	  so	  desire,	  they	  
may	   jointly	   request	   a	   Council	   decision	   to	   implement	   their	   agreement	   on	   a	  
proposal	   from	   the	   Commission.142	   The	   term	   ‘decision’	   refers	   to	   any	   of	   the	  
binding	  legal	  instruments	  provided	  in	  Article	  288	  TFEU	  –	  a	  regulation,	  directive	  
or	   decision	   –,	   as	   proposed	   by	   the	   Commission.143	   The	   European	   Parliament,	  
however,	  is	  excluded	  from	  collectively	  negotiated	  legislation	  except	  to	  the	  extent	  
of	  being	  informed.	  
Without	   the	   Council	   adopting	   the	   text	   of	   the	   agreement	   reached	   by	   the	   social	  
partners	  as	   legislation,	   the	  EU-­‐level	  agreements	  have	  no	  binding	   legal	   force	  on	  
the	  Member	  States.	  The	  Commission	  both	  evaluates	   the	   representativity	  of	   the	  
participants	   in	   the	   social	   dialogue	   as	   well	   as	   assesses	   the	   content	   of	   the	  
agreement	  with	  a	  view	  to	  possibly	  complementing	  it	  with	  legislation	  on	  its	  own	  
proposal	  whereby,	  once	  again,	  all	  necessary	  consultation	  procedures	  will	  have	  to	  
be	   followed.	   In	   practice,	   the	  Union	   legislation	   in	   the	   social	   field	   usually	   avoids	  
harmonisation	   and	   rather	   allows	   the	   Member	   States	   or	   the	   social	   partners	   to	  
arrive	  at	  a	  solution	  that	  best	  fits	  within	  the	  national	  circumstances.144	  
As	  to	  the	  organisation,	  the	  Social	  Partners	  are	  autonomous	  to	  decide	  upon	  their	  
structures	   and	   procedures	   for	   negotiating.	   Yet	   certain	   criteria	   must	   be	  
conformed	   to.145	   Firstly,	   the	   participating	   social	   partners	   must	   either	   be	   of	   a	  
cross-­‐industry	  scope	  or	  relate	  to	  a	  specific	  sector	  or	  category,	  and	  be	  organised	  
on	   the	   European	   level.	   Secondly,	   they	   cannot	   be	   separated	   from	   the	   Member	  
States’	   social	   partner	   structures	   but	   form	   an	   ‘integral	   and	   recognized	   part’	  
thereof.	  Also,	   if	  possible,	   the	  social	  partners	  must	   represent	  all	  Member	  States.	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  Article	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  ibid.	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  Commission,	   ‘Proposal	   for	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  (1996)	  26	  final,	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  C	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  (n	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  66.	  	  
145	   Commission,	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   social	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   level’	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  (1998)	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  final,	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Thirdly,	   the	   social	   partners	  must	   have	   ‘adequate	   structures’	   to	   enable	   them	   to	  
participate	  in	  the	  consultations.	  	  
There	   have	   been	   problems	   with	   the	   recognition	   of	   some	   social	   partners	   with	  
regard	  to	   fulfilling	  the	  above-­‐mentioned	  criteria.	  The	  most	  crucial	  question	  has	  
been	  the	  one	  of	  representativity.	  In	  the	  landmark	  case	  UEAPME,	  in	  which	  a	  trade	  
organisation	   representing	   craft	   and	   small	   and	   medium	   sized	   enterprises	  
challenged	   the	   Parental	   Leave	   Directive,146	   the	   CFI	   asserted	   that	   because	   in	  
social	   dialogue	   the	   European	   Parliament	   is	   excluded	   from	   the	   legislative	  
procedure,	   the	   principle	   of	   democratic	   legitimacy	   requires	   that	   parties	   to	   the	  
social	  dialogue	  be	  ‘sufficiently	  representative’.147	  This	  criterion	  must	  be	  fulfilled	  
separately	   in	   relation	   to	   each	   new	   agreement	   between	   the	   social	   partners.148	  
Representativity	   contains	   two	   elements:	   sufficiency	   and	   collective	  
representativity.	   Whereas	   sufficient	   representativity	   does	   not	   equal	   absolute	  
participation,	  collective	  representativity	  demands	  that	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  Member	  
States	   be	   represented.149	   Moreover,	   rather	   than	   the	   number	   of	   members	   it	   is	  
important	  that	  an	  adequate	  number	  of	  interests	  are	  represented.150	  
So	   far	   the	   Commission	   has	   recognised	   the	   following	   cross-­‐industry	   Social	  
Partners:	  the	  Confederation	  of	  European	  Business	  (BUSINESSEUROPE,	  formerly	  
UNICE)	  and	  the	  European	  Centre	  of	  Employers	  and	  Enterprises	  providing	  Public	  
Services	   (CEEP)	   representing	   private	   and	   public	   sector	   management,	  
respectively;	  and	  the	  European	  Trade	  Union	  Confederation	  (ETUC)	  representing	  
workers.	   These	   three	   organisations	   were	   participating	   in	   the	   original	   Val	  
Duchesse	   talks	  with	   the	  Commission	  that	  became	  known	  as	   the	  social	  dialogue	  
and	   paved	   way	   for	   the	   Social	   Policy	   Agreement	   attached	   to	   the	   Maastricht	  
Treaty.151	   More	   recently,	   recognition	   has	   been	   granted	   to	   the	   European	  
Association	  of	  Craft,	  Small	  and	  Medium-­‐Sized	  Enterprises	  (UEAPME),	  the	  Council	  
                                            
146	  Council	  Directive	  96/34/EC	  of	  3	   June	  1996	  on	   the	   framework	  agreement	  on	  parental	   leave	  
concluded	  by	  the	  Union	  des	  Confédérations	  de	  l'Industrie	  et	  des	  Employeurs	  d'Europe	  (UNICE),	  
the	   Centre	   Européen	   de	   l'Entreprise	   Publique	   (CEEP)	   and	   the	   Confédération	   Européenne	   des	  
Syndicats	  (ETUC)	  [1996]	  OJ	  L145/4.	  
147	  Case	  T-­‐135/96	  UEAPME	  [1998]	  ECR	  II-­‐2335,	  paras	  89-­‐90.	  	  
148	  ibid	  para	  90.	  
149	   B	   Bercusson,	   'Democratic	   Legitimacy	   and	   European	   Labour	   Law'	   (1999)	   28	   Industrial	   Law	  
Journal	  153,	  157-­‐158.	  
150	  ibid	  159.	  
151	   E	   Franssen	   and	   ATJM	   Jacobs,	   'The	   Question	   of	   Representativity	   in	   the	   European	   Social	  
Dialogue'	  (1998)	  35	  Common	  Market	  Law	  Review	  1295,	  1298.	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of	   European	   Professional	   and	   Managerial	   Staff	   (Eurocadres)	   and	   European	  
Confederation	   of	   Executives	   and	   Managerial	   Staff	   (CEC),	   the	   latter	   two	  
participating	   in	   negotiations	   as	   part	   of	   the	   ETUC	   delegation.	   However,	   the	  
question	  of	   representativity	  mainly	  plays	  a	   role	   if	   the	  participants	   in	   the	  social	  
dialogue	  wish	  that	  the	  Council	  implement	  their	  agreement	  by	  a	  decision;	  in	  every	  
other	   case	   the	   agreement	   can	   be	   implemented	   by	   a	   second	   means	   –	   in	  
accordance	  with	  procedures	  and	  practices	  of	  the	  Member	  States.152	  Beyond	  the	  
social	   dialogue	   pillar	   that	   results	   in	   an	   EU	   legislative	   act,	   the	   question	   of	  
participation	   is	  generally	  a	  matter	  of	  mutual	   recognition	  of	   the	  social	  partners,	  
rather	   than	   a	   prescription	   by	   the	   Commission.153	   The	   success	   of	   the	   social	  
dialogue	  depends	  also	  on	   the	   internal	  rules	  of	   the	  representative	  organisations	  
and	   the	   leeway	   given	   to	   them	   by	   their	   constituent	   national	   organisations,	   as	  
reflected	  in	  the	  necessary	  voting	  majorities.154	  
When	  it	  comes	  to	  the	  added	  value	  of	  the	  social	  dialogue	  in	  the	  EU’s	  governance	  
schemes	   it	   is	  argued	   that	   it	  both	  enhances	  and	  reduces	  democracy.	  On	   the	  one	  
hand,	   social	   dialogue	   is	   said	   to	   represent	   an	   alternative	   to	   the	   democratic	  
representation	   of	   the	   EU	   citizens	   in	   the	   European	   Parliament.155	   According	   to	  
another	   opinion,	   the	   legitimacy	   of	   the	   social	   dialogue	   derives	   either	   from	   its	  
nature	  as	  collective	  bargaining	  or	  from	  the	  notion	  of	  participatory	  democracy.156	  
On	  the	  other	  hand,	  however,	  the	  social	  dialogue	  has	  several	  downsides	  including	  
the	   fact	   that	   the	   social	   partners	   replace	   the	   European	   Parliament	   without	  
necessarily	  representing	  a	  large	  number	  of	  industries.	  In	  practice,	  moreover,	  the	  
EU	  social	  partners	  have	  hardly	  ever	  managed	  to	  reach	  agreement.157	  
Not	  only	  the	  social	  partners	  of	   the	  EU	  Member	  States	  are	  engaged	   in	  the	  social	  
dialogue.	  Businesseurope,	  for	  example,	  includes	  representatives	  from	  a	  number	  
of	   non-­‐EU	  Member	   States	   including	   Switzerland,	   Iceland,	  Montenegro,	   Norway	  
and	   Turkey.	   In	   the	   CEEP,	   Norway	   and	   Turkey	   participate.	   ETUC	   includes	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  ibid	  1311.	  
153	  Commission,	   ‘The	  Development	  of	  the	  Social	  Dialogue	  at	  Community	  level’	  (Communication)	  
COM	  (96)	  448	  final,	  4.	  
154	  B	  Keller	  and	  B	  Sörries,	  'The	  New	  European	  Social	  Dialogue:	  Old	  Wine	  in	  New	  Bottles?'	  (1999)	  
9	  Journal	  of	  European	  Social	  Policy	  111,	  114.	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  C	  Barnard	  (n	  112)	  82-­‐83.	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   S	  Fredman,	   'Social	   law	   in	   the	  European	  Union:	  The	   impact	  of	   the	   lawmaking	  process'	   in	  PP	  
Craig	  and	  C	  Harlow	   (eds),	   Lawmaking	   in	   the	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   (Kluwer	  Law	   International	  1998)	  
386,	  408-­‐410.	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  B	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  B	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  (n	  154)	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participants	   from	   Iceland,	   Liechtenstein,	   Macedonia	   (FYROM),	   Norway,	  
Montenegro,	   Serbia,	   Switzerland	   and	   Turkey.	   This	   new	   governance	   regime	   is,	  
thus,	   rather	   including	   towards	   non-­‐EU	   Member	   States.	   By	   replacing	   the	  
European	  Commission	  in	  the	  legislative	  procedure	  including	  the	  consultation	  of	  
expert	  groups	  by	  the	  Commission,	  however,	  some	  third	  country	  stakeholders	  are	  
effectively	  eliminated	  from	  the	  shaping	  of	  the	  acquis.158	  	  
3.1.2	  EU	  environmental	  governance	  
Environmental	   protection	   is	   another	   example	   of	   the	   application	   of	   new	  
governance	   methods	   by	   the	   European	   Union.	   The	   evolution	   of	   environmental	  
governance	   is	   described	   by	   the	   four	   environmental	   governance	   regimes	  
distinguished	  by	  von	  Homeyer,	   including	   the	   technocratic	  environment	  regime,	  
the	   internal	   market	   regime	   of	   harmonisation,	   the	   integration	   regime	   of	  
effectiveness	   and	   efficiency,	   and	   the	   strategy-­‐based	   sustainable	   development	  
regime.159	  	  
While	   the	   former	   two	   represent	   the	   classic	   Community	   method,	   with	   the	  
emergence	  of	  the	  integration	  regime	  in	  the	  1990s	  focus	  shifted	  to	  efficiency	  and	  
effectiveness.	  The	  new	  orientation	  signalled	  by	  the	  integration	  regime	  demanded	  
that	  the	  factors	  that	   influence	  the	  efficiency	  and	  effectiveness	  of	  environmental	  
policies	   be	   targeted	   already	   in	   the	   stage	   of	   decision-­‐making.160	   As	   a	   result,	  
attention	   in	   decision-­‐making	   processes	   shifted	   to	   stakeholders	   and	   experts	   as	  
well	   as	   locally	   tailored	   solutions	   through	   the	   means	   of	   consultations,	  
negotiations,	  and	  public	  information.161	  The	  sustainable	  development	  regime,	  in	  
turn,	  demands	  the	  integration	  of	  environmental	  policy	  into	  all	  EU	  policies.162	  An	  
example	  of	  this	  is	  the	  environmental	  horizontal	  provision	  of	  Article	  11	  TFEU.163	  
The	   environmental	   integration	   principle	   has	   been	   considered	   to	   be	   a	   distant	  
equivalent	   to	   the	   OMC	   in	   the	   sphere	   of	   environmental	   policy.164	   Since	   it	   is,	  
however,	   not	   the	   only	   horizontal	   provision	   in	   the	   TFEU	   it	  may	   be	   argued	   that	  
                                            
158	   The	   different	   possibilities	   for	   third-­‐countries	   to	   participate	   in	   the	   EU	   policy-­‐making	   are	  
discussed	  below	  in	  section	  3.2.	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   I	   von	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   Evolution	   of	   EU	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   Governance'	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   Scott	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Environmental	  Protection	  (Oxford	  University	  Press	  2009)	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  Discussed	  in	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  above	  in	  chapter	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  section	  5.1.1.	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  J	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  and	  DM	  Trubek	  (n	  120)	  5.	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other	   horizontal	   provisions	   too,	   could	   be	   regarded	   as	   examples	   of	   new	  
governance.	  
New	  governance	  calls	  for	  cooperation	  between	  public	  and	  private	  undertakings	  
on	  various	  levels	  and	  discretion	  and	  flexibility	  in	  the	  decision-­‐making	  process.	  In	  
addition,	   the	   instruments	   involved	   in	   the	   new	   governance	   method	   depart	  
significantly	   from	  the	  specific	  objectives	  of	   the	  classic	  Community	  method.	  The	  
objectives	   they	  define	  are	  broad	  and	  consist	  primarily	  of	  procedural	  guidelines	  
rather	  than	  objectives	  of	  result.	  	  
Wurzel	   and	  others	  have	  divided	  new	   instruments	   in	   environmental	  policy	   into	  
three	   sub-­‐categories:	   suasive	   instruments,	   such	  as	   informational	  measures	  and	  
voluntary	   agreements;	   market-­‐based	   instruments,	   such	   as	   taxes	   and	   tradable	  
permits;	   and	   regulatory	   instruments.165	   These	   measures	   are	   employed	   by	   the	  
Member	  States	  as	  well	  as	  the	  EU.	  As	  regards	  the	  acquis,	  though,	  the	  question	  of	  
uniformity	  arises	  rather	  at	  the	  stage	  of	  its	  application	  and	  implementation	  than	  
adoption.	  Variations	  can,	  and	  do	  occur,	  as	  flexibility	  is	  an	  inherent	  component	  of	  
the	  new	  governance	  regime.	  Attention	  on	  the	  new	  types	  of	  norms	  instead	  of	  the	  
procedure	   for	   adopting	   legislation	   is	   the	  main	   contrasting	   feature	  between	   the	  
application	  of	  new	  governance	  in	  EU	  social	  policy	  and	  environmental	  protection.	  
This	  is	  notwithstanding	  the	  fact	  that	  a	  significant	  element	  of	  the	  new	  governance	  
norms	  themselves	  is	  participation.166	  	  
Participation	  includes	  access	  to	  information,	  which	  is	  generally	  regulated	  in	  the	  
Aarhus	   Convention.167	   Article	   1	   of	   the	   Convention	   stipulates	   the	   right	   of	   EU	  
citizens	   to	   receive	   environmental	   information	   from	   the	   EU’s	   institutions	   and	  
agencies,	  bodies	  and	  offices,	  public	  participation	  in	  decision-­‐making,	  and	  access	  
to	  justice	  in	  environmental	  matters.	  Article	  5	  confers	  a	  corresponding	  obligation	  
on	   the	   EU	   to	   make	   information	   regarding	   the	   environment	   available	   to	   the	  
public.	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   (Edward	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Article	   8	  Aarhus	  Convention	   also	   endorses	   effective	   public	   participation	   in	   the	  
drafting	   of	   legislative	   proposals	   that	   may	   have	   a	   significant	   effect	   on	   the	  
environment.	  This	  rule	  is	  well	  applied	  on	  the	  EU	  level	  and	  not	  only	  with	  respect	  
to	   the	   environment.	   All	   Commission	   initiatives	   including	   legislative	   proposals,	  
non-­‐legislative	   initiatives	   and	   implementing	   measures	   are	   subject	   to	   impact	  
assessment	   as	   to	   their	   economic,	   social	   and	   environmental	   effects.	   Impact	  
assessment	  is	  conducted	  in	  the	  form	  of	  consultations	  between	  the	  Commission,	  
on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  stakeholders	  and	  interested	  persons,	  on	  the	  other.	  Impact	  
assessment	   may	   take	   the	   form	   of	   Green	   and	   White	   papers,	   Commission	  
Communications,	   expert	   groups,	   ad	   hoc	   consultations,	   etc.168	   In	   addition,	   the	  
European	   Parliament	   and	   the	   Member	   States,	   too,	   gather	   public	   and	   expert	  
opinions	   on	   EU	   legislative	   proposals.169	   Yet	   the	   sphere	   of	   environmental	  
protection	   features	   no	   alternative	   decision-­‐making	   procedure	   available	   that	  
would	  be	  comparable	  to	  the	  social	  dialogue	  in	  the	  field	  of	  social	  policy.	  Nor	  might	  
such	   a	   governance	   method	   be	   suitable	   in	   this	   context.	   As	   argued	   by	   Jans,	   a	  
compulsory	   system	   including	   a	   legislative	   role	   for	   environmental	   policy	  
stakeholders	  parallel	   to	   that	  of	   the	  European	  Commission	  may	   instead	  hamper	  
the	  current	  possibilities	  for	  swift	  action	  where	  needed.170	  
Contrary	  to	  what	  was	  established	  above	  with	  respect	  to	  social	  policy,	  in	  the	  field	  
of	  environmental	  protection	  new	  governance	  has	  affected	  the	  range	  of	  measures	  
rather	  than	  decision-­‐making	  procedures.	  In	  the	  environmental	  sphere,	  the	  latter	  
do	  not	  provide	  for	  increased	  participation	  of	  actors	  outside	  the	  EU’s	  institutions	  
yet	   third	   country	   participation	  may	   be	   enabled	   in	   the	   initial	   phases	   of	   agenda	  
setting.	   Rather,	   the	   ‘new’	   environmental	   policy	   instruments	   (NEPIs)171	   raise	   a	  
question	   as	   to	  what	   types	   of	   instruments	   belong	   to	   the	   internal	  market	  acquis	  
and,	  subsequently,	  form	  the	  core	  of	  the	  internal	  market	  that	  is	  the	  benchmark	  for	  
assessing	  the	  level	  of	  homogeneity	  in	  the	  expanded	  internal	  market.	  
                                            
168	  European	  Governance	  White	  Paper	  (n	  115)	  15.	  
169	  ibid	  16.	  
170	   JH	   Jans,	   'EU	   Environmental	   Policy	   and	   the	   Civil	   Society'	   in	   JH	   Jans	   (ed),	   The	   European	  
Convention	  and	  the	  Future	  of	  European	  Environmental	  Law	  (Europa	  Law	  Publishing	  2003)	  53,	  59.	  
171	  A	   Jordan	  and	  others,	   'European	  Governance	  and	   the	  Transfer	  of	   ‘new’	  environmental	  policy	  
instruments	  (NEPIs)	  in	  the	  European	  Union'	  (2003)	  81	  Public	  Administration	  555.	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3.2	  Third	  country	  actors	  defining	  the	  core	  of	  the	  internal	  market	  
3.2.1	  European	  Economic	  Area	  
Although	  excluded	   from	  the	   formal	  procedures	  of	  adopting	  EU	   internal	  market	  
acquis,	   third	  countries	  may	  and	  do	  have	  direct	   influence	  on	  EU	   legislation.	  The	  
most	   prominent	   example	   of	   such	   influence	   is	   the	   participation	   of	   the	   EEA	  
countries	  in	  the	  EU	  decision-­‐shaping	  process.	  	  
During	   the	   negotiations	   of	   the	   EEA	   Agreement	   it	   was	   considered	   whether	   to	  
grant	   the	   EEA	   EFTA	   States	   a	   formal	   stake	   in	   the	   decision-­‐making	   procedures.	  
This	  would	   have	  meant	   an	   amendment	   of	   the	  Treaties,	   as	  well	   as	   a	   significant	  
alteration	   of	   the	   EU’s	   legal	   and	   institutional	   order.	   The	   Commission’s	   firm	  
position	  was	  that	  the	  EU	  would	  not	  make	  concessions	  for	  the	  benefit	  of	  the	  EEA	  
EFTA	   States	   insofar	   as	   the	   Union	   itself	   is	   facing	   a	   challenge	   to	   complete	   the	  
internal	  market	   by	   the	  1992	  deadline	   and	  needs	   to	  preserve	   its	   own	  decision-­‐
making	   autonomy.172	   The	   reference	   to	   Community	   integration	   in	   De	   Clercq’s	  
speech	   comes	   from	   an	   assumption	   that	   the	   participation	   of	   countries	  who	   are	  
not	  bound	  by	  the	  supranational	  principles	  of	  the	  EU	  and	  must,	  therefore,	  follow	  
their	  national	  legislative	  procedures	  in	  order	  to	  implement	  EU	  legislation	  would	  
cause	   undue	   delays	   in	   the	   law	  making	   process	   and,	   thereby,	   render	   the	  Union	  
less	  efficient.	  De	  Clercq	  established	  three	  principles	  for	  the	  cooperation	  between	  
the	  then	  Community	  and	  the	  EEA	  EFTA	  States:	  priority	  for	  integration	  within	  the	  
Community,	   safeguarding	   the	   autonomy	   of	   the	   Community’s	   decision-­‐making,	  
and	  ensuring	   ‘a	   fair	  balance	  between	  benefits	  and	  obligations’	  arising	   from	  the	  
EEA	   Agreement.173	   A	   compromise	   solution	   that	   took	   into	   consideration	   the	  
above-­‐mentioned	  constraints	  was	  to	  include	  the	  EEA	  EFTA	  States	  in	  the	  informal	  
stages	   preceding	   the	   official	   adoption	   of	   EU	   legislation.	   In	   fact,	   involvement	   in	  
the	   decision-­‐shaping	   stage	  means	   that	   not	   only	   the	   EU	  but	   also	   the	   EEA	  EFTA	  
States	  can	  preserve	  their	  decision-­‐making	  autonomy,	  only	  that	  both	  exercise	  it	  at	  
different	  stages	  and	  different	  locations	  –	  the	  EU	  in	  the	  Council	  and	  the	  EEA	  EFTA	  
States	  in	  the	  EEA	  Joint	  Committee.	  
                                            
172	   W	   De	   Clercq,	   speech	   held	   at	   the	   EC-­‐EFTA	   ministerial	   meeting,	   Interlaken,	   20	   May	   1987,	  
SPEECH/87/32,	  5.	  See	  also	  above	  chapter	  5	  section	  3.6.	  
173	   Commission,	   ‘Activities	   in	   May	   1987	   –	   External	   Relations’	   Bulletin	   of	   the	   European	  
Communities	  5-­‐1987,	  65,	  para	  2.2.14.	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Decision-­‐shaping	   takes	   the	   form	   of	   EEA	   EFTA	   States	   participating	   in	   various	  
committees	  and	  submitting	  opinions.	  When	  preparing	   legislative	  proposals,	   the	  
Commission	  seeks	  national	  expertise	  from	  the	  EEA	  EFTA	  States	  similarly	  as	  from	  
the	  Member	  States.174	  Just	  as	  the	  national	  experts	  of	  the	  Member	  States	  their	  EEA	  
EFTA	  counterparts	  serve	  as	  independent	  experts	  and	  not	  representatives	  of	  their	  
respective	   states.	   Article	   100	   EEA	   Agreement	   requires	   that	   the	   Commission	  
grant	   EEA	   EFTA	   States	   ‘as	   wide	   as	   possible’	   participation	   in	   the	   procedure	   of	  
preparing	  draft	  measures	  before	  these	  are	  passed	  on	  to	  the	  committees	  assisting	  
the	   Commission.	   Experts	   from	   the	   Member	   States	   and	   from	   the	   EEA	   EFTA	  
countries	  must	   be	   included	   on	   an	   equal	   basis.	   Generally,	   the	   EEA	   EFTA	   States	  
may	   submit	   comments	   to	   the	   EU	   institutions	   on	   various	   policy	   issues.	   The	   so-­‐
called	  ‘EEA	  EFTA	  comments’	  are	  approved	  by	  the	  EFTA	  Standing	  Committee	  and,	  
after	  being	   forwarded	  to	  the	  relevant	  EU	   institutions,	  are	  presented	   in	   the	  EEA	  
Joint	  Committee.	  	  
When	  a	  proposal	  is	  submitted	  to	  the	  Council,	  the	  Commission	  must	  ensure	  that	  
the	  Council	  is	  informed	  about	  the	  views	  of	  the	  EEA	  EFTA	  States.	  At	  the	  same	  time	  
the	  Commission	  must	  submit	  a	  copy	  of	  the	  proposal	  to	  the	  EEA	  EFTA	  States.175	  
This	   is	  without	  prejudice	  to	  the	   fact	   that	   the	   latter	  do	  not	  participate	   in	  the	  EU	  
procedures	   for	   adopting	   the	   EU	   legislative	   act.	   The	   EEA	   EFTA	   States	   may	   be	  
invited	  to	  attend	  informal	  Council	  meetings	  but	  only	  if	  the	  Council	  Presidency	  so	  
decides.176	   A	   special	   arrangement,	   albeit	   not	   part	   of	   the	   EEA	   Agreement,	   has	  
been	  established	  under	  Schengen	  cooperation.	  By	  virtue	  of	  being	  parties	   to	   the	  
Schengen	   Agreement,	   Norway,	   Iceland,	   Liechtenstein	   and	   Switzerland	  
participate	  in	  the	  Schengen	  Mixed	  Committee	  where	  proposals	  for	  new	  Schengen	  
acquis	  are	  discussed	  yet	   lack	  a	  right	   to	  vote	   in	   the	  Council	   that	  adopts	   the	  new	  
legislation.177	  
The	   two	   keywords	   that	   best	   characterise	   the	   participation	   of	   the	   EEA	   EFTA	  
States	   in	   the	   preparatory	   stages	   of	   EU’s	   decision-­‐making	   are	   information	   and	  
                                            
174	  Article	  99(1)	  EEA	  Agreement	  
175	  Article	  99(2)	  EEA	  Agreement.	  
176	   S	   Lavenex,	   'Concentric	   circles	   of	   flexible	   ‘EUropean’	   integration:	   A	   typology	   of	   EU	   external	  
governance	  relations'	  (2011)	  9	  Comparative	  European	  Politics	  372,	  377.	  
177	  For	  example,	  Articles	  3	  and	  8(1)	  of	  the	  Agreement	  Concluded	  by	  the	  Council	  of	  the	  European	  
Union	  and	  the	  Republic	  of	  Iceland	  and	  the	  Kingdom	  of	  Norway	  concerning	  the	  latters'	  association	  
with	   the	   implementation,	   application	   and	   development	   of	   the	   Schengen	   acquis	   [1999]	   OJ	  
L176/36.	  See	  also	  above	  chapter	  1	  section	  3.1.	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consultation.	  All	  parties	  to	  the	  EEA	  Agreement	  must	  act	  in	  good	  faith	  as	  regards	  
the	  flow	  of	  information	  and	  consultation.178	  Despite	  not	  possessing	  voting	  rights,	  
EEA	  EFTA	  States	  must	  be	  kept	  well	  informed	  throughout	  the	  legislative	  process.	  
At	   the	  point	  when	   the	   legislative	  proposal	   is	   submitted	   to	   the	  Council	  any	  EEA	  
Contracting	   Party	   may	   request	   that	   the	   proposal	   be	   discussed	   at	   a	   Joint	  
Committee	  meeting	  for	  a	  ‘preliminary	  exchange	  of	  views'.179	  Information	  sharing	  
and	  consultation	  continue	  in	  the	  Joint	  Committee	  before	  a	  decision	  on	  the	  draft	  
legislation	  is	  taken	  by	  the	  Council.	  	  
The	  scope	  of	   the	  EEA	  Agreement	   is	  not	  strictly	   limited	  to	  the	   four	   fundamental	  
freedoms	   and	   competition	   policy.	   The	   Agreement	   also	   includes	   provisions	   on	  
cooperation	   between	   the	   EU	   and	   the	   EEA	   EFTA	   States	   in	   relevant	   EU	  
programmes.	  This	  cooperation	  extends	  to	  fields	  such	  as	  information	  services,	  the	  
environment,	   education,	   social	   policy,	   consumer	   protection,	   etc.180	   Pursuant	   to	  
Article	   80	   EEA	   Agreement,	   EFTA	   States	   may	   participate	   in	   EU’s	   framework	  
programmes,	  specific	  programmes,	  projects	  and	  similar	  undertakings	  as	  well	  as,	  
for	   example,	   joint	   activities,	   information	   exchange	   and	   parallel	   legislation.	   In	  
cases	   where	   the	   EEA	   EFTA	   States	   take	   part	   in	   a	   programme,	   project	   or	   other	  
action	  mentioned	  above	  and	  specified	  in	  Protocol	  31	  to	  the	  EEA	  Agreement,	  the	  
EEA	   EFTA	   States	   enjoy	   full	   participation	   rights,181	   including	   in	   programme	  
committees	   that	   assist	   the	   Commission	   in	   the	   management	   of	   the	   particular	  
activity.	   In	  addition	   to	  various	  committees,	  EEA	  EFTA	  States	  also	  participate	   in	  
the	  work	  of	  thirteen	  EU	  agencies	  including,	   for	  example,	  the	  European	  Aviation	  
Safety	  Agency,	  European	  Chemicals	  Agency,	  European	  Food	  Safety	  Authority	  and	  
European	  Network	  and	  Information	  Security	  Agency.182	  The	  participation	  of	  EEA	  
EFTA	   States	   in	   EU	   agencies	   is	   subject	   to	   a	   decision	   by	   the	   EEA	   Joint	  
Committee.183	  
                                            
178	  Article	  99(4)	  EEA	  Agreement.	  
179	  Article	  99(2)	  EEA	  Agreement.	  
180	  Article	  78	  EEA	  Agreement.	  
181	  Article	  81	  EEA	  Agreement.	  	  
182	   For	   full	   list,	   see	   ‘EU	   Agencies’	   (EFTA	   Website)	   <http://www.efta.int/eea/eu-­‐agencies>	  
accessed	  24	  June	  2015.	  	  	  
183	   For	   example,	   Decision	   of	   the	   EEA	   Joint	   Committee	   No	   160/2009	   of	   4	  December	   2009	  
amending	  Protocol	  31	   to	   the	  EEA	  Agreement,	  on	  cooperation	   in	   specific	   fields	  outside	   the	   four	  
freedoms	   [2010]	   OJ	   L62/67,	   which	   extended	   the	   cooperation	   between	   the	   parties	   to	   the	   EEA	  
Agreement	   to	   Council	   Regulation	   (EC)	   No	   2062/94	   of	   18	   July	   1994	   establishing	   a	   European	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EEA	  EFTA	  experts	  are,	  furthermore,	  granted	  a	  right	  to	  participate	  in	  committees	  
in	  specific	  areas	  falling	  outside	  the	  scope	  of	  Articles	  81	  and	  100	  EEA	  Agreement.	  
This	   includes	  committees	   listed	   in	  Protocol	  37	  attached	   to	   the	  EEA	  Agreement.	  
The	   list	  may	   be	   amended	   together	  with	   Protocol	   37.	   The	   committees	   listed	   in	  
Protocol	   37	   include,	   for	   example,	   the	   Administrative	   Commission	   for	   the	  
coordination	  of	   social	   security	   systems,	   the	  Advisory	  Committee	  on	  Restrictive	  
Practices	   and	   Dominant	   Positions,	   a	   number	   of	   committees	   on	   pharmaceutics	  
and	   medicinal	   products,	   and	   many	   others.	   The	   Protocol	   37	   list	   is	   subject	   to	  
amendments	  by	  the	  Joint	  Committee,184	  when	  the	   ‘good	  functioning’	  of	  the	  EEA	  
Agreement	  demands	  the	  association	  of	  EEA	  EFTA	  States	  in	  more	  committees.185	  	  
The	   role	   of	   EEA	   EFTA	   States	   in	   shaping	   EU’s	   policies	   also	   extends	   to	   the	  
implementation	  of	  EU	  law	  in	  comitology	  committees.186	  Comitology	  committees	  
are	   in	  place	   to	  assist	   the	  Commission	   in	   its	   task	  to,	   in	  certain	  cases,	   implement	  
EU	   law	   in	  accordance	  with	  Article	  291	  TFEU.	  Comitology	  committees	  comprise	  
representatives	   of	   the	   Member	   States	   as	   well	   as,	   where	   relevant	   to	   the	   EEA	  
Agreement,	  representatives	  of	  the	  EEA	  EFTA	  countries.187	  	  
As	  Member	  States’	  national	   representatives	   control	   the	  Commission’s	  activities	  
in	   the	  comitology	  procedure	  so	  do	   the	  EEA	  EFTA	  States.188	  The	  Member	  States	  
can	   make	   use	   of	   two	   procedures:	   examination	   and	   advisory	   procedure.	  
Examination	   committees	   are	   established	   for	   the	   purpose	   of	   scrutinising	   the	  
Commission’s	  implementing	  activities.	  They	  are	  composed	  of	  representatives	  of	  
the	  Member	  States	  and,	  where	  appropriate,	  of	  EEA	  EFTA	  States	  but	  chaired	  by	  
the	   Commission.	   The	   examination	   procedure	   is	   used	   in	   the	   case	   of	   general	   or	  
potentially	   important	   measures.	   The	   support	   of	   a	   qualified	   majority	   of	   the	  
committee	   is	   sought.	   The	   Commission	  may,	   in	   the	   event	   of	   a	   negative	   opinion	  
expressed	   by	   the	   committee,	   either	   amend	   the	   text	   or	   take	   the	   matter	   to	   an	  
appeal	  committee	  for	  further	  discussion.	  Should	  the	  examination	  committee	  fail	  
                                            
Agency	  for	  Safety	  and	  Health	  at	  Work	  [1994]	  OJ	  L216/1	  as	  amended	  by	  Council	  Regulations	  (EC)	  
No	  1643/95,	  1654/2003	  and	  1112/2005.	  	  
184	  Article	  101(2)	  EEA	  Agreement.	  	  
185	  Article	  101(1)	  EEA	  Agreement.	  
186	  Article	  100	  EEA	  Agreement.	  
187	   Regulation	   (EU)	   No	   182/2011	   of	   the	   European	   Parliament	   and	   of	   the	   Council	   of	  
16	  February	  2011	   laying	   down	   the	   rules	   and	   general	   principles	   concerning	   mechanisms	   for	  
control	   by	   Member	   States	   of	   the	   Commission’s	   exercise	   of	   implementing	   powers	   [2011]	   OJ	  
L55/13.	  	  
188	  T	  Christiansen	  and	  T	  Larsson	  (n	  85)	  5.	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to	  give	  an	  opinion,	  the	  Commission	  may,	  under	  certain	  circumstances,	  adopt	  the	  
draft	  with	  the	  exception	  of	  trade	  policy	  where	  different	  rules	  apply.	  The	  second,	  
advisory	   procedure,	   is	   used	   for	   the	   adoption	   of	   implementing	   acts	   in	   all	   other	  
cases.	  The	  opinions	  of	   the	   advisory	   committee	   are	   adopted	  by	   simple	  majority	  
and	   the	   Commission	  must	   take	   ‘the	   utmost	   account’	   of	   the	   opinion	   expressed.	  
The	  EEA	  EFTA	  States	  do	  not	  possess	  voting	  rights	  but	  are	  able	  to	   influence	  the	  
outcome	   through	   informal	  means.189	  Furthermore,	   the	   information	  gathered	   in	  
the	   committees	   facilitates	   the	   later	   implementation	   of	   the	   acts	   adopted	   in	   the	  
comitology	  procedure	  in	  the	  EEA	  EFTA	  States.190	  
The	  EEA	  EFTA	  States’	  participation	  in	  the	  various	  stages	  of	  EU	  decision-­‐shaping	  
procedures	   has	   a	   dual	   objective.	   The	   first	   is	   that	   of	   increasing	   democratic	  
legitimacy	   and	   autonomy.191	   Notwithstanding	   the	   possibility	   of	   the	   EEA	   EFTA	  
States	  to	  refuse	  the	  incorporation	  of	  a	  new	  or	  amended	  EU	  legal	  act	  into	  the	  EEA	  
Agreement	   and	   the	   purely	   international	   law	   character	   of	   the	   arrangement,	   the	  
ability	   to	   influence	   the	   content	   of	   the	   legislation	  means	   that	   to	   some	   extent	   at	  
least	   EU	   legislation	   is	   not	   completely	   ‘foreign’	   to	   the	   EEA	   EFTA	   States.	   On	   the	  
other	   hand,	   both	   the	  EEA	  EFTA	   States	   and	   the	  EU	  maintain	   their	   autonomy	  of	  
decision-­‐making	  in	  their	  separate	  pillars	  of	  the	  EEA	  and,	  thus,	  the	  overall	  balance	  
of	   benefits	   and	   obligations.	   The	   second,	   more	   pragmatic	   reason	   of	   EEA	   EFTA	  
States’	   participation	   is	   to	   ensure	   that	   through	   continuous	   information	   sharing	  
and	  consultation	  throughout	  the	  legislative	  procedure,	  with	  the	  exception	  of	  the	  
moment	   of	   adopting	   the	   legal	   act,	   a	   consensus	   will	   be	   reached	   in	   the	   Joint	  
Committee	   both	   on	   classifying	   a	   new	   piece	   of	   acquis	   as	   EEA	   relevant	   and	   on	  
amending	   the	  EEA	  Agreement.192	  Not	   of	   less	   relevance	   is	   the	   contribution	   to	   a	  
swift	   parliamentary	   procedure	   where	   required	   by	   the	   EEA	   EFTA	   States’	  
constitutions	   that	   is	   crucial	   for	   a	   timely	   implementation	   of	   the	   acquis.	   This	  
arrangement,	   therefore,	   seeks	   to	   reinforce	   both	   the	   substantive	   and	   temporal	  
dimensions	  of	  homogeneity.	  	  
                                            
189	   EEA	   Joint	   Parliamentary	   Committee,	   ‘EC	   comitology	   and	   the	   EEA’	   (Report	   and	   Resolution)	  
M/20/R/029,	  21	  June	  2011,	  8.	  
190	  ibid.	  	  
191	  Commission,	   ‘Future	  Relations	  between	  the	  Community	  and	  EFTA’	  (Press	  Release)	  P/89/72,	  
22	  November	  1989.	  
192	  Article	  99(4)	  EEA	  Agreement.	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Although	   described	   as	   ‘semi-­‐colonial’,193	   the	   actual	   importance	   of	   the	   ‘mere’	  
participation	   of	   the	   EEA	   EFTA	   States	   in	   the	   preparatory	   stages	   of	   the	   EU’s	  
legislative	  procedure	  should	  not	  be	  underestimated.	  Especially	  in	  the	  light	  of	  the	  
increasing	   importance	   of	   various	   new	   governance	   modes,	   participation	   in	   the	  
norm	   shaping	   may	   turn	   out	   to	   be	   almost	   as	   relevant	   as	   participation	   in	   the	  
formal	   decision-­‐making	   procedures.194	   This	   holds	   especially	   true	   for	   the	  
comitology	   committees,	   which	   are	   described	   exercising	   quasi-­‐legislative	  
functions	  and	  in	  which	  EEA	  EFTA	  States	  possess	  participation	  rights	  equal	  to	  the	  
EU	   Member	   States	   with	   the	   exception	   of	   voting.195	   What	   may	   curb	   the	  
effectiveness	  of	  the	  EEA	  EFTA	  States	  participation	  in	  the	  numerous	  venues	  are,	  
however,	   the	   limits	   of	   their	   own	   administrative	   capacity	   that	   requires	  
prioritising	  among	  different	  policy	  concerns.196	  
Finally,	   due	   to	   the	   international	   law	   character	   of	   the	   EEA	   Agreement	   and	   the	  
ensuing	   need	   for	   parliamentary	   approval	   for	   many	   of	   its	   amendments	   the	  
national	  parliaments	  of	   the	  EEA	  EFTA	  States	  are	   involved	   in	   the	  EEA	  decision-­‐
making	   to	   a	   much	   higher	   degree	   than	   their	   counterparts	   in	   the	   EU	   Member	  
States.	  Theoretically,	  this	  role	  of	  the	  national	  parliaments	  poses	  a	  significant	  risk	  
to	  the	  homogeneity	  of	  the	  EEA	  legal	  order.	  In	  practical	  terms,	  however,	  no	  EEA	  
EFTA	  State	  parliament	  has	  vetoed	  an	  amendment	  of	  the	  Agreement	  until	  now.197	  
3.2.2	  Energy	  Community	  
As	   in	   most	   other	   cases,	   the	   ECAA	   and	   the	   Energy	   Community	   feature	   more	  
simple	  structures	  than	  the	  well-­‐elaborated	  framework	  of	  the	  EEA	  but	  all	  share	  a	  
similar	  set	  of	  basic	  characteristics.	  	  
Similarly	   to	   the	   EEA	   Agreement,	   the	   Energy	   Community	   Treaty,	   too,	   contains	  
provisions	   on	   stakeholder	   consultations.	   In	   the	   two	   Fora	   established	   under	  
                                            
193	  A	  Tovias,	  'Exploring	  the	  ‘Pros’	  and	  ‘Cons’	  of	  Swiss	  and	  Norwegian	  Models	  of	  Relations	  with	  the	  
European	  Union	  –	  What	  Can	  Israel	  Learn	  from	  the	  Experiences	  of	  These	  Two	  Countries?'	  (2006)	  
41	  Cooperation	  and	  Conflict	  203,	  219.	  
194	  S	  Lavenex,	  'Concentric	  circles	  of	  flexible	  ‘EUropean’	  integration’	  (n	  176)	  377.	  
195	   GF	   Schaefer	   and	   A	   Türk,	   'The	   role	   of	   implementing	   committees'	   in	   T	   Christiansen	   and	   T	  
Larsson	  (eds),	  The	  Role	  of	  Committees	  in	  the	  Policy-­Process	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  (Edward	  Elgar	  
Publishing	  2007)	  182,	  184.	  
196	   S	  Kristjánsson	  and	  R	  Kristjánsson,	   'Delegation	   and	  Accountability	   in	   an	  Ambiguous	   System:	  
Iceland	  and	  the	  European	  Economic	  Area	  (EEA)'	  (2000)	  6	  The	  Journal	  of	  Legislative	  Studies	  105,	  
118.	  
197	  Foreign	  Affairs	  Committee,	  The	  future	  of	  the	  European	  Union:	  UK	  Government	  policy	  (HC	  2013-­‐
14	  1-­‐II)	  53.	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Article	   63	   ECT,	   all	   interested	   stakeholders	   including	   industry,	   regulators,	  
industry	  representative	  groups	  and	  consumers	  are	  represented.	  The	  Fora	  have	  
an	  advisory	  function	  in	  the	  Energy	  Community,	  dealing	  with	  electricity	  and	  gas	  
matters,	   respectively.	   As	   such,	   the	   Fora	   play	   a	   highly	   institutionalised	   role	   of	  
stakeholder	   consultation	   in	   the	   Energy	   Community.	   As	   regards	   third	   country	  
participation,	   Switzerland,	   Liechtenstein	   and	   the	   EFTA	   Surveillance	   Authority	  
have	  been	  represented	  in	  the	  Gas	  Regulatory	  Forum,	  and	  Norway	  and	  the	  EFTA	  
Surveillance	  Authority	  in	  the	  Electricity	  Regulatory	  Forum.198	  The	  ECT	  does	  not	  
provide	  any	  information	  about	  the	  participation	  of	  non-­‐EU	  third	  country	  experts	  
in	   the	   Commission’s	   committees	   or	   working	   groups	   but	   neither	   is	   such	  
participation	  excluded.	  	  
The	   fact	   that	   third	   country	   experts	   are	   not	   necessarily	   represented	   in	   the	  
committees	  advising	  the	  European	  Commission	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  they	  cannot	  
participate	   through	   other	   channels.	   In	   many	   agencies	   and	   programmes,	   for	  
example,	   participation	   is	   limited	   to	   EU	   Member	   States,	   EEA	   EFTA	   States	   and	  
candidate	  countries.	  Many	  ECAA	  and	  Energy	  Community	  associated	  parties	  are,	  
in	  fact,	  EU	  candidate	  countries.	  The	  current	  list	  of	  the	  latter	  includes	  Macedonia	  
(FYROM),	  Montenegro,	  Serbia	  and	  Turkey.	  	  
Yet	   in	   a	   Commission	   Communication	   on	   the	   possibilities	   of	   allowing	   ENP	  
partners	   to	   take	   part	   in	   the	   activities	   of	   EU	   agencies	   and	   programmes	   it	   is	  
apparent	  that	  the	  latter	  are	  increasingly	  open	  towards	  external	  participation.199	  
Decisions	  on	  each	  ENP	  country’s	  participation	  are	  taken	  on	  a	  separate	  basis,	  thus	  
enabling	  some	  to	  participate	  and	  others	  not.	  One	  of	  the	  objectives	  of	  opening	  up	  
the	   agencies	   and	   programmes	   to	   participation	   by	   non-­‐EU	  Member	   States	   is	   to	  
prepare	   third	   countries	   for	   the	   adoption	   of	   the	   acquis	   either	   in	   the	   accession	  
process	   or	   as	   a	   party	   to	   an	   agreement	   that	   exports	  EU	  acquis.200	   Participation,	  
therefore,	  is	  perceived	  as	  increasing	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  norms	  export.	  This	  is	  a	  
                                            
198	   See,	   for	   example,	   Attendance	   List,	   27th	   meeting	   of	   the	   European	   Gas	   Regulatory	   Forum,	  
Madrid,	   20-­‐21	   April	   2015	  	  	  
<http://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/GASFORUM-­‐attendance.pdf>	  
accessed	  24	  June	  2015;	  List	  of	  participants,	  27th	  meeting	  of	  the	  European	  Electricity	  Regulatory	  
Forum,	   Florence,	   27-­‐28	   November	   2014	  
<https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/meeting_027_participants.pdf>	  
accessed	  24	  June	  2015.	  
199	  Commission,	  ‘General	  approach	  to	  enable	  ENP	  partner	  countries	  to	  participate	  in	  Community	  
agencies	  and	  Community	  programmes’	  (Communication)	  COM	  (2006)	  724	  final.	  	  
200	  ibid	  7.	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conclusion	   that	   can	   already,	   in	   a	   very	   institutionalised	   setting,	   be	   drawn	  with	  
regard	  to	  the	  EEA.	  
3.2.3	  European	  Common	  Aviation	  Area	  
Information	   and	   consultation	   are	   prominent	   also	   in	   the	   ECAA	  Agreement.	   The	  
ECAA	  contracting	  parties	  exchange	  information	  on	  legislative	  changes	  that	  have	  
a	   perceived	   relevance	   for	   the	   ECAA	   Agreement.201	   As	   in	   the	   case	   of	   the	   EEA,	  
consultation	  on	  the	  matter	  may	  be	  taken	  to	  the	  Joint	  Committee	  upon	  request	  by	  
one	  of	  the	  parties.	  The	  range	  of	  issues	  discussed	  in	  the	  Joint	  Committee	  notably	  
includes	  social	  matters.	  	  
Annex	   II	   to	   the	  ECAA	  Agreement	   lays	  out	   the	  procedure	   for	  consultations	  with	  
the	   associated	   parties	   within	   the	   relevant	   committees	   of	   the	   EU.	   The	   general	  
clause	  on	  exchange	  of	   information	  applies.202	  According	   to	  Point	  4	  of	  Annex	   II,	  
the	  Commission	  consults	  experts	  of	  non-­‐EU	  ECAA	  states.	  Like	  EU	  Member	  State	  
experts,	   ECAA	   experts	   may	   submit	   their	   advice	   and	   opinions	   whenever	   ECAA	  
relevant	   acts	   are	   discussed	   in	   the	   EU	   committees.	   The	   consultation	   procedure	  
consists	   of	   one	   meeting	   that	   takes	   place	   in	   the	   ECAA	   Joint	   Committee	   and	   is	  
chaired	  by	  the	  European	  Commission.	  The	  consultation	  meeting	  is	  convened	  by	  
the	   Commission	   and	   takes	   place	   prior	   to	   the	  meeting	   of	   the	   EU	   Committee	   in	  
question.	   The	   ECAA	   associated	   parties	   have	   two	   weeks	   to	   prepare	   for	   the	  
meeting	  with	  all	  necessary	  information	  disseminated	  by	  the	  Commission,	  unless	  
time	   constraints	   caused	   by	   specific	   circumstances.	   Interestingly,	   ECAA	  
associated	   parties	   do	   not,	   therefore,	   participate	   in	   the	   exchange	   of	   views	   that	  
takes	   place	   within	   the	   Commission	   between	   the	   EU	   Member	   States	   and	   EEA	  
EFTA	   States,	   wherever	   the	   legislative	   act	   in	   question	   is	   part	   of	   the	   EEA	  
Agreement.	  As	  usual,	  the	  Commission	  ‘shall	  take	  due	  account’	  of	  the	  views	  of	  the	  
ECAA	  parties	  and	  consider	  them	  together	  with	  all	  other	  expert	  opinions	  gathered	  
at	  the	  preliminary	  stage	  of	  expert	  consultations.	  The	  one	  exception	  regarding	  the	  
consultation	   procedure	   concerns	   competition	   rules	   for	   which	   a	   special	  
consultation	  procedure	  provided	  in	  Annex	  III	  to	  the	  ECAA	  Agreement	  applies.	  	  
                                            
201	  Article	  18(4)	  ECAA	  Agreement.	  	  
202	  Point	  5,	  Annex	  II	  to	  the	  ECAA	  Agreement.	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In	  addition	   to	   the	  separate	  consulting	  committees,	   the	  ECAA	  associated	  parties	  
may	  also	  participate	   in	  the	  activities	  of	  some	  EU	  committees	  such	  as	  the	  Single	  
Sky	   Committee	   that	   exercises	   comitology	   functions	   by	   examining	   draft	  
implementing	  rules	  before	  the	  Commission	  proceeds	  to	  adopt	  them.	  The	  Single	  
Sky	  Committee	  is	  composed	  of	  the	  representatives	  of	  the	  European	  Commission,	  
the	  EU	  Member	  States,	   the	  ECAA	  States	  as	  Members	  without	  voting	  rights,	  and	  
various	   aviation	   organisations	   and	   bodies	   as	   observers.203	   Importantly,	  
Regulation	  No	  549/2004	  on	  the	  Single	  European	  Sky204	  envisages	  in	  addition	  to	  
the	   establishment	   of	   the	   Single	   Sky	   Committee	   also	   an	   industry	   consultation	  
body	   that	   comprises	   air	   navigation	   service	   providers,	   associations	   of	   airspace	  
users,	   airport	   operators,	   the	   manufacturing	   industry	   and	   professional	   staff	  
representative	   bodies.205	   The	   industry	   consultation	   body	   advises	   the	  
Commission	  on	   the	   implementation	  of	   the	  Single	  European	  Sky.	   Insofar	   as	   this	  
Article	   applies	   to	   the	   ECAA	   Agreement	   it	   can	   be	   assumed	   that	   non-­‐EU	   ECAA	  
stakeholders,	   too,	   participate	   in	   its	   activities.	   In	   the	   context	   of	   the	   Single	  
European	  Sky,	  particular	  attention	   is	  accorded	   to	   informing	  and	  consulting	   the	  
social	  partners	  on	  measures	  with	  substantial	  social	  implications,	  for	  example	  by	  
means	   of	   consulting	   the	   Sectoral	   Dialogue	   committee	   established	   under	  
Commission	  Decision	  1998/500/EC.206	  
It	  is	  obvious	  that	  among	  non-­‐EU	  Member	  States	  the	  EEA	  EFTA	  States	  have	  more	  
influence	  on	  the	  ECAA	  acquis	  if	  the	  latter	  also	  forms	  part	  of	  the	  EEA	  Agreement.	  
Non-­‐EEA	  countries,	  however,	  have	  the	  possibility	  of	  expressing	  their	  opinion,	  at	  
least	  in	  the	  comitology	  committee.	  	  
Finally,	   since	   Norway	   and	   Iceland	   are	   parties	   to	   the	   ECAA	   Agreement	   it	   is	  
important	   to	   note	   that	   the	   provisions	   of	   the	   ECAA	   Agreement	   are	   without	  
prejudice	  to	  the	  respective	  rules	  in	  the	  EEA	  Agreement.207	  All	  of	  these	  rules	  are	  
                                            
203	  See,	   for	  example,	   the	   list	  of	  participants:	  Summary	  Report	  of	   the	  54th	  meeting	  of	   the	  Single	  
Sky	   Committee	   (SSC),	   Brussels,	   1	   and	   2	   July	   2014	  
<http://www.eraa.org/system/files/Summary%20Report%20of%20the%2054th%20meeting
%20of%20the%20Single%20Sky%20Committee.pdf>	  accessed	  24	  June	  2015.	  	  
204	   Regulation	   (EC)	   No	   549/2004	   of	   the	   European	   Parliament	   and	   of	   the	   Council	   of	   10	  March	  
2004	  laying	  down	  the	  framework	  for	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  single	  European	  sky	  [2004]	  OJ	  L96/1.	  
205	  ibid	  Article	  6.	  
206	  ibid,	  Recital	  17	  of	  the	  Preamble;	  Commission	  Decision	  of	  20	  May	  1998	  on	  the	  establishment	  of	  
Sectoral	  Dialogue	  Committees	  promoting	  the	  Dialogue	  between	  the	  social	  partners	  at	  European	  
level	  (98/500/EC)	  [1998]	  OJ	  L225/27.	  
207	  Recital	  11,	  Preamble	  to	  the	  ECAA	  Agreement;	  Article	  5	  ECAA	  Agreement.	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of	  EU	  origin	  and	  in	  all	  probability	  identical	  in	  wording.	  Article	  5	  ECAA	  Agreement	  
is	  meant	  to	  eliminate	  potential	  conflicts	  between	  the	  differing	  scopes	  of	  the	  EEA	  
and	   ECAA	   Agreements	   with	   respect	   to	   the	   same	   legislation.	   Should	   the	   ECAA	  
Joint	   Committee	   reject	   an	   amendment	   to	   the	   ECAA	   Agreement	   to	   adapt	   its	  
content	  to	  changes	  in	  the	  EU	  acquis,	  Iceland	  and	  Norway	  would	  remain	  bound	  by	  
the	  obligations	  assumed	  under	   the	  EEA	  Agreement.	  Vice	  versa,	   this	  would	  also	  
apply	   in	   the	   hypothetical	   situations	   where	   the	   EEA	   Joint	   Committee	   rejects	   a	  
change	   regarding	   a	   piece	   of	   EU	   legislation	   that	   forms	   part	   of	   the	   ECAA	  
Agreement.	  What	  can	  create	  confusion	  in	  interpretation	  and	  application,	  though,	  
are	   the	   different	   scopes	   of	   the	   ECAA	   and	   the	   EEA	   Agreements	   and	   their	  
respective	  objectives	  and	  context.	  Council	  Directive	  93/13/EEC	  on	  unfair	  terms	  
in	  consumer	  contracts,208	  for	  example,	  is	  incorporated	  into	  both	  the	  EEA	  and	  the	  
ECAA	   agreements.	   However,	   the	   sectoral	   scope	   of	   the	   ECAA	   Agreement	   may	  
require	  a	  narrower	   interpretation	  of	   the	  provisions	  of	   the	  Directive	  than	  in	  the	  
EEA	  or	  the	  EU.	  The	  Court	  recognised	  in	  Opinion	  1/00	  the	  problem	  of	  two	  sets	  of	  
identical	  rules	  –	  those	  of	  the	  ECAA	  and	  of	  the	  EU	  –	  being	  applicable	  on	  the	  same	  
territory	   but	   not	   being	   subject	   to	   identical	   implementation	   and	   enforcement	  
mechanisms.209	  The	   same	  holds	   true	   in	   the	  EEA-­‐ECAA	  axis,	   or	   even	   that	  of	   the	  
EEA-­‐Energy	  Community.	  
4	  Conclusion	  
On	  the	  one	  hand,	  homogeneity	  in	  the	  extended	  internal	  market	  is	  dependent	  on	  
the	   suitability	   of	   the	   institutional	   and	   procedural	   frameworks	   set	   up	   by	   the	  
multilateral	   agreements	   for	   the	   task	   of	   exporting	   the	   acquis	   in	   a	   timely	   and	  
comprehensive	   manner.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   homogeneity	   is	   affected	   by	   the	  
willingness	  of	  third	  countries	  to	  incorporate	  new	  EU	  acquis	  into	  the	  multilateral	  
agreement	  and	  later,	  where	  applicable,	  into	  their	  domestic	  legal	  orders.	  For	  the	  
sake	  of	  ensuring	  the	  dynamic	  character	  of	  the	  agreements	  exporting	  the	  acquis	  it	  
is	  important	  whether	  and	  to	  what	  extent	  can	  representatives	  and	  stakeholders	  of	  
the	  non-­‐EU	  contracting	  parties	  participate	   in	   the	  process	  of	   shaping	   the	  acquis	  
on	  the	  EU	  level.	  
                                            
208	  Council	  Directive	  93/13/EEC	  of	  5	  April	  1993	  on	  unfair	  terms	  in	  consumer	  contracts	  [1993]	  OJ	  
L95/29.	  
209	  Opinion	  1/00	  ECAA	  [2002]	  ECR	  I-­‐3493,	  para	  10.	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Firstly,	   the	   level	   of	   sophistication	   of	   the	   institutional	   and	   procedural	  
arrangements	   for	   ensuring	   homogeneity	   in	   the	   expanded	   internal	  market	   is	   in	  
obvious	   correlation	  with	   the	   scope	   of	   the	   international	   agreement	   in	   question.	  
The	   EEA	   Agreement	   envisages	   strong	   guarantees	   not	   only	   in	   terms	   of	   the	  
substantive	  aspects	  of	  homogeneity	  –	   the	   transferral	  of	  a	   large	  part	  of	  relevant	  
acquis	  from	  the	  EU	  to	  the	  EEA	  –	  but	  also	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  temporal	  and	  territorial	  
aspects	  thereof.	  By	  imposing	  strict	  deadlines	  for	  the	  incorporation	  of	  new	  acquis	  
and	   establishing	   consequences	   for	   all	   EEA	   EFTA	   States	   in	   the	   event	   of	   non-­‐
compliance	  by	  one,	  significant	  effort	  has,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  been	  made	  to	  ensure	  
that	   the	   EFTA	   pillar	   of	   the	   EEA	   remains	   homogeneous.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	  
treating	  the	  EFTA	  pillar	  as	  one	  whole	  and	  subjecting	  all	  three	  EEA	  EFTA	  States	  to	  
a	   potential	   suspension	   of	   a	   part	   of	   the	   agreement	   –	   the	   concept	   being	  
undetermined	  as	   it	   has	  never	  been	  put	   to	  practice	   –	   is	   a	   further	   guarantee	   for	  
maintaining	  homogeneity	   in	   the	  EU-­‐EEA	  dimension.	  Much	  simpler	  mechanisms	  
and,	   thus,	   weaker	   guarantees	   for	   homogeneity	   are	   in	   place	   in	   sectoral	  
agreements.	  This	  applies	   to	   the	  substantive,	   temporal	  and	   territorial	  aspects	  of	  
homogeneity	  alike.	  
Secondly,	   the	   increasing	   use	   of	   new	   governance	   methods	   has	   influenced	   the	  
range	   of	   actors	   involved	   in	   EU’s	   decision-­‐shaping	   and	   decision-­‐making	  
procedures.	  Traditionally,	   the	  participation	  of	   external	   actors	   in	   the	  EU	  policy-­‐
making	   has	   been	   limited	   to	   Commission	   expert	   groups.	   The	   procedures	   for	  
engaging	   third	   country	   representatives	   in	   the	   preparatory	   stages	   of	   decision-­‐
making	   are	   well	   structured	   in	   the	   case	   of	   the	   EEA	   but	   more	   ambiguous	   in	  
relation	   to	   the	   Energy	   Community	   and	   the	   ECAA.	   Early	   information	   and	  
consultation	  procedures	  are	  not	  only	   relevant	   from	  a	  democratic	  point	  of	  view	  
but	   also	   exert	   a	   positive	   impact	   the	   acceptance	   of	   the	   acquis	   by	   the	   third	  
countries.	   This	   may	   be	   shown	   either	   in	   the	   stage	   of	   incorporating	   new	   or	  
amended	   acquis	   in	   the	   multilateral	   agreement	   or	   in	   the	   stage	   of	   satisfying	  
national	   constitutional	   requirements.	  Early	  discussions	  are	  even	  more	   relevant	  
in	   the	   case	   of	   the	   EEA	   where	   the	   Joint	   Committee	   decisions	   on	   updating	   the	  
acquis	   are	   taken	   by	   consensus	   rather	   than	   by	   formal	   voting.	   In	   the	   Energy	  
Community	  and	  the	  ECAA	  voting	   takes	  place	  although	  unanimity	   is	  required	   in	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the	   ECAA	   unless	   the	   ECAA	   Joint	   Committee	   decides	   upon	   a	   different	   voting	  
majority.	  	  
The	  new	  governance	  methods	  concern	  mostly	   flanking	  policies	   including	   those	  
relevant	   to	   the	   core	   of	   the	   internal	   market	   –	   social	   policy	   and	   environmental	  
protection.	   In	   addition	   to	   new,	   especially	   soft	   law	   measures,	   information	   and	  
consultation	  are	  the	  essence	  of	  new	  governance	  in	  the	  EU.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  the	  
requirement	   to	   disseminate	   information	   about	   new	   legislative	   proposals	   and	  
include	   third	   countries	   in	   the	   discussions	   may	   well	   grant	   more	   participatory	  
opportunities	  for	  the	  latter.	  In	  turn,	  rule	  making	  procedures	  that	  depart	  from	  the	  
classic	  Community	  method	  are	  often	  not	   regulated	  by	   the	  EU	  Treaties	  and	  are,	  
thus,	  considerably	  more	  flexible	  in	  terms	  of	  participating	  actors.	  Participation,	  in	  
turn,	  may	  suggest	  increased	  compliance.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  however,	  where	  new	  
governance	   translates	   into	   incorporating	   non-­‐traditional	   participants	   into	   EU	  
law	   making,	   such	   as	   in	   the	   case	   of	   the	   social	   dialogue,	   third	   country	  
representatives	  may	   become	  more	   excluded	   from	   the	   policy-­‐making	   processes	  
than	  would	  have	  been	  the	  case	  under	  the	  classic	  Community	  method.	  Statistics,	  
nevertheless,	   reveals	   that	  although	  new	  governance	  methods	  are	  emerging	   the	  
prevalent	  means	   of	   decision-­‐making	   in	   the	   EU,	   especially	   outside	   the	   flanking	  
policies,	  are	  still	  the	  traditional	  Treaty	  procedures.210	  
As	   concerns	   the	   effect	   of	   decision-­‐making	   procedures	   on	   the	   quest	   for	  
homogeneity	   in	   an	   expanded	   EU	   internal	  market	   it	   can	   be	   concluded	   that	   the	  
more	  comprehensive	  the	  framework	  the	  more	  sophisticated	  the	  institutional	  and	  
procedural	   guarantees	   for	   achieving	   homogeneity	   and	   the	  more	   homogeneous	  
the	  outcome.	  It	  is	  certainly	  possible	  to	  achieve	  homogeneity	  through	  institutional	  
and	   procedural	  means	   but	   less	   easy	   to	  maintain	   the	   homogeneity.	   Both	  quasi-­‐
sanctions	   such	   as	   the	   suspension	   of	   a	   part	   of	   the	   agreement	   and	   early	  
participation	   in	   the	   EU’s	   decision-­‐making	   processes	   are	   important	   factors	   that	  
encourage	   timely	   adaptation	   of	   the	   non-­‐EU	   segments	   of	   the	   expanded	   internal	  
market	   to	   changes	   in	   the	   relevant	  acquis	   in	   the	   EU.	   Limited	   by	   the	   ‘balance	   of	  
benefits	   and	   obligations’	   and	   the	   autonomy	   of	   the	   EU	   legal	   order,	   the	  
participation	   of	   third	   countries	   in	   the	   defining	   of	   the	   acquis	   cannot	   extend	   to	  
                                            
210	   K	   Holzinger,	   C	   Knill	   and	   A	   Schäfer,	   'Rhetoric	   or	   Reality?	   ‘New	   Governance’	   in	   EU	  
Environmental	  Policy'	  (2006)	  12	  European	  Law	  Journal	  403.	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formal	  decision-­‐making.	  The	  increasing	  use	  of	  new	  governance	  methods	  that	  are	  
characterised	   by	   stakeholder	   participation,	   however,	   opens	   up	   possibilities	   for	  
deeper	  third	  country	  involvement	  in	  the	  making	  of	  the	  acquis	  and,	  thus,	  a	  larger	  
degree	  of	  homogeneity	  provided	  that	  stakeholder	  participation	   is	  open	  to	  third	  
countries.	  	  
 
	   299 
Chapter	  7	   Institutional	  framework:	  safeguarding	  the	  core	  
1	  Introduction	  
The	   fundamental	   purpose	   of	   the	   internal	   market	   is	   to	   create	   a	   legal	   space	   in	  
which	  all	  market	  operators	  enjoy	  the	  same	  rights	  and	  obligations.	  In	  addition	  to	  
the	   same	   set	   of	   rules,	   unity	   in	   the	   internal	  market	   demands	   that	   the	   rules	   be	  
implemented	   and	   enforced	   in	   an	   effective	   manner	   so	   as	   to	   grant	   all	   market	  
participants	  the	  rights	   that	   they	  derive	   from	  the	  EU	  Treaties.	  Most	  directly,	   the	  
principle	  of	   effectiveness	   finds	   expression	   in	   the	   foundational	  principles	  of	   the	  
EU,	  especially	  that	  of	  direct	  effect.	  As	  stated	  above,	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  principle	  
of	   direct	   effect	   is	   to	   maintain	   unity	   in	   the	   EU	   and	   to	   guarantee	   uniform	  
application	  of	  EU	  law	  throughout	  the	  Union.	  
In	   order	   to	   achieve	   the	   objective	   of	   creating	   a	   common	  market,	   including	   the	  
uniform	   protection	   of	   individual	   rights,	   the	   EEC	   Treaty	   set	   up	   ‘institutions	  
endowed	  with	  sovereign	  rights,	  the	  exercise	  of	  which	  affects	  Member	  States	  and	  
also	  their	  citizens’.1	  Comprising	  a	  number	  of	  sovereign	  states	  it	  is	  indispensable	  
for	   the	   internal	  market	   to	   have	   common	   institutions	   that	   have	   been	   conferred	  
with	   independent	  powers	  to	  enforce	  the	  common	  rules	  as	  well	  as	   to	  be	  able	  to	  
effectively	   coordinate	   the	  actions	  of	   its	   constituent	   states.2	  EU	   individuals	  both	  
benefit	  from	  and	  participate	  in	  the	  functioning	  of	  the	  EU	  and	  its	  internal	  market.	  
In	  order	  to	  expand	  the	  internal	  market	  to	  non-­‐EU	  Member	  States,	  therefore,	  the	  
individuals	  of	  the	  latter,	  too,	  should	  be	  able	  to	  both	  benefit	  from	  and	  participate	  
in	  the	  functioning	  of	  the	  market	  either	  individually	  or	  via	  the	  institutions	  of	  their	  
respective	  states.	  	  
As	   regards	  EU	   institutions,	   the	  primary	  actors	  dealing	  with	   the	  enforcement	  of	  
EU	   law	  are	   the	  Commission	  and	   the	  EU	   judiciary.	  The	  bulk	  of	   the	  enforcement	  
duty	   is,	  however,	  performed	  by	  Member	  State	  authorities.	  National	   influence	   is	  
very	   notable	   in	   the	   EU’s	   institutional	   architecture.	   The	   EU	   legal	   order	   is	  
supranational	  but	  the	  EU	  is	  not	  a	  federal	  state.	  The	  Member	  States	  are	  sovereign	  
and	  maintain	  a	  high	  degree	  of	  procedural	  autonomy.	  In	  such	  circumstances,	  it	  is	  
impossible	   for	   the	  Union	  to	  exercise	   its	  surveillance	  and	  enforcement	  activities	  
                                            
1	  Case	  26/62	  Van	  Gend	  en	  Loos	  [1963]	  ECR	  1.	  
2	  R	  Barents,	  The	  Autonomy	  of	  Community	  Law	  (Kluwer	  Law	  International	  2004)	  201.	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in	  a	  manner	  comparable	  to	  nation	  states.	  Instead,	  the	  effective	  functioning	  of	  the	  
internal	  market	  must	  be	  ensured	   through	  means	  of	   close	   cooperation	  between	  
the	  centralised	  procedures	  for	  surveillance	  and	  enforcement	  on	  the	  EU	  level	  and	  
the	   Member	   States’	   national	   authorities	   acting	   as	   constituent	   parts	   of	   the	   EU	  
institutional	  system.	  Both	  the	  centralising	  and	  the	  decentralising	  dynamics	  play	  a	  
role	  in	  the	  effective	  protection	  of	  individual	  rights	  in	  the	  Union	  and	  the	  internal	  
market.	  	  
In	   the	   process	   of	   creating	   an	   expanded	   internal	   market	   that	   is	   homogeneous	  
both	  in	  its	  internal	  and	  external	  dimensions,	  the	  uniformity	  of	  rules	  goes	  hand	  in	  
hand	   with	   their	   uniform	   application	   and	   effective	   enforcement.	   The	   former	  
ensures	   that	   individuals	   and	   economic	   operators	   across	   the	   expanded	   EU	  
internal	   market	   have	   the	   same	   rights	   whereas	   the	   latter	   make	   sure	   that	   the	  
individuals	  can,	  indeed,	  enjoy	  the	  rights	  thus	  conferred	  to	  an	  extent	  equal	  to	  EU	  
nationals	   regardless	  of	  whether	   they	   find	   themselves	  on	   the	  EU	  or	   the	  non-­‐EU	  
side	  of	   the	  expanded	  internal	  market.	   Institutional	  and	  procedural	  mechanisms	  
equivalent	  to	  those	  established	  by	  the	  EU	  Treaties	  must,	  therefore,	  necessarily	  be	  
created	  by	  the	  international	  agreements	  that	  export	  the	  acquis	  in	  order	  to	  allow	  
for	  a	  true	  extension	  of	  the	  internal	  market.	  	  
There	  is	  nothing,	  not	  even	  the	  case	  law	  of	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice,	  to	  compromise	  the	  
general	  objective	  of	  setting	  up	  institutions	  endowed	  with	  similar	  tasks	  as	  the	  EU	  
institutions	   for	   the	   purpose	   of	   maintaining	   homogeneity	   within	   the	   expanded	  
internal	  market.	  The	  only	  restrictions	  are	  imposed,	  from	  an	  EU	  law	  perspective,	  
by	  the	  necessity	  to	  safeguard	  the	  autonomy	  of	  the	  EU	  legal	  order3	  and,	  from	  the	  
perspective	   of	   the	   expanded	  market,	   by	   a	   sufficient	   degree	   of	   efficiency	   of	   the	  
institutional	   framework.	   It	   is	   the	   judicial	   system	   of	   the	   EU	   that	   is	   particularly	  
sensitive	   towards	   external	   influence.	   A	   system	   of	   courts	   established	   by	   an	  
international	   agreement	   conferred	  with	   jurisdiction	   to	   settle	   disputes	   between	  
parties	   to	   an	   international	   agreement	   and	   to	   interpret	   its	   provisions	   has,	  
nevertheless,	  been	  deemed	  compatible	  with	  the	  EU	  Treaties.	  This	  is	  so	  even	  if	  the	  
decisions	  of	  that	  court	  will	  be	  binding	  on	  the	  institutions	  of	  the	  EU,	  including	  the	  
Court.4	  	  
                                            
3	  Discussed	  above	  in	  chapter	  5.	  	  
4	  Opinion	  1/91	  EEA	  I	  [1991]	  ECR	  I-­‐6079,	  paras	  39-­‐40.	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The	   following	   analysis	   is	   based	   on	   the	   assumption	   that	   an	   adequate	   level	   of	  
protection	  of	   individual	   rights	   through	  procedural	  means	   is	   guaranteed	  by	   the	  
system	  set	  up	  by	  the	  EU.	  In	  order	  to	  be	  deemed	  equally	  effective,	  the	  system	  of	  
institutions,	   procedures	   and	   remedies	   must	   contain	   at	   least	   certain	   core	  
elements	  of	  surveillance,	  enforcement	  and	  judicial	  protection	  as	  provided	  by	  the	  
EU	   Treaties.	   This	   chapter	   explores	   the	   different	   models	   of	   surveillance	   and	  
enforcement	   set	   up	   by	   Treaties	   and	   the	  multilateral	   agreements	   exporting	   the	  
internal	  market	  acquis,	   respectively.	  The	  analysis	   focuses	  on	  the	  characteristics	  
of	  the	  various	  institutional	  mechanisms	  and	  their	  relative	  efficiency	  in	  terms	  of	  
ensuring	  the	  identical	  interpretation	  and	  the	  effective	  enforcement	  of	  the	  acquis	  
in	   the	   broadened	   internal	   market.	   Although	   the	   institutions	   and	   procedures	  
involved	  in	  the	  application	  and	  enforcement	  of	  EU	  law	  and	  the	  exported	  acquis	  
are	  numerous,	  the	  current	  analysis	  focuses	  on	  the	  procedures	  of	  surveillance,	  on	  
the	  one	  hand,	  and	  the	  interpretation	  and	  application	  of	  the	  acquis	  by	  courts,	  on	  
the	  other.	  The	  latter	  discussion	  is	  limited	  to	  courts	  primarily	  because	  it	  is	  mainly	  
in	   the	   case	   law	   of	   courts	   where	   legal	   problems	   are	   identified,	   the	   core	   of	   the	  
Union	   system	   revealed	   and	   questions	   about	   judicial	   dialogue,	   hierarchies,	  
autonomy	  and	  independence	  answered.	  	  	  	  	  
The	   chapter	   is	   structured	   according	   to	   the	   modes	   of	   centralisation	   and	  
decentralisation.	   The	   first	   part	   of	   the	   chapter	   deals	   with	   the	   centralised	  
institutions	   and	   procedures	   for	   surveillance	   and	   enforcement	   in	   the	   EEA,	   the	  
Energy	   Community	   and	   the	   ECAA,	   and	   the	   cooperation	   between	   these	  
institutions	  and	  those	  of	  the	  Union.	  The	  second	  part	  of	  the	  chapter	  focuses	  on	  the	  
procedural	   links	  between	  the	   international	  or	  supranational	   institutions	  on	  the	  
one	   hand	   and	   national	   authorities	   and	   individuals	   on	   the	   other	   hand.	   The	  
analysis	  aims	  at	  identifying	  whether	  and	  if,	  then	  how	  different	  institutional	  and	  
procedural	  safeguards	  help	  achieve	  and	  maintain	  the	  homogeneous	  application	  
of	  the	  acquis	  in	  an	  expanded	  internal	  market.	  	  
2	  Safeguarding	  homogeneity:	  centralising	  dynamics	  
2.1	  Surveillance	  and	  enforcement	  
The	  main	  guardian	  of	   the	   functioning	  of	   the	  EU	  Treaties,	   including	   the	   internal	  
market,	  is	  the	  European	  Commission.	  Within	  the	  EU	  legal	  order,	  the	  Commission	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is	   specifically	   tasked	   to	   investigate	   the	   proper	   performance	   by	   the	   Member	  
States	  of	  their	  duties	  under	  the	  Treaties.	  There	  are	  several	  procedures	  designed	  
for	  scrutinising	  the	  Member	  States’	  compliance	  with	  their	  obligations	  under	  EU	  
law.	  
Firstly,	   the	   Commission	   may	   take	   initiatives	   itself	   under	   Article	   258	   TFEU.	  
Suspecting	  that	  a	  Member	  State	  has	  infringed	  the	  Treaties,	  the	  Commission	  may	  
issue	  a	  reasoned	  opinion	  and	  allow	  the	  Member	  State	  to	  submit	  observations.5	  If	  
the	   Member	   State	   in	   question	   fails	   to	   comply	   with	   the	   reasoned	   opinion	   the	  
Commission	  may	  initiate	  infringement	  proceedings	  before	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice.6	  	  
Secondly,	  the	  Commission	  may	  follow	  the	  initiative	  taken	  by	  the	  Member	  States	  
under	   Article	   259	   TFEU.	   In	   such	   cases,	   the	   Commission	   acts	   as	   a	   middle	   link	  
between	  a	  Member	  State	  alleging	  infringement	  by	  another	  Member	  State,	  on	  the	  
one	   hand,	   and	   the	   Court	   of	   Justice,	   on	   the	   other.	   The	   Commission	   receives	  
complaints	   from	   Member	   States,	   hears	   each	   State	   concerned	   and	   submits	   a	  
reasoned	  opinion	  after	  which	  the	  matter	  may	  be	  brought	  to	  the	  Court.7	  Member	  
States	   cannot	   take	   infringement	   actions	   directly	   to	   the	   Court	   without	   first	  
informing	   the	   Commission	   and	   allowing	   the	   latter	   to	   issue	   a	   reasoned	   opinion	  
within	   three	  months’	   time.	  Should	   the	  Commission	   fail	   to	  deliver	  an	  opinion	   in	  
the	  given	  timeframe,	  the	  Member	  State	  may	  nevertheless	  refer	  the	  matter	  to	  the	  
Court.	  
A	  decision	  of	  the	  Court	  establishing	  a	  breach	  of	  Treaty	  obligations	  is	  binding	  on	  
the	   Member	   State	   concerned.8	   The	   Commission	   must	   further	   monitor	   the	  
Member	  State’s	  compliance	  with	  the	  judgment.	  In	  case	  of	  a	  failure	  to	  rectify	  the	  
breach,	  the	  Commission	  may	  bring	  a	  new	  case	  to	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice	  specifying	  a	  
lump	  sum	  or	  penalty	  payment	  due	  by	  the	  Member	  State.9	  	  
The	  Commission	  plays	  a	  central	  role	  also	  where	  breaches	  of	  EU	  law	  by	  individual	  
market	   participants	   are	   concerned.	   The	   Commission’s	   role	   is	   especially	  
significant	   in	  the	   field	  of	  competition	   law	  that	   is	  one	  of	   the	  cornerstones	  of	   the	  
internal	   market.	   The	   Commission	   conducts	   investigation	   of	   suspected	  
                                            
5	  Article	  258	  TFEU.	  
6	  ibid.	  
7	  Article	  259	  TFEU.	  
8	  Article	  260(1)	  TFEU.	  
9	  Article	  260(2)	  TFEU.	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competition	  law	  infringements	  as	  well	  as	  proposes	  measures	  to	  bring	  them	  to	  an	  
end.10	  Similarly	  to	  cases	  of	  infringement	  against	  Member	  States,	  the	  Commission	  
may	  either	  act	  on	   its	  own	  initiative	  or	  on	  application	  by	  a	  Member	  State.	   If	   the	  
proposed	   measures	   prove	   inefficient,	   the	   Commission	   may	   issue	   a	   reasoned	  
decision	  and	  authorise	  the	  Member	  State	  in	  question	  to	  remedy	  the	  situation.11	  A	  
special	   surveillance	   and	   enforcement	   procedure	   in	   the	   field	   of	   state	   aids	   is	  
provided	  in	  Article	  108	  TFEU.	  	  
In	   the	  area	  of	   competition	   law,	   the	  EEA	  Agreement	  meticulously	   replicates	   the	  
surveillance	  system	  of	  the	  EU.	  The	  EEA	  Agreement	  envisages	  the	  establishment	  
of	   both	   ‘an	   independent	   surveillance	   authority’	   –	   the	   EFTA	   Surveillance	  
Authority	  (ESA)	  –	  and	  ‘procedures	  similar	  to	  those	  existing	  in	  the	  [Union]’	  for	  the	  
purposes	   of	   both	   monitoring	   compliance	   with	   the	   EEA	   Agreement	   and	   for	  
reviewing	  the	  legality	  of	  the	  acts	  of	  the	  ESA.12	  For	  the	  latter	  purpose,	  the	  SCA13	  
was	   concluded	   between	   the	   EEA	   EFTA	   States.	   Neither	   the	   EU	   nor	   its	  Member	  
States	  are	  parties	  to	  the	  SCA.	  	  
In	   terms	   of	   set-­‐up,	   the	   ESA	   resembles	   a	   smaller	   sibling	   of	   the	   European	  
Commission.	   The	   ESA	   has	   three	   independently	   acting	   members	   who	   are	   the	  
equivalent	  of	  EU	  Commissioners.14	  At	  least	  two	  EFTA	  states	  must	  be	  represented	  
among	  the	  members.	  The	  specific	  tasks	  of	  the	  ESA	  are	  to	  monitor	  the	  functioning	  
of	  the	  EEA	  Agreement	  and	  the	  SCA.15	  Just	  like	  the	  Commission,	  the	  ESA	  monitors	  
the	  compliance	  of	  EEA	  EFTA	  States	  both	  with	  the	  EEA	  Agreement	  generally16	  and	  
competition	  rules	  specifically.17	  If	  the	  ESA	  considers	  an	  EEA	  EFTA	  State	  to	  have	  
breached	   its	   obligations	   under	   the	   EEA	   Agreement,	   it	   delivers	   a	   reasoned	  
opinion	   upon	   which	   the	   state	   concerned	   has	   the	   possibility	   to	   submit	  
observations.18	   If	   the	   state	   concerned	   fails	   to	   comply	  with	   the	  opinion	   the	  ESA	  
may	   bring	   the	   matter	   to	   the	   EFTA	   Court.19	   Differently	   from	   the	   EU	   Member	  
                                            
10	  Article	  105(1)	  TFEU.	  
11	  Article	  105(2)	  TFEU.	  
12	  Article	  108	  EEA	  Agreement.	  
13	  Agreement	  between	   the	  EFTA	  States	  on	   the	  Establishment	  of	   a	   Surveillance	  Authority	   and	  a	  
Court	  of	  Justice	  [1994]	  OJ	  L344/3.	  
14	  Articles	  7	  and	  8	  SCA.	  
15	  Article	  22	  SCA.	  
16	  Article	  31	  SCA.	  
17	  Articles	  23-­‐25	  SCA.	  
18	  Article	  31	  SCA.	  
19	  ibid.	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States,	   though,	  the	  EEA	  EFTA	  States	  have	  no	  possibility	  to	   initiate	   infringement	  
proceedings	  against	  another	  EEA	  EFTA	  State.	  
Compliance	   with	   EEA	   competition	   rules	   is	   monitored	   by	   both	   the	   European	  
Commission	  and	  the	  ESA,	  both	  acting	  within	  their	  respective	  pillar	  of	  the	  EEA	  yet	  
in	  close	  cooperate	  in	  order	  to	  guarantee	  uniformity	  in	  the	  surveillance	  of	  the	  EEA	  
Agreement.20	  To	   this	   end,	   the	  Commission	  and	   the	  ESA	  are	  bound	   to	  exchange	  
information	   and	   consult	   each	   other	   both	   on	   general	   surveillance	   policy	   issues	  
and	  on	   individual	  cases.21	  When	  one	   institution	  receives	  a	  complaint	  about	   the	  
application	   of	   the	   EEA	   Agreement	   it	   must	   forward	   it	   to	   the	   other.	   Should	   a	  
complaint	  be	  handed	  in	  to	  the	  wrong	  institution,	  the	  case	  must	  be	  passed	  on	  to	  
the	   institution	   that	   is	   competent	   to	   handle	   the	   issue.22	   In	   the	   case	   of	  
disagreement	   between	   the	   Commission	   and	   the	   EFTA	   Surveillance	   Authority	  
concerning	  the	  action	  to	  be	  taken	  with	  regard	  to	  a	  complaint	  or	  the	  results	  of	  an	  
examination,	  either	  body	  may	  refer	  the	  issue	  to	  the	  EEA	  Joint	  Committee,	  rather	  
than	   either	   of	   the	   courts.23	   No	   similar	   penalty	   system	   as	   provided	   by	   Article	  
260(2)	  TFEU	  exists	  under	  the	  ESA,	  though.	  
The	   Commission	   and	   the	   ESA	   investigate	   suspected	   competition	   law	  
infringement	  cases	  in	  the	  EEA	  either	  on	  their	  own	  initiative,	  by	  request	  of	  an	  EEA	  
EFTA	  State	  on	  its	  respective	  territory	  or	  by	  the	  other	  surveillance	  authority.24	  In	  
the	   investigation	  process,	   the	  Commission	  and	   the	  ESA	  receive	  assistance	   from	  
each	  other	  and	  from	  the	  states	  concerned.25	  	  	  
The	   European	   Commission	   and	   the	   ESA	   each	   act	   on	   cases	   arising	  within	   their	  
designated	   area.26	   The	   ESA	   deals	   with	   cases	   which	   either	   only	   affect	   trade	  
between	   the	   EEA	   EFTA	   States	   or	   where	   the	   turnover	   of	   the	   undertakings	  
concerned	  in	  the	  territory	  of	  the	  EFTA	  States	  equals	  33	  per	  cent	  or	  more	  of	  their	  
turnover	  in	  the	  entire	  EEA	  territory.	  The	  remaining	  cases	  fall	  on	  the	  Commission	  
to	   decide,	   including	   those	   where	   trade	   between	   the	   EU	   Member	   States	   is	  
                                            
20	  Articles	  58	  and	  109(1)	  EEA	  Agreement;	  Protocols	  23	  and	  24	  to	  the	  EEA	  Agreement.	  
21	  Article	  109(2)	  EEA	  Agreement.	  
22	  Article	  109(3)	  and	  (4)	  EEA	  Agreement.	  
23	  Article	  109(5)	  EEA	  Agreement.	  
24	  Article	  55(1)	  EEA	  Agreement.	  	  
25	  ibid.	  
26	  Article	  56(1)	  EEA	  Agreement.	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affected.	   If	   the	   latter	   is	  not	  appreciable	   the	  case	   is	  decided	  by	   the	  ESA.27	  Cases	  
concerning	   the	  abuse	  of	  a	  dominant	  position	  are	  dealt	  with	  by	   the	  surveillance	  
authority	   in	   the	   territory	  of	  whom	   the	  dominant	  position	   is	   found	   to	  exist.28	   If	  
dominance	  exists	   in	   the	   territories	  of	  both	   surveillance	  authorities,	   the	   regular	  
rules	   apply.	   Special	   rules	   apply	   to	   the	   division	   of	   case	   law	   between	   the	  
Commission	   and	   the	   ESA	   in	   cases	   of	   concentrations.29	   Even	   where	   one	   of	   the	  
surveillance	  authorities	  is	  not	  competent	  to	  decide	  a	  case	  it	  may	  request	  copies	  
of	   important	   documents	   from	   the	   other	   authority	   during	   all	   stages	   of	   the	  
procedure	  as	  well	  as	  make	  observations.30	  
Should	  one	  of	  the	  surveillance	  authorities	  find	  that	  the	  implementation	  of	  state	  
aid	  control	  by	  the	  other	  fails	  to	  uphold	  equal	  conditions	  for	  competition	  within	  
the	  EEA	  the	  two	  institutions	  will	  hold	  an	  exchange	  of	  views	  within	  a	  timeframe	  of	  
two	  weeks.	  If	  they	  fail	  to	  find	  a	  common	  solution	  then	  the	  ‘competent	  authority	  
of	   the	   affected	   Contracting	   Party’	  may	   immediately	   adopt	   interim	  measures	   in	  
order	  to	  remedy	  the	  resulting	  distortion	  of	  competition.	  A	  commonly	  acceptable	  
solution	   will	   thereafter	   be	   sought	   in	   the	   EEA	   Joint	   Committee.	   If	   the	   Joint	  
Committee	  has	  not	  found	  such	  a	  solution	  within	  three	  months	  and	  if	  the	  practice	  
in	   question	   causes	   or	   threatens	   to	   cause	   distortion	   of	   competition	   that	   affects	  
trade	  between	  the	  parties	  to	  the	  EEA	  Agreement,	   the	   interim	  measures	  may	  be	  
replaced	   by	   definitive	   measures.	   The	   latter	   will	   be	   strictly	   limited	   to	   those	  
necessary	  to	  offset	  the	  effect	  of	  distortion	  to	  competition.	  Priority	  will	  be	  given	  to	  
measures	   that	  will	   least	   affect	   the	   functioning	   of	   the	   EEA	  Agreement.	   The	   fact	  
that	  differences	  will	  be	  solved	   in	   the	  EEA	   Joint	  Committee	  rather	   than	   through	  
judicial	   means	   –	   which	   more	   likely	   than	   not	   would	   have	   granted	   exclusive	  
jurisdiction	  to	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice	  –	  ensures	  that	  in	  the	  field	  of	  surveillance	  of	  the	  
functioning	  of	  the	  EEA	  Agreement	  the	  EU	  and	  the	  EFTA	  pillars	  of	  the	  EEA	  are	  on	  
an	   equal	   footing	   without	   the	   one	   being	   granted	   a	   more	   significant	   role	   in	  
safeguarding	  homogeneity	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  the	  other.	  
A	  uniform	  effect	  of	  surveillance	  decisions	  is	  granted	  by	  virtue	  of	  Articles	  280	  and	  
299	  TFEU	  and	  Article	  110	  EEA	  Agreement	  pursuant	   to	  which	   the	  enforcement	  
                                            
27	  Article	  56(3)	  EEA	  Agreement.	  
28	  Article	  56(2)	  EEA	  Agreement.	  
29	  Article	  57	  EEA	  Agreement.	  
30	  Article	  7	  Protocol	  23	  to	  the	  EEA	  Agreement.	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decisions	  of	  the	  Commission	  and	  the	  ESA	  that	  impose	  a	  pecuniary	  obligation	  on	  
individuals	  is	  enforceable	  in	  the	  EU	  as	  well	  as	  in	  the	  EEA.	  The	  same	  applies	  to	  the	  
judgments	  of	  the	  EEA	  and	  EU	  judiciaries.31	  	  
Both	   the	   Commission	   and	   the	   ESA	   can	   be	   held	   liable	   for	   failure	   to	   act.	   The	  
institutions	  can	  be	  subject	  to	  infringement	  proceedings	  under	  Article	  265	  TFEU	  
and	  Article	  37	  SCA,	   respectively.	  An	   infringement	  action	  can	  be	  brought	  before	  
the	  Court	   of	   Justice	   by	   an	  EU	  Member	   State	   and	   to	   the	  EFTA	  Court	   by	   an	  EEA	  
EFTA	  State.	  Importantly,	  the	  surveillance	  authorities	  may	  only	  become	  subject	  to	  
infringement	   proceedings	   if	   they	   have	   previously	   been	   called	   upon	   to	   act.	   The	  
timeframe	   for	   the	   infringement	   action	   is	   two	   months	   in	   both	   cases.	   If	   the	  
surveillance	  authority	   in	  question	  has	  not	  defined	   its	  position	   regarding	  a	  plea	  
from	  an	  EU	  Member	   State	   or	   an	  EEA	  EFTA	  State	  within	   two	  months,	   the	   state	  
involved	  has	  two	  more	  months	  to	  bring	  the	  action.	  Any	  natural	  or	   legal	  person	  
may	   complain	   to	   the	   Court	   of	   Justice	   or	   the	   EFTA	   Court,	   respectively,	   alleging	  
that	  an	   institution,	  body,	  office	  or	  agency	  of	   the	  Union	  or	   the	  ESA	  has	   failed	   to	  
address	   to	   that	  person	   ‘any	  act	  other	   than	  a	  recommendation	  or	  an	  opinion’	   in	  
the	   case	   of	   the	   EU	   or	   a	   decision	   in	   the	   case	   of	   the	   EEA	   EFTA	   States.	   In	   the	  
meantime,	  EEA	  EFTA	  nationals	  can	  bring	  to	  national	  courts	  cases	  challenging	  the	  
legality	   of	   national	   legal	   acts	   implementing	   ESA	   decisions	   whereas	   EU	  
individuals	  can	  only	  challenge	  individual	  decisions	  in	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice.32	  
The	   grounds	   on	   which	   enforcement	   and	   surveillance	   of	   the	   internal	   market	  
acquis	   takes	   place	   in	   the	   ECAA	   and	   the	   Energy	   Community	   are	   very	   different	  
from	   those	   of	   the	   EU	   and	   the	   EEA.	   Neither	   the	   ECAA	   Agreement	   nor	   the	   ECT	  
envisage	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  separate	  surveillance	  authority.	  The	  surveillance	  of	  the	  
functioning	  of	  the	  ECAA	  Agreement	  and	  the	  ECT	  is	  conducted	  by	  the	  Commission	  
in	   the	   EU	   pillar	   of	   the	   agreements	   and	   by	   national	   authorities	   of	   the	   non-­‐EU	  
contracting	   parties	   in	   the	   non-­‐EU	   pillar.	   EU	   institutions,	   primarily	   the	  
Commission,	   exercise	   surveillance	   duties	   in	   the	   ECAA	   and	   the	   Energy	  
Community	   where	   the	   competition	   rules	   or	   secondary	   legislation	   of	   the	  
respective	   treaties	   so	   provide.33	   For	   example,	   the	   Commission	   enjoys	   special	  
                                            
31	  Article	  110	  EEA	  Agreement.	  
32	  HP	  Graver,	  'The	  Efta	  Court	  and	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice	  of	  the	  EC:	  Legal	  Homogeneity	  at	  Stake?'	  in	  P-­‐
C	  Müller-­‐Graff	  and	  E	  Selvig	  (eds),	  EEA-­EU	  Relations	  (Berlin	  Verlag	  Arno	  Spitz	  1999)	  31,	  40-­‐42.	  
33	  Opinion	  1/00	  ECAA	  [2002]	  ECR	  I-­‐3493,	  para	  7.	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powers	   as	   granted	   to	   it	   under	   EU	   acquis	   in	   cases	   that	   may	   affect	   the	  
authorisation	  of	  actual	  or	  potential	  air	  services,34	  and	  may	  monitor	  compliance	  
with	  aviation	  security	  rules.35	  Whereas	  the	  EEA	  Agreement	  features	  substantial	  
institutional	   safeguards	   for	  maintaining	   homogeneity	   in	   the	   EEA	   and	   between	  
the	   EEA	   and	   the	   EU	   acquis,	   no	   such	   special	   guarantees	   are	   envisaged	   by	   the	  
sectoral	   agreements.	   This	   does	   not	   necessarily	   mean	   that	   homogeneity	   is	   in	  
danger,	   though.	   In	   situations	   where	   EU	   institutions	   including	   the	   Commission	  
have	  a	  power	  to	  act	  one	  may	  assume	  that	  the	  level	  of	  homogeneity	  can	  be	  even	  
higher	  than	  in	  the	  EEA	  where	  homogeneity	  is	  to	  be	  secured	  by	  two	  institutions	  –	  
the	  Commission	  and	  the	  ESA.	  In	  cases	  where	  EU	  institutions	  have	  no	  powers	  to	  
act	   they	  equally	   lack	  such	  powers	   in	  the	  EU	  Member	  States,	   leading	  to	  a	  rather	  
equal	   outcome	   in	   terms	   of	   homogeneity.	   This	   is	   notwithstanding	   the	   practical	  
difficulties	   that	   the	   Commission	   or	   other	   EU	   institutions	  may	   encounter	  when	  
exercising	  their	  powers	  to	   investigate	  the	   implementation	  of	   the	  acquis	   in	  non-­‐
EU	  Member	  States	  rather	  than	  within	  the	  EU.	  	  
In	  the	  Energy	  Community,	  surveillance	  is	  conducted	  by	  the	  Energy	  Community’s	  
own	   institutions	   rather	   than	   the	   European	   Commission.	   Any	   party	   to	   the	   ECT,	  
the	  Secretariat	  or	   the	  Regulatory	  Board	  may	  notify	   the	  Ministerial	  Council	  of	   a	  
failure	  of	  a	  contracting	  party	  to	  comply	  with	  a	  Treaty	  obligation	  or	  implement	  a	  
decisions	   addressed	   to	   it.36	   Private	   bodies	   may	   submit	   complaints	   to	   the	  
Secretariat.	  The	  party	  against	  whom	  a	  request	  or	  complaint	  has	  been	  addressed	  
may	  make	   observations	   in	   response.37	   The	  Ministerial	   Council	   determines	   the	  
existence	   of	   a	   breach	  by	   a	   simple	  majority	   of	   votes	   in	   case	   of	   extension	  of	   the	  
acquis	   communautaire,	   by	   a	   two-­‐third	  majority	   in	   the	   case	   of	   network	   energy,	  
and	   by	   unanimity	   in	   case	   of	   the	   Single	   Energy	  Market.38	   A	   simple	  majority	   of	  
votes	  in	  the	  Ministerial	  Council	  is	  required	  for	  revoking	  any	  previous	  decisions.39	  
At	  the	  request	  of	  a	  contracting	  party,	  the	  Secretariat	  or	  the	  Regulatory	  Board	  the	  
Ministerial	  Council	  may,	  by	  unanimous	  vote,	  establish	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  serious	  
and	  persistent	  breach	  of	   the	   treaty	  obligations	  by	   a	  party	   and	   suspend	   certain	  
                                            
34	  Article	  15(2)	  ECAA	  Agreement.	  
35	  Article	  12(4)	  ECAA	  Agreement.	  
36	  Article	  90(1)	  ECT.	  
37	  Article	  90(2)	  ECT.	  
38	  Article	  91(1)	  ECT.	  
39	  Article	  91(2)	  ECT.	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rights	   conferred	   to	   it	   under	   the	   Treaty.40	   Again,	   the	   Ministerial	   Council	   may	  
revoke	   any	   such	   decisions	   by	   a	   simple	   majority	   vote.	   Since	   the	   Energy	  
Community	   lacks	   an	   independent	   surveillance	   authority	   the	   procedures	   for	  
determining	  the	  existence	  of	  an	  infringement	  are	  fully	  political.	  The	  link	  between	  
the	  Commission	  and	  the	   institutions	  of	   the	  Energy	  Community	   is	   limited	  to	  the	  
participation	   of	   the	   Commission	   in	   the	   voting.	   This	   mechanism	   is	   based	  
completely	   on	   international	   law	   and	   hardly	   possesses	   the	   necessary	  
synchronising	   tools,	   such	   as	   close	   cooperation	   between	   the	   surveillance	  
authorities	   of	   the	   Energy	   Community	   and	   the	   EU,	   to,	   indeed,	   guarantee	  
uniformity	  in	  the	  protection	  of	  rights	  arising	  from	  identical	  acquis	  within	  the	  EU	  
and	  within	  the	  non-­‐EU	  segments	  of	  the	  Energy	  Community.	  	  
2.2	  Interpretation	  and	  dispute	  settlement	  
2.2.1	  European	  Economic	  Area	  
The	  EU	   judiciary,	  especially	   the	  Court	  of	   Justice	  and	  the	  General	  Court,	  provide	  
authoritative	   interpretations	   of	   EU	   law	   and,	   thereby,	   the	   benchmark	   for	  
uniformity	   in	   the	   interpretation	   and	   application	   of	   EU	   acquis	   in	   the	   expanded	  
internal	  market.	  Pursuant	  to	  Article	  19(1)	  TEU	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice	  shall	  observe	  
that	  in	  the	  interpretation	  and	  application	  of	  the	  Treaties	  the	  law	  is	  observed.	  The	  
Court	   rules	   on	   direct	   actions	   brought	   by	   Member	   States,	   EU	   institutions	   or	  
natural	  and	  legal	  person,	  and	  in	  other	  cases	  provided	  in	  the	  Treaties,41	  whereas	  
the	   General	   Court	   decides	   on	   all	   other	   cases	   that	   are	   neither	   assigned	   to	   the	  
Court	   nor	   to	   a	   specialised	   court	   under	   Article	   257	   TFEU.42	   Article	   273	   TFEU,	  
furthermore,	  allows	  the	  Member	  States	  grant	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice	  jurisdiction	  in	  
any	   dispute	   between	   them	   that	   relates	   to	   the	   subject	   matter	   of	   the	   Treaties	  
under	   a	   special	   agreement.	   In	   the	   meantime,	   Article	   344	   TFEU	   forbids	   the	  
Member	  States	  to	  submit	  a	  dispute	  concerning	  the	  interpretation	  or	  application	  
of	  EU	  law	  to	  any	  other	  forum	  than	  the	  courts	  of	  the	  EU.	  The	  rulings	  of	  the	  Court	  
of	  Justice	  are	  binding	  and	  enforceable	  in	  the	  Member	  States.43	  	  
While	  in	  the	  EU	  the	  task	  of	  maintaining	  of	  judicial	  homogeneity	  is	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  
                                            
40	  Article	  92(1)	  ECT.	  
41	  Article	  19(3)	  TEU.	  
42	  Article	  256(1)	  TFEU.	  
43	  Articles	  280	  and	  299	  TFEU.	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the	   Court	   of	   Justice,	   the	   EEA	   system	   of	   ensuring	   homogeneity	   in	   the	  
interpretation	   and	   application	   of	   the	   acquis	   is	   hybrid	   in	   that	   it	   includes	   both	  
judicial	  and	  political	  elements.44	  The	  EEA	  judicial	  system	  consists	  of	  independent	  
courts	  including	  the	  EFTA	  Court,	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice	  of	  the	  EU,	  the	  General	  Court,	  
and	  the	  courts	  of	  last	  instance	  of	  the	  EEA	  EFTA	  States.45	  	  
The	  EFTA	  Court	  is	  established	  under	  Article	  108(2)	  EEA	  Agreement.	  Its	  tasks	  are	  
to	  conduct	  surveillance	  in	  EEA	  EFTA	  States,	  decide	  on	  appeals	  on	  the	  decisions	  of	  
the	  ESA	  in	  the	  field	  of	  competition	  law,	  and	  to	  settle	  disputes	  between	  the	  EEA	  
EFTA	   States.46	   	   The	   EFTA	   Court	   consists	   of	   three	   judges	   all	   of	   whom	   must	  
participate	   in	   the	  deliberations	   in	  order	   for	  a	  decision	  of	   the	  EFTA	  Court	   to	  be	  
valid.47	  The	   jurisdiction	  of	   the	  EFTA	  Court	   comprises	  disputes	  between	   two	  or	  
more	   EEA	   EFTA	   States	   regarding	   the	   interpretation	   or	   application	   of	   the	   EEA	  
Agreement,48	  penalties	   imposed	  by	   the	  ESA,49	   and	  actions	  brought	  by	  an	  EFTA	  
state	  against	  a	  decision	  of	  the	  latter.50	  Individuals,	  too,	  may	  institute	  proceedings	  
against	  a	  decision	  of	  the	  ESA	  on	  the	  same	  grounds	  provided	  that	  the	  decision	  was	  
addressed	  to	  the	  individual	  or	  otherwise	  if	  the	  decision	  is	  of	  direct	  and	  individual	  
concern	  to	  the	  person	  initiating	  proceedings.51	  The	  EFTA	  Court	  may	  declare	  the	  
challenged	  decision	  of	  the	  ESA	  void.52	  
The	  EU	  and	  the	  EFTA	  courts	  do	  not	  exist	  and	  work	  in	  isolation	  from	  each	  other.	  
The	  EEA	  Agreement	  sets	  up	  a	  system	  of	  exchange	  of	  information	  concerning	  the	  
judgments	   of	   the	   Court	   of	   Justice,	   the	   General	   Court,	   the	   EFTA	   Court	   and	   the	  
courts	  of	   last	   instance	  of	   the	  EEA	  EFTA	  States.	  To	  this	  end,	   the	  Registrar	  of	   the	  
Court	  of	  Justice	  receives	  copies	  of	  the	  judgments	  of	  the	  above	  courts	  in	  which	  the	  
latter	  have	  interpreted	  and	  applied	  either	  the	  EEA	  Agreement	  or	  the	  EU	  Treaties	  
or	   EEA	   relevant	   acquis	   and	   passes	   the	   relevant	   documents	   on	   to	   the	   EEA	  
contracting	  parties.53	  
                                            
44	   C	   Reymond,	   'Institutions,	   Decision-­‐Making	   Procedure	   and	   Settlement	   of	   Disputes	   in	   the	  
European	  Economic	  Area'	  (1993)	  30	  Common	  Market	  Law	  Review	  449,	  475.	  
45	  Article	  106	  EEA	  Agreement.	  
46	  Article	  108(2)	  EEA	  Agreement.	  	  
47	  Articles	  28	  and	  29	  SCA.	  
48	  Article	  32	  SCA.	  
49	  Article	  35	  SCA.	  
50	  Article	  36	  SCA.	  
51	  ibid.	  
52	  ibid.	  
53	  Article	  106	  EEA	  Agreement.	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Maintaining	  homogeneity	  in	  the	  interpretation	  of	  common	  rules	  across	  the	  EEA	  
is,	  however,	  primarily	  the	  task	  of	  the	  EEA	  Joint	  Committee.	  The	  Joint	  Committee	  
is	  assigned	  to	  ensure	  homogeneity	  on	  top	  of	  the	  efforts	  in	  this	  respect	  made	  by	  
the	  EU	  judiciary	  and	  the	  EFTA	  Court.	  Pursuant	  to	  Article	  105(2)	  EEA	  Agreement,	  
the	   Joint	  Committee	  constantly	  reviews	  the	  development	  of	   the	  case	   law	  of	   the	  
Court	   of	   Justice	   of	   the	   EU	   as	   well	   as	   the	   EFTA	   Court.	   By	   doing	   so,	   the	   Joint	  
Committee	  thus	  also	  compares	  the	  interpretation	  of	   identical	  rules	  provided	  by	  
the	  two	  courts.	  The	  EU	  courts	  and	  the	  EFTA	  Court	  refer	  their	   judgments	  to	  the	  
Joint	  Committee	   that	  will,	   if	  necessary,	   ‘act	   so	  as	   to	  preserve	   the	  homogeneous	  
interpretation	   of	   the	   Agreement’.	   Should	   the	   Joint	   Committee	   fail	   to	   find	   a	  
solution	  within	  two	  months’	  time,	  the	  matter	  will	  be	  dealt	  with	  under	  the	  dispute	  
settlement	   procedure	   provided	   in	   Article	   111	   EEA	   Agreement.54	   It	   has	   been	  
questioned	  whether	  the	  EEA	  Joint	  Committee	  could,	  in	  the	  process	  of	  preserving	  
the	   homogeneous	   interpretation	   of	   the	   EEA	   Agreement	   also	   incorporate	   new	  
Court	   of	   Justice	   case	   law	   into	   the	   EEA.55	   As	   homogeneity	   advancing	   as	   this	  
solution	  may	  be,	   it	   is	  highly	  questionable	  whether	  the	  Joint	  Committee	  could	  in	  
effect	   amend	   the	   EEA	   Agreement	   and	   SCA	   which	   in	   Articles	   6	   and	   3(2),	  
respectively,	   stipulate	   that	  post-­‐1992	  case	   law	   is	  not	  binding	  on	   the	  EEA	  EFTA	  
States	  and	  institutions.56	  Because	  of	  the	  independence	  of	  the	  judiciary,	  moreover,	  
it	  would	  be	  questionable	  for	  the	  EEA	  Joint	  Committee	  to	  compel	  the	  EFTA	  Court	  
to	   follow	   the	   case	   law	   of	   the	   Court	   of	   Justice,	   especially	   case	   law	   that	   is	   not	  
binding	   on	   the	   EFTA	   Court	   neither	   by	   virtue	   of	   Article	   6	   EEA	   Agreement	   nor	  
Article	   3(2)	   SCA.	   Neither	   could	   the	   political	   institutions	   of	   the	   EU	   exert	   such	  
pressure	  on	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice.	  	  
The	  process	  of	  determining	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  divergence	  in	  case	  law	  pursuant	  to	  
Article	   105(2)	   EEA	   Agreement	   as	   well	   as	   the	   outcome	   in	   terms	   of	   preserving	  
homogeneity	  are	  strictly	  political,	  not	  judicial.	  Homogeneity,	  in	  turn,	  is	  limited	  to	  
what	   the	   contracting	   parties	   consider	   homogeneous.57	   The	   means	   of	   action	  
                                            
54	  Article	  105(3)	  EEA	  Agreement.	  	  
55	   C	  Baudenbacher,	   'Between	  Homogeneity	   and	   Independence:	   The	   Legal	   Position	   of	   the	   EFTA	  
Court	  in	  the	  European	  Economic	  Area'	  (1997)	  3	  Columbia	  Journal	  of	  European	  Law	  169,	  220.	  
56	  ibid,	  220.	  
57	   This	   applies	   also	   to	   the	   legislative	  means	   of	   achieving	   and	  maintaining	   homogeneity	   in	   the	  
form	   of,	   for	   example,	   updating	   the	   EEA	   Agreement	   and	   the,	   in	   practice	   rather	   subjective,	  
determination	  of	  whether	  a	  piece	  of	  EU	  acquis	  is	  EEA	  relevant	  or	  not.	  See	  above	  chapter	  6	  section	  
2.1.2,	  especially	  n	  19.	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available	  for	  the	  Joint	  Committee	  are	  not	  specified	  in	  the	  EEA	  Agreement	  but	  the	  
means	  made	  use	  of	  by	  the	  Joint	  Committee	  may	  certainly	  not	  affect	  the	  case	  law	  
of	   the	   Court	   of	   Justice	   as	  was	   agreed	   by	   the	   drafters	   of	   the	   EEA	   Agreement.58	  
Since	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  whether	  the	  prohibition	  concerns	  only	  the	  Court’s	  rulings	  on	  
EU	  law	  or	  also	  on	  EEA	  law	  one	  must	  assume	  that	  it	  concerns	  both.	  Insofar	  as	  the	  
solution	  found	  by	  the	  Joint	  Committee	   is	  an	  outcome	  of	  political	  negotiations	   it	  
may,	  theoretically,	  diverge	  from	  the	  interpretation	  of	  EU	  law	  given	  by	  the	  Court	  
of	  Justice.	  Nevertheless,	  the	  Joint	  Committee	  may	  not	  adversely	  affect	  the	  binding	  
nature	  of	  the	  decisions	  of	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice	  within	  the	  EU	  legal	  order.59	  If	  the	  
Joint	  Committee	  were	  to	  bind	  the	  EEA	  Contracting	  Parties,	  which	  include	  the	  EU	  
and	   its	   Member	   States,	   to	   an	   interpretation	   of	   EEA	   law	   that	   is	   in	   substance	  
identical	  to	  EU	  law	  that	  diverges	  from	  the	  interpretation	  given	  by	  the	  Court,	  the	  
Joint	  Committee	  would	   itself	   undermine	   the	  homogeneity	   in	   the	  EEA.	  Whether	  
the	   Joint	   Committee	   could	   challenge	   an	   interpretation	   provided	   by	   the	   EFTA	  
Court	   is,	   furthermore,	   questionable	   from	   the	   point	   of	   view	   of	   judicial	  
independence.60	   Clearly,	   the	   Court	   of	   Justice	   is	   the	   source	   of	   authoritative	  
interpretations	  of	  internal	  market	  acquis	  not	  only	  in	  the	  EU	  but	  also	  in	  the	  EEA.	  	  
In	  the	  case	  of	  disputes	  arising	  from	  the	  application	  or	  interpretation	  of	  the	  EEA	  
Agreement,	  either	  the	  EU	  or	  an	  EEA	  EFTA	  State	  may	  bring	  the	  matter	  before	  the	  
EEA	  Joint	  Committee.61	  The	  EU	  Member	  States	  have	  no	  such	  possibility.	  The	  task	  
of	  the	  Joint	  Committee	  is	  to	  gather	  all	  relevant	  information	  and	  endeavour	  to	  find	  
an	   acceptable	   solution	   to	   the	   case	   at	   hand	   by	   examining	   ‘all	   possibilities	   to	  
maintain	   the	   good	   functioning	   of	   the	   EEA	   Agreement’.62	   The	   link	   between	  
Articles	   105(3)	   and	   111	   EEA	  Agreement	   ‘necessarily	   implies’	   that	   the	   ‘procès-­‐
verbal	  agréé	  ad	  article	  105’	  and	  Protocol	  48	  to	  the	  EEA	  Agreement	  also	  apply	  to	  
the	  EEA	  dispute	  settlement	  procedure	  meaning	  that	  the	  case	  law	  of	  the	  Court	  of	  
Justice	  must	  not	  be	  affected.63	  	  
                                            
58	   'Procès-­verbal	  agréé	  ad	  article	  105',	  see	  Opinion	  1/92	  EEA	  II	   [1992]	  ECR	  I-­‐2821,	  para	  6;	  Also	  
Protocol	   48	   to	   the	   EEA	   Agreement	   concerning	   interpretation	   of	   Articles	   105	   and	   111,	   which	  
reads:	   ‘Decisions	   taken	  by	   the	  EEA	   Joint	  Committee	  under	  Articles	  105	  and	  111	  may	  not	  affect	  
the	  case-­‐law	  of	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice	  of	  the	  European	  Communities.’	  
59	  Opinion	  1/92	  EEA	  II	  (n	  58)	  para	  22.	  
60	  C	  Baudenbacher,	  ‘Between	  Homogeneity	  and	  Independence’	  (n	  55)	  222-­‐223.	  
61	  Article	  111(1)	  EEA	  Agreement.	  
62	  Article	  111(2)	  EEA	  Agreement.	  	  
63	  Opinion	  1/92	  EEA	  II	  (n	  58)	  para	  28.	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The	   Joint	   Committee	  must	   find	   a	   solution	   to	   divergent	   interpretations	   of	   EEA	  
acquis	  that	  is	  identical	  to	  EU	  law	  within	  three	  months’	  time.64	  	  If	  it	  cannot	  arrive	  
at	   a	   solution	   the	   parties	   to	   the	   dispute	   may	   decide	   to	   request	   a	   binding	  
interpretation	  of	  the	  rules	  under	  dispute	  from	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice.65	  In	  practice,	  
it	   is	   unlikely	   that	   the	   Court	   will	   be	   called	   upon	   to	   rule	   on	   whether	   its	   own	  
interpretation	   or	   that	   provided	  by	   the	  EFTA	  Court	  will	   prevail.66	   In	   any	   event,	  
this	  solution	  demonstrates	  once	  again	  the	  strong	  position	  of	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice	  
vis-­à-­vis	   the	   EFTA	   Court	   in	   interpreting	   the	   acquis	   of	   the	   expanded	   internal	  
market.	  If	  no	  solution	  has	  been	  found	  by	  the	  Joint	  Committee	  in	  six	  months	  and	  if	  
the	  parties	  have	  not	  requested	  a	  ruling	  from	  to	  the	  Court,	  the	  contracting	  parties	  
may	  either	  take	  safeguard	  measures	  or	  apply	  the	  procedure	  of	  Article	  102	  EEA	  
Agreement,	  which	  is	  used	  in	  cases	  of	  inability	  to	  duly	  incorporate	  changes	  in	  EU	  
acquis	   into	   the	  EEA	  Agreement.67	  The	   latter	   includes	   assessing	   the	   situation	   in	  
the	   Joint	   Committee,68	   taking	   all	   efforts	   to	   arrive	   at	   an	   agreement	   on	  matters	  
relevant	   to	   the	  EEA	  Agreement,69	   or,	   as	   a	   last	   resort,	   the	  EEA	   Joint	   Committee	  
examining	   ‘all	   further	   possibilities	   to	   maintain	   the	   good	   functioning	   of	   [the]	  
Agreement’	  and	  taking	  ‘any	  decision	  necessary	  to	  [that]	  effect’	  within	  six	  months	  
of	   referral.70	   This	   solution	   calls	   for	   political	   agreement,	   not	   necessarily	   strict	  
judicial	  homogeneity.	  The	  ultimate	  solution	  is	  to	  suspend	  the	  affected	  part	  of	  the	  
EEA	  Agreement	  under	  Article	  102(5).	  Since	  the	  final	  remedy	  is	  the	  suspension	  of	  
the	  Agreement	  rather	  than	  a	  possibility	  to	  appeal,	   the	  hybrid	  system	  of	  dispute	  
resolution	  is,	  in	  general,	  not	  likely	  to	  benefit	  the	  weaker	  party,	  which	  is	  the	  EEA	  
EFTA	  States.71	  Only	  in	  some	  specific	  cases	  that	  do	  not	  involve	  an	  interpretation	  
of	  the	  acquis	  may	  a	  dispute	  between	  the	  EEA	  contracting	  parties	  be	  referred	  to	  
arbitration	  under	  Protocol	  33	  of	  the	  EEA	  Agreement.72	  	  
As	  stated	  in	  the	  introduction	  above,	  the	  meaning	  of	  homogeneity	  is	  to	  allow	  the	  
same	   rules	   to	   be	   applied	   in	   an	   equally	   effective	   manner	   across	   the	   expanded	  
                                            
64	  Article	  111(3)	  EEA	  Agreement.	  	  
65	  Article	  111(3)	  EEA	  Agreement;	  C	  Reymond	  (n	  44)	  473.	  
66	  T	  van	  Stiphout,	  'Homogeneity	  vs.	  Decision-­‐Making	  Autonomy	  in	  the	  EEA	  Agreement'	  (2007)	  9	  
European	  Journal	  of	  Law	  Reform	  431,	  442-­‐443.	  
67	  Article	  111(3)	  EEA	  Agreement.	  	  
68	  Article	  102(2)	  EEA	  Agreement.	  
69	  Article	  102(3)	  EEA	  Agreement.	  
70	  Article	  102(4)	  EEA	  Agreement.	  
71	  C	  Reymond	  (n	  44)	  475-­‐476.	  
72	  Article	  111(4)	  EEA	  Agreement.	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market.	  The	  homogeneity	  provision	  laid	  down	  in	  Article	  1(1)	  EEA	  Agreement	  is	  
neutral	   as	   to	   the	   authoritative	   source	   of	   the	   interpretation	   and	   application	   of	  
internal	  market	  acquis	  that	  would	  serve	  as	  a	  benchmark	  for	  homogeneity.	  From	  
several	   provisions	   of	   the	   EEA	   Agreement	   it	   appears,	   however,	   that	   the	   upper	  
hand	   in	   determining	   the	   effect	   that	   the	   homogeneous	  acquis	  must	   have	   in	   the	  
EEA	  as	  a	  whole	  rests	  with	  the	  Court	  of	   Justice.	  Seemingly,	   the	  EEA	  EFTA	  States	  
have	   retained	   their	   sovereignty	  whereas	   in	  practice	   this	   appears	  not	   to	   be	   the	  
case	  entirely.	  	  
EEA	  law	  is	  polycentric.73	  Both	  EU	  and	  EEA	  EFTA	  courts,	  including	  national	  courts	  
interpret	   internal	  market	  acquis.	  A	  homogeneous	  outcome	   in	   the	  EEA	   requires	  
all	  of	   those	   judicial	  bodies	   to	  arrive	  at	   the	  same	   interpretation	  as	  concerns	   the	  
rights	  conferred	  on	  individuals	  by	  the	  EEA	  Agreement.	  Certain	  provisions	  of	  the	  
EEA	   Agreement	   and	   the	   SCA	   clarify	   how	   the	   uniform	   result	   in	   interpretation	  
should	  be	  reached.	  Article	  6	  EEA	  Agreement	  stipulates	  that	  the	  provisions	  of	  the	  
EEA	  Agreement	   that	  mirror	   EU	  acquis	  must	   be	   interpreted	   in	   conformity	  with	  
the	  rulings	  of	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice	  of	  the	  EU,	  including	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice	  and	  the	  
General	  Court,74	  given	  prior	  to	  the	  date	  of	  signature	  of	  the	  EEA	  Agreement.	  The	  
Agreement	   was	   signed	   in	   Oporto	   on	   2	   May	   1992.	   The	   EFTA	   Court	   and	   the	  
national	  courts	  of	   the	  EEA	  EFTA	  States	  are	  not	  obliged	  to	   follow	  the	  post-­‐1992	  
case	  law	  of	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice	  yet	  neither	  are	  they	  discouraged	  from	  doing	  so.	  
Quite	   to	   the	   contrary,	   owing	   to	   the	   institutional	   shortcomings	   of	   the	   EEA	  
Agreement	  as	  concerns	  the	  lack	  of	  obligation	  of	  the	  numerous	  judiciaries	  of	  the	  
EEA	  to	  always	  follow	  one	  others’	  rulings,	  homogeneity	  of	  the	  EEA	  legal	  order	  can	  
in	   practice	   only	   be	   upheld	   by	   the	   goodwill	   of	   the	   contracting	   parties.	  
Furthermore,	   the	   case	   law	   of	   the	   Court	   of	   Justice	   has	   no	   stare	   decisis	   effect	   of	  
precedent.	   Although	   such	   situations	   occur	   very	   seldom,75	   the	   Court	   of	   Justice	  
may	  deviate	  from	  the	  previously	  given	  interpretations	  of	  EU	  law.	  In	  this	  respect,	  
the	   concept	   of	   homogeneity	   necessarily	   requires	   careful	   consideration	   of	   the	  
                                            
73	   H	   Haukeland	   Fredriksen,	   'One	  Market,	   Two	   Courts:	   Legal	   Pluralism	   vs.	   Homogeneity	   in	   the	  
European	  Economic	  Area'	  (2010)	  79	  Nordic	  Journal	  of	  International	  Law	  481,	  482.	  
74	  Case	  E-­‐2/94	  Scottish	  Salmon	  Growers	  [1994-­‐1995]	  EFTA	  Ct	  Rep	  59,	  para	  13.	  
75	  For	  example,	  Case	  192/73	  Hag	  I	  [1974]	  ECR	  731	  and	  Case	  C-­‐10/89	  Hag	  II	  [1990]	  ECR	  I-­‐3711;	  
and	  Case	  120/78	  Cassis	  de	  Dijon	  [1979]	  ECR	  649	  and	  Joined	  Cases	  C-­‐267/91	  and	  C-­‐268/91	  Keck	  
and	  Mithouard	  [1993]	  ECR	  I-­‐6097.	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evolution	  of	   the	  Court’s	   case	   law	   in	   time	   instead	  of	   stagnating	   in	   the	  pre-­‐1992	  
state	  of	  the	  internal	  market.	  	  
Article	  6	  EEA	  Agreement	  is,	  furthermore,	  without	  prejudice	  to	  Article	  3	  SCA.	  The	  
SCA	  was	  concluded	  between	   the	  EEA	  EFTA	  States	  and	   is,	   thus,	  only	  binding	  on	  
them.	   While	   Article	   3(1)	   SCA	   replicates	   in	   essence	   Article	   6	   EEA	   Agreement,	  
paragraph	  2	  of	  the	  same	  Article	  stipulates	  that	  the	  ESA	  and	  the	  EFTA	  Court	  ‘shall	  
pay	  due	  account	  to	  the	  principles	  laid	  down	  by	  the	  relevant	  rulings	  by	  the	  Court	  
of	  Justice	  of	  the	  European	  [Union]’76	  post-­‐1992	  when	  interpreting	  and	  applying	  
EEA	  law	  that	   is	   identical	   to	  EU	  acquis	   contained	   in	  the	  EEA	  Agreement	  and	  the	  
SCA.	  Taken	  by	  its	  wording,	  paying	  due	  account	  to	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice’s	  case	  law	  
is	  not	   the	  same	  as	  being	  obliged	  to	   follow	  the	  Court’s	   interpretation.	  The	  EFTA	  
Court	  has	  held	  that	  it	  is	  ‘an	  inherent	  consequence’	  of	  the	  institutional	  system	  of	  
the	  EEA	  that	  consists	  of	   two	   judiciaries	  that	  occasionally	  the	  two	  may	  arrive	  at	  
different	  interpretations	  of	  common	  rules.77	  In	  practice,	  the	  EFTA	  Court	  has	  been	  
accommodating	   towards	   the	   rulings	   of	   the	   Court	   of	   Justice	   regardless	   of	   their	  
time	  of	  delivery.78	  There	  are	  numerous	  examples	  of	  case	   law	  that	   illustrate	   the	  
EFTA	  Court’s	  homogeneity-­‐prone	  attitude.79	  	  
The	   same	   does	   not	   hold	   true	   in	   the	   case	   of	   the	   Court	   of	   Justice.	   As	  witnessed	  
above,	   the	   responsibility	   of	  maintaining	   judicial	   homogeneity	   in	   the	   EEA	   leans	  
significantly	  towards	  the	  EFTA	  Court.	  One	  of	  the	  reasons	  for	  this	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  
the	  Court	  of	   Justice	   is	  not	  only	   tasked	  with	  upholding	  homogeneity	   in	   the	  EEA	  
but	  also	  with	  securing	  the	  uniform	  interpretation	  of	  EU	  law.	  When	  interpreting	  
EEA	  rules	   that	  replicate	  EU	  acquis	   it	   is	   to	  be	  expected	  that	   the	  Court	  of	   Justice,	  
first	  and	   foremost,	  bears	   in	  mind	   the	  development	  of	   the	   internal	  market.	  This	  
would	  normally	  only	  pose	  problems	  in	  cases	  where	  EEA	  law	  is	  not	  interpreted	  in	  
a	  manner	  identical	  to	  EU	  law,	  i.e.	  where	  the	  particular	  context	  of	  the	  EEA	  rule	  is	  
different	  from	  that	  of	  the	  EU	  provision.	  The	  latter	  usually	  requires	  interpretation	  
                                            
76	  Emphasis	  added.	  
77	  Joined	  Cases	  E-­‐9/07	  and	  E-­‐10/07	  L’Oréal	  [2008]	  EFTA	  Ct	  Rep	  259,	  para	  28.	  
78	  ibid.	  
79	  EFTA	  Court	  cases	  citing	  post-­‐1992	  Court	  of	  Justice	  case	  law	  include,	  among	  others,	  Case	  E-­‐1/94	  
Restamark	  [1994-­‐1995]	  EFTA	  Ct	  Rep	  15;	  Case	  E-­‐6/96	  Wilhelmsen	  [1997]	  EFTA	  Ct	  Rep	  53;	  Joined	  
Cases	  E-­‐8/94	  and	  E-­‐9/94	  Mattel	  and	  Lego	  [1994-­‐1995]	  EFTA	  Ct	  Rep	  113;	  Case	  E-­‐8/97	  TV	  1000	  
[1998]	   EFTA	   Ct	   Rep	   68;	   Case	   E-­‐1/95	   Samuelsson	   [1994-­‐1995]	   EFTA	   Ct	   Rep	   145;	   Case	   E-­‐2/95	  
Eidesund	  [1995-­‐1996]	  EFTA	  Ct	  Rep	  1;	  Case	  E-­‐2/96	  Ulstein	  and	  Røiseng	  [1995-­‐1996]	  EFTA	  Ct	  Rep	  
65;	  Case	  E-­‐3/96	  Ask	   [1997]	  EFTA	  Ct	  Rep	  1;	  Case	  E-­‐3/98	  Rainford-­Towning	  [1998]	  EFTA	  Ct	  Rep	  
205;	  Case	  E-­‐5/98	  Fagtún	  [1999]	  EFTA	  Ct	  Rep	  51.	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that	  takes	  account	  of	  the	  deeper	  integration	  objectives	   in	  the	  EU.	  There	  are	  not	  
many	   such	  examples,	   though.80	  Whenever	   the	  Court	  of	   Justice	  has	  provided	  an	  
interpretation	  of	  internal	  market	  acquis	  the	  EFTA	  Court	  is	  likely	  to	  follow	  that	  by	  
virtue	   of	   both	  Article	   6	   EEA	  Agreement	   and	  Article	   3	   SCA.	   Problems,	   from	   the	  
perspective	  of	  homogeneity,	  arise	  when	  the	  EFTA	  Court	  is	  the	  first	  of	  the	  two	  to	  
be	   faced	   with	   the	   task	   of	   interpreting	   a	   provision	   of	   EEA	   legislation	   that	   the	  
Court	  of	  Justice,	  either	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  EU	  or	  the	  EEA,	  has	  not	  yet	  reviewed.	  
This	  situation	  is	  also	  known	  as	  a	  ‘going	  first	  constellation’.81	  The	  EEA	  Agreement	  
and	  the	  SCA	  are	  silent	  as	  to	  whether	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice,	  too,	  has	  an	  obligation	  to	  
maintain	   homogeneous	   interpretation	   of	   EEA	   law	  by	   following	   the	   case	   law	  of	  
the	  EFTA	  Court.	  The	  practice	  of	  the	  Courts	  reveals	  that	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice,	  too,	  
often	   follows	   the	   interpretation	   provided	   by	   the	   EFTA	   Court.	   In	   a	   number	   of	  
cases	  where	  the	  EFTA	  Court	  has	  ruled	  on	  a	  matter	  first	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice	  has	  
subsequently	  upheld	  the	  EFTA	  Court’s	  interpretation.82	  Yet	  it	  is	  highly	  doubtable	  
that	   the	   Court	   of	   Justice	  would	   consider	   itself	   bound	   by	   any	   obligation	   in	   this	  
regard,	  including	  the	  objective	  of	  maintaining	  a	  homogeneous	  EEA.	  The	  Court	  of	  
Justice	  has	  also	  on	  several	  occasions	  decided	  either	  not	  to	  refer	  to83	  or	  to	  deviate	  
from	  previous	   interpretations	  given	  by	   the	  EFTA	  Court.84	  There	  are,	  moreover,	  
examples	  of	  the	  EFTA	  Court	  deviating	  from	  the	  case	  law	  of	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice,	  
albeit	   not	   to	   the	   extent	   of	   triggering	   a	   dispute	   settlement	   procedure	   under	  
Article	  111	  EEA	  Agreement.85	  	  
The	   best-­‐known	   cases	   dealing	   with	   deviations	   from	   and	   re-­‐alignment	   with	  
previous	  case	  law	  are	  those	  belonging	  to	  the	  Maglite-­‐Silhouette-­‐L’Oréal	  saga.	  All	  
                                            
80	  For	  an	  example,	  see	  the	  discussion	  on	  Maglite-­‐Silhouette-­L’Oréal	  cases	  below.	  
81	   C	  Baudenbacher,	   'The	  EFTA	  Court	   and	   the	  European	  Court'	   in	  P-­‐C	  Müller-­‐Graff	   and	  E	   Selvig	  
(eds),	  EEA-­EU	  Relations	  (Berlin	  Verlag	  Arno	  Spitz	  1999)	  69,	  81.	  
82	  Joined	  Cases	  E-­‐8/94	  and	  E-­‐9/94	  Mattel	  and	  Lego	  (n	  79)	  in	  Joined	  Cases	  C-­‐34/95,	  C-­‐35/95	  and	  
C-­‐36/95	  De	  Agostini	   [1997]	  ECR	  I-­‐3843;	  Case	  E-­‐3/00	  Kellogg’s	   [2000-­‐2001]	  EFTA	  Ct	  Rep	  73	   in	  
Case	   C-­‐192/01	   Commission	   v	   Denmark	   [2003]	   ECR	   I-­‐9693	   and	   Case	   C-­‐41/02	   Commission	   v	  
Netherlands	   [2004]	   ECR	   I-­‐11375;	   Case	   E-­‐3/02	   Paranova	   [2003]	   EFTA	   Ct	   Rep	   101	   in	   Case	   C-­‐
348/04	  Boehringer	   ingelheim	  [2007]	  ECR	  I-­‐3391.	  Advocates	  General,	   too,	  refer	   to	  EFTA	  Court’s	  
case	  law.	  See,	  for	  example,	  Joined	  Cases	  C-­‐34/95,	  C-­‐35/95	  and	  C-­‐36/95	  De	  Agostini	  [1997]	  ECR	  I-­‐
3843,	  Opinion	  of	  AG	  Jacobs.	  
83	  For	  example,	  in	  Case	  C-­‐189/95	  Franzén	  [1997]	  ECR	  I-­‐5909	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice	  did	  not	  refer	  to	  
the	   EFTA	   Court’s	   advisory	   opinion	   in	   Case	   E-­‐6/96	  Wilhelmsen	   (n	   79).	   The	   Court	   of	   Justice	  
reached	  the	  same	  conclusion	  as	  the	  EFTA	  Court	  but	  on	  a	  different	  justification.	  
84	  Cases	   in	  which	   the	  Court	  of	   Justice	  deviated	   from	  previous	  EFTA	  Court	   case	   law	   include,	   for	  
example,	  Joined	  Cases	  C-­‐34/95,	  C-­‐35/95	  and	  C-­‐36/95	  de	  Agostini	  (n	  82)	  deviating	  from	  Case	  E-­‐
5/96	  Nille	  [1997]	  EFTA	  Ct	  Rep	  30,	  and	  Case	  C-­‐379/05	  Amurta	  [2007]	  ECR	  I-­‐9569	  deviating	  from	  
Case	  E-­‐1/04	  Fokus	  Bank	  [2004]	  EFTA	  Ct	  Rep	  11.	  	  
85	  C	  Baudenbacher,	  ‘The	  EFTA	  Court	  and	  the	  European	  Court’	  (n	  81)	  80-­‐81.	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of	   the	   cases	   concerned	   the	   interpretation	   of	   Article	   7(1)	   of	   the	   Trade	   Marks	  
Directive86	  and	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  the	  Directive	  settled	  in	  addition	  to	  EEA-­‐
wide	   exhaustion	   of	   trade	   mark	   rights	   also	   the	   question	   of	   international	  
exhaustion	   or	   whether	   that	   determination	   was	   left	   for	   the	   national	   courts	   to	  
make.87	   In	   Maglite,	   the	   EFTA	   Court	   found	   that	   the	   different	   objectives	   and	  
contexts	  of	   the	  EU	  and	  the	  EEA	  –	   the	  one	  being	  a	  customs	  union	  and	  the	  other	  
not	  –	  may	  justify	  different	  interpretation	  of	  the	  rule	  of	  international	  exhaustion	  
of	  trade	  mark	  rules	  and	  that	  the	  Directive	  as	  it	  applies	  to	  the	  EEA,	  therefore,	  does	  
not	   prohibit	   compulsory	   international	   exhaustion	   of	   trade	   mark	   rights.88	   In	  
Silhouette,	   however,	   the	   Court	   of	   Justice	   found	   that	   the	   Directive	   did,	   indeed,	  
preclude	   the	   Member	   States	   from	   applying	   the	   principle	   of	   international	  
exhaustion	  of	   trade	  mark	   rights	   in	   addition	   to	   the	  EEA-­‐wide	   exhaustion.89	  The	  
differences	   in	   the	   two	   interpretations	   arose	   from	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   EFTA	  Court	  
approached	  the	  issue	  from	  the	  angle	  of	  free	  trade	  and	  competition	  whereas	  the	  
Court	  of	  Justice	  emphasised	  the	  functioning	  of	  the	  internal	  market.90	  Although	  in	  
this	  case	  a	  difference	  in	  interpretation	  arose	  the	  matter	  did	  not	  become	  subject	  
to	  a	  procedure	  in	  the	  EEA	  Joint	  Committee.	  Instead,	  the	  next	  time	  the	  EFTA	  Court	  
dealt	   with	   the	   matter,	   in	   the	   L’Oréal	   case,91	   it	   followed	   the	   Court	   of	   Justice’s	  
interpretation	  in	  Silhouette	  and,	  thus,	  ensured	  homogeneity	  by	  using	  the	  judicial	  
means	   at	   hand.92	   The	   EFTA	   Court	   held	   that	   the	   differences	   between	   the	   EU	  
Treaties	   and	   the	   EEA	   Agreement	   did	   not,	   after	   all,	   call	   for	   a	   need	   for	   it	   to	  
interpret	   the	   provision	   in	   question	   differently	   from	   the	   Court	   of	   Justice.93	   The	  
EFTA	  Court	  considered	  both	  approaches	  to	  be	  equally	  relevant	  in	  the	  EU	  and	  the	  
EEA	  context	  and,	  therefore,	  decided	  to	  abide	  by	  the	  choice	  made	  by	  the	  Court	  of	  
Justice	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  upholding	  homogeneity.	  	  
Cases	   where	   the	   EFTA	   Court	   goes	   first	   involve,	   moreover,	   a	   valid	   concern	   for	  
legal	  certainty.	  In	  spite	  of	  the	  homogeneity	  claim	  the	  specific	  legal	  issue	  at	  hand	  
                                            
86	  Council	  Directive	  89/104/EEC	  of	  21	  December	  1988	  to	  approximate	  the	  laws	  of	  the	  Member	  
States	  relating	  to	  trade	  marks	  [1989]	  OJ	  L40/1.	  
87	  O-­‐A	  Rognstad,	  'The	  Conflict	  between	  Internal	  Market	  and	  Third	  Country	  Policy	  Considerations	  
in	  the	  EEA.	  Maglite	  Vs.	  Silhouette'	  in	  P-­‐C	  Müller-­‐Graff	  and	  E	  Selvig	  (eds),	  EEA-­EU	  Relations	  (Berlin	  
Verlag	  Arno	  Spitz	  1999)	  131,	  132.	  
88	  Case	  E-­‐2/97	  Maglite	  [1997]	  EFTA	  Ct	  Rep	  127,	  paras	  25-­‐28.	  
89	  Case	  C-­‐355/96	  Silhouette	  [1998]	  ECR	  I-­‐4799,	  para	  52.	  
90	  Joined	  Cases	  E-­‐9/07	  and	  E-­‐10/07	  L’Oréal	  (n	  77)	  para	  30.	  
91	  ibid.	  
92	  H	  Haukeland	  Fredriksen,	  'One	  Market,	  Two	  Courts’	  (n	  73)	  497.	  
93	  Joined	  Cases	  E-­‐9/07	  and	  E-­‐10/07	  L’Oréal	  (n	  77)	  para	  37.	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cannot	  be	  considered	  to	  have	  been	  settled	  authoritatively	  in	  the	  EEA	  for	  as	  long	  
as	   the	  Court	  of	   Justice	  has	  not	  expressed	   itself	  on	   the	  same	  matter	  and,	  should	  
the	   Court	   depart	   from	   the	   interpretation	   previously	   given	   by	   the	   EFTA	   Court,	  
until	   the	   latter	  has	  had	  the	  opportunity	  to	  pronounce	  itself	  on	  the	  same	  matter	  
again	   and	   possibly	   align	   its	   case	   law	   with	   that	   of	   the	   Court	   of	   Justice.	   In	   the	  
particular	  case	  of	  Maglite,	  it	  must	  be	  added	  that	  the	  EFTA	  Court’s	  change	  of	  mind	  
was	   not	   unpredictable.	   In	   the	   judgment,	   the	   EFTA	   Court	   did	   provide	   a	  
reservation	  by	  establishing	  a	  minimum	  standard	  of	  exhaustion	  subject	  to	  future	  
developments	   of	   case	   law.94	   Because	   of	   this	   proviso	   the	   impact	   of	   the	   later	  
change	   in	   direction	   on	   individuals	   in	   terms	   of	   legal	   certainty	   cannot	   be	  
considered	  significant.95	  
With	   respect	   to	   the	   EFTA	   Court’s	   reservation	   in	   Maglite,	   van	   Stiphout	   has	  
deemed	   the	  EFTA	  Court	   to	  perceive	   itself	  as	  not	  having	  more	   than	   ‘provisional	  
authority’.96	   Magnússon	   claims	   that	   the	   same	   can	   be	   said	   about	   the	   Court	   of	  
Justice.97	  Whereas	  both	  opinions	  can	  be	  considered	   justified	  to	  a	  certain	  extent	  
the	  scales	  of	  provisional	  authority	   lean	  more	  strongly	   towards	  the	  EFTA	  Court.	  
The	   seeming	   difference	   between	   the	   two	   courts	   is	   that	   the	   Court	   of	   Justice	  
changes	  path	  in	  its	  case	  law	  because	  of	  its	  own	  determination	  whereas	  the	  EFTA	  
Court	  in	  the	  L’Oréal	  case	  reversed	  its	  previous	  interpretation	  in	  order	  to	  realign	  
itself	  with	  a	  ruling	  of	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice.	  	  
The	  Court	  of	  Justice	  is	  the	  final	  and	  authoritative	  interpreter	  of	  EU	  law.	  This	  does	  
not	  mean	  that	  the	  Court	  may	  not	  accept	  the	  EFTA	  Court’s	  interpretation	  of	  EEA	  
law	  or	   even	  make	   references	   to	   it.	  One	   should	  not,	   however,	   imply	   from	   these	  
references	   that	   the	   Court	   of	   Justice	   accepts	   the	   EFTA	   Court’s	   interpretation	  
because	  it	  perceives	  the	  latter	  to	  exercise	  judicial	  authority	  over	  its	  own	  judicial	  
activity.	  Rather,	  the	  Court	  refers	  to	  the	  judgments	  of	  the	  EFTA	  Court	  because	  it	  
finds	  no	  reason	  to	  deviate	  from	  the	  interpretation	  given	  by	  the	  latter	  in	  the	  given	  
                                            
94	  Case	  E-­‐2/97	  Maglite	  (n	  82)	  para	  22.	  
95	  S	  Magnússon,	   'Judicial	  Homogeneity	  in	  the	  European	  Economic	  Area	  and	  the	  Authority	  of	  the	  
EFTA	  Court.	   Some	  Remarks	  on	   an	  Article	  by	  Halvard	  Haukeland	  Fredriksen'	   (2011)	  80	  Nordic	  
Journal	  of	  International	  Law	  507,	  532.	  
96	  T	  van	  Stiphout,	  'The	  L’Oréal	  Cases	  -­‐	  Some	  Thoughts	  on	  the	  Role	  of	  the	  EFTA	  Court	  in	  the	  EEA	  
Legal	  Framework:	  Because	  it	  is	  worth	  it!'	  (2009)	  1	  Jus	  &	  News	  7,	  15.	  
97	  S	  Magnússon,	  'Judicial	  Homogeneity	  in	  the	  European	  Economic	  Area’	  (n	  95)	  531.	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case	  and,	  possibly,	  because	  it	  regards	  such	  references	  relevant	  from	  the	  point	  of	  
view	  of	  homogeneity	  in	  the	  EEA.	  	  
The	  mere	  fact	  that	  two	  courts	  try	  to	  align	  their	  case	  law	  to	  that	  of	  one	  other	  does	  
not	  mean	   that	   either	   of	   the	   courts	   considers	   itself	   bound	   to	   do	   so.	   There	   is	   a	  
distinction	  between	  the	  binding	  and	  persuasive	  authority	  of	  judicial	  decisions.98	  
The	   former	   category	   comprises	   judgments	   that	  must	   be	   followed	   in	   later	   case	  
law	  unless	  the	  judge	  can	  find	  good	  reasons	  for	  not	  doing	  so,	  or	  even	  if	  the	  judge	  
could,	  in	  fact,	  give	  good	  reasons	  for	  not	  doing	  so.99	  The	  latter	  category	  refers	  to	  
previous	   decisions	   that	   have	   informative,	   rather	   than	   obligatory	   value.100	   The	  
rulings	  of	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice	  given	  prior	  to	  1992	  have	  binding	  authority	  on	  the	  
EFTA	  Court	  but	  no	  rulings	  of	  the	  EFTA	  Court	  have	  binding	  authority	  on	  the	  Court	  
of	  Justice.	  It	  is	  apparent	  from	  Maglite	  and	  Silhouette	  that	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice	  does	  
not	  set	  the	  homogeneity	  objective	  of	  the	  EEA	  Agreement	  above	  its	  own	  judicial	  
authority.	   Contrary	  would	   be	   proven	   in	   cases	   in	  which	   the	   EFTA	   Court	  would	  
depart	   from	  the	  case	   law	  of	   the	  Court	  of	   Justice	  and	   the	  Court	  of	   Justice	  would	  
later	  follow	  the	  EFTA	  Court’s	  precedent	  but	  to	  this	  date	  this	  has	  never	  happened.	  	  
When	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice	  arrives	  at	  a	  similar	  interpretation	  as	  the	  EFTA	  Court,	  
these	   references	   are,	   therefore,	   informative	   in	   the	   sense	  of	   demonstrating	   that	  
the	  EFTA	  Court	  has	  previously	  arrived	  at	  the	  same	  conclusion	  that	  the	  Court	  of	  
Justice	  would	  make.	  Whereas	  agreeing	  with	   the	  approach	  of	   the	  EFTA	  Court	   in	  
given	  cases	  may	  be	  coincidental	  the	  references	  that	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice	  makes	  to	  
the	   EFTA	   Court’s	   case	   law	   are,	   however,	   hardly	   that.	   Instead,	   the	   fact	   that	   the	  
Court	  does	  refer	  to	  the	  EFTA	  Court’s	  rulings,	  regardless	  of	  who	  had	  first	  ruled	  on	  
the	   issue	   in	   question,	   shows	   that	   the	   Court	   of	   Justice,	   too,	   implicitly	   perceives	  
that	   the	   proper	   functioning	   of	   the	   EEA	   Agreement	   requires,	   in	   practice,	  
homogeneity	  in	  the	  interpretation	  of	  identical	  rules	  and	  that	  there	  is,	  thus,	  a	  need	  
to	  signal	  the	  existence	  of	  such	  homogeneity	  where	  this	  does	  not	  conflict	  with	  the	  
Court’s	   own	   judicial	   authority.	   Even	   though	   formally	   the	   rulings	   of	   the	   EFTA	  
Court	  do	  not	  bind	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice	  and	  neither	  do	  the	  post-­‐1992	  rulings	  of	  the	  
Court	  of	   Justice	  bind	   the	  EFTA	  Court	  beyond	   ‘duly	   taking	   them	   into	  account’	   it	  
                                            
98	  AG	  Toth,	  'The	  Authority	  of	  Judgments	  of	  the	  European	  Court	  of	  Justice:	  Binding	  Force	  and	  Legal	  
Effects'	  (1984)	  4	  Yearbook	  of	  European	  Law	  1,	  20.	  	  
99	  R	  Cross	  and	  JW	  Harris,	  Precedent	  in	  English	  Law	  (Oxford	  University	  Press	  1991)	  4.	  
100	  AG	  Toth	  (n	  98)	  20.	  	  
 
	   319 
cannot	  be	  denied	  that	  the	  persuasive	  authority	  of	  these	  rulings	  is,	  still,	   to	  some	  
extent	  an	  authority,	  even	  if	  very	  ‘soft’.	  
In	   comparison	   to	   the	  Court	  of	   Justice,	   the	  EFTA	  Court	   certainly	   enjoys	  a	   lesser	  
degree	  of	  independence	  in	  interpreting	  EEA	  acquis	  than	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice	  even	  
if	   this	   loss	   of	   independence	   is	   at	   times	   voluntary.	   One	   further	   example	  
illustrating	  the	  generally	  weaker	  position	  of	  the	  EFTA	  Court	  in	  the	  EEA	  equation	  
is	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice	  but	  not	  the	  EFTA	  Court	  has	  jurisdiction	  to	  rule	  
on	  the	  validity	  of	  internal	  market	  acquis.	  The	  Court	  of	  Justice	  enjoys	  the	  exclusive	  
jurisdiction	   to	   review	   the	   legality	  of	   legislative	   acts	   adopted	  by	  EU	   institutions	  
and,	   if	  necessary,	  declare	   them	  void.101	   In	   the	  EU	  pillar	  of	   the	  EEA	  the	  Court	  of	  
Justice	  may,	  moreover,	  rule	  on	  the	  validity	  of	  the	  Council	  decision	  that	  concluded	  
the	  EEA	  Agreement	  and	  Council	  decisions	  by	  which	  the	  Union’s	  positions	  to	  be	  
taken	   in	   the	   EEA	   Joint	   Committee	   are	   adopted.102	   Should	   the	   Court	   of	   Justice	  
declare	   void	   the	   Council	   decision	   concluding	   the	   EEA	   Agreement,	   the	  
international	  obligations	  of	   the	  EU	  vis-­à-­vis	   the	  other	  contracting	  parties	  would	  
remain	  in	  place	  until	  the	  Agreement	  is	  denounced	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  rules	  of	  
international	   treaty	   law.	  The	  EFTA	  Court,	   on	   the	  other	  hand,	   enjoys	  no	   similar	  
powers.	  The	  EFTA	  Court	  can	  neither	  review	  the	  legality	  of	  EU	  law	  nor	  the	  legality	  
of	  the	  decisions	  of	  the	  EEA	  Joint	  Committee.103	  In	  the	  EFTA	  pillar	  of	  the	  EEA	  only	  
the	   EEA	   EFTA	   States’	   national	   courts	   can	   review	   the	   validity	   of	   the	   national	  
legislation	  implementing	  EEA	  law	  following	  their	  own	  constitutional	  procedures.	  	  
In	  addition	  to	  the	  provisions	  on	  taking	  into	  account	  each	  other’s	  case	  law	  there	  
are	  procedural	  provisions	  in	  place	  with	  the	  aim	  of	  promoting	  homogeneity	  in	  the	  
EEA.	  The	  EU	  and	  the	  European	  Commission	  may	  intervene	  in	  proceedings	  before	  
the	   EFTA	   Court104	   and	   the	   EEA	   EFTA	   States	   and	   the	   ESA	   may	   intervene	   in	  
proceedings	  before	   the	  Court	  of	   Justice	   in	  cases	   that	  concern	  the	  application	  of	  
EEA	  law	  or	  EU	  acquis	  replicated	  by	  the	  EEA	  Agreement.	  To	  this	  end,	  Articles	  20	  
and	  37	  of	  the	  Statute	  of	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice	  and	  the	  Court	  of	  First	  Instance	  of	  the	  
                                            
101	  Articles	  263-­‐264	  TFEU.	  
102	   See,	   for	   example,	   Case	   C-­‐431/11	  United	   Kingdom	   v	   Council	   (Court	   of	   Justice,	   26	   September	  
2013).	  
103	  The	  EFTA	  Court	  has,	  however,	  under	  Article	  34	  SCA	  the	  jurisdiction	  to	  assess	  the	  limits	  of	  the	  
competences	  of	  the	  EEA	  Joint	  Committee.	  See,	  for	  example,	  Case	  E-­‐6/01	  CIBA	  [2002]	  EFTA	  Ct	  Rep	  
281,	  paras	  21-­‐23.	  
104	  Article	  36	  of	  the	  Statute	  of	  the	  EFTA	  Court,	  Protocol	  5	  to	  the	  EEA	  Agreement.	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European	   Communities	   (now	  Articles	   23	   and	   40	   of	   the	   Statute	   of	   the	   Court	   of	  
Justice	   of	   the	   European	   Union)	   were	   amended	   accordingly.105	   The	   EEA	   EFTA	  
States	  and	  the	  ESA	  may	  appear	   in	  proceedings	  between	  EU	  institutions	  and	  EU	  
Member	   States	   as	  well	   as	   in	   preliminary	   ruling	   proceedings	   provided	   that	   the	  
cases	   concern	   one	   of	   the	   fields	   of	   application	   of	   the	   EEA	   Agreement.106	   The	  
second	  paragraph	  of	  Article	  40	  of	  the	  Statute,	  however,	  provides	  that	  natural	  or	  
legal	  persons,	  including	  the	  ESA,	  may	  only	  intervene	  in	  a	  case	  before	  the	  Court	  of	  
Justice	  of	  the	  EU	  if	  they	  can	  establish	  an	  interest	   in	  the	  result	  of	  that	  case,	  with	  
the	   exception	   of	   cases	   between	   Member	   States,	   between	   EU	   institutions	   or	  
between	  EU	   institutions	   and	  Member	   States.107	  Article	   36	   of	   the	   Statute	   of	   the	  
EFTA	   Court	   does	   not	   restrict	   the	   intervention	   rights	   of	   the	   EU	   and	   the	  
Commission	  in	  a	  similar	  manner.	  Only	  recently	  has	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice	  actually	  
refused	   to	   allow	   the	   ESA	   to	   intervene	   in	   the	   proceedings	   of	   a	   case	   that	   did	  
concern	   a	   field	   covered	  by	   the	  EEA	  Agreement	  because	   the	  parties	   to	   the	   case	  
were	  an	  EU	   institution	  and	  an	  EU	  Member	  State.108	  Previously	   In	  other	   similar	  
cases	   had	   EEA	   EFTA	   States	   been	   granted	   leave	   to	   intervene	   in	   proceedings	  
before	  the	  Court.109	  	  
The	  lack	  of	  reciprocity	  in	  the	  intervention	  rights	  under	  the	  Statute	  of	  the	  Court	  of	  
Justice	   and	   the	   Statute	   of	   the	   EFTA	   Court,	   respectively,	   has	   prompted	   many	  
authors	   to	   note	   the	   lack	   of	   procedural	   homogeneity	   in	   the	   EEA.110	   While	  
generally	   unknown	   as	   a	   concept	   within	   EU	   law,	   procedural	   homogeneity	   has	  
been	   recognised	   by	   the	   EFTA	   Court.111	   Although	   it	   is	   not	   explicit	   in	   either	   the	  
                                            
105	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   the	   European	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   on	   the	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   for	   the	   EFTA	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Court	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  Justice	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  para	  1.	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  Council	  Decision	  of	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  1994	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  the	  Protocol	  on	  the	  Statute	  of	  the	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Justice	  of	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  of	  19	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  2012	  in	  Joined	  Cases	  T-­‐289/11,	  T-­‐290/11	  and	  T-­‐521/11	  Deutsche	  Bahn	  
(General	  Court,	  6	  September	  2013),	  para	  7.	  
108	  Order	  of	  15	  July	  2010	  in	  Case	  C-­‐493/09	  Commission	  v	  Portugal	  [2011]	  ECR	  I-­‐9247,	  paras	  11-­‐
12.	  
109	   See,	   for	   example,	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   C-­‐377/98	  Netherlands	   v	   Parliament	   and	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   [2001]	   ECR	   I-­‐7079;	  
Order	   of	   10	   July	   2006	   in	   Joined	   Cases	   C-­‐14/06	   and	   C-­‐295/06	   Parliament	   and	   Denmark	   v	  
Commission	  [2008]	  ECR	  I-­‐1649.	  
110	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  'Procedural	  Homogeneity	  v.	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  of	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  Courts	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  on	  
Order	  of	  the	  EFTA	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  President	  of	  15	  June	  2012	  in	  Case	  E-­‐16/11	  EFTA	  Surveillance	  Authority	  
v.	   Iceland',	   (2012),	   196	   <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2140717>	  
accessed	  24	  June	  2015;	  C	  Baudenbacher,	   'The	  EFTA	  Court	  and	  Court	  of	   Justice	  of	   the	  European	  
Union:	   Coming	   in	   Parts	   But	   Winning	   Together',	   The	   Court	   of	   Justice	   and	   the	   Construction	   of	  
Europe:	  Analyses	  and	  Perspectives	  on	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  Years	  of	  Case-­law	  (T.M.C.	  Asser	  Press	  2013)	  183.	  
111	   ‘[…]	   for	   the	   sake	  of	  procedural	  homogeneity	   [...]’:	  Order	  of	  25	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  2011	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  Case	  E-­‐14/10	  
Konkurrenten.no	  [2011]	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  Rep	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  para	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EEA	  Agreement,	  the	  ECT	  or	  the	  ECAA	  Agreement	  that	  the	  homogeneity	  principle	  
would	  extend	  to	  the	  procedural	  realm,	  it	  is	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  homogeneity	  that	  the	  
institutions	   set	   up	   for	   ensuring	   the	   proper	   functioning	   of	   these	   agreements	  
should	   also	   be	   equipped	   with	   the	   tools	   necessary	   to	   safeguard	   the	   uniform	  
interpretation	   and	   application	   of	   the	   internal	   market	   acquis.	   This	   necessarily	  
includes	   interpreting	   the	   identical	   procedural	   and	   institutional	   rules	   of	   the	   EU	  
and	  the	  multilateral	  agreements	  in	  a	  coherent	  and	  uniform	  manner.112	  	  
2.2.2	  Energy	  Community	  
Neither	   the	   ECAA	   nor	   the	   Energy	   Community	   establishes	   any	   judicial	  
institutions.	  Article	  94	  ECT	  allocates	   the	   task	  of	   interpreting	   the	  aspects	  of	   the	  
Treaty	   that	   mirror	   EU	   acquis	   to	   the	   Ministerial	   Council	   who	   may,	   in	   turn,	  
delegate	   the	   matter	   to	   the	   PHLG.	   Energy	   Community	   law	   that	   replicates	   EU	  
acquis	   must	   be	   interpreted	   in	   conformity	   with	   the	   case	   law	   of	   the	   Court	   of	  
Justice.	  Compared	  to	  the	  EEA,	  Article	  94	  of	   the	  ECT	  contains	  no	  reservation	  for	  
post-­‐signature	  case	  law	  suggesting	  that	  Energy	  Community	  acquis	  might	  be	  more	  
dynamic	   than	   EEA	   acquis.	   When	   no	   interpretation	   has	   yet	   been	   given	   by	   the	  
Court,	  ‘guidance’	  on	  how	  to	  interpret	  the	  ECT	  will	  be	  provided	  by	  the	  Ministerial	  
Council	   or,	   upon	   delegation	   from	   the	   latter,	   the	   PHLG.	   The	   interpretation	  
provided	   by	   the	   political	   institutions	   of	   the	   Energy	   Community	   does	   not,	  
however,	   bind	   the	   Court	   subsequently	   to	   a	   certain	   interpretation	   of	   EU	   law.	  
Article	  94	  ECT	  clearly	  states	  that	  it	  is	  the	  ‘institutions’	  of	  the	  Energy	  Community	  
that	  must	   interpret	  Energy	  Community	   law	   in	   conformity	  with	   the	   case	   law	  of	  
the	  Court	  without	  any	  reference	  to	  the	  national	  courts	  of	  the	  non-­‐EU	  parties	  to	  
the	   ECT.	   Neither	   Article	   6	   EEA	   Agreement	   nor	   Article	   16(1)	   ECAA	   Agreement	  
restricts	   the	   requirement	   of	   conforming	   interpretation	   to	   the	   institutions	   only.	  
To	   the	   contrary,	   they	   refer	   to	   the	   ‘implementation	  and	  application’	  of	   identical	  
provisions.	  Nevertheless,	  the	  cases	  in	  which	  the	  Energy	  Community	  institutions	  
interpret	  Energy	  Community	  acquis	  include	  the	  dispute	  settlement	  procedures	  in	  
the	  Ministerial	   Council.	   There	   is,	   thus,	   a	   centralised	  means	   of	   ensuring	   judicial	  
homogeneity	  in	  the	  Energy	  Community	  even	  if	  political	  in	  nature.	  
                                            
112	   S	   Magnusson,	   ‘Procedural	   Homogeneity’	   (n	   110)	   4-­‐5.	   See	   also	   C	   Baudenbacher,	   ‘The	   EFTA	  
Court	  and	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice	  of	  the	  European	  Union’	  (n	  110)	  194.	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2.2.3	  European	  Common	  Aviation	  Area	  
In	  the	  ECAA,	  the	  same	  rule	  applies	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  judgments	  of	  the	  Court	  of	  
Justice	   on	   legislative	   acts	   reproduced	   in	   the	   ECAA	   Agreement	   as	   in	   the	   EEA	   –	  
only	   judgments	   given	   before	   the	   date	   of	   signature	   of	   the	  ECAA	  Agreement	   are	  
subject	  to	  conforming	  interpretation.113	  Later	  decisions	  are	  communicated	  to	  the	  
contracting	  parties	  and	  at	  the	  request	  of	  one	  of	  the	  latter	  the	  implications	  of	  such	  
later	  rulings	  and	  decisions	  will	  be	  determined	  by	  the	  ECAA	  Joint	  Committee.	  The	  
decisions	  of	  the	  ECAA	  Joint	  Committee	  taken	  in	  this	  regard	  must	  conform	  to	  the	  
case	   law	   of	   the	   Court	   of	   Justice.114	   The	   ECAA	   Joint	   Committee	   must	   keep	   the	  
development	   of	   the	   case	   law	   of	   the	   Court	   under	   constant	   review.	   The	   EU	  
forwards	   to	   the	  ECAA	  Partners	   all	   relevant	   judgments	  of	   the	  Court.	   Just	   as	   the	  
EEA	   Joint	  Committee,	   the	  ECAA	   Joint	  Committee	  shall	  act	  so	  as	   to	  preserve	   the	  
homogeneous	  interpretation	  of	  the	  ECAA	  Agreement	  and	  has	  three	  months	  to	  do	  
so.115	  	  
Dispute	   settlement	   in	   the	   ECAA	   is	   conducted	   by	   the	   ECAA	   Joint	   Committee.	  
Matters	   of	   dispute	   concerning	   the	   application	   or	   interpretation	   of	   the	   ECAA	  
Agreement	  may	   be	   brought	   to	   the	   Joint	   Committee	   by	   the	   EU	   acting	   together	  
with	   its	   Member	   States	   or	   by	   an	   ECAA	   Partner.116	   The	   dispute	   settlement	  
procedure	   starts	   with	   immediate	   consultations	   between	   the	   parties	   to	   the	  
dispute.	   The	   EU	   is	   always	   involved	   in	   the	   procedure,	   if	   not	   as	   a	   party	   to	   the	  
dispute	   then	   as	   an	   invited	   participant	   to	   the	   consultations.	   If	   the	   disputing	  
parties	  manage	   to	   agree	   to	   a	   solution	   they	  draft	   a	   proposal	   in	   that	   regard	   and	  
submit	   it	   to	   the	   ECAA	   Joint	   Committee.	   In	   the	   absence	   of	   an	   ECAA	   court,	   the	  
ECAA	   Joint	   Committee	   is	   more	   likely	   to	   become	   involved	   in	   the	   settlement	   of	  
disputes	  between	  the	  parties	  than	  the	  EEA	  Joint	  Committee.117	  
Also	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  ECAA,	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice	  enjoys	  a	  special	  position	  as	  an	  
authoritative	   interpreter	  of	  EU	  acquis.	  The	  ECAA	  Joint	  Committee	  must	  respect	  
the	   case	   law	   of	   the	   Court	   of	   Justice	   in	   the	   dispute	   settlement	   procedure.118	  
Furthermore,	   if	  the	  ECAA	  Joint	  Committee	  is	  unable	  to	  solve	  a	  dispute	  between	  
                                            
113	  Article	  16(1)	  ECAA	  Agreement.	  	  
114	  ibid.	  
115	  Article	  18(7)	  ECAA	  Agreement.	  
116	  Article	  20(1)	  ECAA	  Agreement.	  
117	  Opinion	  1/00	  ECAA	  (n	  33)	  para	  8.	  
118	  Article	  20(2)	  ECAA	  Agreement.	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the	  contracting	  parties	  within	  four	  months,	  the	  parties	  to	  the	  dispute	  may	  refer	  it	  
to	   the	  Court	  whose	  decision	   shall	   be	   final	   and	  binding.119	   In	   such	  an	  event	   the	  
parties	  to	  the	  dispute	  may,	  moreover,	  take	  appropriate	  safeguard	  measures	  for	  a	  
period	  of	  maximum	  six	  months.	  After	  six	  months	  each	  Party	  may	  denounce	  the	  
ECAA	  Agreement	  with	  immediate	  effect.	  It	  is	  noteworthy	  that	  referring	  a	  dispute	  
to	   the	  Court	  of	   Justice	  precludes	   the	  adoption	  of	   safeguard	  measures	  except	   in	  
cases	   of	   aviation	   safety	   or	   compliance	   with	   mechanisms	   provided	   for	   in	  
individual	  acts.120	  Finally,	  similarly	  to	  the	  EEA	  and	  also	  the	  Energy	  Community,	  
although	   not	   explicit	   in	   the	   ECT,	   the	   jurisdiction	   of	   the	   Court	   of	   Justice	   also	  
extends	  to	  a	  legality	  review	  of	  the	  decisions	  taken	  under	  the	  ECAA	  Agreement	  by	  
EU	  institutions.121	  	  
3	  Safeguarding	  homogeneity:	  decentralising	  dynamics	  
3.1	  Surveillance	  and	  enforcement	  
In	  the	  area	  of	  surveillance,	   the	  decentralising	  dynamics	  of	   the	  EU	  legal	  order	   is	  
reflected	  in	  the	  role	  of	  the	  EU	  Member	  States’	  institutions	  in	  the	  EU	  institutional	  
architecture.	   The	   concepts	   of	   unity	   of	   the	   internal	  market	   and	   of	   the	   EU	   legal	  
order	   assume	   particular	   relevance	   in	   this	   context.	   In	   order	   to	   preserve	   the	  
‘Community	   character’122	   or	   the	   ‘Community	   nature’123	   of	   EU	   law	   the	   Union	  
relies	   on	   a	   set	   of	   common	   procedures	   and	   institutions,	   including	   those	   of	   the	  
Member	  States.	  Direct	  administration	  of	  EU	  law	  on	  the	  Union	  level	  is	   limited	  to	  
certain	   specific	   areas	   only;	   instead,	   the	   Member	   States	   are	   the	   primary	  
implementers	   and	   enforcers	   of	   EU	   law.124	   For	   example,	   the	   Member	   States’	  
customs	   authorities	   act	   as	   EU	   customs	   authorities,125	   and	   the	   Member	   States’	  
competition	   authorities	   assist	   the	   Commission	   in	   the	   investigation	  
procedures.126	  National	  authorities	  are	  also	  empowered	  to	  implement	  and	  apply	  
EU	  acquis	   exported	   to	  non-­‐member	  states	  as	  well	  as	   to	   investigate	  breaches	  of	  
                                            
119	  Article	  20(3)	  ECAA	  Agreement.	  
120	  Article	  20(4)	  ECAA	  Agreement.	  
121	  Article	  15(3)	  ECAA	  Agreement.	  
122	  Case	  166/73	  Rheinmühlen	  I	  [1974]	  ECR	  33,	  para	  2.	  	  	  
123	  Case	  104/81	  Kupferberg	  [1982]	  ECR	  3641,	  para	  14.	  
124	  HCH	  Hofmann	  and	  AH	  Türk,	  'Policy	  implementation'	  in	  HCH	  Hofmann	  and	  AH	  Türk	  (eds),	  EU	  
Administrative	  Governance	  (Edward	  Elgar	  Publishing	  2006)	  74,	  74.	  
125	   See,	   for	   example,	   Report	   of	   the	   Panel,	   European	   Communities	   –	   Customs	   Classification	   of	  
Certain	  Computer	  Equipment	  (LAN	  case),	  WT/DS62/R,	  WT/DS67/R,	  WT/DS68/R,	  para	  4.14.	  
126	  Article	  105(1)	  TFEU.	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those	  rules.	  When	  implementing	  EU	  law,	  the	  national	  authorities	  are	  not	  entirely	  
free	  in	  their	  activities.	  The	  Member	  States	  are	  under	  a	  general	  obligation	  to	  abide	  
by	  the	  principles	  of	  unity	  and	  solidarity	  with	  the	  EU.127	  The	  Member	  States	  must	  
ensure	  the	  ‘effective	  defence	  of	  the	  common	  interests	  of	  the	  [Union]’128	  and	  may	  
not	  act	  where	  concurrent	  action	  would	  compromise	   the	   ‘unity	  of	   the	   [Internal]	  
Market	  and	  the	  uniform	  application	  of	  [Union]	  law’.129	  	  
Decentralisation	   also	   finds	   expression	   in	   the	   possibilities	   of	   individuals	   and	  
economic	   operators	   to	   indirectly	   trigger	   infringement	   proceedings	   for	   non-­‐
compliance	   with	   EU	   law.	   Individuals	   may,	   for	   example,	   submit	   complaints	   to	  
notify	   the	   Commission	   of	   possible	   breaches	   of	   EU	   law	   by	   a	   Member	   State.	  
However,	   there	   is	  no	  guarantee	   for	  an	  EU	   individual	   to	  have	   their	  rights	  under	  
EU	   law	   upheld	   by	   the	   Commission.	   The	   Commission	   enjoys	   discretion	   as	   to	  
whether	  to	  initiate	  infringement	  proceedings	  against	  a	  Member	  State	  for	  failure	  
to	  fulfil	  their	  obligations	  under	  EU	  law.	  Considering	  the	  vast	  amount	  of	  individual	  
complaints	  received,	  the	  number	  of	  cases	  actually	  taken	  up	  by	  the	  Commission	  is	  
very	  low.	  
In	   the	  EEA,	   individuals	  may	   lodge	  complaints	  either	   to	   the	  ESA	  against	  an	  EEA	  
EFTA	   State	   allegedly	   infringing	   of	   EEA	   law,	   or	   to	   the	   European	   Commission	  
against	  assumed	  breaches	  of	  the	  EEA	  Agreement	  by	  the	  EU	  or	  its	  Member	  States.	  
In	   the	   Energy	   Community	   and	   the	   ECAA	   no	   such	   general	   complaints	   can	   be	  
submitted.	   Since	   anyone	   can	   lodge	   a	   complaint	   to	   the	  Commission	   regarding	   a	  
breach	  of	  EU	  law	  by	  a	  Member	  State,	  theoretically,	  also	  nationals	  of	  the	  non-­‐EU	  
contracting	   parties	   to	   the	   ECT	   or	   the	   ECAA	   Agreement	  may	   lodge	   complaints.	  
This	  means	  of	  recourse	  is	  not	  applicable	  for	  complaints	  against	  non-­‐EU	  Member	  
States,	   though.	  Finally,	   the	  complaints	  procedure	   is	  established	  for	   the	  purpose	  
of	   informing	   the	   Commission	   of	   potential	   breaches	   only.	   Individual	   remedies	  
must	  always	  be	  sought	  in	  national	  courts.	  	  	  
                                            
127	  Opinion	  1/76	  European	  laying-­up	  fund	  for	  inland	  waterway	  vessels	  [1977]	  ECR	  741,	  para	  12.	  	  
128	  Opinion	  1/75	  Re	  Understanding	  on	  a	  Local	  Costs	  Standard	  [1975]	  ECR	  1355,	  paras	  15-­‐18.	  
129	  Case	  22/70	  AETR	  [1971]	  ECR	  263,	  para	  31.	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3.2	  Interpretation	  and	  dispute	  settlement	  
3.2.1	  European	  Union	  
Individual	  rights	  derived	  from	  internal	  market	  law	  within	  and	  outside	  the	  EU	  are	  
protected	  by	  the	  judicial	  system.	  The	  protection	  of	  individual	  rights	  rests	  on	  the	  
principle	  of	  effective	  legal	  protection.	  The	  principle	   is	  provided	  in	  Article	  67(4)	  
TFEU	  that	  obliges	  the	  Union	  to	  facilitate	  access	  to	  justice	  and	  in	  Article	  47	  of	  the	  
Charter	  of	  Fundamental	  Rights	  that	  establishes	  the	  right	  to	  an	  effective	  remedy	  
and	   to	   a	   fair	   trial.	   Underlying	   the	   constitutional	   traditions	   of	   the	   EU	   Member	  
States,	  effective	  legal	  protection	  is	  a	  general	  principle	  of	  EU	  law.130	  Moreover,	  by	  
virtue	  of	  Articles	  6	  and	  13	  ECHR	  the	  principle	  is	  binding	  on	  all	  EU	  Member	  States	  
as	   well	   as	   all	   non-­‐EU	   parties	   to	   the	   EEA	   Agreement,	   the	   ECT	   and	   the	   ECAA	  
Agreement.	  	  
The	  duty	  of	  cooperation	  enshrined	  in	  Article	  4(3)	  TEU	  obliges	  the	  Member	  States	  
to	   contribute	   to	   the	   protection	   of	   the	   rights	   that	   individuals	   derive	   from	   EU	  
law.131	  The	  duty	  is	  engrained	  in	  the	  institutional	  architecture	  of	  the	  EU.	  The	  two-­‐
tier	  judicial	  system	  of	  the	  EU	  envisages	  that	  not	  only	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice	  but	  also	  
national	   courts	   participate	   the	   protection	   of	   individual	   rights	   arising	   from	   the	  
Treaties.	   Member	   States’	   courts	   form	   an	   indispensable	   part	   of	   the	   EU	   judicial	  
architecture.132	   The	   EU	   and	   the	   Member	   States’	   judiciaries	   are	   separate	   yet	  
‘closely	   interlinked,	   dependent	   on	   and	   related	   to	   each	   other’.133	   Where	   no	  
jurisdiction	  has	  been	  conferred	  upon	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice,	  it	  is	  the	  national	  courts	  
that	   must	   apply	   EU	   law	   and	   do	   so	   in	   a	   manner	   that	   ‘ensures	   the	   effective	  
application	   of	   [EU]	   law	   [...]	   in	   line	   with	   the	   deeper	   philosophy	   of	   unity	   and	  
diversity	  underlying	  the	  Union	  itself.’134	  	  
                                            
130	  Case	  222/84	   Johnston	   [1986]	  ECR	  1651,	  para	  18.	  Case	  C-­‐432/05	  Unibet	   [2007]	  ECR	   I-­‐2271,	  
para	  37.	  
131	  Case	  33/76	  Rewe	  [1976]	  ECR	  1989,	  para	  5;	  Case	  106/77	  Simmenthal	  [1978]	  ECR	  629,	  para	  21;	  
Case	  C-­‐432/05	  Unibet	  (n	  130)	  para	  38;	  	  
132	  Case	  26/62	  Van	  Gend	  en	  Loos	  (n	  1);	  Case	  166/73	  Rheinmühlen	  I	  (n	  122)	  para	  2;	  Case	  348/89	  
Mecanarte	  [1991]	  ECR	  I-­‐3277,	  para	  44;	  Case	  C-­‐210/06	  Cartesio	  [2008]	  ECR	  I-­‐9641,	  Opinion	  of	  AG	  
Poiares	  Maduro,	  para	  19;	  Opinion	  1/09	  Patents	  Court	  [2011]	  ECR	  I-­‐1137,	  paras	  83-­‐85.	  	  	  
133	  I	  Pernice,	  'Multilevel	  constitutionalism	  and	  the	  Treaty	  of	  Amsterdam:	  European	  constitution-­‐
making	  revisited'	  (1999)	  36	  Common	  Market	  Law	  Review	  703,	  710;	  also	  I	  Pernice,	  'The	  Treaty	  of	  
Lisbon:	  Multilevel	  Constitutionalism	  in	  Action'	  (2009)	  15	  Columbia	  Journal	  of	  European	  Law	  349,	  
374.	  	  
134	  K	  Lenaerts,	  'The	  Rule	  of	  Law	  and	  the	  Coherence	  of	  the	  Judicial	  System	  of	  the	  European	  Union'	  
(2007)	  44	  Common	  Market	  Law	  Review	  1625,	  1625;	  Case	  166/73	  Rheinmühlen	  I	  (n	  122)	  para	  2.	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In	   Simmenthal,	   the	   Court	   ruled	   that	   national	   courts	   as	   ‘organ[s]	   of	   a	   Member	  
State’	  must	  protect	   the	   rights	   conferred	  on	   individuals	  by	  EU	   law	   in	   cases	   that	  
fall	  within	  their	   jurisdiction.135	  National	  courts	  must,	   firstly,	  apply	  EU	  law	  in	  an	  
effective	  manner.	  The	  Member	  States	  have	  an	  obligation	  under	  Article	  19(1)	  TEU	  
to	  ensure	   the	  effective	   legal	  protection	  of	   individual	   rights	   in	  areas	  covered	  by	  
EU	   law	   through	   appropriate	   remedies.	   Secondly,	   national	   courts	   must	   make	  
proper	   use	   of	   the	   preliminary	   ruling	   procedure.	   Under	   Article	   267	   TFEU	   the	  
Court	   of	   Justice	   has	   jurisdiction	   to	   give	   preliminary	   rulings	   concerning	   the	  
interpretation	  of	  the	  Treaties	  and	  the	  validity	  and	  interpretation	  of	  secondary	  EU	  
legislation.136	  This	  procedure	   is	   central	   to	   the	  protection	  of	   individual	   rights	   in	  
the	  EU.137	  	  
The	   proper	   use	   of	   the	   preliminary	   ruling	   procedure	   includes	   two	   elements.	  
Firstly,	   a	  national	   court	  of	   last	   instance	  must	   refer	   a	   case	   involving	  EU	   law	   for	  
preliminary	  ruling	  if	  necessary	  for	  it	  to	  give	  a	  judgment	  in	  the	  case.	  Secondly,	  the	  
preliminary	  ruling	  given	  by	  the	  Court	  is	  binding	  on	  the	  national	  court.138	  Member	  
State	   courts	   or	   tribunals	   may	   request	   the	   Court	   to	   give	   a	   ruling	   when	   they	  
consider	  it	  necessary	  to	  enable	  them	  to	  give	  a	  judgment	  in	  the	  case	  before	  them	  
whereas	  courts	  of	  last	  instance	  must	  do	  so.139	  These	  measures	  are	  to	  ensure	  that	  
all	   questions	   relating	   to	   the	   interpretation	   and	   application	   on	  which	   the	  Court	  
has	  not	  already	  given	  a	  preliminary	  ruling140	  or	  which	  do	  not	  constitute	  an	  acte	  
clair141	   are,	   indeed,	   decided	   centrally	   by	   the	   Court	   of	   Justice.	   The	   decision	   on	  
whether	  or	  not	  to	  refer	  a	  request	  to	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice	  is	  strictly	  for	  the	  national	  
court	   to	   make	   because	   it	   is	   the	   national	   courts	   that	   court	   responsible	   for	  
adjudicating	  the	  case	  and	  the	  Court	  is,	  in	  principle,	  bound	  to	  give	  the	  ruling.142	  	  
The	  preliminary	  reference	  procedure	  has	  primarily	  been	  considered	  a	  measure	  
to	  provide	  for	  a	  judicial	  dialogue	  between	  the	  EU	  and	  the	  national	  judiciaries	  but	  
                                            
135	  Case	  106/77	  Simmenthal	  (n	  131)	  para	  16.	  
136	  Furthermore,	  Article	  256(3)	  TFEU	  provides	  that	  in	  specific	  areas	  laid	  down	  by	  the	  Statute	  of	  
the	  Court	  of	  Justice	  the	  General	  Court	  has	  jurisdiction	  to	  hear	  and	  determine	  questions	  referred	  
for	  a	  preliminary	  ruling	  under	  Article	  267	  TFEU.	  	  
137	  Case	  C-­‐224/01	  Köbler	  [2003]	  ECR	  I-­‐10239,	  para	  35.	  
138	  Opinion	  1/91	  EEA	  I	  (n	  4)	  para	  61.	  
139	  Article	  267	  TFEU.	  
140	  Case	  283/81	  CILFIT	  [1982]	  ECR	  3415,	  para	  13.	  	  
141	  ‘Where	  the	  correct	  application	  of	  Community	  law	  [is]	  so	  obvious	  as	  to	  leave	  no	  scope	  for	  any	  
reasonable	  doubt	  as	  to	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  the	  question	  is	  to	  be	  resolved':	  ibid	  para	  16.	  	  
142	  Case	  C-­‐36/02	  Omega	  [2004]	  ECR	  I-­‐9609,	  para	  19.	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judicial	  dialogue	  alone	  does	  not	  always	  lead	  to	  effectiveness	  in	  legal	  protection.	  
The	   national	   judicial	   systems	   must	   also	   feature	   certain	   effectiveness-­‐ensuring	  
elements.	   The	   quest	   for	   effectiveness	   may,	   therefore,	   in	   some	   circumstances	  
conflict	   with	   the	   notion	   of	   national	   procedural	   autonomy.143	   The	   Court	   has,	  
however,	  asserted	  that	  it	  will	  not	  itself	  get	  involved	  in	  the	  particular	  procedures	  
of	  the	  national	  legal	  systems	  provided	  that	  the	  Member	  States	  do	  guarantee	  the	  
effective	  protection	  of	  individual	  rights.144	  	  
The	  duty	  of	  sincere	  cooperation	  also	  requires	  national	  courts	  to	  ensure	  the	  legal	  
protection	   of	   individuals	   by	   upholding	   the	   direct	   effect	   of	   EU	   law.145	  
Encompassing	  both	  rights	  and	  specific	  requirements	  for	  remedies,	  the	  notion	  of	  
‘effectiveness’	   brings	   together	   the	  principles	   of	   primacy	   and	  direct	   effect	   in	   an	  
even	  wider	   concept.146	   National	   rules	  must	   not	   be	   ‘less	   favourable	   than	   those	  
governing	   similar	   domestic	   actions	   (principle	   of	   equivalence)’	   or	   ‘render	  
virtually	   impossible	   or	   excessively	   difficult	   the	   exercise	   of	   rights	   conferred	   by	  
[EU]	   law	   (principle	   of	   effectiveness)’.147	   The	   domestic	   legal	   orders	   must,	  
consequently,	   guarantee	   that	   individuals	   do	   not	   find	   it	   more	   difficult	   or	   even	  
impossible	  in	  practice	  to	  uphold	  their	  rights	  acquired	  through	  directly	  effective	  
EU	  law	  than	  from	  national	  law,	  as	  long	  as	  there	  are	  no	  EU	  rules	  on	  the	  matter.148	  
If	  no	  national	  procedures	  that	  would	  ensure	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  EU	  law	  exist	  in	  
the	  national	   legal	  systems,	   the	  Court	  has	  ordered	  a	  national	  court	   to	  create	  the	  
procedure	  missing	  in	  national	  law.149	  	  
It	   is	   apparent	   that	   the	   judicial	   architecture	   of	   the	   EU	   cannot	   itself	   guarantee	  
complete	  uniformity	  of	  interpretation	  and	  application	  of	  EU	  law	  as	  compared	  to	  
the	   uniformity	   of	   the	   legal	   systems	   of	   the	   Member	   States.	   The	   question	   is	  
whether	   the	  apparent	   impossibility	  of	  achieving	  uniformity	  should	  be	  accepted	  
as	  inevitable	  in	  a	  supranational	  legal	  order	  while	  maintaining	  the	  sovereignty	  of	  
the	   constituent	   states	   or	   whether	   the	   idea	   of	   uniformity	   should	   prevail	   at	   all	  
                                            
143	   The	   two	   are	   closely	   linked.	   See	   M	   Accetto	   and	   S	   Zleptnig,	   'The	   Principle	   of	   Effectiveness:	  
Rethinking	  Its	  Role	  in	  Community	  Law'	  (2005)	  11	  European	  Public	  Law	  375,	  394.	  
144	  Case	  C-­‐224/01	  Köbler	  (n	  137)	  para	  47.	  
145	  Case	  45/76	  Comet	  [1976]	  ECR	  2043,	  para	  12.	  	  
146	  S	  Weatherill,	  Law	  and	  Integration	  in	  the	  European	  Union	  (Clarendon	  Press	  1995)	  117.	  
147	   Case	   C-­‐129/00	  Commission	   v	   Italy	   [2003]	   ECR	   I-­‐14637,	   para	   25,	   summarising	   earlier	   cases	  
33/76	  Rewe	  (n	  131)	  para	  5,	  and	  C-­‐255/00	  Grundig	  Italiana	  [2002]	  ECR	  I-­‐8003,	  para	  33.	  
148	  Case	  45/76	  Comet	  (n	  145)	  paras	  13	  and	  15-­‐16.	  	  
149	  Case	  C-­‐213/89	  Factortame	  [1990]	  ECR	  I-­‐2433,	  para	  21.	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costs	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  effective	  legal	  protection.	  The	  principle	  of	  effectiveness	  
obviously	  has	  its	  natural	  limits	  and	  these	  can	  be	  found	  within	  the	  need	  to	  include	  
national	   courts.	   The	   latter	   enjoy	   their	   own	   autonomy	   and	   express	   certain	  
reluctance	  towards	  authority	  coming	  from	  the	  outside.	  	  	  
Overall,	  because	  of	  the	  national	  courts’	  possibility	  to	  consider	  whether	  or	  not	  it	  is	  
necessary	  in	  a	  particular	  case	  to	  refer	  a	  question	  to	  the	  Court	  for	  a	  preliminary	  
ruling	  and	  because	  of	  the	  national	  court	  being	  able	  to	  determine	  how,	  if	  at	  all,	  to	  
apply	  the	  preliminary	  ruling	  given,	  the	  Court	  depends	  to	  a	  very	  large	  extent	  on	  
national	   courts	   to	  maintain	   judicial	  uniformity	  within	   the	  EU.	  Since	   individuals	  
generally	   lack	   direct	   access	   to	   the	   Court	   their	   only	   possibility	   of	   directly	  
enforcing	   their	   rights	   under	   the	   Treaties	   is	   through	   the	   national	   judiciaries.	  
Should	   a	   national	   court	   refrain	   from	   referring	   a	   request	   to	   the	   Court	   if	   it	   is	  
obliged	  to	  do	  so	  or	  should	  it	  fail	  to	  implement	  a	  ruling	  by	  the	  Court,	  the	  Member	  
State	  will	  be	   in	  breach	  of	   its	  obligations	  under	   the	  Treaties.	   Similarly	  as	  under	  
international	   law,	   the	   liability	   of	   a	   Member	   State	   for	   a	   breach	   of	   EU	   law	   is	  
irrespective	  of	  the	  national	  authority	  whose	  act	  or	  omission	  gave	  ground	  to	  the	  
breach.150	   This	   includes	   the	   judiciary,	   as	   under	   international	   law	   the	   state	   is	  
generally	  regarded	  as	  a	  single	  entity.151	  Under	  EU	  law,	  too,	  the	  fact	  that	  a	  Treaty	  
obligation	   is	  breached	  by	  means	  of	  an	  act	  of	   the	   judiciary	  does	  not	   liberate	   the	  
Member	   State	   of	   its	   obligations	   under	   the	   Treaties.152	   The	   duty	   of	   sincere	  
cooperation	  imposes	  an	  obligation	  on	  the	  Member	  States	  to	  take	  ‘all	  appropriate	  
measures,	   whether	   general	   or	   particular,	   to	   ensure	   the	   fulfilment	   of	   that	  
obligation	   is	   binding	   on	   all	   the	   authorities	   of	   Member	   States	   including,	   for	  
matters	  within	  their	  jurisdiction,	  the	  courts.153	  In	  the	  context	  of	  state	  liability,	  the	  
duty	   of	   sincere	   cooperation	   was	   already	   established	   by	   the	   Court	   in	  
Francovich.154	  	  
Holding	  a	  Member	  State	  liable	  for	  breaches	  of	  EU	  law	  committed	  by	  courts	  of	  last	  
instance	   is,	  moreover,	   central	   to	   the	  question	  of	  effectiveness	  of	  EU	   law,	  as	   the	  
highest	   courts’	   incompliance	   with	   the	   preliminary	   ruling	   procedure	   severely	  
                                            
150	   Joined	  Cases	  C-­‐46/93	  and	  C-­‐48/93	  Brasserie	  du	  Pêcheur	  and	  Factortame	  [1996]	  ECR	  I-­‐1029,	  
paras	  32	  and	  34.	  
151	  Case	  C-­‐224/01	  Köbler	  (n	  137)	  para	  32.	  
152	  Case	  77/69	  Commission	  v	  Belgium	  [1970]	  ECR	  237,	  para	  15.	  
153	  Joined	  Cases	  C-­‐397/01	  to	  C-­‐403/01	  Pfeiffer	  [2004]	  ECR	  I-­‐8835,	  para	  110.	  
154	  Joined	  Cases	  C-­‐6/90	  and	  C-­‐9/90	  Francovich	  and	  Bonifaci	  [1991]	  ECR	  I-­‐5357,	  para	  36.	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limits	   the	   remedies	   available	   to	   individuals	   for	   asserting	   their	   rights	  under	  EU	  
law.155	   If	   a	   national	   court	   adjudicating	   at	   last	   instance	   has,	   indeed,	   failed	   to	  
defend	   the	   rights	   of	   a	   party	   bestowed	   upon	   the	   individual	   by	   EU	   law,	   the	  
individual	   cannot	   appeal	   the	   decision	   but	   must	   instead	   file	   a	   new	   claim	   in	   a	  
national	  court	  for	  reparation	  for	  the	  loss	  incurred.	  	  
In	  practice,	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice	  has	  been	  very	  cautious	  to	  establish	  state	  liability	  
in	   cases	   of	   a	   national	   court	   failing	   to	  make	   proper	   use	   the	   preliminary	   ruling	  
procedure.	  This	  is	  notwithstanding	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  had	  long	  been	  established	  by	  
the	   Court	   that	   actions	   or	   omission	   of	   all	   institutions	   of	   the	   Member	   States,	  
including	   those	   ‘constitutionally	   independent’	   may	   constitute	   failures	   of	   the	  
Member	  State	  to	  fulfil	   its	  obligations	  under	  EU	  law.156	  Whether	  this	  includes	  an	  
obligation	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  Member	  State	  to	  provide	  restitution	  to	  the	  individual	  
affected	  was	  not	  as	  clear.	  	  
A	   string	   of	   case	   law	   of	   the	   Court	   illustrates	   the	   move	   towards	   the	   liability	   of	  
national	   judiciaries	   for	   breaches	   of	   EU	   law.	   In	   Köbler,	   an	   Austrian	   court	  
submitted	   a	   request	   for	   a	   preliminary	   ruling	   to	   the	   Court.157	   During	   the	  
proceedings	  the	  Court	  notified	  the	  Austrian	  court	  that	  it	  had	  given	  a	  ruling	  in	  a	  
similar	  case.	  Supposing	  that	  the	  preliminary	  ruling	  already	  given	  might	  enable	  it	  
to	   adjudicate	   on	   the	   matter,	   the	   Austrian	   court	   subsequently	   withdrew	   its	  
request.	   The	   Austrian	   court’s	   interpretation	   of	   the	   Court’s	   ruling	   in	   the	   other	  
case	  was,	  however,	  wrong,	  and	  the	  applicant’s	  request	  was	  wrongly	  dismissed.	  In	  
other	  cases,	  too,	  national	  courts	  have	  failed,	  either	  by	  mistake	  or	  deliberately,	  to	  
refer	   questions	   to	   the	   Court	   at	   all.158	   In	   Köbler,	   the	   Court	   found	   that	   the	  
protection	  of	  individual	  rights	  necessarily	  entails	  redress	  for	  the	  damage	  caused	  
to	   an	   individual	   by	   a	   breach	   of	   EU	   law	  by	   a	   national	   court	   adjudicating	   at	   last	  
instance.159	   State	   liability	   follows	   such	   a	   breach	   when	   three	   conditions	   are	  
fulfilled:	   firstly,	   if	   the	   infringed	  rule	   is	   intended	   to	  confer	  rights	  on	   individuals;	  
secondly,	   if	   the	   breach	   is	   sufficiently	   serious;	   and,	   thirdly,	   if	   there	   is	   a	   direct	  
causal	  link	  between	  the	  breach	  of	  the	  obligation	  and	  the	  loss	  or	  damage	  suffered	  
                                            
155	  Case	  C-­‐224/01	  Köbler	  (n	  137)	  paras	  33-­‐34.	  
156	  Case	  77/69	  Commission	  v	  Belgium	  (n	  152)	  para	  15.	  
157	  Case	  C-­‐224/01	  Köbler	  (n	  137).	  
158	  For	  examples,	  see	  DWK	  Anderson	  and	  M	  Demetriou,	  References	  to	  the	  European	  Court	  (Sweet	  
&	  Maxwell	  2002)	  177-­‐180.	  	  
159	  Case	  C-­‐224/01	  Köbler	  (n	  137)	  paras	  36-­‐37.	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by	  the	  injured	  party.160	  National	  rules	  may	  set	  lower	  thresholds	  for	  establishing	  
liability161	   but	   not	   higher.162	   The	   existence	   of	   a	   right	   for	   reparation	   originates	  
from	  EU	  not	  national	   law	  but	  the	   latter	  provides	  the	  procedural	   framework	  for	  
making	   reparation	   for	   the	   damages.163	   Importantly,	   the	   bearer	   of	   the	  
responsibility	   is	   the	   Member	   State	   not	   the	   national	   court	   or	   judge,	   thus	   not	  
affecting	  the	  independence	  of	  the	  judiciary.164	  
While	  the	  first	  and	  the	  third	  condition	  can	  be	  fulfilled	  more	  easily,	  the	  Court	  has	  
been	  reluctant	  to	  recognise	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  ‘sufficiently	  serious	  breach’.	  This	  is	  
largely	   due	   to	   the	   sensitivity	   involved	   in	   one	   court	   –	   the	   Court	   of	   Justice	   –	  
‘condemning’	  another,	  usually	  a	  supreme	  court	  of	  a	  Member	  State.165	   In	  Köbler,	  
the	   Court	   noted	   that	   the	   ‘specific	   nature	   of	   the	   judicial	   function’	   and	   legal	  
certainty	  do	  play	  a	  role	  in	  establishing	  a	  sufficiently	  serious	  breach,	  leaving	  only	  
‘exceptional	  case[s]	  where	  the	  court	  has	  manifestly	  infringed	  the	  applicable	  law’	  
as	  potentially	  incurring	  state	  liability.166	  Again,	  the	  assessment	  is	  to	  be	  made	  by	  
the	  national	   court	   that	  hears	   the	   claim	   for	   reparation.	  The	  national	   court	  must	  
assess	  the	  clarity	  and	  precision	  of	  the	  infringed	  rule,	  the	  possible	  intention	  of	  the	  
infringing	  court,	  whether	   the	  error	  was	  excusable	  or	  not,	   the	  position	  taken	  by	  
the	  EU	  and,	  finally,	  whether	  the	  court	  had	  failed	  to	  comply	  with	  an	  obligation	  to	  
make	   a	   reference	   for	   a	   preliminary	   ruling	   to	   the	   Court.167	   The	   clear	   indication	  
that	   the	   Court	   gave	   of	   a	   sufficiently	   serious	   breach	   was	   a	   ‘manifest	   error’	   in	  
following	   the	   Court’s	   case	   law.168	   The	   criterion	   is	   almost	   tautological	   and	  
definitely	  difficult	  to	  apply,	   leaving	  the	  national	  courts	  with	  very	  little	  guidance	  
or	  authority	  to	  criticise	  a	  decision	  of	  a	  higher	  court.	  	  
In	   Köbler,	   the	   Court	   found	   that	   the	   Austrian	   court	   had	   misread	   the	   previous	  
preliminary	   ruling	  and	  was	   thus	  excused	  without	   referring	   to	   the	   conditions	   it	  
                                            
160	  Case	  C-­‐424/97	  Haim	  [2001]	  ECR	  1-­‐5123,	  para	  36.	  
161	  Case	  C-­‐224/01	  Köbler	  (n	  137)	  para	  57.	  
162	  Case	  C-­‐173/03	  Traghetti	  del	  Meditteraneo	  [2006]	  ECR	  I-­‐5177,	  para	  46.	  
163	  Case	  C-­‐224/01	  Köbler	  (n	  137)	  para	  58.	  
164	   ibid	   para	   42.	   AG	   Geelhoed,	   however,	   interprets	   the	   independence	   of	   the	   judiciary	   as	  
independence	  from	  external	  influence	  when	  deciding	  on	  specific	  cases,	  not	  independence	  from	  a	  
declaration	  that	  the	  case	  law	  of	  the	  national	  court	  has	  constituted	  an	  infringement	  of	  EU	  law	  by	  
the	   Member	   State:	   Case	   C-­‐129/00	   Commission	   v	   Italy	   [2003]	   ECR	   I-­‐14637,	   Opinion	   of	   AG	  
Geelhoed,	  para	  56.	  
165	  K	  Lenaerts,	  I	  Maselis	  and	  K	  Gutman,	  EU	  Procedural	  Law	  (Oxford	  University	  Press	  2014)	  102-­‐
103.	  	  	  
166	  Case	  C-­‐224/01	  Köbler	  (n	  137)	  para	  53.	  
167	  ibid	  para	  55.	  	  
168	  ibid	  para	  56.	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had	   established	   itself	   previously	   in	   the	   analysis	   of	   the	   case.	   The	   judgment,	  
although	  significant	  in	  making	  an	  introduction	  to	  the	  line	  of	  case	  law	  establishing	  
the	  conditions	  for	  state	  liability	  for	  the	  omissions	  of	  the	  national	  judiciary,	  gave	  
ground	   to	   loud	   critique.	   The	   critique	   has	   been	   directed	   both	   towards	   the	  
confusing	   array	   of	   criteria	   for	   establishing	   a	   breach169	   as	   well	   as	   the	   final	  
outcome	  of	  the	  case.170	  
One	  further	  argument	  often	  raised	  in	  the	  context	  of	  holding	  national	  courts	  liable	  
for	  breaches	  of	  EU	  law	  is	  the	  proper	  application	  of	  the	  principle	  of	  res	   judicata.	  
National	   legal	   orders	   usually	   feature	   a	   system	   of	   complete	   legal	   remedies	   the	  
exhaustion	   of	  which	   in	   all	   available	   instances	   leads	   to	   an	   expectation	   that	   the	  
final	  decision	  will	  be	  final	  and	  that	  the	  legal	  relations	  can	  return	  to	  a	  stabile	  state.	  
It	   was	   argued	   in	   the	   proceedings	   of	  Köbler	   that	   reopening	   a	   case	   due	   to	   new	  
proceedings	  seeking	   to	  establish	  whether	  an	   infringement	  of	  EU	   law	  had	  taken	  
place	   could	   harm	   the	   legal	   certainty	   of	   the	   parties.	   The	   Court	   addressed	   the	  
question	   and	   stated	   that	   the	   principle	   of	   res	   judicata	   will	   not	   be	   called	   into	  
question	  because	  the	  case	  that	  the	  national	  court	  has	  finished	  reviewing	  would	  
not	   be	   reopened.	   Instead,	   new	   proceedings	   will	   be	   begun	   for	   the	   purpose	   of	  
establishing	  reparation	  for	  eventual	  damage	  caused	  by	  an	  unlawful	  decision	  of	  a	  
national	   court	   adjudicating	   at	   last	   instance.	   Neither	   the	   purpose	   of	   the	   new	  
proceedings	   nor	   necessarily	   the	   parties	   will	   be	   the	   same	   as	   in	   the	   original	  
dispute.171	  In	  sum,	  the	  Court	  found	  that	  state	  liability	  for	  judicial	  decisions	  does	  
not	  conflict	  with	  the	  principle	  of	  res	  judicata.172	  	  	  	  	  
In	   general	   terms,	   the	   conflict	   between	   the	  principle	   of	   res	   judicata,	   on	   the	   one	  
hand,	  and	  the	  supranational	   judicial	  architecture	  of	   the	  EU	  and	  the	  principle	  of	  
effective	   judicial	  protection	  in	  EU	  law,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	   is	  enrooted	  in	  the	  EU	  
legal	  order	  and,	  especially,	   the	   institutional	  architecture	  of	   the	  EU.	  The	  conflict	  
translates	   into	   a	   choice	   between	   allowing	   for	   errors	   of	   the	   judiciary,	   including	  
the	  possibility	  of	  deliberate	  errors,	  or	  insisting	  on	  the	  uniformity	  of	  the	  EU	  legal	  
system	  for	  the	  price	  of	  interfering	  with	  the	  established	  institutional	  balance	  and	  
                                            
169	  P	  Cabral	  and	  MC	  Chaves,	  'Member	  State	  Liability	  for	  Decisions	  of	  National	  Courts	  Adjudicating	  
at	  Last	  Instance'	  (2006)	  13	  Maastricht	  Journal	  of	  European	  and	  Comparative	  Law	  109,	  120-­‐121.	  	  
170	  ibid	  123.	  
171	  Case	  C-­‐224/01	  Köbler	  (n	  137)	  para	  39.	  
172	  ibid	  para	  40.	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hierarchies	  in	  the	  national	  judicial	  orders.	  Clearly,	  the	  Court	  has	  made	  its	  choice	  
for	  the	  latter	  and	  for	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  protection	  of	  individual	  rights.	  	  
In	  addition	  to	  constitutional	  law	  concerns,	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  national	  court	  reviewing	  
the	  decisions	  of	  a	  higher	  court	  is	  surrounded	  by	  practical	  difficulties.	  As	  AG	  Léger	  
pointed	  out	  in	  his	  opinion	  in	  Köbler,	  referring	  a	  request	  for	  a	  preliminary	  ruling	  
to	  the	  Court	  may	  be	  the	  best	  way	  for	  a	  national	  court	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  situation	  –	  
both	  because	  of	  removing	  doubts	  about	  the	  impartiality	  of	  the	  national	  court	  as	  
well	  as	  circumventing	  the	  sensitive	  issue	  of	  a	  lower	  court	  reviewing	  a	  decision	  of	  
a	   higher	   court.173	   The	   Court	   would,	   however,	   once	   again	   be	   asked	   to	   express	  
itself	   on	   the	   interpretation	   of	   a	   rule	   of	   EU	   law	   rather	   than	   to	   ascertain	   the	  
responsibility	   of	   a	   national	   court	   in	   the	   particular	   instance.	   This	   is	  
notwithstanding	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   Court	   of	   Justice	   can	   provide	   rather	   specific	  
guidance	   to	   the	   national	   court	   on	   how	   to	   classify	   the	   situation	   of	   an	   alleged	  
breach.	  	  
Köbler	  has	  been	  followed	  by	  a	  number	  of	  cases	  specifying	  the	  liability	  of	  Member	  
States	  for	  breaches	  of	  EU	  law	  by	  the	  national	  judiciary	  and	  especially	  the	  highest	  
courts.	   The	   line	   of	   significant	   cases	   includes	   Kühne	   &	   Heitz,174	   Commission	   v	  
Italy,175	  Traghetti	  del	  Meditteraneo,176	  and,	  most	  recently,	  Commission	  v	  Spain.177	  	  
Concerns	  have	  been	  raised	  about	  the	  possible	  damage	  that	  the	  principle	  of	  state	  
liability	  for	  actions	  and	  omissions	  of	  the	  national	  judiciaries	  causes	  to	  the	  judicial	  
dialogue	   between	   the	   EU	   and	   the	   Member	   States’	   national	   courts.	   After	   all,	   it	  
defeats	   the	   purpose	   of	   a	   dialogue	   if	   the	   one	   party	   can	   force	   the	   other	   to	   align	  
with	  its	  side	  of	  the	  story.178	  Member	  States	  have	  expressed	  numerous	  objections	  
to	   the	   case	   law	   of	   the	   Court	   discussed	   above.179	   There	   is,	   indeed,	   a	   delicate	  
balance	  between	  ensuring	  the	  effective	  protection	  of	  individual	  rights	  across	  the	  
Union	   and,	   thereby,	   the	   unity	   of	   EU	   law,	   on	   the	   one	   hand,	   and	   national	  
procedural	  autonomy	  and	  other	  procedural	  principles,	  on	   the	  other.	  Neither	  of	  
                                            
173	  Case	  C-­‐224/01	  Köbler	  [2003]	  ECR	  I-­‐10239,	  Opinion	  of	  AG	  Léger,	  para	  111.	  
174	  Case	  C-­‐453/00	  Kühne	  &	  Heitz	  [2004]	  ECR	  I-­‐837.	  
175	  Case	  C-­‐129/00	  Commission	  v	  Italy	  (n	  147).	  
176	  Case	  C-­‐173/03	  Traghetti	  del	  Meditteraneo	  (n	  162).	  
177	  Case	  C-­‐154/08	  Commission	  v	  Spain	  [2009]	  ECR	  I-­‐187.	  
178	   J	  Komárek,	   'Federal	   Elements	   in	   the	  Community	   Judicial	   System:	  Building	  Coherence	   in	   the	  
Community	  Legal	  Order'	  (2005)	  42	  Common	  Market	  Law	  Review	  9,	  23.	  
179	   PJ	   Wattel,	   'Köbler,	   CILFIT	   and	   Welthgrove:	   We	   can’t	   go	   on	   meeting	   like	   this'	   (2004)	   41	  
Common	  Market	  Law	  Review	  177.	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these	  aspects	   can	   light-­‐heartedly	  be	   sacrificed	   for	   the	  other.	  The	  dilemma	  only	  
proves	  that	  not	  even	  the	  EU’s	  institutional	  framework	  is	  flawless	  when	  it	  comes	  
to	  the	  objective	  of	  setting	  up	  an	  internal	  market	  in	  which	  all	  market	  participants	  
enjoy	   the	   same	   set	   of	   rights	   and	   obligations.	   Insofar	   as	   several	   layers	   of	  
institutions	  are	   involved	   in	   the	   interpretation	  and	  application	  of	   identical	  rules	  
without	  one	  clear	  hierarchy	  such	  as	  in	  the	  national	  court	  systems,	  discrepancies	  
are	   likely	   to	   happen	   and	   some	   of	   them	   rather	   difficult	   if	   not	   impossible	   to	  
remedy.	  
3.2.2	  European	  Economic	  Area	  
The	  EEA	  Agreement,	  too,	  contains	  the	  principle	  of	  effective	  judicial	  protection,180	  
confirmed	   by	   the	   EFTA	   Court	   in	   Ásgeirsson.181	   In	   the	   EEA,	   an	   advisory	   ruling	  
procedure	   is	   in	   place	   to	   contribute	   to	   the	   ‘proper	   functioning	   of	   the	   EEA	  
Agreement	   to	   the	  benefit	  of	   individuals	  and	  economic	  operators’.182	   In	  Bellona,	  
the	  EFTA	  Court	  stated	  that	  access	  to	   justice	   formed	  an	  essential	  element	  of	   the	  
EEA	   legal	   framework,	   subject	   to	  conditions	  and	   limitations	   following	   from	  EEA	  
law.183	  Furthermore,	  similarly	  to	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice	  vis-­à-­vis	  the	  EU	  legal	  order,	  
the	  EFTA	  Court	  stated	  that	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  EEA	  rules	  it	  is	  for	  the	  national	  legal	  
systems	   to	   create	   procedures	   for	   the	   protection	   of	   the	   rights	   that	   individuals	  
derive	   from	   EEA	   law	   with	   the	   qualification	   that	   national	   procedures	   may	   not	  
discriminate	  against	  persons	  deriving	  their	  rights	  from	  EEA	  law	  or	  restrict	  their	  
fundamental	  freedoms.184	  	  
Both	  the	  EEA	  and	  the	  ECAA	  Agreements	  promote	  judicial	  dialogue	  as	  a	  means	  of	  
ensuring	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  acquis.	  Under	  Article	  107	  EEA	  Agreement,	  EEA	  
EFTA	   States	  may	   allow	   their	   courts	   or	   tribunals	   to	   ask	   the	   Court	   of	   Justice	   to	  
decide	   on	   the	   interpretation	   of	   an	   EEA	   rule.	   This	   procedure	   is	   explained	   in	  
Protocol	   34	   of	   the	   EEA	   Agreement.	   The	   EEA	   EFTA	   States	   are	   at	   liberty	   to	  
determine	   the	   scope	   and	  modalities	   of	   this	   possibility,	   and	   communicate	   their	  
intentions	  in	  this	  regard	  to	  the	  Depositary	  of	  the	  Court	  of	   Justice	  who	  will	  then	  
                                            
180	  Recital	  8,	  Preamble	  to	  the	  EEA	  Agreement.	  
181	  Case	  E-­‐2/03	  Ásgeirsson	  [2003]	  EFTA	  Ct	  Rep	  185,	  para	  28.	  
182	  ibid	  para	  24.	  
183	  Case	  E-­‐2/02	  Bellona	  [2003]	  EFTA	  Ct	  Rep	  52,	  para	  36.	  
184	  Case	  E-­‐5/10	  Kottke	  [2009-­‐2010]	  EFTA	  Ct	  Rep	  320,	  paras	  26-­‐27.	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notify	   the	   other	   contracting	   parties.185	   However,	   none	   of	   the	   EEA	   EFTA	   States	  
have	  enabled	  their	  courts	  to	  benefit	  from	  the	  possibility	  of	  direct	  dialogue	  with	  
the	  Court.186	  	  
The	  EEA	  also	   features	  other	   types	  of	   judicial	  dialogue.	  The	  Court	  of	   Justice	  and	  
the	  EFTA	  Court	  function	  as	  a	  ‘system	  of	  parallel	  functions	  and	  competencies’.187	  
Since	  the	  EEA	  Agreement	  is	  part	  of	  the	  EU	  legal	  order,	  the	  EU	  Member	  States	  are	  
bound	   to	   apply	   it	   as	   EU	   law.188	   Failure	   to	   do	   so,	   including	   in	   the	   form	   of	   not	  
requesting	   a	   preliminary	   ruling	   from	   the	   Court	   or	   not	   upholding	   the	   Court’s	  
interpretation	   of	   the	   EEA	   Agreement	   may	   result	   in	   infringement	   proceedings	  
being	  brought	  against	   the	  Member	  State	  and	  possible	  state	   liability	   for	  damage	  
caused	   to	   individuals.	   In	   the	   EFTA	   pillar	   of	   the	   EEA,	   the	   EFTA	   Court	   provides	  
advisory	  opinions	  on	   the	   interpretation	  of	   the	  EEA	  Agreement.189	  Any	   court	   of	  
tribunal	   of	   the	   EEA	   EFTA	   States	   may,	   if	   faced	   with	   a	   question	   about	   the	  
interpretation	   of	   the	   EEA	   Agreement,	   request	   the	   EFTA	   Court	   for	   an	   advisory	  
opinion	  if	  it	  considers	  such	  opinion	  necessary	  for	  being	  able	  to	  give	  a	  ruling	  in	  a	  
pending	  case.	  The	  SCA	  endows	  the	  right	  to	  request	  an	  advisory	  opinion	  upon	  all	  
EEA	   EFTA	   States’	   national	   courts.	   The	   states	   themselves	   may	   decide,	   but	   are	  
under	  no	  obligation,	  to	  limit	  the	  possibility	  to	  make	  requests	  to	  those	  courts	  and	  
tribunals	   only	   against	   whose	   decisions	   there	   are	   no	   judicial	   remedies	   under	  
national	  law.190	  	  
Instead	  of	  preliminary	  rulings,	  the	  EFTA	  Court	  gives	  advisory	  opinions.	  Pursuant	  
to	   the	   EFTA	   Court,	   the	   advisory	   opinion	   is	   ‘a	   specially	   established	   means	   of	  
judicial	  co-­‐operation	  between	  the	  Court	  and	  national	  courts’.191	  National	  courts	  
are	   ‘entitled’	  rather	  than	  obliged	  to	  request	  an	  advisory	  opinion	  from	  the	  EFTA	  
Court.192	   In	   the	  meantime,	   the	  EFTA	  Court	   recognised	   the	   identical	  wording	  of	  
Articles	  267	  TFEU	  and	  34	  SCA	  in	  the	  essential	  elements	  of	  the	  provisions,193	  as	  
well	  as	  interpreted	  the	  prerogatives	  of	  the	  national	  court	  to	  request	  an	  advisory	  
                                            
185	  Article	  2	  Protocol	  34	  to	  the	  EEA	  Agreement.	  
186	  H	  Haukeland	  Fredriksen,	  'One	  Market,	  Two	  Courts’	  (n	  73)	  487.	  
187	  HP	  Graver	  (n	  32)	  49.	  
188	  Case	  181/73	  Haegeman	  [1974]	  ECR	  449;	  Case	  87/75	  Bresciani	  [1976]	  ECR	  129.	  
189	  Article	  34	  SCA.	  
190	   ibid.	  No	  EEA	  EFTA	  State	  has	  made	  such	  a	  restriction,	  see	  S	  Magnússon,	   'On	  the	  Authority	  of	  
Advisory	  Opinions'	  (2010)	  13	  Europarättslig	  Tidskrift	  528,	  n	  61.	  
191	  Case	  E-­‐1/95	  Samuelsson	  (n	  79)	  para	  13.	  	  
192	  ibid	  para	  13.	  	  
193	  ibid	  para	  13.	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opinion	   in	   the	   light	   of	   the	   case	   law	   of	   the	   Court	   of	   Justice.194	   Importantly,	   the	  
EFTA	   Court	   considered	   the	   procedures	   to	   be	   identical	   as	   to	   their	   essential	  
elements	  regardless	  of	   the	  one	  being	  compulsory	   for	   the	  courts	  adjudicating	  at	  
last	  instance	  whereas	  the	  other	  is	  not.	  The	  EFTA	  Court	  did	  not	  discuss	  the	  non-­‐
compulsory	  nature	  of	  its	  advisory	  opinions.	  	  
Not	   always	   is	   the	   title	   of	   a	   procedure	   indicative	   of	   its	   binding	   nature.	   The	  
advisory	  opinions	  of	  the	  ICJ	  given	  under	  Article	  96	  UN	  Charter	  and	  Article	  65	  of	  
the	   ICJ	   Statute	  may	   be	   conferred	   binding	   force	   in	   disputes	   between	   parties.195	  
The	   opinions	   of	   the	   Court	   of	   Justice	   given	   under	   Article	   218(11)	   TFEU	   are	  
definitely	   binding	   to	   the	   effect	   that	   an	   envisaged	   international	   agreement	   that	  
the	  Court	  deems	  incompatible	  with	  the	  Treaties	  may	  not	  enter	  into	  force	  unless	  
either	   the	  draft	   is	   amended	  or	   the	  Treaties	   revised.196	  Similarly,	  Article	  105(2)	  
and	  (3)	  EEA	  do	  not	  distinguish	  between	  rulings	  in	  direct	  actions	  and	  preliminary	  
rulings/advisory	   opinions.	   The	   treaty	  makers’	   choice	   for	   an	   ‘advisory	   opinion’	  
rather	   than	   a	   ‘preliminary	   ruling’	   in	   the	   EEA	   Agreement,	   however,	   speaks	   the	  
clear	   language	   of	   the	   EEA	   EFTA	   contracting	   parties’	   intention	   not	   to	   vest	   the	  
EFTA	   Court	   with	   a	   similar	   authority	   as	   the	   Court	   of	   Justice	   of	   being	   the	   sole	  
authoritative	  interpreter	  of	  EEA	  law	  in	  the	  EEA	  EFTA	  States,	  notwithstanding	  the	  
possibility	   of	   applying	   Protocol	   34	   of	   the	   EEA	   Agreement.	   This	   conclusion	   is	  
confirmed	  by	  the	  text	  of	  Article	  34	  SCA	  that	  provides	  that	  the	  courts	  or	  tribunals	  
of	  an	  EEA	  EFTA	  State	  ‘may’	  if	  they	  consider	  it	  necessary	  request	  the	  EFTA	  Court	  
to	  give	  an	  opinion.	  	  
The	  objective	  of	  advisory	  opinions	  is,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  homogeneity	  and,	  on	  the	  
other	  hand,	  the	  equal	  protection	  of	  individual	  rights	  arising,	  firstly,	  from	  the	  EEA	  
Agreement	   and,	   secondly,	   from	   the	  EU	   internal	  market	  acquis.	   The	  EU	  and	   the	  
EFTA	  pillars	  of	   the	  EEA	  Agreement	  are	   to	   function	   in	   the	  spirit	  of	  equality	  and	  
reciprocity.197	  According	  to	  the	  EFTA	  Court,	  the	  principle	  of	  homogeneity	  creates	  
a	  presumption	  that	  provisions	  worded	  identically	  in	  the	  EU	  Treaties	  and	  the	  EEA	  
Agreement	  will	  be	   interpreted	  in	  the	  same	  way,198	  notwithstanding	  the	  specific	  
                                            
194	  Case	  E-­‐5/96	  Nille	  (n	  84)	  para	  12.	  
195	  R	  Ago,	   'Binding	  Advisory	  Opinions	  of	   the	  International	  Court	  of	   Justice'	  (1991)	  85	  American	  
Journal	  of	  International	  Law	  439.	  
196	  Opinion	  1/91	  EEA	  I	  (n	  4)	  para	  61.	  
197	  Recital	  4,	  Preamble	  to	  the	  EEA	  Agreement.	  
198	  Case	  E-­‐2/06	  EFTA	  Surveillance	  Authority	  v	  Norway	  [2007]	  EFTA	  Ct	  Rep	  164,	  para	  59.	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differences	   between	   the	   agreements	   that	   may	   eventually	   lead	   to	   diverging	  
interpretations.199	  	  
The	  EFTA	  Court	  is	  eager	  to	  find	  parallels	  between	  the	  procedures	  established	  by	  
the	   EU	   Treaties	   and	   the	   EEA	   Agreement.	   The	   requirement	   in	   Article	   3(1)	   SCA	  
that	  the	  acquis	  that	  originates	  from	  the	  EU	  be	  interpreted	  in	  conformity	  with	  the	  
case	  law	  of	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice	  law	  does	  not	  extend	  to	  the	  main	  part	  of	  the	  EEA	  
Agreement	   or	   to	   the	   SCA	   that	   lays	   down	   the	   procedural	   rules	   concerning	   the	  
EFTA	   Court	   and	   the	   ESA.	   Voluntarily,	   however,	   the	   EFTA	   Court	   has	   striven	  
towards	  homogeneity	  also	  in	  procedural	  law	  finding	  it	  necessary	  to	  align	  its	  case	  
law	  on	   concepts	   of	   EU	   law	   that	   are	   identical	   in	   substance	   to	   those	   of	   EEA	   law	  
with	  the	  relevant	  rulings	  of	  the	  Court	  of	   Justice.200	  As	  mentioned	  above,	  part	  of	  
maintaining	   homogeneity	   must	   necessarily	   take	   place	   through	   procedure	   in	  
order	  to	  ensure	  uniformity	  in	  the	  level	  of	  protection	  accorded	  to	  individuals.	  The	  
cases	  that	  have	  reached	  the	  Court	  of	   Justice	  concerning	  violations	  of	  EU	  law	  by	  
Member	   State	   judiciaries	   have	   demonstrated	   that	   it	   may	   be	   impossible	   for	  
individuals	  to	  assert	  their	  EU	  rights	  in	  practice	  due	  to	  the	  reluctance	  of	  national	  
courts	  to	  uphold	  those	  rights.	  	  
The	  explicit	  differences	  between	  the	  EU’s	  preliminary	  ruling	  procedure	  and	  the	  
EEA’s	  advisory	  opinion	  procedure	  provoke	  the	  question	  of	  the	  role	  played	  by	  the	  
EEA	  EFTA	  national	  courts	   in	   the	   legal	  architecture	  of	   the	  EEA.	  The	  EU	  Member	  
States’	  national	  courts	  are	   ‘EU	  courts’	  but	  are	  EEA	  EFTA	  States’	  national	  courts	  
‘EEA	  courts’?	  The	  EFTA	  Court	  has	  not	  been	  minded	  by	   the	  different	   title	  of	   the	  
procedure	  and	  has	  held	  that	  the	  objective	  of	  the	  advisory	  opinion	  procedure,	  too,	  
is	   to	   ensure	   uniform	   interpretation	   of	   the	   EEA	   Agreement.201	   The	   judicial	  
dialogue	  in	  this	  case	  is	  explained	  by	  the	  need	  to	  maintain	  homogeneity	  not	  by	  the	  
explicit	   need	   to	   give	   effect	   to	   the	   EEA	   provisions	   although	   this,	   too,	   can	   be	  
implied.	   Moreover,	   roughly	   the	   same	   conditions,	   with	   the	   exception	   of	   the	  
obligation	  to	  refer,	  apply	  to	  the	  advisory	  opinion	  procedure	  of	  the	  EFTA	  Court.202	  
This	  is	  without	  prejudice	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  lack	  of	  exclusive	  jurisdiction	  of	  the	  
EFTA	  Court	   renders	   the	  hierarchical	   relationship	  between	   the	  EFTA	  Court	   and	  
                                            
199	  Case	  E-­‐3/98	  Rainford-­Towning	  (n	  79)	  para	  21.	  
200	   See,	   for	   example,	   Case	   E-­‐1/94	  Restamark	   (n	   79)	   paras	   23-­‐24;	   Case	   E-­‐2/94	   Scottish	   Salmon	  
Growers	  (n	  74)	  paras	  11	  and	  15.	  	  
201	  Case	  E-­‐1/94	  Restamark	  (n	  79)	  para	  25.	  	  
202	  Case	  E-­‐1/95	  Samuelsson	  (n	  79)	  para	  15.	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the	   EEA	   EFTA	   States’	   national	   courts	   weaker.	   The	   latter,	   therefore,	   have	   a	  
stronger	  role	  as	  interpreters	  of	  EEA	  law.	  
The	   question	   of	   a	   national	   judiciary’s	   liability	   for	   breaches	   of	   EEA	   law,	   too,	   is	  
relevant	  to	  this	  discussion.	  The	  EFTA	  Court	  remotely	  touched	  upon	  the	  issue	  in	  
Kolbeinsson.203	   In	   that	   case,	   the	   applicant	   first	   applied	   for	   compensation	   for	  
work-­‐related	   injury	   in	   an	   Icelandic	   court.	   	   In	   infringement	   of	   EEA	   law,	   the	  
Icelandic	  courts	  including	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  dismissed	  his	  claim.	  Subsequently,	  
the	  applicant	  brought	  another	  case	  against	  the	  state	  of	  Iceland	  for	  compensation	  
for	   the	  damages	   incurred	   as	   a	   result	   of	   the	  wrongful	   decision	  by	   the	   courts.	   A	  
district	   court	  decided	   to	  refer,	  upon	  request	  by	   the	  applicant,	   two	  questions	   to	  
the	  EFTA	  Court	  for	  an	  advisory	  opinion.	  On	  appeal,	  however,	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  
refused	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  EFTA	  Court	  the	  question	  asking	  for	  an	  assessment	  of	  the	  
Supreme	  Court’s	  own	  liability	  for	  a	  wrongful	  interpretation	  of	  Icelandic	  law.	  The	  
EFTA	   Court	   could	   only	   consider	   a	   possible	   breach	   by	   the	   legislature.	   In	   the	  
meantime,	   Icelandic	   procedural	   law	  does	  not	   allow	   for	   a	   possibility	   of	   a	   lower	  
court	   reviewing	   the	   decisions	   of	   the	   Supreme	   Court.	   Because	   of	   the	   Supreme	  
Court’s	   refusal	   to	   submit	   to	   the	   EFTA	   Court	   both	   questions	   requested	   by	   the	  
applicant	   the	   EFTA	   Court	   missed	   the	   opportunity	   of	   expressing	   itself	   in	   the	  
matter.	   Instead,	   the	   EFTA	   Court	   referred	   to	   its	   previous	   rulings	   in	  Karlsson204	  
and	  Nguyen205	  where	   it	  had	   found	  that	   it	   is	   for	   the	  national	  court	   to	  assess	   the	  
facts	  of	  the	  case	  and	  to	  determine	  whether	  the	  conditions	  for	  state	  liability	  for	  a	  
breach	   of	   EEA	   law	   have	   been	   met	   while	   the	   EFTA	   Court	   can	   provide	   some	  
indication.206	   Since	   the	  EFTA	  Court	   continuously	   referred	   to	   the	   interpretation	  
given	  by	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice	  to	  the	  procedural	  elements	  relating	  to	  state	  liability	  
for	  breaches	  of	  EU	  law,	  and	  considering	  the	  generally	  dynamic	  interpretation207	  
that	  the	  EFTA	  Court	  usually	  gives	  to	  the	  EEA	  Agreement	  there	  is	  little	  doubt	  that	  
had	  the	  EFTA	  Court	  been	  given	  the	  chance	  it	  would	  have	  ruled	  for	  state	  liability	  
of	  the	  judiciary	  of	  an	  EEA	  EFTA	  State.	  Surely,	  the	  dynamic	  interpretation	  of	  the	  
                                            
203	  Case	  E-­‐2/10	  Kolbeinsson	  [2009-­‐2010]	  EFTA	  Ct	  Rep	  234.	  
204	  Case	  E-­‐4/01	  Karlsson	  [2002]	  EFTA	  Ct	  Rep	  240.	  
205	  Case	  E-­‐8/07	  Nguyen	  [2008]	  EFTA	  Ct	  Rep	  224.	  
206	  Case	  E-­‐2/10	  Kolbeinsson	  (n	  203)	  para	  81.	  
207	  Case	  E-­‐4/04	  Pedicel	  [2005]	  EFTA	  Ct	  Rep	  1,	  para	  28.	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EEA	  Agreement	  exercised	  by	  the	  EFTA	  Court	  does	  lead	  to	  a	  more	  ‘supranational’	  
EEA	  Agreement	  than	  initially	  planned.208	  
The	  appeal	  system	  that	  the	  EEA	  EFTA	  States	  have	  set	  up	  for	  submitting	  requests	  
for	   advisory	   opinions	   to	   the	   EFTA	   Court	   is	   peculiar	   in	   itself.	   The	   preliminary	  
ruling	   system	   is	  deemed	  by	   the	  Court	  of	   Justice	   to	   serve	  as	   ‘direct	   cooperation	  
between	   the	   Court	   of	   Justice	   and	   the	   national	   courts	   by	  means	   of	   a	   procedure	  
which	  is	  completely	  independent	  of	  any	  initiative	  by	  the	  parties’	  and	  dependent	  
only	   on	   the	   referring	   court’s	   assessment	   of	   necessity.209	   In	  Cartesio,	   the	   Court	  
further	   specified	   the	   scope	   of	   the	   direct	   cooperation	   between	   itself	   and	   a	  
national	   court,	   stating	   that	  any	  appeal	   system	  against	  a	  Member	  State	  national	  
court’s	   requests	   for	   preliminary	   ruling	   to	   the	   Court	   would	   be	   contrary	   to	   the	  
Treaties	  as	   it	  would	   jeopardise	  the	   ‘autonomous	   jurisdiction’	  which	  Article	  267	  
TFEU	  confers	  on	  the	  referring	  court.210	  	  
In	   Irish	  Bank,	   the	  EFTA	  Court	   finally	  got	   the	  possibility	   to	  express	   itself	  on	   the	  
appeals	   system.211	  The	   facts	  of	   the	   case	  as	   regards	   the	   request	   for	   an	  advisory	  
opinion	  were	  similar:	  an	  Icelandic	  district	  court	  wished	  to	  make	  a	  request	  to	  the	  
EFTA	   Court,	   the	   defendant	   appealed	   against	   the	   ruling	   on	   the	   request	   to	   the	  
Supreme	   Court	   of	   Iceland	   and	   the	   latter	   upheld	   yet	   amended	   the	   questions	  
referred	  to	  the	  EFTA	  Court.	  The	  district	  court	  submitted	  both	  its	  own	  ruling	  and	  
the	   ruling	  of	   the	  Supreme	  Court	   as	   regards	   the	  questions	   to	  be	   referred	   to	   the	  
EFTA	  Court.	  During	  the	  proceeding	  at	  the	  EFTA	  Court	  the	  plaintiff	  claimed	  that	  
the	  ruling	  of	   the	  Court	  of	   Justice	   in	  Cartesio	  constitutes	  a	  precedent	   in	  EEA	  law	  
because	  of	  the	  similarity	  of	  the	  purposes	  of	  Article	  267	  TFEU	  and	  Article	  34	  SCA.	  
Moreover,	   the	   plaintiff	   submitted	   that	   the	   objective	   of	   achieving	   a	   balance	   of	  
rights	   for	   individuals	   and	   economic	   operators	   in	   the	   EEA	   means	   that	   equal	  
access	  to	  courts	  and	  judicial	  remedies	  must	  be	  granted	  across	  the	  EEA	  including	  
equivalent	   access	   to	   the	   respective	   referral	   procedures,212	   especially	   since	  
                                            
208	   H	   Haukeland	   Fredriksen,	   'The	   EFTA	   Court	   15	   Years	   on'	   (2010)	   59	   International	   and	  
Comparative	  Law	  Quarterly	  731,	  756.	  
209	  Case	  C 2/06	  Kempter	  [2008]	  ECR	  I 411,	  paras	  41-­‐42.	  
210	  Case	  C-­‐210/06	  Cartesio	  [2008]	  ECR	  I-­‐9641,	  para	  95.	  	  
211	  Case	  E-­‐18/11	  Irish	  Bank	  [2012]	  EFTA	  Ct	  Rep	  592.	  
212	  ibid	  para	  44.	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Iceland	  had	  not	   reserved	   the	   right	   to	   request	   advisory	  opinions	  only	   to	   courts	  
adjudicating	  at	  last	  instance.213	  
In	  earlier	  case	  law,	  the	  EFTA	  Court	  had	  found	  that	  only	  the	  national	  court	  before	  
which	  the	  dispute	  has	  been	  brought	  is	  to	  decide	  both	  on	  whether	  to	  request	  an	  
advisory	  opinion	  and	  what	  questions	  to	  submit	  to	  the	  EFTA	  Court.214	  The	  EFTA	  
Court	   noted	   the	   differences	   between	   the	   preliminary	   ruling	   and	   the	   advisory	  
opinion	  procedures	  finding	  its	  relationship	  with	  the	  national	  supreme	  courts	  of	  
the	   EEA	  EFTA	   States	   to	   be	   ‘more	   partner-­‐like’	   and	   recalled	   the	   duty	   of	   loyalty	  
enshrined	   in	   Article	   3	   EEA	   Agreement.215	   Not	   being	   able	   to	   make	   an	   equally	  
frank	  statement	  as	   the	  Court	  of	   Justice,	   the	  EFTA	  Court	   instead	   referred	   to	   the	  
possibility	   that	   a	   refusal	   by	   a	   court	   of	   last	   instance	   to	   permit	   a	   request	   to	   the	  
EFTA	  Court	  by	  a	   lower	  court	  may	  infringe	  the	  principle	  of	  access	  to	   justice	   laid	  
out	  it	  Article	  6(1)	  ECHR.216	  With	  reference	  to	  the	  case	  law	  of	  the	  ECtHR,	  the	  EFTA	  
Court	   specified	   that	   the	   infringement	   is	   particularly	   apparent	   if	   the	   refusing	  
court	   fails	   to	   provide	   adequate	   reasoning	   for	   its	   decision.217	   Moreover,	   in	  
addition	  to	  a	  refusal	  to	  refer	  a	  national	  court	  of	  last	  instance	  may	  also	  breach	  the	  
ECHR	  when	  it	  upholds	  the	  decision	  to	  refer	  but	  amends	  the	  question	  referred.218	  	  
The	  voluntary	  nature	  of	  EFTA	  advisory	  opinions	  is	  in	  some	  respects	  comparable	  
to	  an	  EU	  Member	  State	  national	  court	  determining	  whether	  an	  interpretation	  of	  
EU	   law	   in	   a	   case	   before	   it	   constitutes	   and	   acte	   claire	   or	   not	   and	   whether,	  
subsequently,	  a	  preliminary	  reference	  to	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice	  is	  due.	  Compared	  to	  
the	   EFTA	   pillar	   of	   the	   EEA,	   though,	   the	   EU	   Member	   States’	   national	   courts’	  
omission	   to	  make	  a	   request	  may,	   if	   it	   constitutes	  a	  manifest	  error	  of	  appraisal,	  
give	   rise	   to	   the	   Member	   State	   breaching	   its	   obligations	   under	   EU	   law.	  
Establishing	   potential	   state	   liability	   of	   an	   EEA	   EFTA	   state	   in	   a	   similar	   case	   is	  
much	   more	   complicated.	   The	   preamble	   to	   the	   EEA	   Agreement	   states	   that	  
uniformity	   in	  the	  interpretation	  and	  application	  of	  the	  EEA	  Agreement	  must	  be	  
maintained	  ‘in	  full	  deference	  to	  the	  independence	  of	  the	  courts’.219	  At	  first	  glance,	  
                                            
213	  ibid	  para	  45.	  
214	  Case	  E-­‐13/11	  Granville	  [2012]	  EFTA	  Ct	  Rep	  400,	  para	  18.	  	  
215	  Case	  E-­‐18/11	  Irish	  Bank	  (n	  211)	  paras	  57-­‐58.	  
216	  ibid	  para	  64.	  
217	  ibid	  para	  64.	  
218	  ibid	  para	  64.	  
219	  Recital	  15,	  Preamble	  to	  the	  EEA	  Agreement.	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and	  bearing	  in	  mind	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  EEA	  is	  not	  a	  supranational	  legal	  order,	  the	  
sovereignty	  of	  the	  EEA	  EFTA	  States	  may	  rule	  out	  any	  obligation	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  
EEA	  EFTA	  States’	  national	   courts	   to	   follow	   the	  case	   law	  of	   the	  Court	  of	   Justice.	  
The	   EFTA	   Court,	   nevertheless,	   has	   found	   that	   the	   objectives	   of	   the	   EEA	  
Agreement	   as	   well	   as	   the	   homogeneity	   clause	   provided	   in	   Article	   3	   oblige	  
national	  courts	  to	  interpret	  national	  law	  in	  conformity	  with	  EEA	  law,	  as	  well	  as	  
apply	   to	   teleological	   interpretation	   in	   the	   limits	   provided	  by	   the	  national	   legal	  
order.220	  	  
Magnússon	   has	   argued	   that	   the	   aims	   of	   the	   EEA	   Agreement	   as	   expressed	   in	  
Article	  3	  EEA	  place	  an	  obligation	  on	  the	  national	  courts	  of	  the	  EEA	  EFTA	  States	  to	  
request	  advisory	  opinions	   from	  the	  EFTA	  Court	  even	   in	   the	  absence	  of	  such	  an	  
obligation	   in	   the	   EEA	   Agreement.221	   Magnússon’s	   suggestions	   could	   be	  
supported	   by	   the	   EFTA	   Court’s	   ruling	   in	   Pedicel	   where	   the	   EFTA	   Court	  
recognised	   the	   necessity	   of	   a	   dynamic	   interpretation	   of	   EEA	   law	   in	   order	   to	  
achieve	   the	   objective	   of	   homogeneity.222	   Although	   the	   case	   concerned	   a	  
substantive	   provision	   of	   the	   EEA	   Agreement,	   this	   interpretation	   could	   be	  
extended	  by	  the	  EFTA	  Court	  also	  to	  the	  procedural	  provisions	  of	  the	  Agreement	  
or	  the	  SCA.	  In	  Fokus	  Bank,	  the	  EFTA	  Court	  moreover	  stated	  that	  the	  homogeneity	  
claim	  that	  is	  provided	  in	  Article	  3	  EEA	  Agreement	  and	  mirrors	  Article	  4(3)	  TEU	  
by	   seeking	   to	   secure	   the	   protection	   of	   individual	   rights	   limits	   the	   procedural	  
autonomy	  of	  EFTA	  States.223	  The	  question	   remains,	   though,	  whether	  one	   could	  
interpret	  Article	  34	  SCA	  in	  a	  dynamic	  manner	  and	  arrive	  at	  the	  conclusion	  that	  
the	   EEA	   EFTA	   States	   have	   an	   obligation	   under	   the	   EEA	   Agreement	   to	   request	  
advisory	   opinions	   without	   arriving	   at	   a	   contra	   legem	   interpretation	   of	   the	  
provision.	  The	  homogeneity	  obligation	  of	  Article	  3	  EEA	  Agreement	  applies	  to	  the	  
contracting	   parties	   not	   specifically	   to	   national	   courts,	   and	   does	   not	   contain	   an	  
obligation	  of	  result	  but	  rather	  of	  best	  efforts,	  notwithstanding	  the	  concrete	  legal	  
obligations	  contained	  in	  the	  Agreement	  that	  serve	  the	  purpose	  of	  achieving	  and	  
maintaining	  homogeneity.	  In	  this	  regard,	  Article	  3	  EEA	  Agreement	  should	  not	  be	  
interpreted	  as	  imposing	  upon	  EEA	  EFTA	  States’	  national	  courts	  an	  obligation	  to	  
                                            
220	  Case	  E-­‐1/07	  Criminal	  Proceedings	  against	  A	  [2007]	  EFTA	  Ct	  Rep	  246,	  para	  39.	  
221	  S	  Magnússon,	  'On	  the	  Authority	  of	  Advisory	  Opinions'	  (n	  190)	  539-­‐540.	  
222	  Case	  E-­‐4/04	  Pedicel	  (n	  207)	  para	  28.	  
223	  Case	  E-­‐1/04	  Fokus	  Bank	  [2004]	  EFTA	  Ct	  Rep	  11,	  para	  41.	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make	  references	   for	  advisory	  opinions	   to	   the	  EFTA	  Court	  as	   this	  would	  clearly	  
conflict	  with	  Article	  34	  SCA.	  
Furthermore,	  Article	  33	  SCA	  provides	  that	  the	  EEA	  EFTA	  States	  are	  required	  to	  
take	   the	  measures	  necessary	   to	   comply	  with	   the	   judgments	   of	   the	  EFTA	  Court	  	  
but	  does	  not	  refer	  to	  advisory	  opinions.	  The	  preliminary	  rulings	  of	  the	  Court	  of	  
Justice,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   are	   binding	   on	   the	   national	   court.224	   Although	   this	  
entails	  no	  explicit	  obligation	  on	  behalf	  of	  other	  courts	  or	  the	  same	  court	  in	  other	  
cases	  to	  follow	  the	  Court’s	  ruling	  such	  obligation,	  nevertheless,	  follows	  implicitly.	  
A	   decision	   by	   a	   national	   court	   to	   divert	   from	   an	   interpretation	   of	   EU	   law	  
provided	  by	   the	  Court	  of	   Justice	  would	  collide	  with	   the	  obligation	  of	  a	  national	  
court	  –	  if	  adjudicating	  at	  last	  instance	  –	  to	  request	  a	  preliminary	  reference	  from	  
the	   Court.	   This	   is	   the	   case	   regardless	   of	   whether	   the	   national	   court	   falsely	  
applied	   the	  acte	   claire	   doctrine	  or	  overlooked	   the	   fact	   that	   the	  Court	  of	   Justice	  
had	  already	  ruled	  on	  the	  matter.	  Failure	  to	  comply	  with	  the	  obligation	  to	  make	  a	  
reference	   for	   a	   preliminary	   ruling	   may	   result	   in	   infringement	   proceedings	  
against	   the	  Member	  State	  under	  Article	  260(2)	  TFEU.	  The	  Court	  of	   Justice	  may	  
impose	  on	  the	  Member	  State	  a	   lump	  sum	  or	  penalty	  payment	   in	  order	   to	  exert	  
pressure	   on	   the	   Member	   State	   to	   comply	   with	   its	   obligations	   under	   the	   EU	  
Treaties.225	  In	  order	  to	  receive	  compensation	  for	  damages,	  the	  individual	  has	  to	  
file	  a	  new	  claim	  to	  a	  national	  court.	  The	  SCA,	  however,	  contains	  no	  equivalent	  to	  
Article	   260(2)	   TFEU,	   and	   thus	   no	   obligation	   of	   an	   EEA	   EFTA	   State	   to	   pay	   a	  
financial	  penalty	  for	  a	  failure	  to	  comply	  with	  the	  rulings	  of	  the	  EFTA	  Court	  or,	  for	  
that	  matter,	  ‘advisory’	  opinions.	  Yet	  the	  EEA	  EFTA	  States	  do	  have	  an	  obligation	  to	  
compensate	  for	  the	  damage	  caused	  to	  individuals	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  principle	  of	  
state	   liability.226	   An	  EEA	  EFTA	   State’s	   failure	   to	   perform	   the	   obligations	   under	  
the	  EEA	  Agreement	  may	  result	  in	  infringement	  proceedings	  under	  Article	  31	  SCA	  
against	   the	  EEA	  EFTA	  State	  but	  not	  on	  grounds	  of	   an	  EEA	  EFTA	  State	  national	  
court	  not	  requesting	  an	  advisory	  opinion	  from	  the	  EFTA	  Court	  or,	   if	   it	  does,	  for	  
not	   following	   it.	   Only	   indirectly,	   through	   the	   EFTA	   Court’s	   interpretation	   of	   a	  
provision	  of	  the	  EEA	  Agreement	  in	  infringement	  proceedings	  may	  an	  EEA	  EFTA	  
national	  court,	  by	  virtue	  of	  that	  EEA	  EFTA	  State’s	  obligation	  to	  conform	  with	  the	  
                                            
224	  Case	  69/85	  Wünsche	  [1986]	  ECR	  947,	  para	  13.	  
225	  Case	  C-­‐304/02	  Commission	  v	  France	  [2005]	  ECR	  I-­‐6263,	  para	  91.	  
226	  Case	  E-­‐18/10	  EFTA	  Surveillance	  Authority	  v	  Norway	  [2011]	  EFTA	  Ct	  Rep	  202,	  para	  28.	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judgment	  of	   the	  EFTA	  Court,	  be	  persuaded	  to	  bring	   their	   interpretation	  of	  EEA	  
law	  in	  conformity	  with	  that	  of	  the	  EFTA	  Court.	  	  
While	  the	  general	  attitude	  among	  the	  supreme	  courts	  of	  the	  EEA	  EFTA	  States	  has	  
been	   accommodating	   towards	   the	   advisory	   opinions	   given	   by	   the	   EFTA	   Court,	  
the	  Norwegian	  Supreme	  Court	   recently	   set	  aside	  an	  advisory	  opinion	   in	  STX227	  
with	  reference	  to	  the	  advisory	  nature	  of	  the	  procedure.228	  Strangely	  enough,	  the	  
EFTA	   Court	   then	   imposed	   the	   duty	   of	   cooperation	   under	   Article	   3	   EEA	  
Agreement	   directly	   on	   the	   national	   courts	   of	   last	   instance	   noting	   that	   ‘EFTA	  
citizens	  and	  economic	  operators	  benefit	  from	  the	  obligation	  of	  courts	  of	  the	  EU	  
Member	  States	  against	  whose	  decision	  there	  is	  no	  judicial	  remedy	  under	  national	  
law	  to	  make	  a	  reference	  to	  the	  ECJ’.229	  In	  Jonsson,	  the	  EFTA	  Court	  referred	  to	  its	  
advisory	   opinions	   in	   both	   STX	   and	   Irish	   Bank	   and	   recalled	   the	   importance	   of	  
referring	  questions	  to	  the	  EFTA	  Court	  under	  the	  advisory	  opinion	  procedure	  in	  
order	  to	  ensure	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  EEA	  Agreement	  by	  avoiding	  errors	  in	  the	  
interpretation	  of	   the	  EEA	  Agreement	  and	  ensure	  the	  coherence	  and	  reciprocity	  
of	  the	  rights	  of	  EEA	  citizens.230	  The	  strong	  recommendation	  does	  not,	  however,	  
have	  the	  legal	  effect	  of	  amending	  Article	  34	  SCA.	  
3.2.3	  Energy	  Community	  
The	   ECT	   contains	   no	   provisions	   on	   a	   judicial	   dialogue	   between	   the	   Court	   of	  
Justice	  and	  the	  non-­‐EU	  and	  non-­‐EEA	  parties	  of	  the	  Energy	  Community,	  nor	  even	  
an	   obligation	   of	   the	   contracting	   parties	   to	   ensure	   EU	   law	   conforming	  
interpretation	   of	   the	   Energy	   Community	   acquis.	   The	   only	  means	   of	   upholding	  
homogeneity	  in	  the	  interpretation	  and	  application	  of	  the	  internal	  market	  aquis	  in	  
the	   Energy	   Community	   is,	   therefore,	   the	   non-­‐judicial	   dispute	   settlement	  
mechanism	  provided	   in	  Articles	   90-­‐93	  ECT	   in	   the	   framework	   of	  which	   Energy	  
Community	   institutions	   are	   bound	   to	   interpret	   identical	   acquis	   in	   conformity	  
with	  the	  caw	  law	  of	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice.231	  
                                            
227	  Case	  E-­‐2/11	  STX	  [2012]	  EFTA	  Ct	  Rep	  4.	  	  
228	  Case	  HR-­‐2013-­‐00496-­‐A	  STX	  (Norges	  Høyesterett,	  5	  March	  2013),	  para	  46.	  
229	  Case	  E-­‐18/11	  Irish	  Bank	  (n	  211)	  para	  58.	  
230	  Case	  E-­‐3/12	  Jonsson	  [2013]	  EFTA	  Ct	  Rep	  136,	  para	  60.	  
231	  Article	  94	  ECT.	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3.2.4	  European	  Common	  Aviation	  Area	  
The	   ECAA	   Agreement	   contains	   a	   hybrid	   system	   of	   referrals	   for	   authoritative	  
interpretations	   of	   the	   ECAA	   Agreement	   containing	   elements	   of	   the	   respective	  
systems	  of	  the	  EU	  and	  the	  EEA.	  Firstly,	  each	  state	  party	  to	  the	  ECAA	  Agreement	  
must	  ensure	  that	  individuals	  can	  invoke	  their	  rights	  under	  the	  Agreement	  before	  
national	   courts.232	   Secondly,	   an	   ECAA	   Partner’s	   court	   or	   tribunal	   that	   is	   faced	  
with	   a	   task	   of	   interpreting	   a	   provision	   of	   the	   ECAA	   Agreement	   identical	   in	  
substance	  to	  EU	  acquis	  must	  refer	  a	  question	  to	  the	  Court	  of	   Justice	   if	   it	  deems	  
the	  latter’s	  interpretation	  necessary	  in	  order	  to	  be	  able	  to	  give	  a	  judgment	  in	  the	  
case.233	  Differently	   from	   the	  EEA,	   thus,	   the	  non-­‐EU	  –	  and,	   for	   that	  matter,	  non-­‐
EEA-­‐EFTA	  –	  national	  courts	  are	  under	  an	  obligation	  to	  ask	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice	  for	  
a	  preliminary	  ruling.	  For	  the	  sake	  of	  maintaining	  ‘a	  degree	  of	  uniformity’234	  and	  
in	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  separate	  ECAA	  court,	  this	  can	  be	  considered	  as	  the	  only	  viable	  
solution.	  An	  ECAA	  Partner	   state	  may	  decide	  upon	   the	   extent	   and	  modalities	  of	  
the	  request	  for	  a	  preliminary	  ruling	  from	  the	  Court.235	  The	  extent	  and	  modalities	  
may,	   for	   example,	   include	   a	   specification	   as	   to	   whether	   to	   allow	   any	   national	  
court	  to	  submit	  the	  ruling	  or	  to	  reserve	  the	  possibility	  to	  courts	  adjudicating	  at	  
last	  instance	  only.236	  Importantly,	  the	  preliminary	  rulings	  may	  concern	  both	  the	  
validity	   and	   the	   interpretation	   of	   the	   ECAA	   Agreement,	   including	   the	   adopted	  
acquis.	   Pursuant	   to	   Article	   1(1)	   of	   Annex	   IV	   to	   the	   ECAA	   Agreement	   the	  
preliminary	  rulings	  of	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice	  are	  binding,	  thus	  complying	  with	  the	  
requirements	  established	  by	  the	  Court	  in	  Opinion	  1/91.237	  The	  ECAA	  contracting	  
parties	   can	   moreover	   participate	   in	   the	   proceedings	   before	   the	   Court	   by	  
submitting	   observations	   to	   the	   Court	   on	   the	   same	   grounds	   as	   EU	   Member	  
States.238	  	  
If	  an	  ECAA	  Partner’s	  national	  court	  of	  last	  instance	  is	  unable	  to	  make	  a	  referral	  to	  
the	  Court	  of	   Justice	  any	   judgment	  of	   that	  court	  must	  be	  passed	  on	  to	   the	  ECAA	  
Joint	   Committee	   ‘which	   shall	   act	   so	   as	   to	   preserve	   the	   homogeneous	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  Article	  15(1)	  ECAA	  Agreement.	  
233	  Article	  16(2)	  ECAA	  Agreement.	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  Opinion	  1/00	  ECAA	  (n	  33)	  para	  7.	  
235	  Article	  16(2)	  ECAA	  Agreement.	  
236	  Article	  2(1)	  of	  Annex	  IV	  to	  the	  ECAA	  Agreement.	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  Opinion	  1/91	  EEA	  I	  (n	  4)	  para	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  See	  above	  chapter	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  3.2.	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  Article	  1(2)	  of	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  to	  the	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  Agreement.	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interpretation	  of	  [the	  ECAA]	  Agreement’.239	  The	  Joint	  Committee	  must	  act	  within	  
two	  months	  after	   receiving	   the	   judgment	  of	  a	  Partner	  state	  court	   that	   conflicts	  
with	  the	  case	  law	  of	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice.240	  Should	  the	  Joint	  Committee	  fail	  to	  act	  
within	   the	   given	   timeframe,	   the	   dispute	   settlement	   procedures	   of	   Article	   20	  
ECAA	  Agreement	  may	  be	  applied	  including	  the	  possibility	  under	  Article	  20(3)	  of	  
the	  parties	  to	  the	  dispute	  to	  bring	  the	  matter	  to	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice.	  In	  the	  end,	  
the	   Court	   of	   Justice	   will	   be	   the	   final	   judicial	   authority	   deciding	   on	   the	  
interpretation	  of	  internal	  market	  acquis	  exported	  by	  the	  ECAA	  Agreement.	  
4	  Conclusion	  	  
The	   notion	   of	   homogeneity	   refers	   to	   equivalence	   of	   the	   applicable	   rules	  
containing	   individual	   rights	   and	   obligations,	   and	   their	   interpretation	   and	  
application.	  In	  addition,	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  homogeneous	  internal	  market,	  or	  a	  sector	  
thereof,	  extended	  to	  non-­‐EU	  Member	  States	  necessarily	  entails	  a	  similar	  level	  of	  
effectiveness	  in	  safeguarding	  individual	  rights.	  In	  order	  to	  be	  able	  to	  extend	  the	  
internal	  market	  or	  a	   sector	   thereof	   to	  non-­‐EU	  Member	  States	   the	   international	  
agreements	  must,	  therefore,	  provide	  for	  procedural	  and	  institutional	  safeguards	  
that	   at	   least	   in	   the	   core	   aspect	   are	   equivalent	   to	   those	   enshrined	   in	   the	   EU	  
Treaties.	  
To	  achieve	  this,	  each	  of	  the	  multilateral	  agreements	  under	  scrutiny	  has	  set	  up	  a	  
different	   institutional	   system	   for	   ensuring	   homogeneity	   through	   systems	   of	  
surveillance	  and	  interpretation	  of	  EU	  law	  as	  well	  as	  dispute	  settlement.	  The	  EEA	  
features	   parallel	   institutions	  with	   rules	   on	   coordinating	   the	   activities	   between	  
the	  Commission	  and	  the	  ESA,	  whereas	  the	  ECT	  and	  the	  ECAA	  Agreement	  either	  
subordinate	   the	   tasks	   of	   surveillance	   and	   authoritative	   interpretation	   of	   the	  
acquis	  directly	  to	  EU	  institutions	  or,	  on	  the	  contrary,	  entrust	  the	  domestic	   legal	  
orders	  of	  the	  non-­‐EU	  contracting	  parties	  with	  the	  task	  of	  ensuring	  the	  effective	  
functioning	   of	   the	   agreements.	   The	  dispute	   settlement	   procedures	   under	   all	   of	  
the	   multilateral	   agreements	   exporting	   the	   acquis	   are	   political	   or	   hybrid,	  
including	   in	   the	   EEA	   and	   the	   ECAA	   the	   possibility	   to	   refer	   a	   question	   on	   the	  
interpretation	  of	  the	  acquis	  subject	  to	  dispute	  to	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice.	  Moreover,	  
the	  judicial	  systems	  of	  two	  out	  of	  the	  three	  agreements	  reflect	  the	  decentralising	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  Article	  16(3)	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  Agreement.	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dynamics	  present	  in	  the	  EU.	  Only	  the	  ECT	  stands	  out	  by	  precluding	  any	  judicial	  
dialogue	   between	   the	   national	   courts	   of	   the	   contracting	   parties	   and	   either	   a	  
common	  court	  established	  by	  the	  agreement	  or	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice.	  	  	  
The	  elaborateness	  of	   the	   institutional	  design	  mirrors	  rather	  exactly	   the	  explicit	  
objectives	   of	   the	   agreements	   as	   expressed	   in	   their	   texts.	   The	   EEA	   Agreement	  
strives	  after	  a	  true,	  if	  partial,	  extension	  of	  the	  EU’s	  internal	  market	  whereas	  the	  
homogeneity	  objectives	  in	  the	  sectoral	  agreements	  are	  worded	  more	  modestly.	  
In	   the	  case	  of	   the	  EEA,	   the	  clash	  between	   the	  objectives	  of	   the	  EEA	  Agreement	  
and	  the	   legal	  and	  institutional	   framework	  that	   it	  sets	  up	   is	  apparent.	  The	  EFTA	  
Court,	  demonstrating	  goodwill	  in	  terms	  of	  maintaining	  homogeneity,	  attempts	  to	  
interpret	  into	  the	  provisions	  of	  the	  EEA	  Agreement	  means	  of	  judicial	  protection	  
equivalent	  to	  those	  in	  place	  in	  the	  EU	  but	  does	  this	  on	  the	  limits	  of	  what	  can	  be	  
considered	   legally	   acceptable	   and	   what	   the	   EEA	   EFTA	   States’	   national	   courts,	  
legislatures	   and	   executives	   can	   tolerate.	   It	   is	   apparent	   that	   the	   tensions	   in	   the	  
EEA	   Agreement	   between	   the	   ambitious	   objectives	   of	   an	   expanded	   EU	   internal	  
market	   and	   the	   reality	   of	   the	   agreement	   functioning	   in	   a	   regular	   international	  
law	  setting	  that	  features	  sovereignty	  EEA	  EFTA	  States	  as	  contracting	  parties	  are	  
not	   easy	   to	   reconcile	   with	   one	   another.	   A	   truly	   homogeneous	   outcome	  
necessitates	   that	   the	  rights	  and	  remedies	  under	   the	  EEA	  Agreement	  be	  aligned	  
with	   those	   in	  place	   in	   the	  EU.	  This	   requirement,	  however,	   clearly	   collides	  with	  
the	  wish	  of	  the	  EEA	  EFTA	  States	  to	  retain	  their	  sovereignty	  to	  the	  fullest	  and	  not	  
become	  part	  of	  a	  supranational	  legal	  order	  such	  as	  the	  EU.	  But	  as	  critics	  say,	  one	  
cannot	  have	  their	  cake	  and	  eat	  it,	  too.241	  In	  the	  end,	  the	  losers	  are	  the	  individuals	  
of	  the	  EEA	  EFTA	  States	  who	  may	  find	  themselves	  in	  a	  position	  of	  being	  unable	  to	  
assert	   the	   rights	   conferred	   upon	   them	   by	   the	   EEA	   Agreement.	   This	   reasoning	  
applies	  equally	  to	  the	  Energy	  Community	  and	  the	  ECAA.	  	  	  	  
A	  tension	   is	  also	  written	   into	  the	   institutional	  and	  procedural	  provisions	  of	   the	  
multilateral	   agreements	   exporting	   the	  acquis.	  When	   the	  EFTA	  Court	   rules	  on	  a	  
provision	  of	  EU	  law	  that	  is	  replicated	  in	  the	  EEA	  Agreement	  without	  the	  Court	  of	  
Justice	   previously	   having	   expressed	   itself	   on	   the	   matter	   and	   the	   Court	  
subsequently	  decides	  to	  go	  in	  another	  direction,	  the	  homogeneity	  band	  between	  
the	  EU	  and	  the	  EFTA	  pillar	  is	  cut.	  This,	  however,	  is	  a	  flaw	  written	  in	  the	  original	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homogeneity	   code	   of	   the	   EEA	   Agreement	   that	   aims	   to	   maintain	   both	   the	  
homogeneity	  of	   the	  whole	   and	   the	   sovereignty	  or	   autonomy	  of	   the	   constituent	  
parts.	   However,	   since	   neither	   the	   Court	   of	   Justice	   nor	   the	   EFTA	   Court	   has	   an	  
obligation	   to	   follow	   the	   precedents	   of	   the	   other	   or	   even	   itself,	   the	   EEA	  
homogeneity	  concept	  cannot	  be	  perceived	  to	  include	  a	  requirement	  for	  absolute	  
uniformity	  of	  case	  law.	  After	  all,	  as	  the	  concept	  of	  stare	  decisis	  does	  not	  apply	  to	  
the	  Court	  of	  Justice	  it	  may	  deviate	  from	  previously	  given	  interpretations	  should	  
the	  circumstances	  of	  a	  new	  case	  before	   it	  so	  require.	  This	  situation	   is	  not	  even	  
precluded	   from	  happening	   by	   virtue	   of	   the	   objective	   of	   the	   internal	  market	   to	  
closely	  resemble	  that	  of	  a	  national	  market	  as	  neither	  does	  the	  principle	  of	  stare	  
decisis	  apply	  in	  the	  legal	  orders	  of	  most	  of	  the	  EU	  Member	  States.	  
While	   the	   multilateral	   agreements	   try	   to	   mirror	   certain	   aspects	   of	   the	   EU	  
surveillance	  and	  judicial	  system,	  they	  can	  only	  be	  considered	  equivalent	  for	  the	  
purposes	  of	   achieving	  a	  homogeneous	  expansion	  of	   the	   internal	  market	   if	   they	  
ensure	   efficient	   enforcement	   of	   the	   agreements	   exporting	   the	   acquis	   and	   the	  
effective	  protection	  of	  individual	  rights	  deriving	  from	  the	  agreements.	  Insofar	  as	  
the	  EU	  Member	  States	  have	  had	  to	  surrender	  a	  part	  of	  their	  national	  sovereignty	  
to	  accommodate	  the	  common	  framework	  of	  rights	  and	  remedies,	  the	  same	  must	  
be	  expected	  from	  third	  countries	  wishing	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  EU	  internal	  market	  
project	  to	  the	  same	  extent	  as	  the	  EU	  Member	  States.	  Otherwise	  the	  outcome	  can	  
merely	   resemble	  an	  extension	  of	  equal	   rights	  and	  obligations	  without	   reaching	  
up	  to	  safeguarding	  their	  enjoyment	  in	  reality.	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Chapter	  8	   Conclusion	  
The	  practice	  of	  expanding	  the	  EU	  internal	  market	  by	  exporting	   internal	  market	  
acquis	  to	  non-­‐EU	  Member	  States	  is	  no	  longer	  a	  novelty.	  The	  EEA	  Agreement	  has	  
celebrated	   its	   20	   years’	   anniversary	   and	   the	   citizens	   of	   Europe	   take	   free	  
movement	  between	  the	  EU	  and	  the	  EEA	  EFTA	  States	  for	  granted.	  The	  two	  –	  soon	  
three	  –	  multilateral	  sectoral	  agreements	  concluded	  or	  negotiated	  more	  recently	  
in	   the	   fields	  of	   energy,	   aviation	  and	   transport	   cooperation	  cement	   the	   trend	   in	  
both	   the	   EU’s	   external	   relations	   and	   internal	   policies	   towards	   strongly	  
integrating	   neighbouring	   countries	   into	   the	   EU’s	   internal	  market.	   The	   trend	   is	  
not	   likely	   to	   end	   soon.	   Rather,	   new	   opportunities	   for	   expanding	   the	   internal	  
market	   await	   in	   the	   conclusion	   of	   the	   new	   generation	   association	  
agreements/DCFTAs	  with	  the	  eastern	  neighbourhood	  countries.	  Comprehensive,	  
EEA-­‐type	  solutions	  can,	  moreover,	  be	  employed	   in	   the	  hypothetical	   scenario	  of	  
one	  or	  more	  of	  the	  current	  Member	  States	   leaving	  the	  EU	  and	  seeking	  for	  new,	  
more	  market-­‐focused	  legal	  and	  political	  cooperation	  frameworks	  to	  govern	  their	  
future	   relationship	   with	   the	   EU.	   Instead	   of	   joining	   the	   EEA	   on	   might	   wish	   to	  
design	  a	  new	   type	  of	   arrangement	   for	   integrating	  a	  non-­‐EU	  Member	  State	   into	  
the	  internal	  market	  or,	  reversely,	  for	  not	  disconnecting	  from	  the	  internal	  market	  
a	  current	  Member	  State	  that	  plans	  to	  leave	  the	  Union.	  
The	   objective	   of	   any	   of	   such	   exporting/expanding/extending/integrating	  
exercise	  is	  to	  allow	  a	  third	  country,	  which	  in	  practice	  comprises	  countries	  in	  the	  
EU’s	   immediate	   neighbourhood,	   to	   become	   a	   full	   participant	   of	   the	   internal	  
market	   or	   a	   sector	   thereof	   without	   becoming	   a	   party	   to	   the	   EU	   Treaties	   and	  
having	   to,	   thereby,	   adhere	   to	   all	   EU	   policies.	   For	   the	   EU,	   in	   addition	   to	   the	  
economic	   benefits	   of	   gaining	   access	   to	   third	   countries’	   domestic	   markets,	   the	  
expansion	  of	  the	  internal	  market	  also	  entails	  political	  advantages	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  
more	  prosperous	  neighbourhood	  and	  current	  or	  future	  candidate	  countries	  that	  
are	   better	   prepared	   for	   eventual	   membership	   in	   the	   Union.	   The	   practice	   of	  
concluding	  multilateral	  sectoral	  agreements	  serves	  the	  same	  purpose	  of	  mutual	  
market	   access	   as	   the	   comprehensive	  EEA	  Agreement.	   The	   sectoral	   agreements	  
have,	  moreover,	  enabled	  those	  neighbourhood	  countries	  that	  would	  not	  be	  able	  
to	   align	   their	   legal	   orders	   to	   that	   of	   the	   EU	   to	   the	   same	   extent	   as	   the	   EEA	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Agreement	   to,	   nevertheless,	   participate	   in	   the	   internal	   market	   in	   fields	   where	  
cross-­‐border	  cooperation	  is	  inevitable.	  
Full	   participation	   in	   the	   internal	  market	   or	   a	   sector	   thereof	  means	   that	   in	   the	  
areas	   covered	   by	   the	   particular	   agreements	   non-­‐EU	  market	   actors	   are	   able	   to	  
trade	   and	   move	   on	   equal	   footing	   with	   their	   EU	   counterparts.	   The	   non-­‐EU	  
Member	  States	  gain	  full	  participation	  rights	  in	  the	  internal	  market	  on	  condition	  
of	   adopting	   and	   implementing	   EU	   internal	   market	   acquis.	   Since	   the	   expanded	  
internal	   market	   also	   includes	   third	   countries	   the	   EU	  market	   participants,	   too,	  
enjoy	  the	  same	  access	  to	  those	  countries’	  domestic	  markets.	  The	  precondition	  of	  
placing	   non-­‐EU	   market	   actors	   on	   an	   equal	   footing	   with	   the	   EU	   actors	   is	   the	  
enjoyment	   of	   the	   same	   set	   of	   rights	   and	   obligations.	   The	   same	   rights	   and	  
obligations	  are,	  firstly,	  derived	  from	  the	  substantive	  rules	  of	  the	  acquis.	  Secondly,	  
the	  equivalence	  of	  rights	  and	  obligations	  across	  the	  internal	  market	  requires	  that	  
the	   differences	   between	   the	   acquis	   as	   it	   applies	   in	   the	   different	   states	   are	  
minimal	  or	  at	  least	  remain	  within	  certain	  previously	  agreed	  limits.	  Thirdly,	  equal	  
rights	  and	  obligations	  necessarily	  call	  for	  a	  similar	  degree	  of	  effectiveness	  in	  the	  
application	   of	   the	   identical	   set	   of	   rules	   in	   order	   to	   provide	   individuals	   a	  
possibility	   to	   enforce	   their	   rights.	   The	   achievement	   of	   all	   of	   these	   three	   stages	  
requires	   appropriate	   institutional	   and	  procedural	   structures.	  On	   the	   one	  hand,	  
institutions	  and	  procedures	  are	   important	   for	  making	  sure	   that	   the	  same	  rules	  
are	   applicable	   in	   all	   states	   participating	   in	   the	   internal	   market,	   or	   a	   sector	  
thereof,	  at	  any	  point	  in	  time.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  institutions	  and	  procedures	  help	  
ensure	   that	   identical	   rules	   are	   given	   the	   same	   effect	   in	   the	   course	   of	  
implementation,	   interpretation	   and	   application	   across	   the	   expanded	   internal	  
market.	  Only	  if	  all	  of	  these	  elements	  are	  in	  place	  and	  function	  properly	  can	  one	  
speak	  of	  a	  true	  extension	  of	  the	  internal	  market.	  	  
The	   thesis	   has	   sought	   to	   establish	   whether	   the	   ideal	   situation	   of	   an	   internal	  
market,	  or	  a	  sector	  thereof,	  extended	  beyond	  the	  borders	  of	  the	  Union	  to	  non-­‐EU	  
Member	  States	  could	  be	  attained	  in	  the	  framework	  of	  the	  Treaties	  of	  the	  EU	  and	  
the	  case	  law	  of	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice	  and	  if	  so,	  then	  in	  what	  ways	  does	  participation	  
in	  the	  expanded	  internal	  market	  differ	  from	  membership	  in	  the	  EU,	  or	  if	  not,	  then	  
what	  are	  the	  main	  limitations.	  An	  ideal	  situation	  of	  an	  expanded	  internal	  market	  
is	   such	  where	   the	   third	   country	  market	  participants	  are,	   indeed,	  placed	  on	   the	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same	   footing	   with	   EU	   market	   operators	   by	   enjoying	   the	   same	   rights	   and	  
obligations,	  including	  the	  same	  degree	  of	  effectiveness	  in	  the	  protection	  of	  those	  
rights	  as	  EU	  nationals.	  	  
In	   order	   to	   establish	   the	   content	   of	   the	   same	   rights	   and	   obligations	   recourse	  
must	  be	  had	   to	   the	   concept	  of	   the	   internal	  market.	  While	   initially	  perceived	  as	  
including	   the	   four	   fundamental	   freedoms	   and	   competition	   policy	   only,	   the	  
developments	  of	  the	  past	  few	  decades	  have	  seen	  a	  transformation	  of	  the	  concept.	  
The	  four	  freedoms	  and	  competition	  policy	  are	  strongly	  influenced	  by	  a	  number	  
of	   non-­‐economic	   considerations	   both	   in	   the	   policy-­‐making	   and	   interpretation	  
stages.	   These	   considerations	   include	   mainly	   horizontal	   provisions,	   such	   as	  
environmental	  protection,	  social	  policy,	  consumer	  protection	  and	  public	  health,	  
as	   well	   as	   fundamental	   rights	   and	   reflect	   the	   ‘social	   function’	   of	   the	   internal	  
market	   that	   is	   ancillary	   to	   its	   economic	   function.	   The	   effect	   of	   non-­‐economic	  
policy	   concerns	   on	   the	   traditional	   content	   of	   the	   internal	   market	   also	   has	   an	  
impact	  on	  expanding	  the	  EU	  internal	  market	  by	  exporting	  the	  acquis.	  In	  order	  to	  
ensure	   that,	   indeed,	   the	   same	   rules	   are	   in	   place	   in	   the	   EU	   and	   the	   non-­‐EU	  
segments	  of	  the	  expanded	  market	  the	  non-­‐economic	  factors,	  insofar	  as	  they	  are	  
indispensable	  for	  the	  functioning	  of	  the	  internal	  market,	  need	  to	  be	  included	  in	  
the	   exported	   acquis	   in	   order	   to	  make	   it	   possible	   for	   the	   economic	   core	   of	   the	  
exported	  rules	  to	  be	  interpreted	  and	  applied	  in	  the	  same	  manner	  outside	  the	  EU	  
as	  in	  the	  Union.	  	  
The	  same	  set	  of	  rules	  also	  entails	  a	  certain	  level	  of	  coherence.	  The	  concept	  of	  the	  
EU	  internal	  market	  is	  characterised	  by	  unity	  and	  unity	  is	  also	  an	  essential	  feature	  
of	  the	  EU	  legal	  order.	  Neither	  demands	  complete	  uniformity	  but	  adherence	  to	  at	  
least	  a	  core	  set	  of	  key	  elements	  is	  necessary	  for	  the	  internal	  market	  to	  retain	  its	  
special	  characteristics.	  The	  core	  elements	  may	  vary	  somewhat	  from	  one	  sector	  of	  
the	   internal	   market	   to	   another	   in	   that	   not	   all	   of	   the	   elements	   of	   the	   internal	  
market,	  for	  example	  all	  of	  the	  fundamental	  freedoms	  are	  equally	  relevant	  for	  all	  
sectors	  of	   the	   internal	  market.	  The	  aviation	  and	  transport	  sectors,	   for	  example,	  
are	  heavily	  service-­‐dominated	  whereas	  emphasis	  in	  the	  agriculture	  and	  fisheries	  
sectors	  is	  on	  the	  free	  movement	  of	  goods.	  Nevertheless,	  this	  does	  not	  defeat	  the	  
importance	  of	   the	   application	  of	   all	   fundamental	   freedoms	   to	   all	   sectors	  of	   the	  
internal	   market.	   The	   full	   realisation	   of	   the	   objectives	   of	   the	   internal	   market,	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including	   in	   its	   individual	   sectors,	   precludes	   the	   exclusion	   of	   any	   of	   the	  
fundamental	   freedoms	   and	   rules	   on	   competition	   policy	   as	  well	   as	   the	   relevant	  
non-­‐economic	  considerations.	  	  
Maintaining	   the	   unity	   of	   the	   internal	   market	   is	   highly	   relevant	   in	   the	   case	   of	  
expanding	   the	   internal	   market	   to	   third	   countries.	   The	   fact	   that	   exporting	   the	  
acquis	   takes	   place	   via	   an	   international	   agreement	   means	   that	   unity	   must	   be	  
ensured	  in	  two	  dimensions	  –	  the	  dimension	  of	  the	  international	  agreement,	  such	  
as	   the	   EEA	   Agreement,	   itself	   and	   also	   the	   dimension	   of	   the	   international	  
agreement	  vis-­à-­vis	   the	  EU.	  Unity	   in	   the	   latter	  dimension	  means	   that	   the	  states	  
parties	   to	   the	   exporting	   agreements	   cannot	   pick-­‐and-­‐choose	   their	   preferred	  
depth	  and	  breadth	  of	  integration	  –	  an	  entire	  sector	  of	  the	  internal	  market	  being	  
an	  exception	   in	   the	   case	  of	   sectoral	   agreements	  –	  without	   the	  expanded	   single	  
market	   constellation	   losing	   one	   of	   the	   inherent	   qualities	   of	   the	   EU	   internal	  
market.	  	  	  
A	   true	   extension	   of	   the	   internal	   market	   further	   requires	   that	   the	   same	   set	   of	  
rules	  that	  is	  applied	  in	  the	  territory	  of	  the	  extended	  internal	  market	  at	  one	  time	  
also	   be	   given	   similar	   effect	   for	   the	   purposes	   of	   the	   effective	   protection	   of	  
individual	  rights.	  Individuals	  enjoy	  a	  special	  status	  in	  the	  EU	  internal	  market	  and	  
that	   special	   status	   must	   necessarily	   be	   upheld	   when	   the	   internal	   market	   is	  
extended	   to	   third	   countries.	   The	   quest	   for	   effectiveness	   in	   the	   internal	  market	  
pertains	  to	  the	  direct	  effect	  of	  the	  provisions,	  the	  rank	  of	  the	  exported	  acquis	  in	  
the	  hierarchy	  of	  norms,	  the	  interpretation	  of	  national	  law	  in	  conformity	  with	  the	  
acquis	   and	   the	   liability	   of	   the	   state	   for	   breaches	   of	   the	   acquis.	   These	   four	  
elements	  refer	  to	  the	  foundational	  principles	  of	  the	  EU	  –	  the	  doctrines	  of	  direct	  
effect,	  primacy,	  consistent	  interpretation	  and	  state	  liability.	  The	  challenge	  of	  the	  
international	   agreements	   endeavouring	   to	   expand	   the	   internal	   market	   is	   to	  
ensure	   that	   comparable	   safeguards	   for	   maintaining	   the	   effectiveness	   of	   the	  
exported	  acquis	  are	  in	  place	  in	  the	  legal	  orders	  created	  by	  the	  agreements.	  In	  an	  
international	   law	   setting,	   the	   principle	   of	   state	   sovereignty	   may	   affect	   the	  
effectiveness	  of	  the	  domestic	  application	  of	  the	  internal	  market	  acquis	  to	  a	  larger	  
degree	  than	  in	  the	  supranational	  EU	  legal	  order.	  The	  EU	  has	  itself	  established	  the	  
necessary	   legal	  means	   for	  ensuring	   the	  effective	  protection	  of	   individual	   rights	  
whereas	   in	   the	   case	   of	   the	   international	   agreements	   exporting	   the	   acquis	   the	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effective	  application	  of	  the	  internal	  market	  rules	  depends	  primarily	  on	  the	  third	  
countries’	   national	   legal	   orders	   unless	   the	   agreements	   themselves	   or	   the	  
institutions	  they	  have	  set	  up	  develop	  supranational	  principles	  analogous	  to	  those	  
of	  the	  EU.	  	  
Two	   crucial	   elements	   of	   the	   project	   of	   expanding	   the	   internal	   market	   are	   the	  
institutional	   and	   procedural	   arrangements	   that	   support	   the	   norms	   export	   and	  
the	  uniform	  interpretation	  and	  application	  of	  the	  acquis.	  The	  greatest	  challenge	  
to	  setting	  up	  appropriate	  institutions	  and	  procedures	  that	  would	  ensure	  that	  the	  
same	  rules	  apply	  across	  the	  wider	  market	  and	  have	  the	  same	  effect	  is	  posed	  by	  
the	  EU’s	  own	  legal	  order	  and,	  more	  specifically,	  the	  principle	  of	  autonomy	  keenly	  
protected	  by	  the	  Court	  of	   Justice.	  The	  principle	  of	  autonomy	  prescribes	  that	  no	  
international	   agreements	  may	   alter	   the	   essential	   character	   of	   the	   EU’s	   powers	  
and	  institutions	  and	  that	  in	  the	  EU	  legal	  order	  the	  authority	  to	  interpret	  EU	  law	  
rests	  with	  the	  institutions	  of	  the	  Union.	  Both	  of	  the	  requirements	  are	  illustrated	  
by	  many	  examples	  developed	   in	   the	  case	   law	  of	   the	  Court	  of	   Justice.	  The	  Court	  
has	  deemed	  several	  international	  agreements,	  one	  of	  them	  being	  the	  first	  version	  
of	   the	   EEA	   Agreement,	   incompatible	   with	   the	   principle	   of	   autonomy	   and	   thus	  
prevented	  their	  conclusion.	  Even	  in	  the	  light	  of	  the	  often	  criticised	  and	  certainly	  
stringent	   case	   law	   of	   the	   Court	   it	   cannot	   be	   concluded,	   however,	   that	   a	   true	  
extension	   of	   the	   internal	   market	   to	   third	   countries	   is	   impossible.	   The	   Court	  
interprets	   and	   applies	   the	   provisions	   of	   the	   Treaties	   as	   they	   are.	   In	   order	   to	  
conclude	   an	   international	   agreement	   that	   comprises	   elements	   that	   the	   Court	  
does	  not	  permit	  the	  Member	  States	  have	  to	  amend	  the	  Treaties.	  The	  possibility	  
exists	   in	   theory	   even	   if	   it	   is	   not	   always	   feasible	   politically	   and	   in	   practice	  
amendments	  concern	  rather	  the	  draft	  international	  agreements.	  
An	   agreement	   that	   seeks	   to	   expand	   the	   internal	   market	   in	   a	   homogeneous	  
manner	  must,	  first,	  make	  sure	  that	  all	  relevant	  internal	  market	  acquis	  is	  exported	  
to	  the	  third	  country	  legal	  orders	  in	  its	  entirety	  and	  in	  a	  timely	  manner.	  There	  are	  
two	   factors	   that	   play	   a	   crucial	   role.	   Firstly,	   the	   system	   must	   be	   sufficiently	  
dynamic	  in	  order	  to	  ensure	  a	  swift	  process	  of	  updating	  the	  acquis	  in	  all	  parts	  of	  
the	   extended	  market.	   Secondly,	   international	   agreements	   concluded	   by	   the	   EU	  
operate	  under	  public	  international	  law	  and	  their	  application	  is	  largely	  dependent	  
on	  the	  national	  constitutional	  procedures	  and	  the	  approval	  of	  the	  acquis	  by	  the	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national	  legislatures	  of	  the	  third	  countries	  and,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  mixed	  agreements,	  
the	  EU	  Member	  States.	   It	  must,	   therefore,	  be	  guaranteed	   that	  new	  EU	  acquis	   is	  
incorporated	  into	  the	  third	  countries’	   legal	  orders	  fully	  and	  without	  delay.	  This	  
places	  strong	  emphasis	  on	  the	  pre-­‐decision-­‐making	  stage	  in	  the	  EU	  in	  which	  the	  
third	   countries’	   early	   acceptance	   of	   the	   new	   acquis	   can	   be	   promoted	   through	  
information	   sharing	   and	   consultations.	   New	   governance	   methods	   of	   decision-­‐
making	  in	  the	  EU,	  especially	  visible	  in	  the	  area	  of	  social	  policy,	  can	  both	  promote	  
and	   restrict	   the	   participation	   of	   non-­‐EU	   actors	   in	   the	   policy	   and	   law	   making	  
stages.	   Third	   country	   stakeholders	   may	   either	   be	   given	   the	   possibility	   to	  
participate	   in	   policy-­‐making	   outside	   the	   ‘classic	   Community	   method’	   or,	  
conversely,	   their	   participation	   in	   expert	   committees	   and	   expert	   groups	   that	  
prepare	   legislative	   proposals	   in	   the	   traditional	   law-­‐making	   procedure	  may	   be	  
limited	  when	  recourse	  is	  instead	  had	  to	  alternative	  policy-­‐making	  fora.	  
Finally,	  whether	  all	  market	  participants	  in	  and	  outside	  the	  EU	  can	  enjoy	  the	  same	  
rights	   and	   obligations	   depends	   heavily	   on	   the	   existence	   of	   surveillance	   and	  
enforcement	  procedures	  and	  the	  institutional	  safeguards	  as	  regards	  the	  uniform	  
interpretation	  and	  application	  of	  the	  acquis	  across	  the	  expanded	  market	  that	  are	  
comparable	   to	   the	   institutions	   of	   the	   EU.	   Whereas	   the	   institutional	   and	  
procedural	   framework	   of	   the	   EU	   serves	   as	   the	   benchmark	   for	   evaluating	   the	  
adequacy	   of	   corresponding	   frameworks	   set	   up	   by	   the	   international	   agreement	  
that	   exports	   the	  acquis	   it	   cannot	  be	  disregarded,	  however,	   that	   the	  EU	   system,	  
especially	  as	  regards	  the	  uniform	  interpretation	  and	  application	  of	  EU	  law	  in	  all	  
Member	   States,	   is	   not	   flawless.	   This	   owes	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   EU	   is	   an	  
international	   organisation,	   albeit	   a	   supranational	   one,	   and	   that	   its	   constitutive	  
entities	   –	   the	  Member	   States	   –	   are	   sovereign	   states	   with	   their	   own	   sovereign	  
institutions	   and	   national	   procedural	   autonomy.	   The	   judicial	   dialogue	   between	  
the	  EU	  judiciary	  and	  the	  judiciaries	  of	  the	  Member	  States	  both	  strengthens	  and	  
obstructs	   uniformity.	   In	   the	   name	   of	   fostering	   a	   continuing	   cooperative	  
relationship	   between	   itself	   and	   the	   national	   courts	   of	   the	  Member	   States	   it	   is	  
difficult	   for	   the	   Court	   of	   Justice	   to	   condemn	   the	   highest	   courts	   in	   the	   national	  
legal	   systems	   even	   when	   the	   latter	   act	   in	   breach	   of	   EU	   law.	   Insofar	   as	   this	  
element	  of	  ineffectiveness	  is	  embedded	  in	  the	  EU	  system	  of	  judicial	  protection	  of	  
rights	  deriving	  from	  EU	  law	  it	  cannot	  be	  maintained	  that	  the	  same	  fault	  should	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be	  remedied	  by	  an	  international	  agreement	  exporting	  the	  acquis	   for	  the	  sake	  of	  
expanding	  the	  internal	  market.	  Rather,	  this	  particular	  element	  is	  an	  intrinsic	  part	  
of	  the	  institutional	  structures	  supporting	  the	  EU	  internal	  market	  and	  the	  multi-­‐
level	  character	  of	  the	  EU	  more	  generally.	  	  
The	  thesis	  scrutinised	  in	  detail	  three	  international	  agreements	  exporting	  internal	  
market	   acquis	   to	   third	   countries	   with	   the	   objective	   of	   expanding	   the	   internal	  
market.	  One	  of	  the	  agreements	  –	  the	  EEA	  Agreement	  –	  is	  comprehensive	  in	  scope	  
whereas	  the	  ECT	  and	  the	  ECAA	  Agreements	  only	  cover	  the	  energy	  and	  aviation	  
sectors	  of	  the	  internal	  market,	  respectively.	  The	  analysis	  has	  demonstrated	  that	  a	  
genuine	  extension	  of	  a	  sector	  of	  the	  internal	  market	  is	  somewhat	  more	  difficult	  
to	   achieve	   than	   an	   expansion	   of	   the	   internal	   market	   in	   its	   entirety.	   First	   and	  
foremost,	   it	   is	   politically	   challenging	   to	   justify	   a	   general	   extension	   of	   the	  
fundamental	   freedoms	   and	   competition	   policy	   to	   third	   countries	   if	   the	  
agreements	   only	   cover	   one,	   or	   possibly	   more,	   specific	   sectors.	   All	   of	   the	  
fundamental	  freedoms	  would,	  therefore,	  have	  to	  be	  restricted	  to	  apply	  only	  vis-­à-­
vis	   the	   particular	   sector	   at	   hand.	   The	   difficulty	   of	   extending	   to	   third	   countries	  
also	  all	  non-­‐economic	  aspects	  that	  form	  part	  of	  the	  core	  of	  the	  internal	  market	  is	  
common	  to	  the	  sectoral	  as	  well	  as	  the	  comprehensive	  agreements	  exporting	  the	  
acquis.	  
Secondly,	   all	   international	   agreements	   endeavouring	   to	   extend	   the	   internal	  
market	   to	   non-­‐EU	   Member	   States	   must	   feature	   a	   suitable	   framework	   of	  
institutions	   and	  procedures.	  The	  main	   factor	   affecting	   the	   elaborateness	  of	   the	  
institutional	   and	  procedural	   structures	   in	   the	  EEA,	   the	  Energy	  Community	   and	  
the	   ECAA	   is	   the	   scope	   of	   the	   agreement.	   The	   number	   of	   non-­‐EU	   contracting	  
parties	  in	  the	  multilateral	  agreements,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  has	  no	  particular	  effect	  
on	  the	  intricacy	  of	  procedures	  and	  institutions.	  	  
The	   EEA	   Agreement	   features	   both	   the	   most	   elaborate	   institutional	   and	  
procedural	  framework	  but	  also	  the	  most	  explicit	  aim	  of	  homogeneity	  as	  regards	  
the	  connection	  between	  EU	  and	  EEA	  law.	  The	  parallel	  institutions	  set	  up	  by	  the	  
EEA	  Agreement,	  the	  parallel	  procedures,	  the	  strong	  links	  between	  the	  respective	  
actors	   and	   processes	   of	   the	   EU	   and	   the	   EFTA	   pillars	   of	   the	   EEA	   and	   the	  
independent	  institutions	  of	  the	  latter	  help	  ensure	  that	  the	  EEA	  legal	  order	  closely	  
mirrors	   that	   of	   the	   EU.	   However,	   a	   large	   part	   of	   the	   homogeneous	   result	   in	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practice	  can	  be	  attributed	  to	  the	  EFTA	  Court.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	   the	  EFTA	  Court	  
has	   developed	   a	   set	   of	   principles	   applicable	   in	   the	   EEA	   legal	   order	   that	   are	  
analogous	   to	   those	   in	   the	   EU.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   the	   EFTA	   Court	   has	   been	  
promoting	   a	   continuous	   dialogue	   with	   the	   Court	   of	   Justice	   of	   the	   EU	   even	  
regarding	  the	  interpretation	  of	  the	  EEA	  Agreement	  in	  the	  light	  of	  the	  post-­‐1992	  
case	  law	  of	  the	  Court	  that	  the	  EFTA	  Court	  is	  only	  obliged	  to	  take	  due	  account	  of.	  
Not	   without	   importance	   in	   the	   context	   of	   the	   success	   of	   the	   EEA	   system	   of	  
expanding	  the	  internal	  market	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  EEA	  EFTA	  States	  have,	  indeed,	  
surrendered	  a	  part	   of	   their	   sovereignty	   and	   thereby	  made	   the	  EEA	   legal	   order	  
partly	   a	   supranational	   one,	   if	   not	   explicitly	   under	   the	   EEA	   Agreement	   then	  
implicitly	   by	   means	   of	   the	   mechanisms	   of	   the	   EEA	   Agreement	   that	   render	   it	  
politically	   difficult	   for	   the	   EEA	   EFTA	   States	   to	   refuse	   an	   update	   of	   the	   EEA	  
Agreement.	  
The	  Energy	  Community	  has	  a	  number	  of	   institutions	  but	  compared	  to	   the	  EEA,	  
the	   institutions	   and	   procedures	   envisaged	   by	   the	   ECT	   are	   of	   a	   political	   nature	  
and	  have	  very	  little	  if	  any	  connection	  to	  the	  parallel	  institutions	  of	  the	  EU	  apart	  
from	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   Commission	   coordinates	   the	   activities	   of	   the	   Energy	  
Community	   and	  participates	   in	   the	  Energy	  Community	   institutions.	  Among	   the	  
agreements	   studied,	   the	   ECT	   is	   the	   most	   traditional	   international	   agreement	  
functioning	   under	   the	   rules	   of	   international	   treaty	   law	   rather	   than	   any	  
supranational	  principles.	  The	  ECAA,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	   features	  one	   institution	  
only	   –	   the	   Joint	   Committee	   –	   but	   has	   also	   set	   up	   direct	   links	   with	   the	   EU	  
institutions	  in	  the	  areas	  of,	  for	  example,	  dispute	  settlement,	  interpretation	  of	  the	  
acquis	   and	   surveillance	   that	   in	   some	   fields	   covered	   by	   the	   ECAA	  Agreement	   is	  
conducted	   by	   the	   Commission.	   The	   administrative	   capacity	   of	   the	   sectoral	  
agreements	   in	   terms	  of	  maintaining	  homogeneity	  between	   the	  exported	  acquis	  
and	  the	  acquis	  as	  applicable	  in	  the	  EU	  internal	  market	  is	  not	  as	  high	  as	  that	  of	  the	  
EEA.	  For	   that	   reason,	   the	  main	  burden	  of	  ensuring	  a	  homogeneous	  outcome	   in	  
the	  expanded	  market	  falls	  on	  the	  third	  country	  national	  courts.	  The	  difficulty	  of	  
establishing	   an	   equally	   effective	   institutional	   system	   as	   in	   place	   in	   the	   EU	   is,	  
therefore,	  another	  reason	  for	  why	  expanding	  to	  non-­‐EU	  Member	  States	  a	  sector	  
of	   the	   internal	  market	   is	  more	   complicated,	   even	   if	  not	   impossible,	   than	   in	   the	  
case	  of	  comprehensive	  frameworks	  such	  as	  the	  EEA.	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The	  success	  of	  the	  project	  of	  expanding	  the	  internal	  market	  is	  in	  correlation	  with	  
the	   loss	   of	   sovereignty	   on	   behalf	   of	   the	   third	   countries	   to	   which	   the	   internal	  
market	   is	   extended.	   On	   the	   one	   hand,	   the	   loss	   of	   sovereignty	   concerns	   the	  
position	  that	  third	  country	  national	  constitutional	  systems	  accord	  to	  rules	  of	  EU	  
origin	  in	  the	  national	  hierarchies	  of	  norms.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  processes	  of	  
ensuring	   the	  dynamic	  updating	  of	   the	  agreements	   to	   reflect	   the	   changes	   in	   the	  
EU	   acquis	   and	   the	   effective	   application	   of	   the	   exported	   acquis	   depend	   on	  
appropriate	   institutional	   and	  procedural	   arrangements	   that	  may	   impinge	  upon	  
national	  sovereignty.	  The	  loss	  of	  sovereignty	  of	  the	  Member	  States	  holds	  equally	  
true	   for	   the	  EU	   itself	  and	  shows	   that	  exporting	   the	   internal	  market	  acquis	  may	  
lead	  to	  a	  true	  extension	  of	  the	  internal	  market	  without	  granting	  third	  states	  the	  
status	   of	   EU	   Member	   States	   on	   the	   condition	   that	   the	   non-­‐EU	  Member	   States	  
surrender	  their	  independence	  to	  a	  similar	  degree	  as	  their	  EU	  counterparts.	  The	  
EU	  Treaties	   impose	   certain	   limitations	   on	  homogeneity-­‐advancing	   institutional	  
and	   procedural	   solutions	   but	   the	   latter	   serve	   as	   a	   guarantee	   for	   the	   proper	  
functioning	  of	  the	  internal	  market	  rather	  than	  a	  precondition.	  The	  effectiveness	  
of	  the	  internal	  market	  can,	  in	  theory,	  also	  be	  safeguarded	  if	  the	  institutions	  of	  the	  
non-­‐EU	  Member	  States	  voluntarily	  assume	  the	  task	  of	  maintaining	  homogeneity	  
with	  EU	  acquis	   in	   the	  absence	  of	  supranational	   institutions.	  There	   is	  nothing	   in	  
the	  nature	  of	  the	  EU	  legal	  order,	  therefore,	  that	  would	  exclude	  the	  possibility	  of	  
expanding	  the	  internal	  market	  without	  enlarging	  the	  Union	  provided	  that	  there	  
are	   third	   countries	   that	   wish	   to	   participate	   in	   the	   EU	   internal	  market	   sharing	  







                                            
1	  Cf	  ‘sharing	  everything	  with	  the	  Union	  but	  institutions’:	  R	  Prodi,	  ‘A	  Wider	  Europe	  –	  A	  Proximity	  
Policy	  as	   the	  key	   to	   stability’,	   speech	  held	  at	   the	  Sixth	  ECSA-­‐World	  Conference	   ‘Peace,	   Security	  
And	   Stability	   International	   Dialogue	   and	   the	   Role	   of	   the	   EU’,	   Brussels,	   5-­‐6	   December	   2002,	  
SPEECH/02/619.	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  Cases	  21-­‐24/72	  International	  Fruit	  Company	  [1972]	  ECR	  1219	  
Case	  39/72	  Commission	  v	  Italy	  [1973]	  ECR	  101	  
Case	  4/73	  Nold	  [1974]	  ECR	  491	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Case	  152/73	  Sotgiu	  [1974]	  ECR	  153	  
Case	  166/73	  Rheinmühlen	  I	  [1974]	  ECR	  33	  
Case	  167/73	  Commission	  v	  France	  (French	  Seamen)	  [1974]	  ECR	  359	  
Case	  181/73	  Haegeman	  [1973]	  ECR	  449	  
Case	  192/73	  Hag	  I	  [1974]	  ECR	  731	  	  
Case	  8/74	  Dassonville	  [1974]	  ECR	  837	  
Case	  36/75	  Rutili	  [1975]	  ECR	  1219	  
Case	  43/75	  Defrenne	  II	  [1976]	  ECR	  455	  
Case	  59/75	  Manghera	  [1976]	  ECR	  91	  
Case	  87/75	  Bresciani	  [1976]	  ECR	  129	  
Case	  26/76	  Metro	  v	  Commission	  [1977]	  ECR	  1875	  
Case	  33/76	  Rewe	  [1976]	  ECR	  1989	  
Case	  45/76	  Comet	  [1976]	  ECR	  2043	  
Case	  51/76	  Verbond	  van	  Nederlandse	  Ondernemingen	  [1977]	  ECR	  113	  
Case	  30/77	  Bouchereau	  [1977]	  ECR	  1999	  
Joined	  Cases	  80/77	  and	  81/77	  Commissionnaires	  Réunis	  v	  Receveur	  des	  Douanes	  
[1978]	  ECR	  928	  
Case	  106/77	  Simmenthal	  [1978]	  ECR	  629	  
Case	  139/77	  Denkavit	  [1978]	  ECR	  1317	  
Case	  149/77	  Defrenne	  III	  [1978]	  ECR	  1365	  
Case	  31/78	  Bussone	  [1978]	  ECR	  2429	  
Case	  120/78	  Cassis	  de	  Dijon	  [1979]	  ECR	  649	  
Case	  128/78	  Commission	  v	  United	  Kingdom	  [1979]	  ECR	  419	  
Case	  232/78	  Commission	  v	  France	  [1979]	  ECR	  2729	  
Case	  44/79	  Hauer	  [1979]	  ECR	  3727	  
Case	  52/79	  Debauve	  [1980]	  ECR	  833	  
Case	  61/79	  Denkavit	  II	  [1980]	  ECR	  1205	  
Case	  91/79	  Commission	  v	  Italy	  [1980]	  ECR	  I-­‐1099	  
Case	  130/79	  Express	  Dairy	  Foods	  [1980]	  ECR	  1887	  
Case	  149/79	  Commission	  v	  Belgium	  [1980]	  ECR	  3881	  
 
	   359 
Case	  149/79	  Commission	  v	  Belgium	  [1982]	  ECR	  1845	  
Case	  66/80	  International	  Chemical	  Corporation	  [1981]	  ECR	  1191	  	  
Case	  193/80	  Commission	  v	  Italy	  [1981]	  ECR	  3019	  
Case	  270/80	  Polydor	  v	  Harlequin	  Records	  [1982]	  ECR	  329	  
Case	  15/81	  Gaston	  Schul	  [1982]	  ECR	  1409	  
Case	  17/81	  Pabst	  &	  Richarz	  [1982]	  ECR	  1331	  
Case	  54/81	  Fromme	  [1982]	  ECR	  1449	  	  
Case	  104/81	  Kupferberg	  [1982]	  ECR	  3641	  
Case	  106/81	  Kind	  [1982]	  ECR	  2885	  
Case	  261/81	  Walter	  Rau	  Lebensmittelwerke	  v	  De	  Smedt	  [1982]	  ECR	  3961	  
Case	  283/81	  CILFIT	  [1982]	  ECR	  3415	  
Joined	  Cases	  75/82	  and	  117/82	  Razzouk	  and	  Beydoun	  v	  Commission	  [1984]	  ECR	  
1509	  
Case	  227/82	  Van	  Bennekom	  [1983]	  ECR	  3883	  
Joined	  Cases	  286/82	  and	  26/83	  Luisi	  and	  Carbone	  [1984]	  ECR	  377	  
Case	  327/82	  Ekro	  v	  Produktschap	  voor	  Vee	  en	  Vlees	  [1984]	  ECR	  107	  
Case	  14/83	  von	  Colson	  [1984]	  ECR	  1891	  
Case	  106/83	  Sermide	  v	  Cassa	  Conguaglio	  Zucchero	  [1984]	  ECR	  4209	  
Case	  143/83	  Commission	  v	  Denmark	  [1985]	  ECR	  427	  
Case	  240/83	  ADBHU	  [1985]	  ECR	  531	  
Case	  293/83	  Gravier	  [1985]	  ECR	  593	  
Case	  137/84	  Mutsch	  [1985]	  ECR	  2681	  
Case	  152/84	  Marshall	  [1986]	  ECR	  723	  
Case	  178/84	  Commission	  v	  Germany	  [1987]	  ECR	  1227	  
Joined	  Cases	  209-­‐213/84	  Nouvelles	  Frontières	  [1986]	  ECR	  1425	  
Case	  222/84	  Johnston	  [1986]	  ECR	  1651	  
Case	  299/84	  Neumann	  [1985]	  ECR	  3663	  
Case	  304/84	  Muller	  [1986]	  ECR	  1511	  
Case	  307/84	  Commission	  v	  France	  [1986]	  ECR	  1725	  
Case	  59/85	  Reed	  [1986]	  ECR	  1283	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Case	  66/85	  Lawrie-­Blum	  [1986]	  ECR	  2121	  
Case	  69/85	  Wünsche	  [1986]	  ECR	  947	  
Case	  314/85	  Foto-­Frost	  [1987]	  ECR	  4199	  
Case	  12/86	  Demirel	  [1987]	  ECR	  3719	  
Case	  80/86	  Kolpinghuis	  Nijmegen	  [1987]	  ECR	  3969	  
Case	  302/86	  Commission	  v	  Denmark	  (Danish	  Bottles)	  [1988]	  ECR	  4607	  
Joined	  Cases	  46/87	  and	  227/88	  Hoechst	  v	  Commission	  [1989]	  ECR	  2859	  
Case	  143/87	  Stanton	  v	  Inasti	  [1988]	  ECR	  I-­‐3877	  
Case	  186/87	  Cowan	  [1989]	  ECR	  195	  
Case	  265/87	  Schraeder	  [1989]	  ECR	  2237	  
Case	  305/87	  Commission	  v	  Greece	  [1989]	  ECR	  1476	  
Case	  5/88	  Wachauf	  [1989]	  ECR	  2609	  
Case	  30/88	  Greece	  v	  Commission	  [1989]	  ECR	  3711	  
Case	  103/88	  Fratelli	  Costanzo	  [1989]	  ECR	  1839	  
Joined	   Cases	   C-­‐143/88	   and	   C-­‐92/89	   Zuckerfabrik	   Süderdithmarschen	   and	  
Zuckerfabrik	  Soest	  [1991]	  ECR	  I-­‐415	  
Case	  C-­‐10/89	  Hag	  II	  [1990]	  ECR	  I-­‐3711	  
Case	  C-­‐106/89	  Marleasing	  [1990]	  ECR	  I-­‐4135	  
Case	  C-­‐192/89	  Sevince	  [1990]	  ECR	  I-­‐3461	  
Case	  C-­‐213/89	  Factortame	  [1990]	  ECR	  I-­‐2433	  
Case	  C-­‐260/89	  ERT	  v	  DEP	  [1991]	  ECR	  I-­‐2925	  
Case	  C-­‐288/89	  Collectieve	  Antennevoorziening	  Gouda	  [1991]	  ECR	  I-­‐4007	  
Case	  C-­‐300/89	  Commission	  v	  Council	  (Titanium	  dioxide)	  [1991]	  ECR	  I-­‐2867	  
Case	  348/89	  Mecanarte	  [1991]	  ECR	  I-­‐3277	  
Joined	  Cases	  C-­‐1/90	  and	  C-­‐176/90	  Aragonesa	  [1991]	  ECR	  I-­‐4151	  
Joined	  Cases	  C-­‐6/90	  and	  9/90	  Francovich	  and	  Bonifaci	  [1991]	  ECR	  I-­‐5357	  
Case	  C-­‐18/90	  Kziber	  [1991]	  ECR	  I-­‐199	  
Case	  C-­‐39/90	  Denkavit	  [1991]	  ECR	  I-­‐3069	  
Case	  C-­‐42/90	  Bellon	  [1990]	  ECR	  I-­‐4863	  
Case	  C-­‐76/90	  Säger	  [1991]	  ECR	  I-­‐4221	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Case	  C-­‐179/90	  Merci	  Convenzionali	  Porto	  di	  Genova	  v	  Siderurgica	  Gabrielli	  [1991]	  
ECR	  I-­‐5889	  
Case	  C-­‐286/90	  Poulsen	  and	  Diva	  Navigation	  Corp.	  [1992]	  ECR	  I-­‐6019	  
Case	  C-­‐370/90	  Surinder	  Singh	  [1992]	  ECR	  I-­‐4265	  
Joined	  Cases	  C-­‐13/91	  and	  C-­‐113/91	  Criminal	  proceedings	  against	  Michel	  Debus	  
[1992]	  ECR	  I-­‐3617	  
Case	  C-­‐188/91	  Deutsche	  Shell	  [1993]	  ECR	  I-­‐363	  
Case	  C-­‐207/91	  Eurim-­Pharm	  [1993]	  ECR	  I-­‐3723	  	  
Joined	  Cases	  C-­‐267/91	  and	  C-­‐268/91	  Keck	  and	  Mithouard	  [1993]	  ECR	  I-­‐6097	  
Case	  C-­‐312/91	  Metalsa	  [1993]	  ECR	  I-­‐3751	  
Case	  C-­‐19/92	  Kraus	  [1993]	  ECR	  I-­‐1663	  
Case	  C-­‐91/92	  Faccini	  Dori	  v	  Recreb	  [1994]	  ECR	  I-­‐3325	  
Joined	  Cases	  C-­‐92/92	  and	  C-­‐326/92	  Phil	  Collins	  [1993]	  ECR	  I-­‐5145	  
Case	  C-­‐292/92	  Hünermund	  [1993]	  ECR	  I-­‐6787	  
Case	  C-­‐379/92	  Peralta	  [1994]	  ECR	  I-­‐3453	  
Case	  C-­‐398/92	  Mund	  &	  Fester	  v	  Hatrex	  [1994]	  ECR	  I-­‐467	  
Case	  C-­‐419/92	  Scholz	  [1994]	  ECR	  I-­‐505	  
Case	  C-­‐431/92	  Grosskrotzenburg	  [1996]	  ECR	  I-­‐2189	  
Case	  C-­‐18/93	  Corsica	  Ferries	  [1994]	  ECR	  I-­‐1783	  
Joined	  Cases	  C-­‐46/93	  and	  C-­‐48/93	  Brasserie	  du	  Pêcheur	  and	  Factortame	  [1996]	  
ECR	  I-­‐1029	  
Case	  C-­‐55/93	  van	  Schaik	  [1994]	  ECR	  I-­‐4837	  
Case	  C-­‐312/93	  Peterbroeck	  [1995]	  ECR	  I-­‐4599	  
Joined	  Cases	  C-­‐430/93	  and	  C-­‐431/93	  Van	  Schijndel	  and	  Van	  Veen	  v	  SPF	   [1995]	  
ECR	  I-­‐4705	  
Case	  C-­‐469/93	  Chiquita	  Italia	  [1995]	  ECR	  I-­‐4533	  
Case	  C-­‐473/93	  Commission	  v	  Luxemburg	  [1996]	  ECR	  I-­‐3207	  
Case	  C-­‐5/94	  Hedley	  Lomas	  [1996]	  ECR	  I-­‐2553	  
Case	  C-­‐13/94	  P.	  v	  S.	  and	  Cornwall	  County	  Council	  [1996]	  ECR	  I-­‐2143	  
Case	  C-­‐61/94	  Commission	  v	  Germany	  [1996]	  ECR	  I-­‐3989	  
Case	  C-­‐173/94	  Commission	  v	  Belgium	  [1996]	  ECR	  I-­‐3265	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Case	  C-­‐233/94	  Deposit	  Guarantees	  [1997]	  ECR	  I-­‐2405	  
Case	  C-­‐290/94	  Commission	  v	  Greece	  [1996]	  ECR	  I-­‐3285	  
Joined	  Cases	  C-­‐34/95,	  C-­‐35/95	  and	  C-­‐36/95	  De	  Agostini	  [1997]	  ECR	  I-­‐3843	  
Case	  C-­‐72/95	  Kraaijeveld	  [1996]	  ECR	  I-­‐5403	  
Case	  C-­‐171/95	  Tetik	  [1997]	  ECR	  1-­‐329	  
Case	  C-­‐183/95	  Affish	  [1997]	  ECR	  I-­‐4315	  
Case	  C-­‐189/95	  Franzén	  [1997]	  ECR	  I-­‐5909	  
Case	  C-­‐265/95	  Commission	  v	  France	  (Spanish	  Strawberries)	  [1997]	  ECR	  I-­‐6959	  
Case	  C-­‐337/95	  Parfums	  Christian	  Dior	  [1997]	  ECR	  I-­‐6013	  
Case	  C-­‐341/95	  Bettati	  [1998]	  ECR	  I-­‐4355	  
Case	  C-­‐368/95	  Familiapress	  [1997]	  ECR	  I-­‐3689	  
Case	  C-­‐413/95	  Bosman	  [1995]	  ECR	  I-­‐4921	  
Case	  C-­‐50/96	  Schröder	  [2000]	  ECR	  I-­‐743	  
Case	  C-­‐53/96	  Hermès	  v	  FHT	  [1998]	  ECR	  I-­‐3603	  
Joined	  Cases	  C-­‐64/96	  and	  C-­‐65/96	  Uecker	  and	  Jacquet	  [1997]	  ECR	  I-­‐3171	  
Case	  C-­‐85/96	  Martínez	  Sala	  [1998]	  ECR	  I-­‐2691	  
Case	  C-­‐149/96	  Portugal	  v	  Council	  [1999]	  ECR	  I-­‐08395	  
Case	  C-­‐176/96	  Lehtonen	  and	  Castors	  Braine	  [2000]	  ECR	  I-­‐2681	  
Case	  C-­‐200/96	  Metronome	  Musik	  [1998]	  ECR	  I-­‐1953	  
Case	  C-­‐355/96	  Silhouette	  [1998]	  ECR	  I-­‐4799	  
Case	  C-­‐416/96	  Eddline	  El-­Yassini	  [1999]	  ECR	  I-­‐1209	  
Case	  C-­‐126/97	  Eco	  Swiss	  [1999]	  ECR	  I-­‐3055	  
Case	  C-­‐140/97	  Rechberger	  [1999]	  ECR	  I-­‐3499	  
Case	  C-­‐224/97	  Ciola	  v	  Land	  Vorarlberg	  [1999]	  ECR	  I-­‐2517	  
Joined	  Cases	  C-­‐270/97	  and	  C-­‐271/97	  Deutsche	  Post	  v	  Sievers	  and	  Schrage	  [2000]	  
ECR	  I-­‐929	  
Case	  C-­‐273/97	  Sirdar	  [1999]	  ECR	  I-­‐7403	  
Case	  C-­‐293/97	  Standley	  and	  Metson	  [1999]	  ECR	  I-­‐2603	  
Case	  C-­‐424/97	  Haim	  [2001]	  ECR	  1-­‐5123	  
Case	  C-­‐6/98	  ARD	  [1999]	  ECR	  I-­‐7599	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Case	  C-­‐37/98	  Savas	  [2000]	  ECR	  1-­‐2927	  
Joined	   Cases	   C-­‐49/98,	   C-­‐50/98,	   C-­‐52/98	   to	   C-­‐54/98	   and	   C-­‐68/98	   to	   C-­‐71/98	  
Finalarte	  and	  Others	  [2001]	  ECR	  I-­‐7831	  
Case	  C-­‐187/98	  Commission	  v	  Greece	  [1999]	  ECR	  I-­‐7713	  
Case	  C-­‐224/98	  D’Hoop	  [2002]	  ECR	  I-­‐6191	  
Case	  C-­‐281/98	  Angonese	  [2000]	  ECR	  I-­‐4139	  
Case	  C-­‐285/98	  Kreil	  [2000]	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  I-­‐9011	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Case	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Case	  C-­‐186/01	  Dory	  [2003]	  ECR	  I-­‐2479	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  C-­‐304/02	  Commission	  v	  France	  [2005]	  ECR	  I-­‐6263	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  [2004]	  ECR	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  C-­‐459/03	  Commission	  v	  Ireland	  (MOX	  Plant)	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Case	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Case	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  I-­‐609	  
Case	  C-­‐344/04	  IATA	  and	  ELFAA	  [2006]	  ECR	  I-­‐403	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  [2007]	  ECR	  I-­‐33	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  C-­‐519/04	  P	  Meca	  Medina	  [2006]	  ECR	  I-­‐6991	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Case	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Case	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  Pavlov	  and	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  and	  T-­‐
141/00	  Artegodan	  [2002]	  ECR	  II-­‐4945	  
Case	  T-­‐306/01	  Yusuf	  and	  Al	  Barakaat	  [2005]	  ECR	  II-­‐3533	  
Case	  T-­‐315/01	  Kadi	  [2005]	  ECR	  II-­‐3649	  
Case	  T-­‐289/03	  BUPA	  [2008]	  ECR	  II-­‐741	  
Case	  T-­‐201/04	  Microsoft	  Corp.	  v	  Commission	  [2007]	  ECR	  II-­‐3601	  
Orders	  of	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice	  and	  General	  Court	  
Order	  of	  12	  July	  1996	  in	  Case	  C-­‐180/96	  R	  United	  Kingdom	  v	  Commission	  [1996]	  
ECR	  I-­‐3903	  
Order	   of	   10	   July	   2006	   in	   Joined	   Cases	   C-­‐14/06	   and	   C-­‐295/06	   Parliament	   and	  
Denmark	  v	  Commission	  [2008]	  ECR	  I-­‐1649	  	  
Order	   of	   15	   July	   2010	   in	   Case	   C-­‐493/09	  Commission	   v	   Portugal	   [2011]	   ECR	   I-­‐
9247	  
Order	   of	   19	   January	   2012	   in	   Joined	   Cases	   T-­‐289/11,	   T-­‐290/11	   and	   T-­‐521/11	  
Deutsche	  Bahn	  (General	  Court,	  6	  September	  2013)	  
Opinions	  of	  Advocates	  General	  
Case	  6/64	  Costa	  v	  ENEL	  [1964]	  ECR	  585,	  Opinion	  of	  AG	  Lagrange	  
Case	  80/70	  Defrenne	  I	  [1971]	  ECR	  445,	  Opinion	  of	  AG	  Dutheillet	  de	  Lamothe	  
Case	  69/80	  Worringham	  and	  Humphreys	  v	  Lloyds	  Bank	  Limited	  [1981]	  ECR	  767,	  
Opinion	  of	  AG	  Warner	  
Case	  307/84	  Commission	  v	  France	  [1986]	  ECR	  1725,	  Opinion	  of	  AG	  Mancini	  
Joined	  Cases	  281/85,	  283/85,	  284/85,	  285/85	  and	  287/85	  Germany	  and	  others	  v	  
Commission	  [1987]	  ECR	  3203,	  Opinion	  of	  AG	  Mancini	  
Case	  302/86	  Commission	  v	  Denmark	  (Danish	  Bottles)	  [1988]	  ECR	  4607,	  Opinion	  
of	  AG	  Sir	  Gordon	  Slynn	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Case	  301/87	  France	  v	  Commission	  [1990]	  ECR	  I-­‐307,	  Opinion	  of	  AG	  Jacobs	  
Case	  344/87	  Bettray	  [1988]	  ECR	  1621,	  Opinion	  of	  AG	  Jacobs	  	  
Case	   C-­‐300/89	   Commission	   v	   Council	   (Titanium	   dioxide)	   [1991]	   ECR	   I-­‐2867,	  
Opinion	  of	  AG	  Tesauro	  
Joined	  Cases	  C-­‐92/92	  and	  C-­‐326/92	  Phil	  Collins	   [1993]	  ECR	   I-­‐5145,	  Opinion	  of	  
AG	  Jacobs	  
Case	  C-­‐292/92	  Hünermund	  [1993]	  ECR	  I-­‐6787,	  Opinion	  of	  AG	  Tesauro	  
Joined	   Cases	   C-­‐34/95,	   C-­‐35/95	   and	   C-­‐36/95	   De	   Agostini	   [1997]	   ECR	   I-­‐3843,	  
Opinion	  of	  AG	  Jacobs	  
Case	  C-­‐110/95	  Yamanouchi	  [1997]	  ECR	  I-­‐3251,	  Opinion	  of	  AG	  Fennelly	  
Case	  C-­‐53/96	  Hermès	  v	  FHT	  [1998]	  ECR	  I-­‐3603,	  Opinion	  of	  AG	  Tesauro	  
Case	  C-­‐321/97	  Andersson	  and	  Wåkerås-­Andersson	  [1999]	  ECR	  I-­‐3551,	  Opinion	  of	  
AG	  Cosmas	  
Case	  C-­‐129/00	  Commission	  v	  Italy	  [2003]	  ECR	  I-­‐14637,	  Opinion	  of	  AG	  Geelhoed	  
Case	  C-­‐224/01	  Köbler	  [2003]	  ECR	  I-­‐10239,	  Opinion	  of	  AG	  Léger	  
Case	  C-­‐452/01	  Ospelt	  [2003]	  ECR	  I-­‐9743,	  Opinion	  of	  AG	  Geelhoed	  
Case	  C-­‐265/03	  Simutenkov	  [2005]	  ECR	  1-­‐2581,	  Opinion	  of	  AG	  Stix-­‐Hackl	  
Joined	   Cases	   C-­‐402/05	   P	   and	   C-­‐415/05	   P	  Kadi	   and	   Al	   Barakaat	   [2008]	   ECR	   I-­‐
6351,	  Opinion	  of	  AG	  Poiares	  Maduro	  
Case	  C-­‐438/05	  Viking	  [2007]	  ECR	  I-­‐10779,	  Opinion	  of	  AG	  Poiares	  Maduro	  	  
Case	  C-­‐210/06	  Cartesio	  [2008]	  ECR	  I-­‐9641,	  Opinion	  of	  AG	  Poiares	  Maduro	  
Case	  C-­‐240/09	  Lesoochranárske	  zoskupenie	  VLK	   [	  2011]	  ECR	  I-­‐1255,	  Opinion	  of	  
AG	  Sharpston	  
Case	  C-­‐257/10	  Bergström	  [2011]	  ECR	  I-­‐13227,	  Opinion	  of	  AG	  Mazák	  
Case	  C-­‐425/11	  Katja	  Ettwein	  (Court	  of	  Justice,	  18	  October	  2012),	  Opinion	  of	  AG	  
Jääskinen	  
Case	  C-­‐431/11	  United	  Kingdom	  v	  Council	  (Court	  of	  Justice,	  26	  September	  2013),	  
Opinion	  of	  AG	  Kokott	  
EFTA	  Court	  
Case	  E-­‐1/94	  Restamark	  [1994-­‐1995]	  EFTA	  Ct	  Rep	  15	  
Case	  E-­‐2/94	  Scottish	  Salmon	  Growers	  [1994-­‐1995]	  EFTA	  Ct	  Rep	  59	  
Joined	  Cases	  E-­‐8/94	  and	  E-­‐9/94	  Mattel	  and	  Lego	  [1994-­‐1995]	  EFTA	  Ct	  Rep	  113	  
Case	  E-­‐1/95	  Samuelsson	  [1994-­‐1995]	  EFTA	  Ct	  Rep	  145	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Case	  E-­‐2/95	  Eidesund	  [1995-­‐1996]	  EFTA	  Ct	  Rep	  1	  
Case	  E-­‐2/96	  Ulstein	  and	  Røiseng	  [1995-­‐1996]	  EFTA	  Ct	  Rep	  65	  
Case	  E-­‐3/96	  Ask	  [1997]	  EFTA	  Ct	  Rep	  1	  
Case	  E-­‐5/96	  Nille	  [1997]	  EFTA	  Ct	  Rep	  30	  
Case	  E-­‐6/96	  Wilhelmsen	  [1997]	  EFTA	  Ct	  Rep	  53	  
Case	  E-­‐2/97	  Maglite	  [1997]	  EFTA	  Ct	  Rep	  127	  
Case	  E-­‐3/97	  Opel	  Norge	  [1998]	  EFTA	  Ct	  Rep	  1	  
Case	  E-­‐7/97	  EFTA	  Surveillance	  Authority	  v	  Norway	  [1998]	  EFTA	  Ct	  Rep	  62 
Case	  E-­‐8/97	  TV	  1000	  [1998]	  EFTA	  Ct	  Rep	  68	  
Case	  E-­‐9/97	  Sveinbjörnsdóttir	  [1998]	  EFTA	  Ct	  Rep	  95	  
Case	  E-­‐3/98	  Rainford-­Towning	  [1998]	  EFTA	  Ct	  Rep	  205	  
Case	  E-­‐5/98	  Fagtún	  [1999]	  EFTA	  Ct	  Rep	  51	  
Case	  E-­‐3/00	  Kellogg’s	  [2000-­‐2001]	  EFTA	  Ct	  Rep	  73	  	  
Case	  E-­‐1/01	  Einarsson	  [2002]	  EFTA	  Ct	  Rep	  1	  
Case	  E-­‐4/01	  Karlsson	  [2002]	  EFTA	  Ct	  Rep	  240	  
Case	  E-­‐6/01	  CIBA	  [2002]	  EFTA	  Ct	  Rep	  281	  
Case	  E-­‐2/02	  Bellona	  [2003]	  EFTA	  Ct	  Rep	  52	  
Case	  E-­‐3/02	  Paranova	  [2003]	  EFTA	  Ct	  Rep	  101	  	  	  
Case	  E-­‐2/03	  Ásgeirsson	  [2003]	  EFTA	  Ct	  Rep	  185	  
Case	  E-­‐1/04	  Fokus	  Bank	  [2004]	  EFTA	  Ct	  Rep	  11	  
Case	  E-­‐4/04	  Pedicel	  [2005]	  EFTA	  Ct	  Rep	  1	  
Joined	  Cases	  E-­‐5/04,	  E-­‐6/04	  and	  E-­‐7/04	  Fesil	  and	  Finnfjord	  [2005]	  EFTA	  Ct	  Rep	  
117	  
Order	  in	  Case	  E-­‐9/04	  European	  Banking	  Federations	  [2007]	  EFTA	  Ct	  Rep	  74	  
Case	  E-­‐2/06	  EFTA	  Surveillance	  Authority	  v	  Norway	  [2007]	  EFTA	  Ct	  Rep	  164	  
Case	  E-­‐1/07	  Criminal	  proceedings	  against	  A	  [2007]	  EFTA	  Ct	  Rep	  246	  
Case	  E-­‐8/07	  Nguyen	  [2008]	  EFTA	  Ct	  Rep	  224	  
Joined	  Cases	  E-­‐9/07	  and	  E-­‐10/07	  L’Oréal	  [2008]	  EFTA	  Ct	  Rep	  259	  
Case	  E-­‐2/10	  Kolbeinsson	  [2009-­‐2010]	  EFTA	  Ct	  Rep	  234	  
Case	  E-­‐5/10	  Kottke	  [2009-­‐2010]	  EFTA	  Ct	  Rep	  320	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Order	  of	  25	  March	  2011	   in	  Case	  E-­‐14/10	  Konkurrenten.no	   [2011]	  EFTA	  Ct	  Rep	  
266	  
Case	  E-­‐18/10	  EFTA	  Surveillance	  Authority	  v	  Norway	  [2011]	  EFTA	  Ct	  Rep	  202	  
Case	  E-­‐2/11	  STX	  [2012]	  EFTA	  Ct	  Rep	  4	  
Case	  E-­‐13/11	  Granville	  [2012]	  EFTA	  Ct	  Rep	  400	  
Case	  E-­‐18/11	  Irish	  Bank	  [2012]	  EFTA	  Ct	  Rep	  592	  
Case	  E-­‐3/12	  Jonsson	  [2013]	  EFTA	  Ct	  Rep	  136	  
Case	  E-­‐15/12	  Wahl	  [2013]	  EFTA	  Ct	  Rep	  534	  
Case	  E-­‐26/13	  Gunnarsson	  [2014]	  EFTA	  Ct	  Rep	  254	  
European	  Court	  of	  Human	  Rights	  
Golder	  v	  United	  Kingdom	  (1975)	  Series	  A	  No	  18	  
Permanent	  Court	  of	  International	  Justice	  
Acquisition	  of	  Polish	  Nationality,	  Advisory	  Opinion,	  1923	  PCIJ	  Series	  B	  No	  7,	  20	  
Exchange	  of	  Greek	  and	  Turkish	  Populations,	  Advisory	  Opinion,	  1925	  PCIJ	  Series	  B	  
No	  10	  
Jurisdiction	  of	  the	  Courts	  of	  Danzig,	  Advisory	  Opinion,	  1928	  PCIJ	  Series	  B	  No	  15	  
Free	  Zones	  of	  Upper	  Savoy	  and	  the	  District	  of	  Gex,	  Order,	  1929	  PCIJ	  Series	  A	  No	  22	  
Lighthouses	  Case	  between	  France	  and	  Greece,	  Judgment,	  1934	  PCIL	  Series	  A/B	  No	  
62	  
International	  Court	  of	  Justice	  
Interpretation	   of	   Peace	   Treaties	   (second	   phase),	   Advisory	   Opinion,	   1950	   ICJ	  
Reports	  221	  
Legal	   Consequences	   for	   States	   of	   the	   Continued	   Presence	   of	   South	   Africa	   in	  
Namibia	   (South	   West	   Africa)	   notwithstanding	   Security	   Council	   Resolution	   276	  
(1970),	  Advisory	  Opinion,	  1971	  ICJ	  Reports	  16	  
Nuclear	  Tests	  (Australia	  v	  France),	  Judgment,	  1974	  ICJ	  Reports	  253	  
Aegean	  Sea	  Continental	  Shelf,	  Judgment,	  1978	  ICJ	  Reports	  3	  
Territorial	  Dispute	  (Libyan	  Arab	  Jarnahiriya/Chad),	  Judgment,	  1994	  ICJ	  Reports	  6	  
Oil	   Platforms	   (Islamic	   Republic	   of	   Iran	   v	   United	   States	   of	   America),	  Preliminary	  
Objection,	  Judgment,	  1996	  ICJ	  Reports	  803	  
Kasikili/Sedudu	  Island	  (Botswana/Namibia),	  Judgment,	  1999	  ICJ	  Reports	  1045	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Arbitral	  awards	  and	  WTO	  dispute	  settlement	  panel	  reports	  
Rainbow	  Warrior	  Affair	  (New	  Zealand	  v	  France)	  (1990)	  20	  RIAA	  217	  
Report	   of	   the	   Panel,	  European	   Communities	   –	   Customs	   Classification	   of	   Certain	  
Computer	  Equipment	  (LAN	  case),	  WT/DS62/R,	  WT/DS67/R,	  WT/DS68/R	  
National	  Courts	  
Germany	  
1	  BvR	  248/63,	  216/67	  EWG-­Verordnungen	  [1967]	  BVerfGE	  22,	  293	  
2	  BvR	  197/83	  Solange	  II	  [1986]	  BVerfG	  73,	  339	  
2	  BvR	  2134,	  2159/92	  Maastricht	  [1993]	  BVerfG,	  89,	  155	  	  
2	  BvE	  2/08	  et	  al	  Lissabon	  [2009]	  BVerfG	  123,	  267	  	  
Norway	  
Case	  HR-­‐2013-­‐00496-­‐A	  STX	  (Norges	  Høyesterett,	  5	  March	  2013)	  
United	  Kingdom	  
James	  Buchanan	  &	  Co.	  Ltd.	  v	  Babco	  Forwarding	  and	  Shipping	  (UK)	  Ltd.	  [1978]	  AC	  
141	  
Fothergill	  v	  Monarch	  Airlines	  Ltd.	  [1981]	  AC	  251	  
EU	  legislation	  and	  policy	  documents	  	  
Protocols	  annexed	  to	  the	  EU	  Treaties	  
Protocol	   (No	   1)	   on	   the	   Role	   of	   National	   Parliaments	   in	   the	   European	   Union	  
[2012]	  OJ	  C326/1	  
Protocol	   (No	   2)	   on	   the	   Application	   of	   the	   Principles	   of	   Subsidiarity	   and	  
Proportionality	  [2012]	  OJ	  C326/1	  	  
Regulations	  
Regulation	  (EEC)	  No	  1612/68	  of	  the	  Council	  of	  15	  October	  1968	  on	  freedom	  of	  
movement	  for	  workers	  within	  the	  Community	  [1968]	  OJ	  L257/2	  
Council	   Regulation	   (EC)	   No	   2062/94	   of	   18	   July	   1994	   establishing	   a	   European	  
Agency	  for	  Safety	  and	  Health	  at	  Work	  [1994]	  OJ	  L216/1	  as	  amended	  by	  Council	  
Regulations	  (EC)	  No	  1643/95,	  1654/2003	  and	  1112/2005	  
Council	   Regulation	   (EC)	   No	   2894/94	   of	   28	   November	   1994	   concerning	  
arrangements	  for	  implementing	  the	  Agreement	  on	  the	  European	  Economic	  Area	  
[1994]	  OJ	  L305/6	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Regulation	  (EC)	  No	  549/2004	  of	  the	  European	  Parliament	  and	  of	  the	  Council	  of	  
10	  March	   2004	   laying	   down	   the	   framework	   for	   the	   creation	   of	   the	   single	  
European	  sky	  [2004]	  OJ	  L96/1	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